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 From the birth of Christianity to the present day, conscience has been a prominent and 
essentially contentious concept in Catholic moral theology and tradition. Catholic theologians 
have, for centuries, engaged in generating elaborate treatises on the meaning, nature, 
primacy, role and formation of this human capacity for moral choice. 
 The concept has raised bitter, divisive and damaging disputations in history between 
individual conscience and perceived objective truth that is subjective/objective dilemma. For 
instance, Martin Luther unapologetically asserted that:  
I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and my conscience is 
captive to the Word of God. I cannot and will not retract anything, 
since it is neither safe nor right to go against conscience.
1
  
In the presence of ecclesiastical and political leaders, Luther has done no less than to 
proclaim his ‘captive’ allegiance to the doctrine of the primacy of conscience.  In response to 
such a declaration, the Secretary to the Diet of Worms remonstrated with Luther as follows: 
Lay aside your conscience, Martin; you must lay it aside because it is 
in error; and it will be safe and proper for you to recant. Although you 
say the councils have erred you will never be able to prove it, in 




Amongst the issues raised by this response, issues that are dealt with during the course of this 
thesis, are that: (i) the primacy of conscience will inevitably lead to conflict between the 
individual and the institutions, be they political or ecclesiastical; (ii) the expectation that the 
individual conscience should ‘naturally’ defer to the professionalised ‘wisdom’ of the 
institution; (iii) the ecclesiastical management of the erroneous conscience; and (iv) even in 
the event of the institution being in error, it is better that the individual recant his or her own 
                                                             
1
 Martin Luther, Luther’s Works: Career of the Reformer vol. 32, American ed. Ed. George W. Forell 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1958), 112. 
2
 Ibid., 130. 
2 
 
insights and continue to obey institutional edicts because as a minority of one, he or she will 
always find it inherently difficult to satisfactorily establish such institutional error. There are 
some, however, who would argue at this stage that far from exercising the primacy of 
conscience Luther is actually concretising what John Henry Newman was to later describe as 
“the right of self-will.”
3
 Luther’s solitary, but principled stand foreshadows Mahatma 
Gandhi’s assertion that, “In matters of conscience, the law of the majority has no place.”
4
  
 While matters of conscience for today’s Catholics usually enter their consciousness at 
less grandiose levels than those experienced by Martin Luther, such Catholics are nonetheless 
faced with morally demanding struggles. Hence, this thesis examines the Church’s interaction 
with conscience as she seeks to “inform” it as to how Christians should respond in moral 
areas. It also seeks to examine the individual Catholic’s personal conscientious management 
of such modern moral dilemmas from a stance that is informed by the ethical notion of 
intrinsece malum or malum in se,
5
 for example.  
 This thesis undertakes such a task through the ‘lens’ of the thinking, theories and life 
experiences of these theologians: John Henry Newman, Germain Grisez and Linda Hogan, all 
of whom are absolutely convinced of the notion that conscience is a unique but complex 
human phenomenon that cannot and must not be ignored or mismanaged. It is in the light of 
their unique contributions to the study of the notion of conscience, then, that this thesis seeks 
answers to the following questions:  
                                                             
3
 John Henry Newman, “A Letter Addressed to his Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone’s 
Recent Expostulation,” in Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching, vol. 2 (London: 
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1900), 250. 
4
 Cited by Gerald Benedict, The Five-Minute Philosopher: 80 Unquestionably Good Answers to 80 
Unquestionable Big Questions (London: Watkins Publishing, 2011), 80. 
5
 See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1993), nn.80, 81; Nicholas Crotty, 
“Conscience and Conflict” Theological Studies 32 (June 1971), 208-232; Germain Grisez, “Revelation vs. 
Dissent,” in John Paul II and Moral Theology: Readings in Moral Theology No. 10, ed. Charles E. Curran and 
Richard A. McCormick (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998), 35-42. 
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1. What does conscience mean in a pluralist society that is characterised by 
individualism, subjectivism, relativism and very diverse moral values? 
2. What roles, functions or goals do these scholars assign to conscience? 
3. What is their understanding of the term “primacy of conscience”? 
4. How do they relate conscience to the intention and circumstance of human actions? 
5. What is their response, if any, to the prospect of the individual conscience against 
specific moral church teaching? 
6. In the inevitable event of such conflicts occurring, what solutions do these scholars 
proffer in order that they be resolved?  
7. How do these scholars relate conscience to the role of the Holy Spirit (teacher of 
truth)? 
8. To what extent, if any, does their understanding of the notion of a Christian 
conscience differ from, or closely interrelate with, the notions of goodwill and truth?  
9. How do they treat erroneous conscience in terms both of the ‘informing Church’ and 
the ‘misguided’ Catholic? 
AIM AND PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
 As already noted, this thesis draws from ongoing modern theological enquiry 
evidenced in the works of the English clerical scholar, John Henry Newman, the American 
lay moral theologian, Germain Grisez, and the Irish moral theologian, Linda Hogan. As with 
the overall history of the study of conscience, the writings of these scholars on the nature and 
function of conscience reveal distinctive differences in the moral theological views they 
represent. Newman’s general approach to the topic could be characterised as being 
distinctively religious, while Grisez’s is driven by philosophical/conformist principles and 
Hogan’s by the tenets of personalism. The thesis evaluates the usefulness and efficacy of 
these distinctive approaches by examining them in relation to the overall teaching tradition of 






This thesis undertakes two tasks, one minor, the other major. The minor task traces the 
historical evolution of the notion of conscience from pre-Christian, Greek and Old Testament 
times, through to the early Christian eras of Paul, the Apostles and the Church Fathers, and 
thence to the medieval era of Scholars and Thomas Aquinas, before eventually arriving at the 
modern era of Newman, Grisez and Hogan. Having completed the minor task, the major one 
of examining, evaluating and comparing the works of the latter three scholars is then 
undertaken - particularly in terms of their accord or not with each other, and particularly with 
the teaching traditions of the Catholic Church. 
This dissertation takes the form of a qualitative research project which seeks to give 
voice, through their writings, debates and teachings to the three major protagonists, Newman, 
Grisez and Hogan, on the notion of conscience. A qualitative approach was specifically used 
because it can more than adequately cater for the depth and insightfulness of the diverse 
contributions made by these scholars. 
Under this qualitative umbrella, the use of an assessment tool that is sensitive to the 
‘evolving motions’ of history in assessing the development or otherwise of the concept of 
conscience is vital to the development of this thesis. Imaginative, but proper use of such an 
historically sensitive tool serve as an aid in tracing the original sources of the debates and 
conclusions on conscience. Furthermore, it also facilitates an assessment of the extent to 
which such debates, research and studies have served to horizontally progress and/or 
vertically deepen current understandings of conscience from that of the early pioneers.  
 In conjunction with the implementation of the historically sensitive method of 
research, this thesis is also hermeneutic in its approach. Such a research strategy specifically 
enables this dissertation to make interpretations and achieve an in-depth understanding of the 
5 
 
researched phenomenon, namely the elaboration of the notion of conscience by the 
dissertation’s three scholars. Though concerned with subjective interpretations in the research 
of meanings of text, social and cultural phenomena and thinking, the hermeneutic strategy 
contrasts starkly with scientifically-driven research strategies that stress objectivity and 




 Overall, this thesis divides into five chapters, with the first and last serving to 
contextualise and draw conclusions from the contents of chapters two, three and four.  
 Chapter 1 divides into three parts. Part 1 specifically examines the nature of the 
human person, and outlines and discusses fundamental characteristics of humanity, 
such as its origin in God (Image Dei), its composition of body and soul. From such 
human-Divine origins flow those other human characteristics of reason, intuition, 
emotion, imagination, as well as the desire for freedom, community, communication 
and socialisation, sociality, all of which are shown to have implications for the linking 
of morality to the notion of conscience. 
Part II of Chapter 1 focuses on the etymology of conscience itself, its use in the Bible 
and moral theological understanding of the concept in the scholastic era especially in 
the works of Thomas Aquinas.  
Part III of this opening chapter investigates the documents of Vatican II, the  
Catechism of the Catholic Church, John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor, the 
documents of three national Episcopal Conferences, those of Canada, America and 
                                                             
6
 See Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1972) for further details. 
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Ireland, in terms of their potential for either moving the development of the notion of 
conscience further along, or maintaining and strengthening the magisterial status quo. 
Chapters two, three, and four, seek to describe and analytically evaluate the nature, role and 
formation of conscience as outlined in the thoughts, works and teaching of Newman, Grisez 
and Hogan, respectively.  
 Chapter 2 draws on Newman’s insights as elaborated in vast collection of sermons, 
books, treatises, pamphlets and personal correspondence. In addition, the thesis draws 
on commentaries on Newman’s works, commentaries supportive or otherwise, which 
were commenced even as he still lived, and continue unabated to the present day.  
Newman’s work is contextualised in terms of (i) the historical development of the 
‘Catholic’ conscience as outlined in Chapter 1, and (ii) his own experiences of living, 
working and writing and teaching in 19th century England and Ireland, firstly as an 
Anglican minister, then as a Catholic priest, and eventually as Cardinal. Hence, the 
importance of maintaining the ‘historical’ underpinning to this thesis, overall, is well 
evidenced. The life of Newman and the environments in which he lived impacted on 
his beliefs about the nature and role of conscience. 
 In the case of Grisez, in Chapter 3, the thesis shows that although he had written much 
to do with Catholic moral theology, in particular, many opposed to his views chose to 
show their disdain for his ultra-conservative approach by simply not commenting on 
or even challenging those views publicly. However, by examining his input on 
conscience and the great moral debates of his day, e.g. the death penalty, nuclear war, 
and particularly the ongoing debate on Paul VI’s upholding of the Church’s ban on 
the use of contraception, the thesis fleshes out much of Grisez’s staunchly held and 
aggressively proposed views on the nature of conscience. 
7 
 
It is to be noted that it was through both contextualising and historicising Grisez’s 
works, in terms of his own life and of his contributions to some of the major moral 
debates of his time, that the thesis managed to garner some rich pickings from his 
works on the nature and function of conscience and its relationship to the traditional 
teachings of the Church.   
 As with Grisez in Chapter 3, so it is with Hogan in Chapter 4. Very little contextual 
information about the life of Linda Hogan was to be found, so the thesis focused on 
critically analysing her work in terms of the traditional teaching of the Church as 
outlined in Chapter I, and in terms of the personalist approach as outlined by both 
herself and other ‘independent’ personalist commentators. In this way, an effort was 
made at maintaining the historical underpinning that has been much in evidence in the 
previous chapters. 
 Chapter five attempts to critically evaluate, compare, and synthesise the 
understandings of conscience as individually enunciated by Newman, Grisez and 
Hogan. Specifically, this closing chapter seeks to identify areas of accord and/or 
discord in the thinking of the three scholars, before assessing them in relation to 
current and traditional Church teaching. In so doing, the chapter seeks to examine the 
implications and challenges of their joint or disjointed thinking for Church teaching.  
This chapter also compares the individual, social and institutional implications and 
challenges of the theorising and teaching of the three scholars for the individual 
conscience. In so doing, it captures their joint emphasis on the necessity for each 
individual to assume personal responsibility in the relationship between him or herself 
and their conscience. It also succeeds in capturing an area of fundamental discord 
between two of the scholars and the third. 
8 
 
It can therefore be validly claimed that this thesis - and its design - elaborates and 
critically analyses the contribution of Newman, Grisez and Hogan to furthering the 
understanding of the nature and function of conscience, not only amongst Catholics, but 

























The Human Person and the Concept of Conscience 
Introduction 
 Marvelling at the human person who is at the centre God’s creation, the Psalmist 
exclaims: 
[A]h, what is man that you should spare a thought for him, the son of 
man that you should care for him. Yet you have made him little less 
than a god, you have crowned him with glory and splendour, made 
him lord over the work of your hands, set all things under his feet.
1
 
Yet, finding such Divine consideration for the human person almost incomprehensible, the 
Psalmist feels constrained to ask: “Yahweh, what is man, that you should notice him? A 
human being, that you should think about him?”
2
 These passages point to the essential nature 
of the human person a nature very dear to God for its value but apparently complex. Vatican 
II expresses this idea thus: 
But what is humanity? People have put forward, and continue to put 
forward, many views about humanity, views divergent and even 
contradictory. Sometimes they either set it up as the absolute measure 




On the other hand, the Council also declares: 
People nowadays are becoming increasingly conscious of the dignity 
of the human person; a growing number demand that people should 
exercise fully their own judgment and responsible freedom in their 
actions and should not be subjected to external pressure or coercion 
but inspired by a sense of duty. At the same time, to prevent excessive 
                                                             
1
 Psalm 8:4-5. All biblical citations are from The Jerusalem Bible, Popular ed. (London: Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1968).  
2
 Psalm 144:3. Like the Psalmist, Job expressed: “What is man that you should make so much of him, subjecting 
him to your scrutiny, that morning after morning you should examine him and at every instant test him? Will 
you never take your eyes off me long enough for me to swallow my spittle? Suppose I have sinned, what have I 
done, you tireless watcher of mankind” (Job 7:17-19). 
3
 All citations from Vatican II documents are from Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations, A 
Completely Revised Translation in Inclusive Language, ed. Austin Flannery (Dublin: Dominican Publications, 
2007). See Gaudium et Spes, n.12. 
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restriction of the rightful freedom of individuals and associations, they 
demand constitutional limitation of the powers of government.
4
 
This signifies that there are certain fundamental aspects of humanity necessary for moral 
living. It is in this context that we will examine the principal elements that make up the moral 
person. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part will discuss the basic attributes 
of the human person. The second part will address the notion of conscience and the third part 
will focus on conscience as elaborated by Vatican II and post Vatican II documents.  
PART I 
1. The Human Person  
 Various disciplines seek to comprehend and discover the origin, nature and end of the 
human person and the universe. Thus, the human person is variously described as a created, 




 spiritual, moral or free being. 
The uniquely “moral” attribute links the human person to the concept of “conscience”. The 
key question then is: what makes the human person moral? 
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1.1. A Created Being 
 In Christian tradition, the human person is moral because we are first and foremost 
God’s creature.
7
 In the Genesis’ creation narrative only the human person is said to be created 
in God’s “image” (tselem) and “likeness” (demuth).
8
 Philip Edgcumbe Hughes affirms thus: 
“Man, whatever his affinities with the animal realm, is radically distinguished from all other 
earthly creatures by the fact that he alone has been created in the divine image and is intended 
by constitution to be a godly creature.”
9
 Theologians throughout history show the dynamic 
development of the doctrine of the Imago Dei, and its moral implications for the human 
person.
10
 However, they differ in their explanations of the doctrine of the Imago Die. The 
International Theological Commission points this out clearly: 
Patristic and medieval theology diverged at certain points from 
biblical anthropology, and developed it at other points. The majority 
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of the representatives of the tradition, for example, did not fully 
embrace the biblical vision which identified the image with the totality 
of man. A significant development of the biblical account was the 
distinction between image and likeness, introduced by St. Irenaeus, 
according to which ‘image’ denotes an ontological participation 
(methexis) and ‘likeness’ (mimêsis) a moral transformation (Adv. 
Haer. V,6,1; V,8,1; V,16,2). According to Tertullian, God created 
man in his image and gave him the breath of life as his likeness. While 
the image can never be destroyed, the likeness can be lost by sin 
(Bapt. 5, 6.7). St. Augustine did not take up this distinction, but 
presented a more personalistic, psychological and existential account 
of the imago Dei. For him, the image of God in man has a Trinitarian 
structure, reflecting either the tripartite structure of the human soul 
(spirit, self-consciousness, and love) or the threefold aspects of the 
psyche (memory, intelligence, and will). According to Augustine, the 




Rather than seeking explanations for these differences, it is far more fruitful to treat them as 
varying, but not mutually exclusive insights into the same doctrine. Certainly Patristic 
insights greatly influenced such scholastic theologians as Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure and 
Meister Eckhart, as is evidenced in the document which states:  
In Thomas Aquinas, the imago Dei possesses an historical character, 
since it passes through three stages: the imago creationis (naturae), 
the imago recreationis (gratiae), and the similitudinis (gloriae) (S.Th. 
I q.93 a.4). For Aquinas, the imago Dei is the basis for participation in 
the divine life. The image of God is realized principally in an act of 
contemplation in the intellect (S.Th. I q.93 a.4 and 7). This conception 
can be distinguished from that of Bonaventure, for whom the image is 
realized chiefly through the will in the religious act of man (Sent. II 
d.16 a.2 q.3). Within a similar mystical vision, but with a greater 
boldness, Meister Eckhart tends to spiritualize the imago Dei by 




Views and perspectives on the presence of Imago Dei in human beings have historically 
progressed through the Patristic and Scholastic eras to the present day where they continue to 
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be developed and elaborated. Such current updating is particularly demonstrated, for 
example, by Millard J. Erickson a Baptist theologian, who summarises the theological 
insights in terms of the substantive, relational and functional views of the Imago Dei.
13
  
1.1.1. The substantive view  
 The substantive view is considered to be ontologically driven since it seeks to 
establish the fundamentally distinct entities which compose the notion of the Imago Dei.
14
 
Josef Fuchs explains that the proposition that God’s image resides in the human person 
derives from Holy Scriptures. He goes on to claim that while the Imago Dei was not 
destroyed by original sin, the likeness was. This lost likeness, however, he sees as being 
regained for us by Christ in baptism and claims that it is this sacramental encounter which 
‘remakes’ us, in our living flesh, like unto God. As for the Imago Dei, which was not 
destroyed by Original Sin, Fuchs suggests that it is through the indwelling of this image in us, 
that we gain a true knowledge of God and of the requirements for a moral life, the acceptance 
of which, he believes, will result in our developing a genuine love for God. Maintaining that 
this “has been the dominant view”
15
, Erickson points to such distinct human entities as bodily 
make up, physical features, with possible metaphorical significance, and the presence of 
psychological or spiritual qualities as he attempts to sum up the ‘substantive’ view thus: 
[T]he image is identified as some definite characteristic or quality 
within the make-up of the human. Some have considered the image of 
God to be an aspect of our physical or bodily make-up [and] . . . some 
see the image as being a physical feature with metaphorical import. 
That the human walks upright, for example, is taken as a symbol of 
the moral uprightness or righteousness of God, or of humans’ 
relatedness to God. . . . More common substantive views of the image 
of God isolate it in terms of some psychological or spiritual quality in 
                                                             
13
 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2
nd
 ed., (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1998), 518. 
14
 Josef Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Approach, trans. Helmut Reckter and John A. Dowling (Dublin: 
Gill and Son, 1965), 61-62. 
15
 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 520. 
14 
 
human nature, especially reason. Indeed, the human species is 
classified biologically as Homo sapiens, the thinking being.
16
  
This substantive view is rooted in both Catholic and Protestant traditions of Christianity.
17
 
Erickson concludes that all substantive views agree that the image of God is located within 
humans as a natural quality or capacity.
18
 This conclusion suggests that conscience is a 
special image of God in the human person. Interestingly, Geoffrey W. Bromiley believes that 
the “most widely accepted” meaning of the “image” of God centres on the notion of our 
capacity to make moral decisions.
19
 So, could it be that God’s “image” and “likeness” is in 
fact what is called conscience? 
1.1.2. The relational view 
 Unlike the substantive views, which maintains that the Imago Dei is a natural capacity 
or faculty within the human person, the relational view presents the concepts of the image 
and likeness in terms of human relationships. Advocates of this view argue that we come to 
possess the “image” of God through developing a relationship with Him
20
 or with our 
neighbours. Erickson, for example, writes that advocates say “Humans can be said to be in 
the image or to display the image when standing in a particular relationship.”
21
 The doctrine 
of the Trinity is essential and influential to this view because of the relationality of the triune 
God, hence “theologians in this category identify the image in terms of a person’s various 
relationships.”
22
 Cardinal Ratzinger, elaborates this view thus: 
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To be the image of God implies relationality. It is the dynamic that 
sets the human being in motion toward the totally Other. Hence it 
means the capacity for relationship; it is the human capacity for God. 
Human beings are, as a consequence, most profoundly human when 
they step out of themselves and become capable of addressing God on 
familiar terms. Indeed, to the question as to what distinguishes the 
human being from an animal, as to what is specifically different about 
human beings, the answer has to be that they are the beings that God 
made capable of thinking and praying. They are most profoundly 
themselves when they discover their relation to their Creator. 
Therefore the image of God also means that human persons are beings 
of word and of love, beings moving toward Another, oriented to 
giving themselves to the Other and only truly receiving themselves 
back in real self-giving.
23
 
Here, Ratzinger describes this relational image as ongoing, dynamic, and a work in progress, 
rather than a static, substantive entity. Ratzingar’s use of such “mobile” images as: “motion 
toward the totally Other”, “step[ping] out of themselves” to become fully human; and “beings 
of word and love . . . moving toward Another,” for example, graphically represent his 
perception of the dynamic nature of the relational Imago Dei. Such dynamisms are also 
expressed in the Image Dei accounts of Emil Brunner, Martin Buber and Karl Barth, who are 
strong proponents of this relational viewpoint.
24
  
1.1.3. The functional view 
This view is based on 
the idea that the image is not something present in the makeup of the 
human, nor the experiencing of relationship with God or with fellow 
humans, but the image consists in something one does. It is a human 




This view is linked to the Divine command in Genesis 1:27 for human beings to exercise 
dominion over the universe and to increase and multiply. Beck and Demarest suggest that the 
                                                             
23
 Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, ‘In the Beginning. . .’ 47-48. 
24
 See Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 254-26; James R. Beck and Bruce A. Demarest, The Human 
Person, 143; Dietrich Bonheoffer, Creation and Fall Temptation: Two Biblical Studies (New York: Touchstone, 
1997) . 
25
 Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 527. 
16 
 
functional view considers God’s image and likeness as the human’s exercise of dominion 
over the created order and lower creatures.
26
 
While the concept of the Imago Dei generates divergent discourses, one truth does 
come out clearly from the apparently contradictory viewpoints, namely, that the human 
person originates from God and reflects God.
27
 For Beck and Demarest, such a claim 
influences the dignity and value of human beings, their personal and social ethics, the 




The moral theologian, Richard M. Gula notes that to claim “that the human person is 
the ‘image of God’ is first a theological statement before it is an anthropological one.”
29
 As a 
theological statement, it deals with the relation between God and the human person and 
shows how the human person can be properly understood in relation to our Creator.
30
 As an 
anthropological statement, Gula maintains that created in the image and likeness of God, “we 
all share in a common human condition which has a common end, namely God. It also says 
that human dignity does not depend on human achievements, but on divine love.”
31
 Thus, it 
can be claimed that, as a theological or an anthropological statement, the doctrine imputes a 
moral character to the human person. The Theological Commission clarifies the fruitful 
outcome of this ‘marriage’ of disciplines, when it maintains that the doctrine of Imago Dei 
links anthropology with moral theology by showing that, in his very 
being, man possesses a participation in the divine law. This natural 
law orients human persons to the pursuit of the good in their actions. It 
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follows, finally, that the imago Dei has a teleological and 
eschatological dimension which defines man as homo viator, oriented 
to the parousia and to the consummation of the divine plan for the 
universe as it is realized in the history of grace in the life of each 
individual human being and in the history of the whole human race.
32
 
Here we see the functional imago Dei doctrine and its interpersonal relationship with the 
human being outlined in dynamic terms. Its function has both personal and universal 
implications, for the present and throughout time; it is concerned with the day-to-day living of 
the moral life, but also with final or ultimate causes; and while accompanying the human 
being in his or her daily role of homo viator, it also awaits him at the final outcome, when 
“the glorious establishment of the messianic kingdom . . . [will] bring all men to the definitive 
order of justice, love and peace.”
33
 
1.2. Composed of Body and Soul 
 Ratzinger’s reflection on creation illustrates how the dust or clay combined with the 
breath of life make the human person a composite being.
34
 His reflection affirms that the 
human person is a union of body and soul. Irenaeus and the Catechism refer to the union as 
material and spiritual,
35
 or corporeal and spiritual.
36
 Classical philosophical inquiries about 
human nature, especially by Plato and Aristotle, recognised this composition and 
distinguished between the body and the soul.
37
 
 The influence of Plato on Christian scholars is evident in Augustine as he asks: 
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What is man? Is he both of these? Or is he the body only, or the soul 
only? For although the things are two, soul and body, and although 
neither without the other could be called man (for the body would not 
be man without the soul, nor again would the soul be man if there 
were not a body animated by it), still it is possible that one of these 
may be held to be man, and may be called so. What then do we call 
man? Is he soul and body, as in a double harness, or like a centaur? Or 
do we mean the body only, as being in the service of the soul which 
rules it, as the word lamp denotes not the light and the case together, 
but only the case, yet it is on account of the light that it is so called? 
Or do we mean only the mind, and that on account of the body which 
it rules, as horseman means not the man and the horse, but the man 
only, and that as employed in ruling the horse?
38
 
Here, Augustine appears to answer his own question as to the possibility of the body or the 
soul only being “held to be man.” Thus, he argues that while a lamp is the case, it cannot be 
considered to be truly a lamp until it produces light. He makes a similar argument with the 
notion of a horseman, who remains simply a man until he fulfils his purpose, and rules his 
horse. And so it is with body and soul, where the body cannot be considered to be man in the 
absence of soul, nor can the soul be man in the absence of a body to animate. This body-soul 
relationship, however, is not considered by Augustine to be a relationship of equals. He 
leaves us in no doubt that the soul and not the body is the giver of life as he declared: 
Now if we ask what is the chief good of the body, reason obliges us to 
admit that it is that by means of which the body comes to be in its best 
state. But of all the things which invigorate the body, there is nothing 
better or greater than the soul. The chief good of the body, then, is not 
bodily pleasure, not absence of pain, not strength, not beauty, not 
swiftness, or whatever else is usually reckoned among the goods of 
the body, but simply the soul. For all the things mentioned the soul 




Augustine also states in the dialogue with Evodius: “If you wish a definition of what the soul 
is, I have a ready answer. It seems to me to be a certain kind of substance, sharing in reason, 
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fitted to rule the body.”
40
 John of Damascus echoes Augustine’s description of this unequal 
relationship as he maintains that the soul is  
a living substance, simple and incorporeal, of its own nature invisible 
to bodily eyes, activating an organic body in which it is able to cause 
life, growth, sensation, and reproduction. It does not have the mind as 
something distinct from itself, but its purest part, for, as the eye is to 
the body, so is the mind to the soul. It is free, endowed with will and 
the power to act, and subject to change, that is, subject to change of 
will, because it is also created
41
  
 Thomas Aquinas, who was influenced by Aristotle’s thinking, while objecting to 
Plato’s position says: 
Plato and his followers asserted that the intellectual soul is not united 
to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to moveable, for 
Plato said that the soul is in the body ‘as a sailor in a ship.’ Thus, the 
union of soul and body would be by contact of power . . . But this 
doctrine seems not to fit the facts. For, as a result of contact of power, 
a thing unqualifiedly one does not arise, as we have shown; whereas 
from the union of soul and body there results a man. On Plato’s 
theory, then, a man is not one unqualifiedly speaking, nor, 
consequently, is he a being unqualifiedly speaking, but a being by 
accident. In order to avoid this, Plato asserted that man is not a being 
composed of body and soul, but that the soul itself using the body is 
man; just as Peter is not a thing composed of man and clothes, but a 
man using clothes. 
42
  
He refuted Plato’s position as he declared that 
animal and man are sensible and natural realities. But this would not 
be the case if the body and its parts were not of the essence of man 
and animal; rather, the soul would be the entire essence of both, 
according to the aforesaid position; for the soul is neither a sensible 
nor a material thing. It is, therefore, impossible that man and animal 
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Accordingly, the human person is a unitary creature, a single reality. Within this unitary 
creature and single reality, both elements, soul and body, need each other to arrive at truth 
and to gain knowledge.
44
  
However, as with Augustine and John of Damascus, whose teaching assign a superior 
executive function to the soul, so too with Aquinas. In his Summa, he devotes much of his 
treatises on man to considerations about the soul, which he treats as an intellectual function. 
However, a closer inspection of Aristotle’s thinking sees the philosopher assigning an active 
role to the body in the soul-body union. He suggests that while such a composition of soul 
and body gives us a special identity, it does so in the sense that the body provides information 
through “sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch,”
45
 which, in turn, enables the soul to interpret and 
direct us on what to do. The importance of such a human composition, especially in terms of 
the contribution by a more active body to the overall effectiveness of the union, is summed 
up by Richard Gula:  
[Our] bodies are not accessories. They are not merely something to 
house our subjectivity, but essential to our being integrated persons. 
We express ourselves as the image of God through our bodies. What 
concerns the body inevitably concerns the whole person, for our 
bodies are essential to being human and to relating in human ways. 
The fact that we have bodies affects every expression of ourselves in 
relationship. The affection of love, for example, needs to be expressed 




Of course, there are those for whom these debates are futile, because they see no role for the 
soul in the life of man, since they deny the existence of any such entity. David Hume, for 
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1.3. Endowed with Intellect (Reason) 
 Plato and Aristotle, who distinguished between the body and soul, associate human 
intellect with the soul. Through the intellect, the soul is said to perceive, understand and make 
judgement. In Aquinas’ theology of the human person, he gives priority to the intellect and 
asserts: 
Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but 
as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is 
said, Let us make man to our image and likeness, it is added, And let 
him have dominion over the fishes of the sea (Gen i.26). Now man 
excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according 
to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said 
to be according to the image of God.
48
 
Aquinas is pointing out that God’s image and likeness resides in human beings as the 
capacity for intelligence. Such characteristics not only give humans “dominion” over all other 
creatures and inanimate objects, but they also serve to hold them responsible for their actions. 
Thus, to the extent that reason holds people to account for their actions, to that extent 
morality is embedded in that rational capacity. It is obvious therefore, that human intellect 
specifically enables us to attain the knowledge that makes us moral. 
 Aquinas illustrates how this specific human characteristic leads to knowledge. He 
states accordingly: 
Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers . . . For to 
understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to 
advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an 
intelligible truth. And therefore angels who, according to their nature, 
possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to 
advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and 
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without mental discussion. But man arrives at the knowledge of 
intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and 
therefore he is called rational.
49
 
René Descartes on his part demonstrates the primacy of this special faculty as he states that 
simply by knowing that I exist and seeing at the same time that 
absolutely nothing else belongs to my nature or essence except that I 
am a thinking thing, I can infer correctly that my essence consists 
solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing.
50
 
So without rationality, moral life will be demeaned because as Aquinas says, “human morals 
depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals 
are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discarded from 
reason.”
51
 Aquinas’ discussion on the powers of the soul led to questions relating to 
conscience. This enabled him to discuss vividly the notion of conscience which will be 
expounded in Part II of this chapter. 
1.4. Freedom 
 Freedom is another essential feature of the human person but how free the human 
person is remains unclear since according to the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Man is 
born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”
52
 Certain human experiences, both past and 
present, help us understand the real meaning of freedom. The Exodus experience, whereby 
God led his “Chosen People” from slavery to freedom, may be considered a wonderful 
example of what it means to be both rescued and freed. For Christians, the Incarnation of the 
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Word is considered to be the ultimate rescue, the definitive freeing, in that the Son of God 
took on human form to lead us from the slavery of sin to freedom. 
 However, because of the wrong and immoral choices made by some, many continue 
to experience the absence of freedom. Thus, a world chorus of suffering human voices can be 
heard in modern times pleading for economic freedom, freedom of the press, freedom of 
speech, academic freedom, freedom of religion, and, most importantly, freedom of 
conscience. The importance of freedom of conscience is highlighted by the fact that to 
interfere with such a right serves to produce “Prisoners of Conscience” namely, human 
beings wrongly persecuted or even jailed because of their conscientious beliefs. It can be 
argued that it is only when we either experience or witness the unjust denial of freedom that 
we can appreciate the fundamental significance of Rousseau’s assertion, especially in terms 
of the interrelatedness between the concepts of freedom and of conscience.  
 Aristotle states that “a free man exists who is such for his own sake, and not for the 
sake of another.”
53
 Freedom is therefore so fundamental to human persons that they possess it 
as of their natural right to self-fulfilment, and not as a gift bestowed on them by a powerful 
other. Aquinas considering our fundamental human freedom in terms of the exercising of 
free-will, believes that God’s image in human beings can be expressed in terms of human 
freedom,
54
 such that to be free is to be able to act out of one’s own volition.
55
 
As rationality differentiates us from inanimate things or brutes so also does free-will. 
Aquinas in this regard declared: 
In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act 
without judgement; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner 
all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but 
not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, 
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judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free 
judgment, because it judges, not from reason but from natural instinct. 
And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But 
man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he 
judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this 
judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural 
instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he 
acts from a free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to 
various things . . . And as forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary 
that man have a free will.
56
 
The root of freedom is therefore our free-will. Speaking from an existential viewpoint, which 
strongly emphasises, concrete individual existence, subjectivity, individual freedom and 
choice, Karl Rahner maintains that freedom is one of the existential features of the human 
person. Such that individual freedom, for Rahner, is a basic condition for the possibility of 
human beings moving through and beyond the finite and taking up a position towards God 
himself. Freedom, he maintains, enables us to take responsibility for whatever stance we take, 
since it is mediated in time and space, in our materialism and in our history. Moving from the 
individual to the social, however, Rahner believes that, for any society to be guided by 
conscience, freedom must be guaranteed. This does not mean absolute freedom for people do 
whatever they like, but a freedom to express oneself as a human person. Speaking 
existentially, rather than theoretically or theologically, he emphasises, that freedom must be 
exercised in this world, because if not, it will be of no interest to anyone, and neither would it 
be freedom as Christianity understands it.
57
 
 In his understanding of freedom as a positive state which can enable human beings to 
take up a position towards God himself, Karl Rahner echoes the teaching of the Church. Take 
the following statement for the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, for instance, 
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where freedom is interpreted as that state which enables the human being, not only to become 
friends with his Creator, but to enter His very life: 
By creating man free, God imprinted on him his own image and 
likeness. Man hears the call of his Creator in the inclination and 
aspiration of his own nature toward the Good, and still more in the 
word of Revelation, which was proclaimed in a perfect manner in the 
Christ. It is thus revealed to man that God created him free so that by 
grace man could enter into friendship with God and share his life.
58
 
Human freedom is therefore a divine gift that enables human persons to choose the 
communion which the triune God offers them as their ultimate good.
59
 The Church reminds 
us implicitly that the exercise of freedom carries duties as well as responsibilities. A 
reflection on freedom, by John Paul II, however, suggests that being in this state, involves 
much more than carrying out duties and exercising rights. Rather, he reiterates the spiritual 
stance of Vatican II, which teaches that  
It is only in freedom that man can turn to what is good. . . Genuine 
freedom is an outstanding manifestation of the divine image in man. 
For God willed to leave man in ‘the power of his own counsel,’ (Sir 
15:14), so that he would seek his Creator of his own accord and would 
freely arrive at full and blessed perfection by cleaving to God.
60
  
 Finally, Gula’s words summarise how essential “being in the state of freedom” and 
exercising it responsibly is to the moral and spiritual well-being of every human person, and 
also to the possibility of their actualising their potential as images of God:  
Freedom is so central to the moral life that without it we cannot 
properly speak of being moral persons at all. If we are beyond 
freedom, then we are beyond morality. Morality pertains to those 
areas of our lives where freedom is possible and enables us to 
actualise our potential as the image of God. . . We can speak of 
freedom in the moral life in two ways as basic freedom, or freedom of 
self-determination, and as freedom of choice. In either sense of the 
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word, freedom is so necessary that we can only be morally good not 




1.5. A Social Being 
 We have already alluded to the fact that being created in the image and likeness of 
God carries implications for the human being in terms of human relationships. Not only are 
we directed towards God, but we are also directed towards others, since we have been created 
as communal rather than as isolated beings. Such a relational concept is well illustrated in the 
words of the pastoral theologian, Veronika Prüller-Jagenteufel: 
In a Christian view we are not monads, existing for oneself and only 
secondarily relating to others; we are beings in relation and we exist 
because we are related. We are ourselves because we are in relationships. 
Relatedness is the foundational reality. Christian theology tries to find 
words for that by speaking about the divine as a triune God. The 
Christian belief pictures God, the foundation of foundations, not as a 
monolith, a lonely potentate, nor as an impersonal flow of energy, but 
as personal relationship, as a community. Therefore relatedness is the 
way of being a person.
62
  
That relatedness is vital to the freedom of human beings to achieve their full human, social and 
divine potential, is well borne out in Thomas Merton’s No Man is an Island, a book titled after 
John Donne’s graphic description of the social essence of human beings: “No man is an 
Island, entire of itself, every man is a part of the continent, a part of the main.”
63
 Hence, the 
human person is relational. Gula expressly remarks that exercising our right to live 
relationally carries duties and responsibilities as well as rights and privileges. He declared: 
As relational, social beings, human persons need to live in social 
groups with appropriate structures which sustain human dignity and 
the common good. The moral significance of this aspect of being 
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human is that we must respect the laws and institutions of society 
which promote communal living and uphold the common good. The 
relational dimension of being human reaches its high point in our 
relationship to God in faith, hope, and love.
64
  
 The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith’s Libertatis Conscientia emphasised the 
inherent social nature of the human being and its implications for living freely and 
relationally. Specifically, this document identifies some of the vital communities in which 
people participate and the potential that such engaging has for each individual to actualise his 
or her free personality: 
God did not create man as a ‘solitary being’ but wished him to be a 
‘social being.’ Social life therefore is not exterior to man: he can only 
grow and realize his vocation in relation with others. Man belongs to 
different communities: the family and professional and political 
communities, and it is inside these communities that he must exercise 
his responsible freedom. A just social order offers man irreplaceable 
assistance in realizing his free personality.
65
 
 Thus far, we have looked at the fundamental nature of the human person through the 
eyes of ancient Greek Philosophy, Scripture, Church Fathers, Aquinas and his Scholastic 
peers from the Middle Ages, the magisterium, and scholars such as Richard Gula, Thomas 
Merton, and Veronica Pruller-Jagenteufel. It is necessary to get a broad sweep of insights into 
the multi-faceted nature of the human being, because it is out of such a compound nature that 
an understanding can be achieved of the nature and role of conscience. 
PART II 
2. Conscience and its Theological Development 
 We now examine the concept of conscience itself and the manner in which it has been 
historically studied and understood; its intrinsic nature and whether it can be deemed to be an 
innate or acquired function of the human person; how it is essentially linked with the human 
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person, and the extent to which people can be morally certain about its dictates. Finally, 
reference to morality suggests the need to investigate how the concept of conscience has 
come to hold both moral and theological implications, particularly from the Christian 
perspective. 
2.1. Conscience in Pre-Christian Greek and Roman Thinking  
 Greek and Roman writings provide the etymology for the English word ‘conscience’ 
namely the Greek word, συνείδησις (syneidesis), and the Latin word, conscientia. Concerning 
these two words, Philippe Delhaye remarks that “in the Greek writers closer to the Christian 
era, the use of συνείδησις is very infrequent,” and that, “in Latin, Cicero is the first to use it 
widely.”
66
 Interestingly, in light of the close connection between Judaism and early 
Christianity, Delhaye also points out that “Hebrew has no term equivalent to συνείδησις.”
67
 C. 
A. Pierce traces the origin and use of the word συνείδησις back to the New Testament
68
 and 
illustrates how the word is attributed to Stoic philosophy in the Roman Empire before the 
beginning of Christianity which emphasised ethics as the main field of knowledge.
69
 Pierce 
cites different writers who attributed the origin of the word συνείδησις to the Stoics. He notes 
such apparently supportive comments as the “Stoics invented it’; ‘made much use of it’; or 
‘first gave it a philosophical importance.’”
70
 He affirmed however, that “such an assertion is, 




 In his analysis, Pierce states explicitly that  
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 at best, from Stoic writers can be offered in 
evidence: of these the most vital, as it was attributed to Epictetus, is of 
doubtful origin. Even were Epictetus [is] the author beyond all 
possible doubt, it must still be remembered that he was about four 
years old at the time of St. Paul’s death. If either influenced the other, 
it can only be the earlier [that] influenced the later. In any case, 
further, the fragment would still be a ‘sport’, having no proper place in 
the Epictetean corpus, or, as will be seen, in Stoic writing in general. 
For if it be argued that the remains of Epictetus are fragmentary, and 
that the argument from silence is thus weaker than usual, an earlier, 
more ‘orthodox’ Stoic provides the best answer. Chrysippus 
predicates συνείδησις of every living creature – not exclusively of man 
– and means by it, as might be expected in a philosopher, simply the 
awareness or consciousness which a creature has of its own 
composition. No moral element whatsoever is implied.
73
  
Although the fragments of Chrysippus and Epictetus presented as evidence of the Stoic origin 
of the word συνείδησις, do not appear to have any moral element, either explicitly or 
implicitly attached to them, Pierce states that there is a moral element to the use of the word 
συνείδησις in another Stoic quotation ascribed to the Roman Emperor, Marcus Aurelius (121 
AD–180 AD).  
Such a moral element is however present in the third and last item of 
evidence that can be offered in support of the assertion of a Stoic 
origin for the Pauline συνείδησις. Marcus Aurelius closes a long list of 
virtues, and an exhortation to men to aspire to them, with the words: 




Pierce observes that in this extract “συνείδησις itself is not used here, nor does the passage 
hint at any definition of the derivative epitaph which replaces it. The word here, therefore, 
has no technical significance for the author. In any case the lateness of his date makes him a 
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 Thus, he concludes that the use of the word συνείδησις in the New Testament 
did not originate from Stoic philosophy.
76
  
 The Welsh Congregationalist leader and academic theologian, W. D. Davies, outlines 
the historical use of the word thus: 
The term first occurs in a passage in Democritus (460-361 B.C.), 
whose works were praised by Cicero. The passage reads: ‘Some men, 
not knowing the dissolution of mortal nature, suffer wretchedly 
throughout their life time from distress and fear because of their 
consciousness of the evil-doing in their lives, making false 
speculations about the time after death.’
77
 . . . The term next appears 
in Chrysippus, a celebrated Stoic philosopher born ca. 280 B.C.
78
 . . . 
After Chrysippus we again note the appearance of ‘conscience’ 
(συνείδησις) with moral significance in Wisd. Sol. 17:10, and in 
Philodemus (50 B.C.) Rhetoric 11.40, and in Dionysius of 
Helicarnassus (died 7 B.C.) Antiquities VIII.1.3, where conscience 
disturbs Coriolanus in his approach to the Volsci, whom he had often 
treated brutally in battle. In Diodorus Siculus (a contemporary of 
Julius Caesar and Augustus) we find the term at IV.65.7, but here also 
it may mean ‘consciousness.’
79
 
Davies maintains that: “In all these passages, with the exception of that by Chrysippus, the 
Stoic, συνείδησις has a moral reference.”
80
 Davies believes that there was infrequent use of 
the word by Greek authors unlike conscientia by the Latin authors. He narrates that Cicero 
made use of the term conscientia seventy-five times
81
 and that Latin usage by Roman authors  
lend no support to the view that conscience was peculiarly Stoic 
doctrine, while they suggest that, in its Latin form at least, conscience 
was a concept much more employed in literary circles . . . Latin 
Writers reveal that the term ‘conscience’ was known to Epicuranism, 
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Stoic origin of συνείδησις seems to be inconclusive; however, what is evident is its use in 
Greek and Latin writing.
83
 So then what does the term συνείδησις mean? Davies delineates its 
meaning thus: 
The term ‘conscience’ (συνείδησις) is to be understood in conjunction 
with a number of similar words and phrases, which are sometimes 
used interchangeably. These are τὸ συνειδότος, τὸ συνειδός, συνέισις, 
αὑτῷ συνιστορεῖν τι, αὑτῷ συνεδέναι τι. All these stem from the verb 
σύνοιδα, which means ‘I know in common with.’ It usually implies 
knowledge about another person, which can be used in witness for or 
against him. Hence σύνοιδα came to mean ‘I bear witness.’ Of 
particular importance is the phrase αὑτῷ συνεδέναι τι, which means 
‘to share knowledge with oneself,’ ‘to know oneself,’ to be a witness 
for or against oneself,’ because συνείδηνσιϛ (like τὸ συνειδόϛ and 
συνέισιϛ) is its substantival equivalent. The necessity for finding a 
single substantive to convey the meaning of a phrase would be natural. 
It is also easy to see why συνείδησις and συνειδός, because of their 
greater similarity in form and sound to αὑτῷ συνειδέναι τι, would be 
more likely to be chosen for this than συνέσις. It is more difficult 
understand why συνείδησις should have been preferred to συνειδός. 
Possibly συνείδησις is the wider term, including all sense of the verb 
σὑνοιδα, while συνειδός was restricted to ὲμαυτῷ σὑνοιδα. But this is 
uncertain. By the time of the N.T, in any case, συνείδησις was most 




From its Greek source, conscience apparently refers to a form of knowledge or self 
awareness, which would seem to place this faculty within the domain of the rational. 
However, Davies’ earlier comment about conscience being that which “disturbs Coriolanus in 
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his approach to the Volsci, whom he had often treated brutally in battle,”
85
 suggests that the 
word has an affective component as well. In her study, “A History of the Western Idea of 
Conscience” Helen Costigane, refers not only to the rational component present in the main 
word of the group mentioned by Davies, namely synoida, but also to the presence of both 
moral and social components in the word συνείδησις. She explains: 
Syneidesis itself generally refers to the goodness or badness of specific 
actions performed by an individual, but one who is in relationship 
with others. So, in the Greek fragments, these actions are seen mainly 
in terms of a breach of civic responsibilities, such as receiving bribes, 




The Latin equivalent conscientia which is a direct transliteration of συνείδησις is coined from 
con (with) and scire (to know).
87
 Both terms mean “the state (or act) of sharing knowledge or 
else simply knowledge, awareness, apprehension—even something like mind or thought.”
88
 
The Australian Catholic Philosopher, Eric D’Arcy, associates the usage of both terms with 
“judicial conscience”, and declared that such was the understanding of conscience among the 
Greek and Latin writers before St. Paul.
89
 D’Arcy cites D. F. Ast, and H. Deman to show how 
Greek writers attached moral connotation to its usage: 
The noun συνείδησις does not occur in Plato. However, the verb 
συνείδέναι is found nineteen times. Of these only one seems to have a 
moral flavour: in the Symposium, Alcibiades says, ‘Socrates makes me 
conscious that I cannot deny the duty of doing his bidding.’ In one 
other place, strangely not listed by Ast, the verb clearly bears a moral 
connotation. In the Republic, Cephalus says, ‘The man who is 
conscious of no wrong looks forward with cheerfulness and hope.’ 
Aristotle did not use the noun συνείδησις, and according to Deman it is 
not found again in its moral usage until just before Christian era.
90
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D’Arcy makes the point that “we find in pre-Christian writers what we have called judicial 
conscience. After an action is performed conscience passes moral judgment upon it.”
91
 Thus, 
from the moral perspective, this is the first way conscience was understood. 
 Despite D’Arcy’s conclusion, Delhaye’s remarks that “Before συνείδησις and 
conscientia came into common use—the Greek and Latin languages used the words φρήν, 
ϰρῆ, ϰαρδία and cor to designate the same psychological facts”
92
 signify that other terms 
expressed the moral connotation of conscience. Timothy E O’Connell affirms this as he states 
that “research into Greek and Latin literature has revealed before the emergence of the 
technical term those languages ordinarily expressed the idea of conscience by the word 
‘heart’ (kardia and cor).”
93
 
2.2. Conscience in Scripture 
 As referred to earlier by Delhaye, Hebrew has no technical term for conscience, as 
was the case with Greek and Latin for much of what could be considered the Stoic era.  In 
fact, the earliest references to anything that could resemble the Greco-Latin understanding of 
consciences present themselves in the form of inferences. Thus, the image of the “Tree of 
Knowledge of good and evil” presented in Genesis account of “The Fall of Man (see Genesis 
2:17) can be decoded to mean “conscience”. The actual account of the Fall, itself, (see 
Genesis 3:1-24), wherein God is portrayed as the Divine Punisher of both Adam and Eve for 
their disregard of his command not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge of good and evil, 
suggests an awareness of conscience as a Divinely created inner judicial process. The people 
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of the early Old Testament understood and apparently accepted that breaking divinely 
instituted laws must necessarily require punishment of some form. We see further acceptance 
of this in the Genesis account of the murder of Abel by his brother Cain (Genesis 4:1-18), 
wherein God is seen to pronounce a curse on Cain for this murder, and where Cain accepts 
that he will have to become a vagrant and a wanderer of the earth as punishment for his act of 
fratricide. His acknowledgement that others will seek to kill him for this deed (“whoever 
comes across me will kill me” Genesis 4:14), further portrays him as operating out of an 
innate sense of right and wrong, since a law against murder had yet to be established in the 
Old Testament. Once again the presence of some form of understanding of conscience can be 
inferred from this Old Testament story.  
However, some theologians, biblical and literary historians maintain that it is an 
investigation into the scriptural concept of “heart” which gives both a clearer and a broader 
picture of the Hebrew understanding of the concept of conscience. O’Connell is unambiguous 
about this. He remarks that the Septuagint translates the Hebrew term leb (heart) in Job 27:6 
with the Greek syneidesis and the Vulgate translate Ecclesiastes 7:22 with the Latin word 
conscintia. Hence, the starting point for understanding the notion of conscience is with the 
term “heart.”
94
 The significance of this claim is demonstrated by Rudolf Schnackenburg, who 
asserts that, “For the Semites, the heart was the seat of thoughts, desires and emotions and 
also of moral judgment, taking over the functions we ascribe to the conscience, for which 
there is no specific word in the gospel.”
95
 Evidence for the use of the term “heart” to denote 
conscience is also offered by W. Dupré who cites an ancient Egyptian text which reads: “The 
‘heart’ is an excellent witness; one must not transgress its words.”
96
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The Greek, Latin or Hebrew worlds and their spheres of influence broadened the 
significance of the concept of conscience. Many other cultures like the Hebrew use the word 
heart to denote what conscience means. For instance, up to the present day, among the Igala 
people of Nigeria,
97
 the word for conscience is ẹdọ.
98
 This word can ordinarily mean “chest”, 
“mind” or “heart”, and therefore, its reference and its meaning will depend on the context in 
which it is being used. For instance, while the statement, ẹdọ awumi means “I have a chest 
pain or my chest is paining me”, the phrase, ẹdọ ẹgbiti, meaning “strong mind or will, or 
hardened mind or brave heart” is often used to refer to a person with a strong conscience. 
Igala people often make use of the proverb: “ẹdọ kia kpigbe ọwọ tun” which literally 
interprets as “the hand cannot reach out to stop the heart that spanks.” This Igala proverb 
conveys the notion that the pang of a guilty conscience cannot be stopped or extinguished.
99
 
These examples, from different cultures, serve to demonstrate the significance of what 
the term “heart” carries in terms of its relationship to the concept of conscience. Therefore, it 
is in light of the notion of “heart” as an analogous term to conscience, that we will explore 
the notion of conscience in the Bible. 
2.2.1. The Old Testament and Conscience 
 The term “heart” in Scripture reflects what “conscience” connoted in Greek and Latin 
thinking and literature, as do the terms “mind” and “loin”. R. C. Dentan writes that in 
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Hebrew, there are three words for “heart”: לבב ,לב, and לבה with no distinction in meaning. 
These words are usually translated in LXX as καρδία (occasionally νοῦϛ or δίάνοια).
100
 
O’Connell outlines major biblical references to the “heart” that stand for conscience 
accordingly:  
The psalmist urges us: ‘O, that today you would hear his voice: harden 
not your hearts’ (Ps 95:7f). Repeatedly we are told that ‘God probes 
the heart’ (e.g. Jer 11:20, 17:10; Prov 21:2; ps 26:2). Twice in the 
Book of Samuel, King David is described as a man whose ‘heart 
misgave him’ (1 Sam 24:6; 2 Sam 24:10), The Book of Ecclesiastes 
(7:22) justifies an assertion by declaring that ‘you know in your heart’. 
. . And Proverbs often urges us to ‘take it to heart’ (eg. 2:1; 3:1; 4:21; 
7:3). In the Book of Job, the beleaguered hero responds to his critics 
with the simple statement ‘My heart does not reproach me’ (27:6).
101
 
These references enumerated by O’Connell point to the Hebraic experience and 
understanding of the concept of conscience. It is not surprising then that “heart” in some 
passages is translated with the Greek and Latin terms, συνείδησις and conscientia. 
2.2.2. New Testament Usage and Understanding 
 The Hebrew notion of heart which reflects the Greek concept of conscience is also 
presented in the New Testament. Davies suggests that the term “heart” in Mark 3:5; Matthew 
6:23; Luke 12:57; John 15:20-21 could at least be regarded as a roundabout way to refer to 
conscience, or even be considered to be identical with the notion of conscience.
102
 But with 
regard to the Greek term syneidesis, Pierce asserts that St. Paul introduced it into Christianity, 
and made use of it in New Testament more often than any other writer.
103
 Paul’s background 
placed him in a better position to use this Greek term. He was a well-educated Jew of the 
diaspora and a Roman citizen, was raised in the Greek speaking city of Tarsus in Asia Minor. 
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This enabled him to adopt the term syneidesis.
104
 However, since Paul was not writing for 
professional philosophers, the meaning of “Pauline” syneidesis may only be established in 
terms of its everyday, commonplace, colloquial usage.
105
 
So how did Paul understand and apply this Greek term? According to Bernard Häring:  
While using the concept syneidesis, Paul intends to convey the 
message of the prophets about the heart of man wherein God makes 
known his law of love. Syneidesis is brought explicitly into the context 
of the essential message that God writes his law into man’s heart. It is 
not only a question of remorse or of an accusing conscience; the heart 
or syneidessis argues the case “on either side”. Today it is more and 
more agreed among biblical theologians that Paul uses the word 
syneidesis also to point out the constructive, creative quality of the 
human heart to grasp what is good and right.
106
 
D’Arcy on his part notes that although Paul introduced the term synderesis “in an 
entirely new sense . . . he did not abandon the old one.”
107
 D’Arcy elaborates on this “entirely 
new sense” and distinguishes it from “the old one” as follows: 
St. Paul . . . introduces an entirely new phase in the history of the term 
‘conscience’ in moral theory, and two new features characterize his 
use of it. First, it is to play a directive role before action takes place. In 
the pagan writers conscience did not appear on the scene until after 
the action was performed, and its role was purely judicial; but in St. 
Paul, conscience is credited with a legislative function, and it induces 
an obligation in the proper sense. Second, conscience is infallible: the 
directions it issues may be mistaken.
108
 
This passages suggests that the Pauline syneidesis plays a directive or legislative function 
within the individual before an action takes place, which then goes on to induce an 
appropriate sense of obligation within that individual. Furthermore, although the directions 
issued by this function may be mistaken, the function, in and of itself is considered to be 
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 D’Arcy distinguishes this new Pauline thinking from that of pagan writers, for 
whom “conscience” had a purely judicial function, in that it does not appear on the scene 
until after an action is performed. It makes this appearance in order to judge the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of that action, generally in terms of the individual’s 
civic duties or obligations. However, since Paul retains both old and new usages, he sees 
conscience in terms of both its legislative and judicial roles.
110
 
Paul links the Hebrew notions of “heart” and “law” to his evolving sense of 
“conscience”,
111
 as is evidenced in his epistle to the Romans: 
[P]agans who never heard of the Law but are led by reason to do what 
the Law commands, may not actually ‘possess’ the Law, but they can 
be said to ‘be’ the Law. They can point to the substance of the Law 
engraved on their hearts—they can call a witness, that is, their own 




This passage graphically expands Paul’s notion of conscience with such images as the 
substance of the Law engraved on the hearts of all human beings, be they Christian, Hebrew 
or Pagan. Therefore, he regards all human beings as witnesses who can testify on behalf of 
both the prosecution and the defence through an “inner mental dialogue”. In the words of 
Pierce and Delhaye, the Pauline concept of conscience is establishing itself as a norm for all 
human beings; it can assume the roles of both witness and judge; and finally, as a law of the 
human heart, it can determine the morality of actions.
113
 
 Paul also points to his personal belief in the presence of a Divine component in the 
workings of conscience. Such a presence enables Paul, in Romans 9:1 to assure his readers 
that because his conscience functions “in union with the Holy Spirit,” its testimony can be 
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regarded as a source of truth. In Corinthians 1:12 conscience is a testifier to the truth: “our 
conscience tells us it is true.” Here, it is seen not only to testify to the truth of Paul’s claim, 
but also to assess the morality of his behaviour in terms of his display of such divinely 
instituted qualities as reverence and sincerity, while interacting with his fellow human beings. 
Thus, the Pauline use of conscience possesses a Divine component; on the one hand, it 
demonstrates a capacity to assess the behaviour of human beings in terms of their fulfilment 
of Divine requirements.  However, in 1Corinthians 4:4, Paul, with the words: “It is true that 
my conscience does not reproach me, but that is not enough to justify me,” reminds us that 
there is a fallible component of conscience, namely the humanness of its operator. It is the 
presence of this human factor that prompts Delhaye to observe that conscience can become 
“susceptible to weakness; [and] can be corrupted, edified or influenced in evil, compelled by 
bad examples.”
114
 The Pauline solution to the possibility of such negative, human influence is 
almost predictable, namely to urge his readers to maximise the Divine input to their 
consciences, as can be seen in his letter to the Corinthians. 
2.3. Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel and Christian Usage of Conscience 
 Christian application of συνείδησις and conscientia, was mostly influenced, in its 
theological development, by the writings of the early Church Fathers. The Church Fathers, 
themselves, in drawing their thinking on conscience from philosophy and scripture, followed 
on from St Paul’s introduction of the Greek term into the New Testament.
115
 Although 
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Rudolf Hofmann maintains, that: “The rich foundations in [the] NT for a theological teaching 
on conscience were not followed up by the Church Fathers,”
116
 he believes that variety of 
single statements and individual opinions from such early Church Fathers as Tertullian, 
Origen, Chrysostom, and Augustine, simply functioned as single comments on the role of 
religion in conscience.
117
 Tellingly, Hofmann found no specific treatise on their individual 
understanding of the concept of conscience, an omission which seems to suggest that these 
writers did not engage in debates about the concept. 
 It was Jerome’s interpretation of the fourth vision of the Prophet Ezekiel that 
eventually propelled and transformed the concept of conscience. In his visionary prophecy, 
Ezekiel claimed to have seen four living creatures coming out of a cloud, with each creature 
shaped like a man, but each having four faces, namely that of a human, a lion, an ox and an 
eagle (see Ezekiel 1:4-28). Interpreting this vision, Jerome stated: 
Most people interpret the man, the lion and the ox as the rational, 
emotional and appetitive parts of the soul, following Plato’s division, 
who calls them the logikon and thymikon and epithymetikon, locating 
reason in the brain, emotion in the gall-bladder and appetite in the 
liver. And they posit a fourth part which is above and beyond these 
three, and which the Greeks call synteresin: that spark of conscience 
which was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain after he was 
turned out of Paradise, and by which we discern that we sin, when we 
are overcome by pleasures or frenzy and meanwhile are misled by an 
imitation of reason. They reckon that this is, strictly speaking, the 
eagle, which is not mixed up with the other three, but corrects them 
when they go wrong, and of which we read in Scripture as the spirit 
‘which intercedes for us with ineffable groaning’ (Romans 8:26). ‘For 
no one knows what a man is really like, except the spirit which is in 
him’ (1Corinthians 2:11). And, writing to the Thessalonians, Paul also 
entreats for it to be kept sound together with soul and body 
(1Thessalonians 5:23). However, we also see that this conscience is 
cast down in some people, who have neither shame nor insight 
regarding their offences, and loses its place, as is written in the book 
of Proverbs: ‘When the wicked man reaches the depths of sin, he 
doesn’t care a damn.’ (Proverbs 18:3.) So they deserve to be told: 
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Jerome’s interpretation of the face of the fourth creatures, the eagle, is his fundamental 
contribution to the philosophical and theological understanding of conscience.
119
 In his 
interpretation, Jerome imports the Greek notion of συνείδησις “syneidesis” re-designated as 
“synteresin” or in some translations, “synderesis” which he called the spark of conscience 
(scintilla conscientiae).
120
 Delhaye is of the view that Jerome did not import the term 
“synderesis,” but that it was introduced in error by a copyist into Jerome’s work.
121
 The term 
however became significant in later theological development. Jerome seems to distinguish 
between the Greek συνείδησις “syneidesis” and Latin “conscientia” by specifically 
designating “synderesis” as “the spark of conscientia.” He appears to create a distinction by 
which one heralds the other thus the Greek and Latin words may not possibly be used 
interchangeably. Furthermore, when Jerome attributes a superior position to the fourth part of 
the creatures’ face, the eagle, in that he interprets it as being “above and beyond [the other] 
three,”
122
 we can assume he is referring to synteresis. When he acknowledges, however, that 
conscience can be negatively affected or influenced by certain human failings, in that it can be 
“cast down” or lose its place, as in Proverbs 18:3, we can then assume that he is referring to 
“conscientia” specifically. 
                                                             
118
 Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel 1.7, Latin text in Patrologia Latina, vol. 25, col. 22. Translation is taken 
from Timothy C. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980) 
79-80 [hereafter, Jerome, Commentary on Ezekiel]. 
119
 Douglas Kries who examined Jerome’s Commentary traces the source of interpretation to “Origen’s text such 
as the Homilies on Ezekiel and the Commentary on Romans.” As a result, Kries acknowledged the significance 
of Jerome’s interpretation thus: “It is fair to say that Jerome’s preservation of the Platonic interpretation of the 
first three faces of Ezekiel’s vision — clever as that interpretation was — had relatively little influence on later 
Christian thought. Jerome’s preservation of Origen’s theory of conscience, however, has had a deep and long-
lasting influence on subsequent Christian reflection, for Origen bequeathed to Christianity a sophisticated 
anthropology in which the Pauline conscience is elevated far beyond soul and achieves an extraordinary 
independence from soul. . .“ See “Origen, Plato, and Conscience (Synderesis) in Jerome’s Ezekiel Commentary” 
Traditio 57 (2002) 79 and 82-83.  
120
 See Jerome’s text and also M. B. Crowe, “The Term Synderesis and the Scholastics,” Irish Theological 
Quarterly 23 (1956): 151-164; 228-245; Philippe Delhaye, The Christian conscience, 25-26, 87, 107-8; Michael 
Bertram Crowe, The Changing Profile of the Natural Law (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977),123-27; Bernard 
Häring, The Law of Christ: Moral Theology for Priests and Laity, vol. 1, trans. Edwin C. Kaiser (Cork: The 
Mercier Press, 1963), 139. 
121
 See Philippe Delhaye, The Christian Conscience, 108. 
122
 See Jerome’s text. 
42 
 
Although Jerome attributes a superior place to conscience in Ezekiel’s facial quartet, 
of man, lion, ox and eagle, he cites St. Paul’s to the Thessalonians (1Thessalonians 5:23), to 
assert that synteresis, as the “spark of conscience” stands in need of being “kept sound 
together with soul and body”
123
 a developmental need, which indicates that both synteresis 
and conscientia have need of the human as well as of the Divine. But although it is in need of 
care, and although it may be “cast down”, or “lose its place”, or even be “misled by an 
imitation of reason,” Jerome attributes an element of indestructibility to this “spark of 
conscience.” Specifically, he detects this attribute, for example, in Cain’s response to his act 
of fratricide, when he noted that the spark “was not even extinguished in the breast of Cain 
after he was turned out of Paradise.” On the other hand, however Jerome claims that wicked 
people can cease to have any consciences at all. Such contrasting does indeed suggest that he 
is distinguishing between conscience as either synteresis or conscientia.
124
 
  With regard to the functions of conscience, Jerome noted its power of discernment, in 
its capacity of synteresis, a power that enables it “to discern that we sin, when we are 
overcome by pleasures or frenzy and meanwhile are misled by an imitation of reason.”
125
 
Furthermore, he observes that when assuming  its superior role as synteresis, a role which 
prevents him from “getting mixed up with the other three,” the eagle can exercise the power 
of correction over the human, the lion and the ox, if they assume inappropriate rational, 
emotional or appetitive roles.
126
 Drawing directly from Paul’s epistles to the Romans and to 
the Corinthians, Jerome also explains why the conscience, as synteresis, can be portrayed as a 
spirit with powers of mediation or intercession, between the Creator and man as His creature. 











 Finally, Jerome issues a warning to those who choose the ultimate step of totally 
ignoring the promptings of their synteresis or conscience, to the effect that this spiritual entity 
possesses the power to shame. As evidence for this function of inducing shame, Jerome cites a 
quite colloquial proverb to the effect that “When the wicked man reaches the depths of sin, he 
doesn’t give a damn” (Proverbs, 18:3), a moral aberration, which in Jeremiah’s down-to-earth 
opinion, merits that the offender be strongly reminded that he has acquired the face of a 
prostitute, because he has refused “to blush” (Jeremiah 3:3).
127
 
While it still remains unclear as to whether Jerome deliberately sought to differentiate 
between conscience as synteresis (synderesis) or as conscientia, one thing is certain, that with 
the advent of this Church Father, the Greek word συνείδησις (syneidesis) or synteresis or 
synderesis seems to contrast with the Latin word conscientia. Such a contrast, a corollary of 
Jerome’s textual interpretation of Ezekiel’s vision, would come to dominate the subsequent 
late medieval, Scholastic discourse on conscience.
128
 
3. Conscience in the Middle Ages 
 The term conscience, as examined thus far from the Greco-Roman tradition, made use 
of a single synonymous word συνείδησις (syneidesis) or conscientia. The concept, viewed 
from either Greek or Latin roots, respectively, deals essentially with moral knowledge. 
However, synderesis as the spark of conscience (scintilla conscientia), in Jerome’s writings 
initiated a serious theological debate on the concept of conscience in the “Middle Ages”.
129
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Thus theologians of that time
130
 according to Michael Despland “use the notion of conscience 
primarily to elaborate a theory of moral judgment. In their systematic construction, the 
scholastics used two terms to designate two functions.”
131
 The two terms we will examine in 
this section. 
 Peter Lombard (c. 1100 – 1160), the Italian theologian and bishop of Paris whose 
book Sententiarum libri quatuor (Four Books of Sentences) earned him the title of Magister 
Sententiarum, was the first Middle Age thinker to refer to Jerome’s passage on conscience. 
Lombard’s reference may be considered the beacon which initiated thinkers after him not 
only to seriously debate the concept of conscience, but also to produce treatises on such a 
concept.
132
 Subsequently, discussions on synderesis and conscientia appeared in Scholastic 
commentaries, “university seminars (written up as Debated Questions) and textbooks 
(Summae).”
133
 Such intense academic interest eventually gave the study of conscience a 
standard form, within which theologians of the period specifically identified and 
distinguished between synderesis and conscientia. Häring elaborated on the development 
thus: 
Scholastic theology distinguished clearly between synteresis and 
conscientia, that is, between conscience as permanent power or 
disposition and its activity in the particular dictate of conscience. . . . 
conscience is looked upon as the innate urge of the spiritual person to 
preserve himself . . . The special seat of conscience, according to 
many scholastics, especially the great mystics, is scintilla animae, the 
inmost center of the soul, or the spark of the soul, which is least 
accessible to the contamination of sin.
134
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 Subsequently, great scholars such as: Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, 
Bonaventure, Henry of Ghent, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas went on to produce 
elaborate treatises on the nature of conscience. Specifically, these scholars addressed issues 
centred on the concepts of synderesis and conscientia and the relationship between both. This 
resulted in the emergence of two distinctive views. The first understood conscience from the 
perspective of human-will (voluntaristic). Proponents of this view include: Alexander of 
Hales, Henry of Ghent and Bonaventure. The second group understood conscience from the 
perspective of human intellect (intellectualistic). Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas are 
the major advocates expounding this view.
135
  
 These two perspectives drew upon the thinking of Philip the Chancellor on 
conscience. He produced a thesis, which mainly discusses the topic of synderesis.
136 
According to M. B. Crowe, Philip the Chancellor was the most important of the early writers 
on synderesis. He notes that Philip “virtually created the formal treatise on the subject, 
[while] later writers like the author of the Summa attributed to Alexander of Hales, Odo 
Rigaldus, St. Albert the Great, Peter of Tarentaise and even St. Thomas Aquinas, did little 
more than discuss, and in the same order, the same questions raised by Philip.”
137
 It is clear, 
then, that the significance of Philip the Chancellor in terms of the development of the concept 
of conscience during the Middle Ages cannot be overstated.  
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 In Philip’s major work, Summa de Bono,
138
 which influenced philosophers and 
theologians of his own and later eras, he begins his treatise on conscience with Jerome’s text. 
In the third question of his discussion, for example, he asserts: “synderesis plus the reason for 
a free choice makes conscientia right or mistaken, and conscientia sticks more to the side of 
reason; synderesis itself, however, which is the spark of conscientia, as blessed Gregory says, 
is not mistaken.”
139
 It is through such reasoning, wherein he proposes that conscientia can 
sometimes be right and sometimes wrong, while synderesis will always remain right, that he 
seeks to clearly distinguish between them. Before he made the above distinction, he had 
described synderesis as a dispositional potentiality, which means that it is not and cannot be 
hampered from actualisation in and of itself.
140
 Philip sees synderesis affecting free choice by 
telling it to do good and to refrain from evil, but strictly at a general level. Therefore, in his 
view, it moves human beings to the general good because it is not in itself directed to 
particular good deeds but to the general good present in them. This would suggest that it is 
called synderesis, “because it is directed to what is rationally good.”
141
 It is for this reason 
that synderesis was explicitly identified as a provider of general truths to conscientia, in order 
that the latter could apply them to specific issues.  
 The Franciscan Scholar, Bonaventure, was one of those influenced by Philip the 
Chancellor’s views on synderesis and conscientia. Bonaventure, in his Commentary on Peter 
Lombard’s ‘Books of Judgments’ 2.39,
142
 began his enquiry with the nature of conscientia. 
He identified it within the rational faculty, stating that it is part of practical reason because it 
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is connected to the performance of actions.
143
 Synderesis, on the other hand, he identified 
with the affective or desiring part of the soul or the human person. It is what stimulates the 
human person to do good. More specifically, he portrays synderesis as a power for 
discovering the truth of very general practical principles, while conscientia is portrayed as 
being concerned with the application of these general principles to either general or particular 
situations.
144
 While Bonaventure regards both parts as innate, he describes synderesis  as 
being incapable of error or of being lost to any individual, no matter how morally depraved 
that person may be. On the other hand, he claims that conscientia can be mistaken because of 
the misapplication of very general principles through ignorance, faulty reasoning or 
ignorance. D’Arcy presents a concise summary of Bonaventure’s views as follows: 
Both reason and will have a part to play in our moral life, and each of 
them needs to be given some direction or inclination towards moral 
goodness. Conscience does this for reason; synderesis does it for the 
will, where it resides as a ‘natural bias’ inclining the will towards 
moral goodness, as indeed dispositions do incline the faculty where 
they reside to elicit acts of certain kind. ‘Synderesis is that which 




It is not intended for this thesis to go into any further detail on Bonaventure’s views. However 
it is worth noting their obvious derivation from the thinking of Philip the Chancellor; and that, 
in terms of the activities of both its components, he portrays conscience as being a dynamic 
faculty. Finally, commenting on the connections between the works of both Philip the 
Chancellor and Bonaventure, Timothy C. Potts observed that Bonaventure did not distinguish 
between the terms synderesis and conscience  in the same way as Philip, but that, in fact, he 
considers Bonaventure’s work to be more complicated.
146
 Our attention will now focus on to 
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St. Thomas Aquinas, whose teachings have long been considered the most dominant influence 
in Catholic Moral thinking.
147
 
3.1 Thomas Aquinas  
 Aquinas drew on the writings and thinking of Aristotle, the Church Fathers, the early 
Scholastics, and above all the Scriptures to promote an intellectualistic view of conscience, 
which held that conscience was a device or faculty for distinguishing right from wrong 
through the use of reason and so was a natural part of a mental activity, which provided an 
individual with moral guidance.
148
 Aquinas’ teaching remains a classical landmark in the 
systematic study of the nature of conscience. 
3.1.1 Aquinas’ Specific Teaching on Conscience 
 Aquinas’ distinctive treatment of conscience is contained in his: Commentary on the 
Sentences, Questiones Disputatae de Veritate and the Summa Theologica.
149
 In these works, 
he gave greater clarity to the understanding of the nature of conscience in general through the 
distinction he made between Greek and Latin terms for conscience.  
3.1.2 Synderesis and Conscientia 
 Aquinas’ elaboration of the concept of synderesis in Debated Questions on Truth 
(Questiones Disputatae de Veritate),
150
 deals with questions on its nature and functions. 
Firstly, he asks if synderesis is a potentiality or a disposition; secondly, he investigates the 
possibility of synderesis erring or being wrong; and thirdly, he wonders if synderesis could be 
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extinguished in some people. In the Summa he asks: whether synderesis is a special power of 
the soul, completely distinct from any other powers possessed by human beings.
151
 
According to Aquinas, synderesis is a capacity, disposition or natural habit (habitus) 
of practical reason which enables human beings to apprehend general principles for human 
action.
152
 He bases this assertion on the argument that since synderesis involves apprehension 
of the truth without inquiry, both in theoretical and practical matters, that apprehension must 
be the source of subsequent apprehension, and therefore must be dispositional. It is a 
disposition that is concerned “with the basic principles of behaviour, which are the general 
principles of natural law.”
153
 In this way, Aquinas link synderesis to reason, human action 
and the natural law. In the Summa, Aquinas reiterates his teaching on synderesis accordingly:  
Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative 
things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore 
we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative 
principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative 
principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, 
but to a special habit, which is called the understanding of principles, 
as the philosopher explains. Wherefore the first practical principles, 
bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a 
special natural habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is 
said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first 
principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have 
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Aquinas is quite unequivocal here in his assertion that synderesis is not a special power of the 
soul but rather “a special habit” or a first practical principle bestowed on human beings by 
nature, and as such should be considered “a special natural habit.” Specifically, Aquinas sees 
the notion of habit to be inherent in the process of discovery and judgment that human beings 
will repeatedly engage in when synderesis, as a first practical principle, operates within their 
natures to “incite to good,” or “to murmur at evil.” The very nature of conscience in the sense 
of synderesis is that it is the human person’s natural ability for moral principles.  
With regards to whether synderesis can do wrong, err or be mistaken in its judgement, 
or whether it can be extinguished, Aquinas is unequivocal in his findings. He declared that, as 
a natural disposition or habit, synderesis does not do wrong, err or make mistakes in its 
judgment
155
 and that, as a dispositional light it cannot be extinguished.
156
 Its permanency in 
the life of human beings is underlined by the fact that it is considered to be the first rule for 
human actions.
157
 However, with regard to its extinguishing, Aquinas cites two extreme 
examples, (extreme insofar as they are deemed to be outside the normal range of human 
nature) where such could occur. Aquinas sees the possibility for the extinguishing of 
synderesis occurring where its actualisation has been obstructed and, secondly, where  the use 
of free choice or any use of reason has been seriously compromised due to injury to body 
organs responsible for reasoning.
158
  
Synderesis derives its significance and importance in the study of conscience from the 
fact that it is deemed to be a receptacle for the precepts of Natural Law, precepts which are 
deemed to be the first principles of human action. Furthermore, as human beings seek to 
participate in the Eternal Law, they do so in a context wherein they already possess 
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awareness, through synderesis, of the first general principle of law.
159
 Therefore, up to the 




 Just as with synderesis, Aquinas’ investigation of the nature of conscientia is done out 
in a question and answer format. So we find him posing five questions in this respect.
161
 
These questions concern whether conscientia is a potentiality, a disposition or an 
actualisation and if conscientia can ever be mistaken. In the Summa, however, he seeks to 
ascertain if conscientia is a power of the soul.
162
 
 With regard to conscience and power, Aquinas responds that: “Properly speaking 
conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those 
things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience.”
163
 In an attempt 
to clarify his description of conscience as an act, he elaborates two ways in which this can be 
understood. The first centres on the etymology of the word itself, especially on the notion of 
applying knowledge to something. He states that conscience “according to the very nature of 
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the word . . . implies the relation of knowledge to something. It may be resolved into cum alio 
scientia, that is, knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to 
something is done by some act.” Not surprisingly, then, Aquinas concluded that “from this 
explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.”
164
 
 In another explanation for the above conclusion, Aquinas identifies specific verbs and 
three contexts in which they have been used with reference to conscientia as another basis for 
concluding that it be considered an actus: 
For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, 
torment, or rebuke. And all these follow from the application of 
knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in 
three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or 
not done something . . . and according to this, conscience is said to 
witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge 
that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, 
conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by 
conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and 
in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment.
165
 
Here, Aquinas assigns different verbs or actions denoting action to specific contexts, all of 
which leads him to conclude: “Now, it is clear all these things follow the actual application of 
knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act.”
166
 
 Aquinas’ identification of conscience as an act helps clarify the nature and roles of 
conscience. Conscientia is now seen to be essentially connected with the level of the 
application of the principles of synderesis through recognition, witness and judgement of 
actions that have already been performed or are going to be performed; a process which 













Aquinas establishes a major and fundamental difference between synderesis and 
conscientia through his responses to the following two questions, firstly, as to whether 
synderesis can do wrong, and secondly, as to whether conscientia can be mistaken.
168
 His 
response to the question concerning synderesis not only asserts that it can do no wrong, but 
also serves to distinctly separate it from conscientia, as can be seen in the following excerpt:  
In order that there can be some rightness in human deeds, there must 
be some enduring principle which has unchangeable rightness and by 
reference to which all deeds are tested, such that this enduring 
principle resists everything evil and give assent to everything good. 
This is what synderesis is, whose job is to murmur back in reply to 
evil and to turn us towards what is good. Hence, it is to be admitted 
that it cannot do wrong.
169
 
Basically this response contends that synderesis “cannot do wrong” because it possesses an 
“unchangeable rightness” through which it assesses all deeds, and so must be considered an 
“enduring principle.”  
Aquinas’ response to an observation in Jerome’s Commentary on Ezekiel to the effect 
that synderesis can do wrong or be “cast down” not only serves to support his conclusion in 
the above excerpt from QDV but also to distinguish it from conscientia: 
Syndersis is never cast down in its generalisation, but it can admit of 
error in the application of a general principle to something particular, 
as a result of incomplete or invalid deduction, or of some false 
assumption. Thus [the commentary] does not just say that synderesis 
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is cast down, but that conscientia, which applies the general 
judgments of synderesis to particulars, is cast down.
170
 
 In that response, Aquinas is maintaining that Jerome’s conclusion that (synderesis 
“can admit of error” when it attempts to apply general principles to particular situations), is 
one that should actually be applied to conscientia, because Aquinas, himself, sees such a 
process as its distinct task. He further underscores this distinction in a response he makes to 
his question as to whether conscientia can be mistaken, where he clearly asserts that: “I have 
argued that conscientia is no other than the application of knowledge to some special 
actualisation. Mistakes can occur in two ways in this application: first, because what is 
applied contains a mistake; second, because it is not applied properly.”
171
 Aquinas is at pains 
to emphasise that the general information or knowledge possessed by synderesis is applied by 
conscientia and also by higher and lower reason to particular situations. Furthermore, he 
maintains that since the judgement of synderesis is general, it cannot be applied without the 
involvement of some particular premise, which, in his estimation, is sometimes provided by 
the higher or lower forms of reason present in conscientia. This leads Aquinas to conclude 
that if a mistake occurs in the higher or lower forms of reason, then conscientia can be 
mistaken, but not so with synderesis, because its judgement are general. Finally, in his 
response to Argument 7, Aquinas not only substantiates his conclusion regarding the 
possibility of conscientia being mistaken, but also serves to plainly distinguish between it and 
synderesis: “Conscientia is not the first rule of human deeds but, rather synderesis. 
Conscientia, however, is like a rule which is itself rule-governed (regula regulate), so there is 
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3.1.3 Does Conscientia Bind? 
 Having examined the specific nature of conscientia and distinguished between it and 
synderesis, Aquinas turned his attention to the extent to which conscientia itself can be 
considered to be binding. In fact, over the historical course of the debate on this topic, three 
possible responses were supported, namely that it was always binding; that it was sometimes 
binding; that it was never binding.
173
 Although he found this issue to be tricky and 
complicated, he crucially concluded that “Without any doubt, conscientia binds,” and 
explains that it acquires this force because of the “imposition of necessity.” He elaborates that  
binding can have a place when the necessity is imposed by something 
else. There are two kinds of necessity which can be imposed by 
another agent. The first is a necessity of force, through which 
everything absolutely necessary has to do with what is determined by 
the action of the agent; the other should not strictly be called force but, 
rather, inducement. This is a conditional necessity, that is, deriving 
from the goal; e.g. there may be a necessity imposed upon someone 
that, if he does not do such-and-such, he will not obtain his reward.  
The first kind of necessity, which is that of force, does not occur in 
changes of the will, but in bodily things, because the will is naturally 
free from force. The second kind of necessity can be imposed upon 
the will, e.g. it may be necessary to choose such-and-such, if a certain 
good is to result, or if a certain evil is to be avoided. . . . But just as the 
necessity of force is imposed on bodily things by some action, so 
conditional necessity is imposed upon the will by some action. The 
action, by which the will is changed, however, is the command of a 
ruler or governor. . . . Thus the command of something which governs 
is related to binding bodily things by the necessity of force. But the 
action of a bodily agent only introduces necessity into another thing 
by its forceful contact with the thing on which it acts; so someone is 
only bound by the command of a ruler or lord, too, if the command 
reaches him who is commanded; and it reaches him through 
knowledge. 
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Hence no one is bound by an injunction except by means of 
knowledge of that injunction and, therefore, anyone who is not 
capable of being informed, is not bound by the command; nor is 
someone who is ignorant of an injunction of God bound to carry out 
the injunction, except in so far as he is obliged to know the injunction. 
But if he is neither obliged to know it nor does know it, he is in no 
way bound by the injunction. Just as in bodily matters a bodily agent 
only acts through contact, so in spiritual matters an injunction only 
binds through knowledge . . . since an injunction only binds in virtue 
of knowledge and knowledge only in virtue of the injunction. Hence, 
since conscientia is no other than the application of what is known to 
an actualisation, it has been shown that conscientia is said to bind by 
the power of divine injunction.
174
 
As can be seen, Aquinas, in his elaboration of necessity, distinguishes between two types. 
The first he describes as the necessity of force, whereby all factors relevant to the 
actualisation of an action are determined by the actions of an external agent. The second type, 
which he labels the necessity of inducement, or conditional necessity, he claims derives from 
the actual goal of the action, which can be determined by “the command of a ruler or 
governor”. The first type of necessity is depicted as arising, not from the will, which, of itself, 
is free from the power of force, but from “bodily things”. In the case of conditional necessity, 
however this power can be imposed on the will, because of the necessity for individuals to 
choose specific actions, when it comes to choosing good or avoiding evil. While not overtly 
stating it, Aquinas leaves no room for doubting that in spiritual matters the agent responsible 
for identifying the elements is of Divine origin. Neither is there any doubt that the ruler or 
governor endowed with powers of injunction in matters spiritual is, in fact, God. It is the 
acknowledgement of the prospect of such Divine intervention that drew Aquinas to conclude 
that “conscientia is said to bind by the power of divine injunction.” However, Aquinas points 
out that the power of Divine injunctions to bind in spiritual matters is modulated, in terms of 
both necessities, by the extent of the person’s knowledge of those injunctions and also by the 
influence these injunctions can bring to bear on knowledge. 
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In summary, it is both knowledge and the divine authority underpinning any 
injunctions, which are presented as the main reasons as to why ‘the voice’ of conscientia is 
deemed to be binding on a person. Taking both reasons into account, then, a person who 
chooses to go against or to ignore the ‘voice’ of conscientia’ is committing sin.
175
 However, 
what if that “voice” is found to be mistaken or erroneous? 
3.1.4 Erroneous or Mistaken Conscience  
 Aquinas clearly demonstrated that while no error can happen in synderesis, mistakes 
can occur in conscientia due to ignorance, or to some deficit in the promulgation of the law or 
injunction, for example. Thus, for Aquinas, an erroneous conscience is, in fact, to be 
distinctly understood as an erroneous conscientia. What we are here dealing with is whether 
erroneous or mistaken conscience binds and whether it is blameworthy. Aquinas says it binds 
relatively and accidentally and illustrates thus:  
For someone whose conscientia tells him that he is obliged to 
fornicate, is not so obliged that he cannot forgo fornication without 
sin, except on condition that such a conscientia persists. But this 
conscientia can be removed without sin. Hence such a conscientia 
does not bind in every circumstance; something can happen namely 
the laying aside of that conscientia, and, if this happens, then he is no 
longer bound. But what merely holds upon a condition is said to hold 
relatively. 
. . . Someone who wants or loves one thing on account of something 
else, loves that on account of which he loves the former per se, but 
loves accidentally, as it were, that which he loves on account of the 
other; e.g. a man who loves wine for its sweetness, loves sweetness 
per se but wine accidentally. A man who has a mistaken conscientia 
believing it to be correct (otherwise he would not be mistaken), 
however, does not cling to a mistaken conscientia, either, on account 
of the rightness which he believes to be there; he clings, rather . . . 
speaking per se, he is bound by a correct conscientia, but speaking 
accidentally, by a mistaken one.
176
 




 Ibid., 17.4. 
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This excerpt indicates that erroneous or mistaken conscientia results from a form of 
ignorance, ignorance of what one believes to be right. It is therefore a person’s duty to lay 
aside such ignorance; if not, a person becomes blameworthy for following such a conscientia. 
On the other hand one is not blameworthy for an ignorance that cannot be put aside.
177
 
 Aquinas’ theory on conscience summarises the teachings of the Scholastics. Linda 
Hogan remarks on the significance of Aquinas to the effect that when his task was completed, 
synderesis as a component of conscience was understood to be the habitual grasp of first 
moral principles, and conscientia, as its distinct application of the moral principles.
178
 
Aquinas’ legacy with regard to the notion of conscience remains an indelible development in 
philosophy and theology. 
PART III 
4. Conscience in the Documents of the Church (Twentieth and Twenty First Century) 
 Over the centuries, and certainly in the twentieth century, many Church documents 
have consistently referred to conscience, particularly in the context of emphasising its 
importance for moral living. These documents and many others are intended as useful guides 
to all Christians in their understanding of conscience, in particular as the concept has been 
found to continue to be misunderstood and even misused. This section will draw on a 
selection of such documents that elucidate the true nature of conscience, and refute some of 
the current misconceptions about this concept.
179
 Particular attention will be paid to such 
issues as: the real meaning of conscience; the authority of conscience; freedom of conscience; 
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4.1. Vatican II Council (1962-1965) and Conscience 
 Vatican II’s concern was not about philosophical technicalities as to whether 
conscience as synderesis or as conscientia were distinct or interchangeable functions of 
conscience, rather the Council Fathers attempted to make conscience a personal matter for the 
ordinary person on the street. The Council attempted to bring conscience into daily lives and 
issues. In particular, the Council demonstrates the primacy and freedom of conscience to 
every human being in an era that has suffered the scourges of World Wars, Ethnic Cleansing, 
Holocausts, Man-Made Famines, in short, multiple world-wide Abuses of Human Rights.
181
 
Thus in terms of freedom and primacy of conscience, for instance, the Council teaches:  
All are bound to follow their conscience faithfully in every sphere of 
activity so that they may come to God, who is their last end. 
Therefore, the individual must not be forced to act against conscience 
nor be prevented from acting according to conscience . . .
182
 
The Council Fathers also assert: “The layperson, at one and at the same time a believer and a 
citizen of the world, has only a single conscience, a Christian conscience, by which to be 
guided continually in both domains.”
183
 This statement affirms the fact that we have 
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conscience whose function is to guide us in our duty towards God and the state. The Council 
described the nature of this conscience accordingly: 
Deep within their consciences men and women discover a law which 
they have not laid upon themselves and which they must obey. Its 
voice, ever calling them to love and to do what is good and to avoid 
evil, tells them inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that. For 
they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God. Their dignity rests in 
observing this law, and by it they will be judged. Conscience is the 
most secret core and the sanctuary of the human person. There they 
are alone with God whose voice echoes in their depths. By 
conscience, in a wonderful way, that law is made known which is 
fulfilled in the love of God and of one’s neighbour. Through loyalty to 
conscience, Christians are joined to others in search for truth and for 
the right solution to so many moral problems which arise both in the 
life of individuals and from social relations. Hence, the more a correct 
conscience prevails, the more do persons and groups turn aside from 
blind choice and endeavor to conform to the objective standard of 
moral conduct. Yet it often happens that conscience goes astray 
through ignorance which it is unable to avoid, without thereby losing 
its dignity. This cannot be said of the person who takes little trouble to 
find out what is true and good, or when conscience is gradually almost 
blinded through the habit of committing sin.
184
 
 An overall assessment of the passage shows that the Council places ownership of 
conscience and of its responsibilities firmly and absolutely in the hands of each individual. It 
teaches this, because it understands conscience to be “the most secret core and sanctuary of 
the human person . . . [where we] are alone with God.” However, the Council presents 
conscience as much more than the inalienable possession of solitary, unconnected 
individuals. It reminds all human persons, be they subjects or rulers, that as social and 
spiritual beings, conscience functions to make known “the law . . . which is fulfilled in the 
love of God and of one’s neighbour.” Such a concise presentation of the social and spiritual 
functions of conscience relevant to the life of the individual draws directly from the teachings 
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 and, therefore, is not a new insight that can only be ascribed to the teaching of 
Vatican II. 
 The first noticeable thing from Vatican II is that the document does not simply focus 
on conscience as a locus wherein we can discover our personal, social and spiritual 
obligations only. It portrays conscience as a medium for discovering “a law” which we “must 
obey.” The document reveals conscience as a voice “ever calling [the human person] to love 
and to do what is good and to avoid evil.” It goes on to emphasise the inner and divine nature 
of the voice of such a conscience, and the importance of listening to its precepts, by 
reminding Christians that “they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God.” Therefore, as 
we examined in Paul (Romans 2:14-16) previously, conscience is presented here, more as a 
channel for the transmission of the law of God which Aquinas describes as the eternal law. 
So, Vatican II Fathers succinctly remind Christians that, in a wonderful manner, conscience 
reveals that law, which is fulfilled by the love of God and neighbour (Matthew 22:37-39; 
Galatians. 5:14).  
It is not surprising, then that the Church says to Christians, “Through loyalty to 
conscience, Christians are joined to others in search for truth and for the right solution to so 
many moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and from social relations.” 
Such loyalty, far from constraining the true freedom of individuals, will serve to enhance 
their dignity, because, it claims, “dignity rests in observing this law.” Interestingly, loyalty to 
conscience is seen as a possible point of congruence between Christians and non-Christians. 
The document points out, that the search for truth and right solutions is not simply a Christian 
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pre-occupation. It is also very much the concern of non-Christian “others”, in terms of their 
fidelity to the voice of their conscience, because it is on the basis of such fidelity that all will 
be judged. 
 There is an intimate, private, and almost exclusively personal nature attached to the 
notion of conscience by the Council Fathers that must not be overlooked. Note, for example, 
such deeply personal and intimate images as “the most secret core,” “the sanctuary of the 
human person” and “there they are alone with God.” The moral theologian, Bernard Häring, 
who himself was a peritus during Vatican II drew from these images in his own work of 
personalising the concept of conscience. Applying Vatican II, Häring declared:  
Conscience is the person’s moral faculty, the inner core and sanctuary 
where one knows oneself in confrontation with God and with fellow 
men . . . In the depth of our being, conscience makes us aware that our 
true self is linked with Christ, and that we can find our unique name 




Häring explains that the voice of conscience, which emanates from “the depths of our being” 
“comes through the Word in whom all things are made . . . Of itself, conscience is a candle 
without a flame. It receives its truth from Christ who is Truth and light and through him it 
shines forth with his brightness and warmth.”
187
  Häring, while drawing on Vatican II, 
demonstrates the Christological aspect of conscience. Therefore, as a voice that echoes in a 
person, it must be exercised daily lest it loses its vigour. The document asserts that the more 
this voice is seen to exert its control, the more that individuals and groups will turn aside 
from blind or misguided choices and strive to be guided by the objective norms of morality. 
And for the individual, this is where authentic freedom is to be found because “God has 
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4.1.2. Freedom of Conscience Proclaimed 
 It is well to note that the notion of freedom of conscience which Vatican II seeks to 
champion is one that is seen to be intimately connected to the notions of personal 
responsibility and human dignity. Thus, the Council revealed: 
People nowadays are becoming increasingly conscious of the dignity 
of the human person; a growing number demand that people should 
exercise fully their own judgment and a responsible freedom in their 
actions and should not be subject to external pressure or coercion but 
inspired by a sense of duty. At the same time, to prevent excessive 
restriction of the rightful freedom of individuals and associations, they 
demand constitutional limitation of the powers of government.
189
 
The Council situates this increasing awareness of the dignity of the human person and of their 
desire for greater freedom within the context of recent philosophical and theological 
developments and considers it to be a significant step in the evolution of civilisation. 
However, rather than engaging in the great philosophical debates about the notion of freedom 
itself, Vatican II focuses on “freedom of conscience” in the context of “religious freedom”.
190
 
According to the Council, “the human person has a right to religious freedom. Freedom of 
this kind means that everyone should be immune from coercion by individuals, social groups 
and every human power . . .”
191
 But the individual must not be considered a passive onlooker 
in this process of striving for both religious freedom and freedom of conscience; instead the 
Council Fathers stress that it is both the right and duty of people “to seek the truth in religious 
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matters, so that, through the use of appropriate means, they may form prudent judgements of 
conscience which are sincere and true.”
192
 
The freedom that has been referred to in earlier sections of this chapter was 
understood as inherent, thus individuals in their dealings with each other or with groups are 
called not to undermine that God given freedom.
193
 For example, we note the admonition of 
Vatican II that the dignity of human beings dictates that they “act out of conscious and free 
choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way from within, and not by . . . blind impulses or 
by external constraint.”
194
 The Council Fathers are even clearer and more adamant on this 
point, when they refer to both religious freedom and freedom of conscience. In this context 
they insist that: “the individual must not be forced to act against conscience nor be prevented 
from acting according to conscience, especially in religions matters.”
195
 Even in terms of an 
individual converting to Catholicism this principle can never be violated, as noted in Canon 




 There is no doubt that the Council Fathers are unequivocally affirming that freedom 
of conscience is a fundamental right of every human being and also that this freedom is 
inviolable.
197
 That is why John Paul II strongly emphasised and declared that “No human 
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authority has the right to interfere with a person's conscience.”
198
 Naturally, as a body of 
Christians, the Council Fathers stressed these freedoms were entitlements for Christian 
believers, pointing out that: “the Christian faithful, in common with everybody else, have the 
civil right of freedom from interference, the right to lead their lives according to their 
conscience.”
199
 In general, then, freedom of conscience is understood as the absence of force 
or coercion on a person’s use of conscience. However, such freedom “does not consist . . . in 
the freedom to do as one likes, but rather to do as a responsible conscience directs.”
200
 It “is 
never freedom ‘from’ the truth but always and only freedom ‘in’ the truth.”
201
 
 The Council having taught that conscience is the “most secret core and sanctuary of 
the human person” through which the human person discovers God’s law; and that 
conscience must not be violated drew attention to its formation. The Council state therefore 
that it is the task of the human person “to cultivate a properly informed conscience and to 
impress the divine law on the affairs of the earthly city.”
202
 The Council declared: 
However, in forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful 
attention to the holy and certain teaching of the church. For the 
Catholic Church is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is its 
duty to proclaim and teach with authority the truth which is Christ 
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and, at the same time, to declare and confirm by her authority the 
principles of the moral order which spring from human nature itself.
203
 
This signifies that it is important for individuals to try and do all things possible to avoid 
ignorance and acquire truth that will aid human actions towards God, neighbour and the 
environment. 
4.2. Conscience in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) and Pope John Paul II 
 This Catechism continues the teaching tradition of the Church on conscience. It 
outlines and reiterates the nature of conscience, as found in Sacred Scriptures, Church 
Fathers, Vatican II and many other sources. The extent to which it actually reflects the 
principles of the teaching magisterium will be well illustrated at the conclusion of this section 
through an analysis of a Papal document issued by John Paul II. This analysis can be viewed 
from two contrasting perspectives; either in terms of the Pope putting “flesh and bones” on 
the teachings about conscience found in the Catechism: or in terms of the Catechism 
extracting basic and concrete principle from the teachings of the magisterium. 
4.2.1. Meaning of Conscience 
 The Catechism defines conscience as “a judgment of reason whereby the human 
person recognizes the moral quality of a concrete act that he is going to perform, is in the 
process of performing, or has already completed.”
204
 Once again, as with Aquinas, for 
example, the definition brings out the relationship between conscience, reason and human 
action. It also asserts the judicial and legislative aspects of conscience as in the Greco-Roman 
and Pauline thought. The definition is both direct and concrete for two reasons. Firstly, as 
catechisms are specifically intended to be used as teaching aids, they are not meant to be 
long-winded or cumbersome in their explications. Secondly, the directness and concreteness 
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of the Catechism’s definition can assist the authors in demonstrating their certainty that 
conscience is the definite and recognised means for identifying the moral quality of an action. 
This certainty or self-assuredness is also highlighted by the Catechism’s attention to detailing 
every step of the process for identifying the moral qualities of an action. For example, in its 
explication of conscience, it refers to: (i) synderesis, the perception of the principles of 
morality; (ii) to how these principles are applied in given circumstance by practical 
discernment of reason and of good and evil; and, (iii) to how judgement is exercised on 
concrete acts that are yet to be performed or have already been performed.
205
 
4.2.2. Formation of Conscience 
 Formation of conscience forms a crucial part of the Church’s teaching on conscience 
as Vatican II indicated. This is because; conscience possesses the tendency to err. At a 
theological and moral level, the formation of conscience and the manner in which it may be 
accomplished has been extensively researched. Richard Gula,
206
 for example describes 
formation of conscience as the acquisition of “necessary skills for making right judgments.”  
He goes on to list such formative skills as the ability to access morally relevant factors; the 
ability to assess the action itself, its intentions, circumstances, consequences, values and 
norms. Gula concludes his description by adding the ability to provide sound reason for a 
moral judgment and the ability to have a decisive will to execute a judgment to his list. 
 The Catechism presents conscience formation or education as a life-long task of the 
acquisition of moral objectives which every individual is obliged to undertake.
207
 It asserts 
that this task is essential because human beings are “subjected to negative influence, and 
tempted by sin to prefer their own judgement and to reject authoritative teachings.”
208
 It is for 
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this reason that the authors of the Catechism deem it important to be specific about what the 
formation of conscience actually involves. Particularly, the Catechism describes this process 
as involving the assimilation of the Word of God through faith and prayer, and then putting 
this assimilation into practice through the process of education of conscience.
209
 As helpful 
aids to advancing of this process, the Catechism then lists such practices as the cultivation of 
a deep awareness of the Lord’s Passion; the acceptance of the gifts of the Holy Spirit; being 
open to guidance by the demonstrable witness of others; and crucially (though for some 
Christians still a matter in need of precise clarification) acceptance of guidance from the 
authoritative teaching of the Church.
210
 
As can be seen in the following excerpt from the Catechism, those who sincerely seek 
the formation of a well-formed, upright and truthful conscience through such ‘prudent 
education’, stand to benefit immensely in terms of their own intellectual, emotional and 
spiritual development: 
A well-formed conscience . . . formulates its judgments according to 
reason, in conformity with the true good willed by the wisdom of the 
Creator . . . it awakens the child to the knowledge and practice of the 
interior law recognized by conscience. Prudent education teaches 
virtue; it prevents or cures fear, selfishness and pride, resentment 
arising from guilt, and feelings of complacency, born of human 
weakness and faults. The education of the conscience guarantees 
freedom and engenders peace of heart.
211
 
By this, the Catechism provides clear accounts of the benefits of a conscience formed 
or educated in line with Vatican II’s recommendation. Pope John Paul II himself, in his 1991 
message for the World Day of Peace, provides an elaborate teaching and presentation on the 
formation of conscience. The importance of his elaboration, however, lies in the manner in 
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which he succeeds in inserting the Catechism’s didactic injunctions into the everyday world 
of today’s human beings, in particular those of a Christian  persuasion. 
 John Paul II begins by plainly characterising the formation of conscience as a grave 
duty for all individuals, one with which no one may interfere. The gravity of this requirement 
derives from the necessity for all to know that when they claim to be acting in accordance 
with their conscience, they are not, in fact, superimposing their own limited opinions on the 
truth and law which God has written into their hearts: 
Every individual has the grave duty to form his or her own conscience 
in the light of that objective truth which everyone can come to know, 
and which no one may be prevented from knowing. To claim that one 
has a right to act according to conscience, but without at the same time 
acknowledging the duty to conform one's conscience to the truth and 
to the law which God himself has written on our hearts, in the end 
means nothing more than imposing one's limited personal opinion . . . 
the truth must be passionately pursued and lived to the best of one's 
ability. This sincere search for the truth will lead not only to respect 




John Paul II goes on to identify two key institutions that can play a role in conscience 
formation and education, the family and the school, which are the primary and secondary 
carers, respectively. John Paul II’s use of the term “grave duty” as he advises parents of their 
primary role of helping their children to seek the truth and live their lives in conformity with 
their findings points to the significance he gives to the role of parents. 
The importance that John Paul II attaches to the education of conscience in schools is 
reflected in the amount of space and depth he allocates to that area. The importance of the 
school in the child’s life is seen to originate in the obvious role it plays in the expansion of the 
child’s social life and learning possibilities from that of a cohesive family unit to that of a 
much wider, impersonal and, at times, unintelligible world. More important, however, is John 
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Paul II’s assertion that despite claims to the contrary, no system of education is ever morally 
indifferent when it comes to ethical and religious values. Therefore, the danger to the 
education of the child’s conscience that is inherent in this much broader environment, is that 
he or she may assimilate values that are either consciously or unconsciously being promoted 
by the educational systems, and indeed, even by the child’s family. John Paul II therefore is 
quite forthright when speaking of the need to respect the dignity of the child and the ways 
they can be helped to form their consciences.  
The family plays a primary role in the important task of forming 
consciences. Parents have a grave duty to help their children to seek 
the truth from their earliest years and to live in conformity with the 
truth, to seek the good and to promote it. 
The school is also fundamental to the formation of conscience. It is 
there that children and young people come into contact with a world 
which is larger and often unlike the family environment. Education is 
in fact never morally indifferent, even when it claims to be neutral 
with regard to ethical and religious values. The way in which children 
and young people are brought up and educated will necessarily reflect 
certain values which in turn influence their understanding of others 
and of society as a whole. Hence, in a way consonant with the nature 
and dignity of the human person and with the law of God, young 
people should be helped during their years of schooling to discern and 
to seek the truth, to accept its demands and the limits of authentic 
freedom, and to respect the right of others to do the same.
213
 
The Pope now singles out the importance of religious education in the child’s 
formation of conscience. Under the umbrella term of religious education, John Paul II refers 
to the positive influences that the family, the Catholic Church, Christian communities and 
other religious institutions can have on this process of formation. Even the State is expected to 
play its part in this process, firstly, by guaranteeing the rights of the above institutions to 
actively engage in this process and secondly, by making it possible for those institutions to 
work in this sphere. In the light of such a demand from John Paul II, we are reminded of 
current campaigns by certain humanist and atheist individuals and organisations to have all 





religious references or symbols removed from schools and public buildings, to keep religious 
lessons completely separate from secular ones, and even to have religious schools themselves 
secularised. 
The formation of conscience is compromised if a thorough religious 
education is lacking. How can a young person fully understand the 
demands of human dignity if no reference is made to the source of that 
dignity, namely, God the Creator? In this regard, the role of the 
family, the Catholic Church, Christian communities and other 
religious institutions remains essential. The State, in compliance with 
international norms and Declarations, must guarantee their rights in 
this field and make it possible for them to exercise those rights. For 
their part, families and communities of believers ought to appreciate 
and ever deepen their commitment to the human person and to the 
objective values of the person.
214
 
Finally, John Paul II gives his attention to the mass media and the role it can play in 
the education of conscience if it so desires. He underlines its importance in this role by noting 
that for many in the modern world the media has become their only source of information. 
However, it may be a sign of the times with regard to the relationship that now exists between 
an ascendant media and a Church that has seen its influence wane, particularly in the Western 
World, that the Pope’s input here is expressed more in negative than positive terms. 
Specifically, he seems to be emphasising what practices the mass media could avoid, rather 
than ones it could positively engage in to further conscience education. 
Among the many other institutions and bodies which play a specific 
role in forming consciences, the means of social communication must 
also be mentioned. In today's world of rapid communication, the mass 
media can play an extremely important and indeed essential role in 
furthering the search for the truth, provided that they avoid presenting 
merely the limited interests of certain individuals, groups or 
ideologies. For more and more people the media are often their only 
source of information. How important, then, that the media be used 
responsibly in the service of the truth.
215
 







In summary, Vatican II, the Catechism, and John Paul II brought to world-wide 
attention, in a language intelligible to all ‘interested parties’, the absolute necessity of 
meaningfully and sincerely engaging in the understanding of conscience, both on their own 
behalf and on behalf of their neighbours.  
4.3. Veritatis Splendor (VS): The Misinterpreted Conscience Corrected 
 John Paul II’s encyclical, Veritatis Splendor
216
 deals with issues intrinsically 
connected with conscience, such as moral freedom and responsibility, the immutability of 
truth, and the authority of the Church to morally guide, teach and correct. Addressed 
specifically to Catholic Bishops worldwide, it is considered to be John Paul II’s major work 
on fundamental moral theology.
217
 
Ironically, however, this document opens with the Holy Father exercising his teaching 
authority to challenge a crisis in fundamental moral theology that he witnessed progressively 
unfolding within the post-conciliar Church. From the outset therefore, it is obvious that he 
intends both to robustly identify and rebut false views on morality or conscience that he 
considers to be contaminating Church teaching. This intention is well illustrated in the 
following excerpt from the encyclical, wherein he is found emphatically asserting his 
intention of: 
clearly setting forth certain aspects of doctrine which are of crucial 
importance in facing what is certainly a genuine crisis, since the 
difficulties which it engenders have most serious implications for the 
moral life of the faithful and for communion in the Church, as well as 
for a just and fraternal social life . . . [and of setting] forth, with regard 
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the problems being discussed, the principles of a moral teaching based 
upon Sacred Scripture and the living Apostolic Tradition, and at the 
same time to shed light on the presuppositions and consequences of 
the dissent which that teaching has met.
218
 
What specifically concerned John Paul II, however, was that the Christian community itself 
was being faced with an overall and systematic challenging of traditional moral doctrine, the 
fundamental objective of which, in his view, was to detach human freedom “from its essential 
and constitutive relationship to truth.”
219
 John Paul II’s direct response to this effort, in terms 
of conscience, was to remind his readers that “the relationship between man’s freedom and 
God’s Law is most deeply lived out in the ‘heart’ of the person, in his moral conscience.”
220
 
In rebutting what he considered as the erroneous notion that conscience was a creative 
decision
221
 rather than a judgement arrived at through reason and guidance, John Paul II 
clarified the Church’s understanding of the true nature and function of conscience. Firstly, he 
unequivocally defined it as a practical judgement, one “which makes known what man must 
do or not do or which assesses an act already performed by him.”
222
 There is no place in this 
definition for an element considered essential to creativity, namely spontaneity. Indeed, he 
uses a citation from St. Paul’s Letter to the Romans (2:15) to make it absolutely clear that far 
from being a creative decision, conscience is in fact “a moral judgment about man and his 
actions, a judgment either of acquittal or of condemnation, according as human acts are in 
conformity or not with the law of God written on the heart.”
223
 
 Of far greater danger to the Church’s authentic teaching on conscience, however, in 
the John Paul II’s estimation, were attempts to introduce elements of relativism and 
subjectivism into the functioning of conscience. He saw evidence of this intrusion in some 
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modern theological and philosophical trends that accorded the individual conscience “the 
status of a supreme tribunal of moral judgment which hands down categorical and infallible 
decisions about good and evil.”
224
 In John Paul II’s view, then, this tendency grants “to the 
individual conscience the prerogative of independently determining the criteria of good and 
evil and then acting accordingly.”
225
 One of the negative consequences, which he identified in 
the acceptance of such a view of human autonomy, was that it would “so exalt human 
freedom that [it] would end up in the subjectivist notion that men are the creators of the moral 
order, of what is good and bad.”
226
 Another seriously negative consequence of accepting this 
understanding of human autonomy was that because of human historicity, moral norms would 
no longer be considered as immutable and would therefore “change under varying historical 
and cultural situations.”
227
 This attempt at questioning the human freedom of choice in terms 
of the “existence of objective norms of morality valid for all people of the present and the 
future”
228
 receives the response: 
It must certainly be admitted that man always exists in a particular 
culture, but it must also be admitted that man is not exhaustively 
defined by that same culture. Moreover, the very progress of cultures 
demonstrates that there is something in man which transcends those 
cultures. This ‘something’ is precisely human nature: this nature is 
itself the measure of culture and the condition ensuring that man does 
not become the prisoner of any of his cultures, but asserts his personal 
dignity by living in accordance with the profound truth of his being.
229
 
While he has made references to conscience in his previous writings and sermons,
230
 
he is seen in the above examples to be using the gravitas of an encyclical in his role as 
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Teacher to emphatically reiterate the Church’s teaching on conscience, while at the same time 
unequivocally refuting what he deems to be erroneous opinions concerning this concept. 
John Paul II reminds his readers that “from the Church’s beginnings, the Apostles . . . 
were vigilant over the right conduct of Christians, just as they were vigilant for the purity of 
the faith and the handing down of the divine gifts in the sacraments”
231
 Such Apostolic 
origins and their implications for the teaching magisterium left John Paul II in no doubt that 
“the task of authentically interpreting the word of God, whether in its written form or in that 
of tradition, has been entrusted only to those charged with the Church’s living magisterium, 
whose authority is exercised in the name of Jesus Christ.”
232
 It is this awareness of the 
Apostolic and Divine authority that he believes is invested in him, which empowers him to 
remind the Christian faithful that: “In forming their consciences [they] must give careful 
attention to the sacred and certain teaching of the Church. For the Catholic Church is by the 
will of Christ the teacher of truth.”
233
 
Finally, it will come as no surprise to find that the teachings outlined in Veritatis 
Splendor, in terms of its repudiations and reiterations, did not meet with universal approval, 
even among Christians. John F. Wilkins, a former editor of The Tablet, critically observed 
that so long as conscience was taken to mean “resisting totalitarianism”, it received Papal 
applause (rather than critical Papal analysis).
234
 By contrast, however, Wilkins claims that it 
is when “conscience starts operating in the personal ethical sphere” that cautions and caveats 
are found to increase. It is at this level of individual morality that we find such cautions as 
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conscience being subject to error, or in need of shaping and hard work or, crucially for 
Church influence, in need of help from communal tradition and insights. 
4.3.1. Conscience as Interior Witness and Judge 
 The encyclical describes conscience as one’s interior witness, an image which reflects 
a lot more about conscience than it initially suggest.
235
 It roots this concept in the teachings of 
St. Paul, to point out that 
conscience in a certain sense confronts man with the law, and thus 
becomes a ‘witness’ for man: a witness of his own faithfulness or 
unfaithfulness with regard to the law, of his essential moral rectitude 
or iniquity . . . is the only witness, since what takes place in the heart 
of the person is hidden from the eyes of everyone outside … makes its 
witness known only to the person himself . . . [such that] only the 




Such witnessing is further elaborated as “this interior dialogue of man with himself . . . [and] 
also a dialogue of man with God, the author of the law. . .”
237
 It is in the course of such 
“dialoguing” that conscience is seen to make the law known, and thereby becomes a proper 
witness to the information it gives and to the decisions and actions that follow on from this 
witnessing. The encyclical substantiates the interpersonal notion of witness as the dialoguing 
of man with God, as well as God’s authoritative role in this exchange, by drawing on St. 
Bonaventure’s imaging of conscience as being “like God’s herald and messenger; it does not 
command things on its own authority, but commands them as coming from God’s authority, 
like a herald when he proclaims the edict of the king.”
238
 The role of God in the dialoguing is 
also described: “it is the witness of God himself, whose voice and judgement penetrate the 
depths of man’s soul, calling him fortiter and suaviter to obedience.”
239
 Here, God as witness 
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is portrayed as a Divine Being whose voice will be listened to, whose evidence will penetrate 
deeply, and whose judgment is expected to be ‘boldly and faithfully’ accepted. The reason 
forwarded for such an unequivocal expectation is that as the testimony to the truth emanates 
from God himself (Romans 9:1), that testimony must be considered to be the absolute truth 
about the individual himself, about others and about the Divine Testifier. 
Unlike in human courts, the witness to the truth at the court of conscience functions both 
as witness and judge. This is described elsewhere in terms of the re-enactment of both judicial 
and legislative functions. St. Paul describes the judgement delivered in this moral court of 
conscience as 
a moral judgment about man and his actions, a judgment either of 
acquittal or of condemnation, according as human acts are in conformity 
or not with the law of God written on the heart. . . . [It] is a practical 
judgment, a judgment which makes known what man must do or not do, 
or which assesses an act already performed by him.
240
 
By calling for the unequivocal acceptance of the judgment of conscience, in Veritatis Splendor, 
John Paul II is simply reiterating the Catholic teaching that people are obliged to follow their 
conscience, since if they do not, they will actually be condemned by it, because:  
Like the natural law itself and all practical knowledge, the judgment 
of conscience also has an imperative character: man must act in 
accordance with it. If man acts against this judgment or, in a case 
where he lacks certainty about the rightness and goodness of a 
determined act, still performs that act, he stands condemned by his 
own conscience, the proximate norm of personal morality.
241
 
The encyclical also assesses the judgement of conscience, in terms of the distinction 
between the universal demands of natural law and particular cases, and between the ultimate and 
proximate objectives of conscience: it claims that  
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whereas the natural law discloses the objective and universal demands of 
the moral good, conscience is the application of the law to a particular 
case; this application of the law thus becomes an inner dictate for the 
individual, a summons to do what is good in this particular situation. 
Conscience thus formulates moral obligation in the light of the natural 
law; it is the obligation to do what the individual, through the workings 
of his conscience, knows to be a good he is called to do here and now. . . 
. The judgment of conscience states ‘in an ultimate way’ whether a 
certain particular kind of behaviour is in conformity with the law; it 
formulates the proximate norm of the morality of a voluntary act, 
‘applying the objective law to a particular case.’
242
  
It is in the light of such a description that Gula strongly urges each individual to: “Let conscience 
by your guide.”
243
 As already noted, the key issue in John Paul II’s teaching on the role of 
judgment in conscience, is that individuals are condemned if they fail to be guided by its dictates, 
because the very dignity of conscience, as witness, lies in its capacity to disclose the truth about 




Crucially, while the Holy Father clearly asserts that the judgement of conscience does not 
establish the law, he is equally clear in his assertion that 
it bears witness to the authority of the natural law and of the practical 
reason with reference to the supreme good, whose attractiveness the 
human person perceives and whose commandments he accepts.
245
  
The seriousness of this assertion is that the Church does not consider the requirements of natural 
law to be relative to cultures, historicity, or indeed to the separate or distinct judgments of every 
individual. Rather, it considers those requirements to be the norm by which they themselves are 
to be judged. 
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4.3.2. Veritatis Splendor and the Erroneous Conscience 
` By asserting that the judgement of conscience makes manifest the “link between freedom 
and truth”
246
 the document is seen to be both explicating and supporting the concept of the 
primacy of conscience. However, promoting the understanding of conscience as an act of 
judgement, leaves it open to the possibility that incorrect as well as correct judgments will be 
made by human beings, who by their nature are fallible. John Paul II in this encyclical certainly 
accepts this position and reminds his readers that this has been a doctrine which the Church has 
developed throughout its history.
247
 In his own words he acknowledges that “Conscience, as the 
judgement of an act, is not exempt from the possibility of error.”
248
 He draws on Vatican II to 
further clarify this acknowledgement of acceptance in terms of both invincible and culpable 
ignorance. 
 In the above elaboration of the presence of error in conscience, John Paul II reiterates 
the teachings of Aquinas and Vatican II. Aquinas, for example held that individuals were not 
only excused from wrongdoing if their consciences were in error but they were expected to 
do the wrong thing, if their consciences told them that it was the right thing to do. In the case 
of Gaudium et Spes, it particularises the distinction between ‘culpable’ and invincible 
ignorance, particularly in terms of their relationship to the dignity of conscience: 
Yet it often happens that conscience goes astray through ignorance 
which it is unable to avoid, without thereby losing dignity. This 
cannot be said of the person who takes little trouble to find out what is 
true and good, or when conscience is gradually almost blinded 
through the habit of committing sin.
249
 
John Paul II himself is very much echoing such thinking when he carefully distinguishes 
between culpable and invincible ignorance and the effect of both on the dignity of 
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conscience. He asserts that “error can be the result of an invincible ignorance, an ignorance 
of which the subject is not aware and which the person is unable to overcome by oneself.”
250
 
He maintains, however, that “while [the] judgment of conscience retains its dignity when an 
invincible ignorance is not culpable,”
251
 it is compromised when it is culpably erroneous.
252
 
Having outlined a ‘conscience in error’, the Pope considers it to be just as equally 
important to characterise a conscience that administers good and correct judgements. In 
general terms the encyclical affirms that the dignity of a good or correct conscience comes 
from objective truth.
253
 However, basing much of his characterisation on Pauline teaching, 
John Paul II asserts that a “good conscience” (1 Timothy 1:5) is one that seeks the truth and 
makes judgments in accordance with the same truth.
254
 A good conscience is also one that is 
“confirmed by the Holy Spirit” (Romans 9:1), “clear” (2 Timothy 1:3) “openly states the 
truth” (2 Corinthians 4:2).
255
 The insistence of its search for truth and the extent to which it 
allows itself to be guided by that truth in its actions are quite tangible characteristics of the 
good conscience itself in action.
256
 Finally, quoting Paul to the Romans once again, John Paul 
II reminds us that a good conscience is not one that is “conformed to this world” (Romans 
12:2), but one that is transformed by the renewal of minds, so that all “may prove what is the 
will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect.”
257
 To achieve this level of goodness 
and absolute moral correctness in the judgements of conscience requires that it be shaped and 
formed on a daily basis. 
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4.3.4. Conscience formation as Indicated in Veritatis Splendor 
 The potential for the judgement of conscience to be mistaken is not only an indication 
of its complex nature, but also, in the estimation of both Vatican II and the Catechism, of the 
need for its formation to be extremely relevant to the individual’s daily living, and to be 
always part of an ongoing process. The encyclical’s teaching on the formation of conscience 
definitely reflects these conclusions.  
It is obvious from the characteristics of a good conscience outlined earlier that when 
conscience is sound, a person’s judgement will be good and correct. It is on this basis that the 
document teaches that formation of conscience must be “a continuous conversion to what is 
true and to what is good.”
258
 Furthermore, both bishops and the faithful are reminded that “It 
is the ‘heart’ converted to the Lord and to the love of what is good which is really the source 
of true judgments of conscience.”
259
 Conversion is therefore identified as being crucial to the 
formation of conscience.
260
 While the document points out that for such a conversion to occur 
would require the individual to possess an adequate knowledge of God’s law in general, it 
also indicates that of itself such knowledge would not be sufficient.
261
 The document 
identifies an “essential” characteristic here, not explicitly referred to in Vatican II, which 
individuals will need to internalise, if their conscience formation is to be progressed. The 
document presents the concept of “connaturality”
262
 as that essential characteristic. This can 
be elaborated as a dynamic process through which working towards achieving what is truly 
good will be seen as fundamentally essential to the nature and essence of the human person. 
The promotion of such a connatural state, and by association the advancement of conscience 
formation, will be achieved through the individual’s practice of such virtues as prudence, 
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faith, hope and charity.
263
 The document cites Jesus’ saying that “the man who lives by the 
truth comes out into the light” (John 3:21) as the Scriptural basis for identifying connaturality 
and the formation of virtues with conscience formation.
264
 
 Up until this, the document’s promotion of conscience formation has focused on the 
role of the individual’s inner personal spiritual development. By introducing a role for the 
Church, it demonstrates that forming or educating a conscience is not just an internal matter. 
It is also one that must receive external assistance. John Paul II is unequivocal in his 
identification of the source of such external aid: “Christians have a great help for the 
formation of conscience in the Church and her Magisterium.
265
 He draws on Vatican II
266
 
and the Scriptures to provide an unambiguous basis for such a claim: “For the Catholic is by 
the will of Christ the teacher of truth.”
267
 The nature of that truth can be said to be connatural, 
as seen from another perspective, that of identifying the person of Christ himself with the 
principles of the moral order that “derive from human nature itself.”
268
 Such a concept 
enables John Paul II to claim that involving the magisterium is not a way of introducing 
extraneous truths to the formation of a Christian conscience in the Christian individual. 
Rather, in a marrying of magisterium to the individual Christian, the former is seen as the one 
who “brings to light the truths which it ought already to possess” in order to assist in the 
moral improvement of the latter.
269
 
4.3.5 Conscience and Human Action 
 Thomas Aquinas’ definition of conscience as the act of applying knowledge is at the 
centre of the link between conscience and human action. He opined also that:  
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Since things act according to their nature, they derive their proper acts 
and ends (final cause) according to the law that is written into their 
nature. Everything in nature, insofar as they reflect the order by which 
God directs them through their nature for their own benefit, reflects the 
Eternal Law in their own natures.
270
 
In other words Aquinas teaches that what is contained in people’s most secret inner core, in 
the sanctuary of their conscience, will be revealed not in the words they utter, but in the 
actions they perform. According to him, when an act is performed from choice, it generally 
reflects the agent’s opinion of what is morally good or evil. So “like the natural law itself and 
all practical knowledge, the judgment of conscience also has an imperative character: man 
must act in accordance with it.”
271
 
 Implicitly, moral acts involve the dictate of conscience. According to John Paul II, the 
reason underlying this assertion is that, ultimately, “the judgement of conscience is ‘a 
practical judgement’, a judgement which makes known what man must do or not do, or which 
assesses an act already performed by him.”
272
 All this assessment is carried out with reference 
to the extent to which such “human acts are in conformity or not with the law of God written 
on the heart.”
273
 Interestingly, John Paul II maintains that this connecting of the law to the 
judgemental function of conscience applies to non-believers or “Gentiles” who may not even 
be aware of, or who may reject such a connection. He points out that it is in the actual 
enacting or doing “by nature” what the law requires, rather than in any conscious awareness 
or knowledge, that non-believers can become a true law unto themselves.
274
 
Finally, John Paul II opened Veritatis Splendor with an account of the dialogue of 
Jesus and the rich young man, which is narrated in Matthew 19:16-21.
275
 In terms of the 
above attempt at connecting conscience with actions, it is interesting to note that, in this 
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dialogue, the rich young man asks Jesus what good he must do to have eternal life. Jesus’ 
initial response is one that applies to all humankind; the action required to achieve this 
objective is that the young man “keep the commandments.” This young man has obviously 
formed or educated his conscience quite well, because he claims to have followed and obeyed 
the entire Decalogue. And so his second question as to what else he can do, indicates a person 
for whom life is not simply about keeping rules and honouring laws, but about a search for 
“the full meaning of life.” Jesus’ response to the question of “What else” is to introduce into 
this man’s search for the truth the higher ideals of a Christian conscience: “If you wish to be 
perfect, go, sell your possessions and give the money to the poor, and you will have treasure 
in heaven; then come, follow me.”
276
 One could say that while obedience to the natural law 
will help truly humanise the young man by keeping his feet firmly set on the ground of 
honest and sincere daily living, honouring his Christian conscience will divinise him. This is 
because, in the words of John Paul II and of Mark 1:15 respectively, to know what to do will 
spur the young man to draw near to the One who had begun his preaching with this new and 
decisive proclamation: “The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand; repent, and 
believe in the Gospel” (Mark 1:15).
277
 John Paul II interprets the relevance of this Gospel 
story to the lives of modern-day men and women in terms of what he sees as their absolute 
need to turn to Christ once again in order to receive from him the answer to their questions 
about what is good and what is evil.
278
 The encyclical sees it as the wish of the Church to 
serve all who seek this turning to Christ. Making reference to the encyclical Letter, 
Redemptor Hominis, John Paul II makes it clear that the Church “wishes to serve this single 
                                                             
276
 VS, n.7. 
277





end: that each person may be able to find Christ, in order that Christ may walk with each 
person the path of life.”
279
  
5. Documents of Regional Episcopal Conferences on Conscience 
 Thus far in Part III, we have looked at the concept of conscience as understood and 
used in some cultures, especially Greek and Roman cultures and the Hebraic Old Testament 
world of Israel. We also considered the evolution of the concept in historic eras, such as the 
Pauline Christian era and the medieval Scholastic era and then definitive Catholic teaching as 
illustrated in the documents of Vatican II, the Catechism and Pope John Paul II’s encyclical 
Veritatis Splendor. 
This section will focus on the teaching of the Church on conscience at a more 
localised level. We will analyse three documents of National Episcopal Conferences of 
Bishops, namely: the Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCB), Statement on the 
Formation of Conscience (1973);
280
 the Irish Catholic Bishops Conference (ICBC), 
Conscience and Morality (1980)
281
 and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB), Forming Conscience for Faithful Citizenship: A Call to Political Responsibility 
(2007).
282
 The purpose is to look at how each National Conference applied the concept of 
conscience to the day to day lives and moral problems of the Catholics living within the 
jurisdiction of their respective locality.  
 In particular, this thesis is interested in establishing the extent to which the more 
localised understanding of the concept of conscience mirrors the teaching of the global 
magisterium, and also the extent to which each National Conference speaks the same 
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language on this topic. In other words, this thesis seeks to find out if the local documents are 
universally applicable or if they are mostly centred on local issues. 
5.1. Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops (CCCB): Statement on the Formation of 
Conscience (1973)  
The Canadian Catholic Conference of Bishops issued the “Statement on the 
Formation of Conscience” on 1 December, 1973
283
 in the format of a five part document. 
From the outset of the document, the Bishops emphasised the uniqueness of human beings in 
God’s creation. In the prologue, for example, they noted that out of all creation, “man alone 
of the visible world is called by God to accept responsibility for his actions.”
284
 The 
uniqueness of the human being, in this case the Christian human being, is further 
demonstrated by the fact that it is to man alone that God gave the power to distinguish right 
from wrong, by engraving his way of instilling into the very depths of people’s beings an 
innate sense of the things which are good.
285
 Furthermore, the bishops also see the intrinsic 
worth of this unique and Christian human being affirmed by God’s intervention in the lives of 
humankind through His sending of his Son, Jesus Christ to redeem them and through the 
sending of his Holy Spirit to guide them.
286
 By insisting that such an intervention should be 
the focal point of human life and human doings,
287
 the Bishops give emphasis to the role of 
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Divine Law, as revealed in Scripture and Tradition, in the functioning of conscience. Besides, 
Scripture and Tradition, the Bishops advise that God currently speaks to present day human 
beings through “concrete situations, the providential framework of our existence, our times, 
our vicissitudes, events, happenings, circumstances.”
288
 The ideals or “high ground” which 
this modern-day voice of God asks Christians to aspire to attain is that they actively engage in 
the fight against their sinful natures by responding to the divine call to conversion.
289
 These 
are ideals, and as such will not always be achieved “because man is frail and at times loses 
himself readily.”
290
 Once more, the Bishops are leaving the door open for divine intervention 
in the workings of conscience and a role for the Church itself in such an intervention. The 
language, images and concepts offered by the Bishops in their prologue could have been 
drawn from many of the teaching documents, or ecclesiastically approved sources thereby 
promoting continuity of Church teaching. 
 In their definition of conscience, the bishops debunk the image of conscience as a 
mysterious device within the human psyche which is only ever activated when practical 
decisions have to be made concerning the acceptability of specific courses of action. Rather 
than being a mysterious and mostly static mechanism, the Bishops present a very practical 
and active conscience; a conscience which actively involves itself in the  judgements of 
actions; in ensuring the avoidance of the violation of guiding principles; and in the 
acknowledging of those principles which govern lives. Specifically, the bishops affirm: 
Conscience is not simply some ‘still small voice’ which is evoked by 
some mysterious mechanism within us when we are faced with a 
practical decision as to whether a given course of action is acceptable 
or not. Conscience is that ultimate judgement that every man is called 
to make as to whether this or that action is acceptable to him without 
violating the principles which he is prepared to admit as governing his 
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The bishop’s definition of conscience is a reiteration of the many definitions, elaborations 
and commentaries that preceded their statement. Here, we have a Canadian echoing of the 
notion of conscience as that ultimate judgement that an individual has to make “without 
violating the principles which he is prepared to admit as governing his life.” Again, we come 
across the notion that conscience does not make principles or laws; instead its function is to 
utilise them to accomplish its role of guiding the individual towards acts of obedience in the 
case of the good and/or acts of avoidance in the case of evil. 
 Due to historical antecedents, the Canadian Bishops acknowledged the existence of 
confusion in the ever ongoing debate on conscience, and admitted that the idea of conscience 
could not be taken for granted. They suggested that there had been more poetry attached to 
the debate than clarity.
292
 Rather than continuing this historical debate, however, the Bishops 
adopted a more practical “by-their-fruits-you-shall-know-them” approach and identified three 
current types of conscience in Canada. These appear to fall into the normal distribution of a 
centre position flanked by two contrasting extremes.  
The first extreme form is described as “a static or complacent conscience” and is 
characterised by the individual’s abrogation of any responsibility for his or her actions, in 
favour of requiring the Church to minutely detail his or her obligations on their behalf.
293
 
This conscience appears to simply be a static mechanism to be exercised by others which, 
according to the document, is an indication of the individual’s refusal to accept “the 
dynamics behind the changes in the Church and in society.”
294
 The image that comes to mind 
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for this type of conscience is that of conscience as a pre-programmed “answering telephone 
or machine.” 
At the other extreme of the conscience triad, the Bishops situate “the excessively 
dynamic and revolutionary conscience.” In their opinion, this is the conscience of one who 
cannot be told what to do, not even by the Church, and can be characterised as a form of 
“exaggerated subjectivism.”
295
 At this extreme, every action or behaviour is solely judged 
relative to the beliefs and needs of the individual. This extremely subjective conscience, in 
the Bishops’ opinion, is the product of a person who has totally misinterpreted “the idea that 
everyone must ultimately be the Judge, before God, of his actions,”
296
 It can be argued that 
the tendency for such a misinterpretation may be intrinsic to Western cultures. Such cultures 
are particularly noted for their promotion of individualism, a philosophy wherein 
independence and self-reliance are valued, and any external interference with the individual’s 
interests, from whatever source, is strongly resisted. Therefore, it appears that the Bishops 
have experientially, rather than theoretically, identified this second type of conscience.  
The Bishops describe the third type of conscience as being “in the middle position”
297
 
implying therefore that it will not be found to be either inappropriately subjective and self-
reliant or inappropriately dependent on external influences. This conscience is labelled “the 
dynamic Christian conscience.” Its dynamism can be seen in the document’s description of its 
tasks, which are listed as leading individuals “to have a responsible attitude” and feeling “a 
responsibility for a progressive search and striving to live out a life ideal.”
298
 The Christian 
element of the conscience is to be seen in the Bishop’s insistence that all these tasks must be 
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done “according to the mind of Christ.”
299
 This is the conscience which the Bishops hold up 
as the proper attitude of any human being in today’s society, and particularly in the Catholic 
milieu.
300
 In the opinion of this thesis, it is also an understanding of conscience which gels 
with the teachings of the magisterium and the views of its philosophers and theologians. It is 
also an understanding which would easily fit into the views of many Western based Bishops’ 
Conferences. What must be noted, however, is that while it consciously or unconsciously 
derives its thinking from the teachings of the magisterium, there is also an intimately 
experiential flavour to the Bishop’s description of conscience. 
In Part three of the document, they identify the theological and philosophical roots 
from which this acceptable version of conscience grows, and also the positive consequences 
that can arise from engaging meaningfully with it. Before going into the details of the 
Bishops’ findings in this area, it is well to note that they labelled their approved Catholic as 
being by definition a “Mature Conscience.” Secondly, a person may get the feeling while 
reading this section that he has ‘heard it all before’. This should not be surprising, since a 
perusal of the citations in this section, could easily match those found in the Catechism and in 
John Paul II’s works on conscience, for example. It should come as no surprise if similar 
conclusions are reached. 
 The Bishops identify four factors that enhance the formation of a mature Catholic 
conscience: a respect for the proper dignity of every human being; an acceptance of a sense 
of responsibility by all; the need for an antidote to the denial of sin; and the need for the 
insertion of a faith dimension into any consideration of the functions of conscience.
301
 These 
are presented by the Bishops as guides for the proper formation of Christian conscience, 
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which has been described as “the never-ending search which every man must undertake for 
himself in order to find out what is worthy of a man and what is not worthy of a man.”  
 In the formation of the Catholic conscience, the faithful are advised that since they 
came into the world with God’s law on their hearts, they are duty bound to accept 
responsibility for their acts and, therefore, can only act with reference to their Creator, their 
fellow human beings and to themselves.
302
 They are further advised that it is from accepting 
such responsibility that they derive their proper dignity.
303
 This dignity will be further 
enhanced when the individual specifically accepts that God has a role to play in the 
judgments of conscience. Citing Vatican II, the document asserts that “to obey it is the very 
dignity of man; according to it he will be judged.”
304
 For the Bishops this mature conscience 
will be the antidote to the exaggerated pseudo-autonomy of modern man, which has explicitly 
and implicitly played down the actual existence of sin and its consequences.
305
 While they are 
clear about not wanting to portray God as some sort of tyrant seeking out opportunities to 
punish, they are equally clear in their assertion that “He who rejects love is in turn rejected by 
it and lies howling at the threshold.”
306
 Acceptance of a divine role in the judgments of 
conscience, however, rests on the Catholic’s acceptance that living human life responsibly, 
meaningfully and fully will necessarily entail acknowledging a faith dimension to life. The 
Bishops summarise the need for such a dimension in terms of conversion: “Every man must 
turn freely to God.”
307
 
 It is obvious from the Bishops’ elaboration of a Catholic conscience that they believe 
the formation of conscience in a person who demonstrates a generalised belief in the 
                                                             
302




 Ibid., n.26. 
305




 Ibid., n.30. 
92 
 
existence of a distant God, will differ from that of a person who accepts that God intervened 
in human history. Such a difference will be seen to be all the more inevitable, when that 
intervention is depicted in terms of God sending his Son, Jesus Christ, to free and rehabilitate 
humankind by providing human beings with new principles and an offer to teach them the 
way in which God expects them to live, through the living of His own life (Jn. 3:16; 8:12).
308
 
The Bishops also stress that such a difference will be demonstrated in the requirements that 
obeying such a Catholic formed conscience will require. True Catholics will be required to 
“probe deeper in the refinement of what God has revealed as our norm of conduct.”
309
 There 
is a projection here of John Paul II’s teaching concerning the Rich Man’s question to Jesus as 
to “What else” he needed to do to attain eternal life. And there is further evidence of a 
reiteration of teachings found in contemporary Catholic documents. The bishops implicitly 
advise Catholics that they need not rely solely on Scriptures to transmit the answer; such a 
divine power of transmission now resides “in the College of Bishops under the presiding 
direction of the successor of Peter . . . what we call ‘the magisterium’ or teaching service of 
the Church . . . [which] in matters of guiding our conduct . . . [must be considered] a binding 
rule for those who call themselves Catholic.”
310
 The Bishops insist that these ‘extras’, asked 
only of Catholics, must not be considered to be a form of enslavement; rather they should be 
seen as a response to Jesus’ promise to those who truly seek the truth that: “The truth will 
make you free” (John 8:32).  
 While the role of the teaching magisterium has been forcefully reiterated, the role of 
its voice at the local level, that of the priest, has been refined. The document paints a picture 
of the pre-Vatican II priest as being “the conscience of the community [who] interpreted the 
teaching of the Church with a voice that was considered authoritative and usually 
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 In Post-Vatican II, the Church now sees its priest as one who “still has 
the duty of teaching his community the way of God and of morality”, but who also accepts 
that “this judgement must ultimately be made by the person himself.”
312
 Once again, it can be 
suspected that such an assessment may be driven by local issues, for example, a drop in the 
number of priests to do the teaching. This is not to say that this shift from a centralised 
hierarchical magisterium dictating how conscience should be managed to the localised 
teaching of a Parish Priest is not theologically driven. But it does indicate that the insights of 
the Bishops is experientially driven, and so should be quite relevant to the deliberations of 
other Episcopal Conferences.  
 Having identified the necessity for Catholics to cultivate a Catholic conscience, the 
Bishops proceed to identify certain principles and attitudes, which could help the believer in 
that task. They specifically mentioned four factors: a striving for human balance; cultivation 
of a sense of Christ’s Presence; availing of the guidance of the Scriptures and Tradition; and 
being open to the guidance of the magisterium. In terms of striving for ‘human balance’, the 
bishops are advising their flock of the advantages that can accrue to the formation of a 
Catholic conscience from cultivating such characteristics as sound emotional stability, self-
knowledge and clear objective judgements and education.
313
 They also see a role for utilising 
sound communal attitudes and an awareness of cultural and social influences. In their totality, 
the bishops believe that the acquisition of such characteristics could lead to the development 
of proper attitudes.
314
 But, as they have already pointed out, there is need for something more 
than the human in the formation of conscience. Thus, they unambiguously assert that a person 
who wishes to have a true Christian conscience must be faithful in communication with his 
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Lord in all of his life, particularly through his own prayer and the prayer of the Church.
315
 
The bishops went on to point to the Scriptures and Tradition as sources for discovering the 
designs of the Father and “a refined series of ideals, precepts and examples” which Jesus 
passed on to his followers.
316
 Finally, the Bishops assert that, for a believer, the teaching 
magisterium of the Church cannot be considered to “be just one element among others in the 
formation of his conscience.”
317
 Instead, they insist, believers must see it as “the definitive 
cornerstone upon which the whole edifice of conscientious judgement must be built.”
318
 The 
importance, which the Bishops attach to this final requirement, is well attested to by both the 
amount of print space they assign to it in comparison with the other three, and by the details 
into which they go to justify their conclusion.  
 This attention given to well-illustrated details
319
 is a way to tell Christians that a 
believer “has the absolute obligation of conforming his conduct, first and foremost to what 
the Church teaches.”
320
 And even in matters not defined infallibly, the believer still has “the 
obligation to give full priority to the teaching of the Church in favour of a given position . . . 
and to maintain dialogue with the whole Church.”
321
 The bishops leaving no room 
whatsoever for any element of ambiguity insist that when doubt does arise due to a conflict of 
the believer’s views and those of the magisterium, “the presumption of truth lies on the part 
of the magisterium” and must therefore receive the believer’s “religious assent of soul.”
322
 
The bishops are aware of laws like prescriptive positive law that affect the Christian life and 
which sometimes legalises acts condemned by church teaching. Hence, in relation to 
conscience and law in general, they stated: “We limit ourselves in saying that any law set up 
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by legitimate authority and in conformity with divine law must be taken into account in every 
moral action.”
323
 They unanimously reminded their faithful of the divine “prohibitions 
against killing the innocent, adultery, theft, etc”
324
 and reassured them that the laws that the 
church promulgates “are specifically to guide our feet away from the traps set by our 
sinfulness and our own tendencies to sin.”
325
 
 The above detailed description by the Bishops, contrasts breathtakingly with the 
stance they adopted in the 1968 Winnipeg Statement.
326
 It certainly makes that Statement 
look like an aberration. Once again, however, it is to be expected that any Conference 
drawing from the documents issued and approved by the magisterium on its role in the 




 While appearing to be somewhat experientially based, the Bishops did speak the 
theological language of the magisterium in addressing Canadian Catholics about the nature 
and requirements of a mature conscience. Therefore, while the document audience was local, 
its language and message was universal. It is with such parameters that we proceed to 
examine its Irish counterpart. 
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5.2. Irish Catholic Bishops Conference (ICBC): Conscience and Morality (1980) 
 This document
328
 which was issued on 22 February, 1980, has as its rationale the 
deepening of the awareness of moral values among Irish Catholics.
329
 Among the issues dealt 
with are: “The Meaning of Conscience”; “Conscience and the Gospel Law of Love”; “The 
Role of the Church”; “Conscience and Freedom”; “Conscience and Authority” and “When 
Conscience Errs”.  
 From the beginning, the Bishops claim that their aim is to “help Catholics to grow in 
moral insight and freedom, as they become progressively more responsive to the guidance of 
an enlightened, sure and sensitive conscience.”
330
 The Bishops see these values as embodying 
“God’s plan for human beings” and “as an expression of his wisdom.”
331
 Their authority to 
engage in this process is inferred in their claim that the values they seek to engrave more 
deeply in Irish Catholics have been “reflected through the experience of the Church and its 
teaching in every age.”
332
 They further underscore this authority by claiming that while it is 
actually Christ’s task to engrave these values more deeply into the hearts of Irish Catholics, 
and invite them to live by them, it is also the Church’s task, since it is the Body of Christ on 
earth. As with Jesus’ response to the Rich Young Man’s question as to “What else” he 
needed to do to attain eternal salvation, and the Canadian Bishops’ declared intention of 
dealing only with the formation of a Catholic conscience, so it is with the Irish Bishops. The 
values which are of concern to them do not derive from the demands of the natural law, as 
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 The bishops outline their goals accordingly: 
Our purpose in issuing this statement is to deepen the awareness of 
moral values among our people. These values, which embody God’s 
plan for human beings and are an expression of his wisdom, are 
reflected through the experience of the Church and its teaching in 
every age. The more fully we realise them in our lives through 
obedience to the voice of conscience, the more we become conformed 
to the image of Christ. It is Christ himself, living by the spirit in our 
hearts, and in the Church, which is his body, who makes known these 
values to us and invites us to live by them. Through them the demands 
of the Gospel law of love are presented to us in the concrete 
circumstances of our life. 
In offering these guiding principles on the relationship between 
conscience and morality, and in referring, however briefly, to the 
respective roles of love, freedom and authority in Christian life, our 
aim is to help Catholics to grow in moral insight and freedom, as they 
become progressively more responsive to the guidance of an 
enlightened, sure and sensitive conscience.
334
 
 As with the Canadian Bishops, the Irish Bishops are keen to rectify any “mistaken 
views about the role of conscience” that may exist among Irish Catholics. In fact, in their 
introduction, they maintain that such erroneous views are quite common.
335
 In the following 
excerpt, the bishops specify the exact nature of such errors:  
People frequently fail to understand the relationship of conscience to 
what is morally right and good in itself, or, as it is often called, the 
objective order of morality. They do not pay enough attention to the 
fact that our moral life choices must always be in accordance with the 
true nature of the human person, who is made in the image of God and 
called to eternal union with him in knowledge and love. People are 
often confused, too, about the need for an external guide if conscience 
is to carry out its appointed task. In particular the role of the 
authoritative teaching of the Church in the formation of the individual 
Christian conscience is frequently neglected or misunderstood.
336
 











 The first error identified by the Bishops is the frequent failures of Catholics in the 
area of natural law and conscience. They describe them as simply failing to understand the 
relationship between conscience and the objective order of morality which derives from 
natural law. As a basis for the second error, the Bishops move on to the concept of the role of 
the Divine in conscience. In this context, the Bishops claim that Catholics “do not pay 
enough attention” to their true nature. The essence of their true nature, according to the 
document, is that they have been made in God’s image, and this must be taken into account in 
all moral decision making. Naturally, this cannot happen if the decision takers do not attend 
sufficiently to the element of the divine within them. The Bishops identify the third source of 
error as the confusion that they see existing among Irish Catholics with regard to their need 
for external guidance “if conscience is to carry out its appointed task.”
337
 
 The Bishops recognised confusions that arise in particular with the role of 
“authoritative teaching of the Church in the formation of the individual Christian 
conscience.”
338
 What they do not specify, however, is whether they see Irish Catholics as 
generally being over reliant on Church guidance or seeking to be excessively independent of 
it, or as a mixture of both. As a general observation, it appears that while the Canadian 
document displays a certain awareness of what is actually happening in the modern world, 
the Bishops seem to be interested solely in providing the Catholic with ‘The Pure Theory’ of 
the Church’s teaching on conscience. Neither document appears to provide any strong 
evidence of being interested in the area of ‘Applied Theory’, particularly as to issues of 
conscience in the modern world. 
 Having outlined the nature of the errors Catholics are believed to commit in their 
understanding of the nature of conscience and of how it is required “to carry out its appointed 







task”, the Bishops state a second aim as intention to teach the faithful “a few truths about 
conscience and morality, in line with the tradition of the Catholic Church.”
339
 They 
specifically intend to draw on what they consider to be the newer and clearer insights of the 
Church’s teaching as found in the documents of Vatican II.
340
 
5.2.1 Meaning of Conscience 
 With regard to the meaning of conscience, the Bishops explain it in terms of the tasks 
it is required to perform. At a general level, they suggest that conscience can be understood as 
a function within the human being, which concerns itself with ensuring that an individual 
does well and avoids evil.
341
 At a more practical and precise level, they present conscience as 
a “practical judgement” of an action which is about to be performed or has been performed is 
good or evil. However, as if emphasising that conscience is not simply a series of 
disconnected actions, the Bishops also propose that conscience can be rightly understood as 
“the habitual power of making judgements on the goodness or wickedness of actions.”
342
 
Combining these explanations, the Bishops present conscience to Irish Catholics as an 
individual’s attempt at discerning the moral values which are at stake in particular situations 
and, consequently, what his response should be if he is to respect their demands.
343
 To engage 
in this process requires assistance from at least three sources; from the involvement of the 
individual’s own intelligence; predictably, from the help of God, as delivered through His 
Church; and from other people.
344
 
 The Bishops’ document reinforced what Thomas Aquinas, Vatican II and John Paul II 
had taught earlier. However, there is a striking feature to be found in the language syntax of 
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the document. The bishops’ use of first person pronouns and possessive adjectives can be 
interpreted as an attempt to move from the impersonal to the more personal, even to the 
intimate. It is also a subtle didactic strategy meant to draw the listener more into the world of 
the speaker, or the student more into the world of the teacher. Thus, we find the document 
actually placing the Bishops’ words into the mouths of their readers:  
My conscience, in other words, is my reason telling me that I must 
choose the good and avoid evil, and making it possible for me to 
distinguish between them in practice. It is also my reason passing 
judgment on my actions once they have been performed, apportioning 




5.2.2 Conscience and the Law of Love 
Thus far, the type of conscience offered by the Bishops to their faithful could be 
offered to both believers and non-believers. The principles are general and, the references to 
the need for Divine guidance are centred mainly on the acceptance of the natural law. In 
“Conscience and the Gospel Law of Love,” the Bishops set about presenting the Christian 
conscience to their faithful. They cite Jesus’ command to his followers to love God, their 
neighbour and themselves as “the centre and summation of the Christian life.”
346
 They praise 
the work of recent moral theologians, who have distanced themselves from the previous 
practice of dividing “moral teaching into a multiplicity of individual commands and 
prohibitions with no clear master principle behind them. By asserting the primacy of charity 
and of Jesus’ law of love, the bishops claim that contemporary moral theologians have 
provided that absent “master principle.”
347
 While agreeing with the assertion that “to follow 
one’s conscience is to do what love requires”, the Bishops advise believers to be wary of 
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misunderstanding this dictum, as it could lead them into a subjective moral world of confused 
and arbitrary moral judgments.
348
 
This praise of contemporary moral theologians for moving from a “list system” to the 
notion of a “master principle” is somewhat compromised further on in the document. The 
Irish believers are strongly reminded that “when Jesus enunciated the commandment of love 
of God, neighbour and self, he was not abandoning the traditional moral teaching which 
categorised certain actions as moral and others as immoral.”
349
 The ‘strongly’ derives from 
the Bishops’ use of an extensive list of actual prohibitions contained in the Decalogue and in 
the list of “seven capital sins” which still obtain. According to the Bishops, it was never 
Jesus’ intention to abolish these lists, but rather to extend and amplify them.
350
 The potential 
‘compromising’ lies in the Bishops’ return to the list system, so soon after decrying it.  
With an eye to possibly justifying their own role, as part of the Church’s teaching 
magisterium in conscience guidance and formation, the Bishops note how the Apostles 
instructed their converts about the kind of acts which would accord with Christ’s law of love 
and those which would be considered contrary to such a law. They also note that one of the 
reasons for this apostolic intervention was their awareness of people’s susceptibility to self-
deception. As with the documents produced by the other Bishops’ Conferences we see a 
return to a much debated issue, namely the conscience ‘practitioner’s’ need for moral 
guidance. Crucially in the case of the Catholic ‘practitioner’, the main source of such 
guidance must be of an ecclesiastically-mediated divine nature. Once again, this causes a 
certain tension, evident in this document, between the desire to unreservedly assert the notion 
of the primacy of the judgement of the individual’s conscience, and the desire of those who 
consider it their God-given duty to morally guide their followers to what many see as 
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ecclesiastically pre-determined moral positions. This universal tension may well be summed 
up in terms of the extent to which Catholics, who like all human beings are deemed prone to 
self-deception, can be expected to truly operate out of a conscience guided by the ‘master’ 
principles of Christ’s Law of Love as understood by them.  
5.2.3 The Role of the Church and of the Holy Spirit 
Having addressed the meaning of conscience at the levels of natural and divine law, 
the bishops then focused on justifying the roles of the authoritative teaching Church and the 
Holy Spirit in assisting the individual conscience in its moral tasks. In the case of the former, 
the document is seen to go into great detail in its seeking to establish such justification. 
Firstly, it points to the fact that modern times have generated modern moral problems not 
experienced in the times of the New Testament. This in turn, according to the Bishops, has 
generated a need for an “authoritative guidance”, which they unequivocally assert can be 
found in “the pronouncements of the teaching Church.
351
 The document proceeds to remind 
believers that, although the moral law has been divinely inscribed in their hearts, their 
individual consciences have only an “obscure view of moral truth.” Such potential vagueness, 
in addition to the very diversity of moral opinions in the contemporary world, leads the 
Bishops to advise the faithful of their need for external guidance when it comes to the “more 
detailed application” of the moral law.
352
 It needs to be noted here that the document is 
simply reiterating the Church’s traditional portrayal of human beings as being inherently 
fallible and, therefore, in need of external assistance in their moral dealings with a world, 
which it sees as persistently landing them in moral quandaries. It then proceeds to do what, 
traditionally, the Church has done over the centuries and that is to establish the primacy of its 
role as the provider of external assistance.   
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In true judicial fashion, the document opens and closes its case with two 
uncompromising statements. In its opening address the document asserts that: “It makes little 
sense to call oneself a Christian without accepting the Church.”
353
 Its winding up address is 
even more adamant:  
It is impossible, therefore, to separate allegiance to Christ from 
obedience to the teaching Church. One cannot be his disciple while 




As with other Church documents, the Bishops document cites the Scriptures, the early 
Church Fathers and Vatican II in support of its claims to be the primary and necessary 
authoritative voice for guiding the individual’s conscience.
355
 These contributions are well 
summarised by St. Cyprian, a third century bishop of Carthage, in On the Unity of the 
Catholic Church, “He cannot have God for his Father who has not the Church for his 
Mother.”
356
 However, all arguments supporting the Church as the authoritative assistant to the 
human conscience are subsumed by the bishops into the words of Christ, uttered as he 
commissioned his Apostles to be His voice throughout humankind:  
All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go 
therefore and make disciples of all nations . . . teaching them to 
observe all that I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you always, 
to the close of the age (Matt. 28:20).
357
 
There is no doubt in the minds of the Bishops where that authoritative teaching office now 
resides, namely in the Church’s magisterium. Furthermore, they have no doubt as to the 
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nature of its duty, namely that of “officially interpreting for the Christian community the 
teaching of the Gospel, including its moral demands.”
358
 They are also clear as to the format 
of this magisterium, inherited from the Apostles that it is “the Episcopal College, united 
around its Head, the Bishop of Rome.”
359
 Therefore, the Irish Bishops quite comfortably 
present the Irish faithful with the take-it or leave-it words of Jesus to his Apostles, which are 
now rendered applicable to the Episcopal College of the magisterium: “He who hears you 




As well as the Church, however, the Bishops saw a crucial role for the Holy Spirit in 
the guidance of the individual conscience to right judgements. They saw its divine role as that 
of assisting conscience to mature in its role of discernment: 
The function of conscience is to enable us to discern human moral 
values and respond to them freely. To the extent that we succeed in 
doing so, our conscience may be said to be adult, or mature. To help it 




Elaborating on this, the Irish Bishops proclaimed that the Spirit of Christ dwells in the hearts 
of Catholics through Baptism in order to help them recognise and put into practice the divine 
injunction to love God and their neighbour. In so doing, Christian individuals are not left to 
rely entirely on an “unaided reason”; rather they are helped by the Spirit to be obedient to the 
dictates of conscience, once it has been discerned, by doing what is right. They are also 
helped to choose the good in accordance to the will by being given divine assistance to 
overcome obstacles.
362
 The document presents the help of the Spirit as a form of inner 
guidance which is complemented by the teaching authority of the Church in its function of 













external guidance: “By the will of Christ, therefore, the Spirit speaking in the depths of the 
Christian conscience is complemented by the living voice of the Church’s magisterium.”
363
 
Speaking in more specific terms with reference to the complementary roles of Spirit and 
magisterium, the Bishops assert that the “moral values which conscience seeks to discern 
with the help of the Spirit are inculcated by the Church as it sets forth and applies the moral 
teaching of Christ. And this teaching of the church, too, is guided and directed by the 
Spirit.”
364
 However, with a weather eye to what the document proposes to deal with next, the 
relationship between “Conscience and Freedom”, the Bishops acknowledge that: “Conscience 
is the individual’s first guide in moral matters and, in a very important sense, it is also his 
last, for in the end one must do what conscience command.”
365
 
 What has been presented above in the sections on the role of the Church and the Holy 
Spirit in the moral assessments of the individual conscience can be described as pure 
orthodoxy relevant to the teachings of the magisterium and its sources. As such the Bishops’ 
teaching would sit comfortably in any Episcopal Conference document which seeks the 
unreserved support of that magisterium. On the other hand, whether it would receive such 
support from those for whom it is meant, the Irish Catholic remains doubtful in the twenty 
first century.  
5.2.4. Conscience and Freedom 
 While the Bishops are addressing themselves to all Irish Catholics, they demonstrate 
awareness in this section of those who view the authoritative teaching of the magisterium as 
“a hindrance to true liberty of conscience.” The Bishops absolutely deny that this is the case 
and, in fact, assert that today more than ever “the world needs people who have learned to 
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exercise their own judgement as they search out, day by day, the path of true and right 
behaviour.” However, the document also points out that, as social beings, we will always 
have to depend on others for authoritative guidance. The Bishops regard such dependency as 
intrinsic to the social nature of the human person and for anyone to expect to live a moral life 
totally independent of any external guidance is, in the Bishops’ opinion, a denial of reality 
and a sign of immaturity.
366
 
 On the other hand, the document identifies “adult or mature Christians” as those who 
welcome the authoritative teaching of the Church as both reliable indicators of moral values 
and as “an aid to genuine human development.”
367
 Furthermore, far from encouraging the 
formation of an overly dependent conscience, such a positive attitude towards external 
magisterial assistance will, according to the Bishops, encourage the individual to be always 
“ready to meet new demands.”
368
 As if echoing the Canadian Bishops’ reminder to their 
faithful not to form a conscience that was overly reliant on Church guidance and directives, 
the Irish Bishops remind their Catholic readers that: 
The full challenge of the moral law for the individual cannot be spelt 
out by authority or expressed to the last detail in any series of 
commandments. It is for conscience to consider each new situation in 
the light of the overall command of love and the relevant moral 
values, and make the appropriate response.
369
 
The Bishops elaborate the remainder of what constitutes the “full challenge of the moral law”. 
Specifically, they remind believers that even when their response to the judgements of 
conscience is compatible with the specific commandments of God, as authoritatively 
interpreted by the Church, this simply points to “the limit below which [their] moral response 
must not fall.”
370
 For the Bishops, the true challenge for Catholics lies in their individual 
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response to the realisation that: “we never reach the point at which we can say that we have 
completely fulfilled the moral law in a given area and have no higher demands to meet.”
371
 
 Far from constraining true liberty of conscience, then, the task of the magisterium and 
the Holy Spirit has been presented as that of guiding Christians on the way to moral freedom 
by calling upon them to make responses that are free, willing and generous.
372
 The Irish 
bishops now utilise a memorable and much cited excerpt from Vatican II to remind the Irish 
faithful that the essence of the dignity of conscience can be measured by the extent to which 
it is enabled to “choose the good freely and for its own sake.” They declared: 
For God willed that man should ‘be left in the hand of his own 
counsel’ (Eccl. 15:14), so that he might of his own accord seek his 
Creator and freely attain his full and blessed perfection by cleaving to 
him. Man’s dignity therefore requires him to act out of conscience and 
free choice, as moved and drawn in a personal way from within, and 
not by blind impulses in himself or by mere external constraint.
373
 
This section on “Conscience and Freedom” has seen the Bishops attempting to achieve 
a three-way balance. Such a balance attempted to weight the right of every individual to freely 
exercise his or her conscience against every individual’s intrinsic need for external moral 
guidance. Both of these factors were then weighted against the Church’s claim to be the 
divinely appointed primary guide and interpreter for all Christians seeking moral advice and 
direction. The extent to which the Irish Bishops achieved their ‘weighting task’ may be 
difficult to assess objectively, as the faith commitment of each assessor may well play a key 
role in any assessment.  
5.2.5. Conscience and Authority  
 In terms of the above heading, the document addresses two problems that consistently 
arise in the application of Church teachings on the supremacy of conscience. Firstly, it 
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focuses on the nature and resolution of the conflicts that inevitably occur when there is a clash 
between the moral directives of the Church and the judgements of the individual conscience. 
Secondly, it addresses the contribution of dissident theologians towards resolving or 
exacerbating such conflicts. 
 To shed light on the steps that must be taken to arrive at a resolution of the individual-
magisterium conflict, the Bishops invoked the thinking and writings of John Henry Newman. 
The bishops introduce Newman with a glowing tribute to the effect that “no one has written 
with greater sensitivity on the subject of conscience than John Henry Newman.”
374
 The 
Bishops utilise this “greater” insight on the part of Newman to set limits to the supremacy of 
conscience and, thereby, underscore the need for the teaching Church as a guide for a fallible 
conscience:  
The sense of right and wrong, which is the first element in religion, is 
so delicate, so fitful, so easily puzzled, obscured, perverted . . . that, in 
the struggle for existence amid the various exercises and triumphs of 
the inhuman intellect, this sense is at once the highest of all teachers, 
yet the least luminous; and the Church, the Pope, the Hierarchy are, in 
the divine purpose, the supply of an urgent demand.
375
 
However, although they have already presented Newman as setting limits to the supremacy of 
conscience, the Bishops cite him asserting that no individual is allowed to disregard it under 




 The document presents Newman focusing on a critical scenario wherein an individual 
feels unable in conscience to obey a directive from the Pope. While his response and that of 
the Irish Bishops are shown to be unequivocal – obedience to one’s conscience certainly 
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comes first – all are agreed that a decision to go against the Pope’s authority can only be taken 
for the gravest reason. 
 With regards to theologians who dissent from the teachings of the magisterium, the 
document advises the Irish Catholic that the authority of any theologian cannot and does not 
outweigh that of the Pope in declaring the faith of the Church.
377
 The Bishops then invoked 
the words of John Paul II to enable the faithful to identify an authentic theologian 
accordingly: 
Only when the teaching of theologians is in conformity with the 
teaching of the colleges of Bishops, united with the Pope, can the 
people of God know with certitude that that teaching is ‘the faith 
which has been once and for all entrusted to the Saints.’
378
 
The Pope concludes this part of his address by assuring theologians that such a demarcation of 
their theological activities should not be seen as a restraining imposition. He asks them, 
instead, to view it as liberation, because insofar as his clarification of their roles ties them 
securely to the liberating truth of Christ, it also preserves them from being enslaved by 
changing fashions.
379
 Not surprisingly then, the Bishops call upon theologians who have 
failed to teach from such a positions to reconsider their position. The entire section on 
“Conscience and Authority” as taught by the Bishops, should be considered their Apologia for 
the guiding role of the Church in matters pertaining to the individual’s conscience, even 
where the stances of both may be incompatible and the supremacy of conscience is 
necessarily upheld. Furthermore, the remit of this Apologia is extended to include the 
regularising of the teaching activities of dissenting theologians. As such the Bishops are 
delivering a lesson in obedience to the teaching authority of the Church both to the people of 
God and to theologians.  
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5.2.6 Conscience is Sacred (Even When in Error) 
 Two sections of the document shall here be discussed together: “When Conscience 
Errs”
380
 and “Conscience is Sacred.”
381
 The Bishops open this section with a well-worn 
acknowledgement of the potential for an inherently fallible conscience to err and be mistaken. 
In such a fallible situation, the Bishops suggest that rather than labelling the “perpetrator” a 
sinner, he or she be offered sympathy and understanding. However, the Bishops advise those 
of their faithful who have acted wrongly because of a mistaken conscience that they may not 
be entirely blameless. They claim that an impaired conscience may be of one’s own making 
due to such behavioural factors as habitual sinning in the past, neglecting prayer or refusing to 
seek the advice of others, for example. 
 Whether mistaken or acting in error, however, the document reminds the Irish faithful 
of the essential sacredness of conscience, a sacredness it sees originating in the belief that 
when Christians opt for the morally good, they are “acting in accordance with the law of 
conduct which God has inscribed in [their] hearts.”
382
 Again, the Bishops refer to Newman to 
enunciate the essence of this sacredness: 
Conscience does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to 
something beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self 
for its decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and 
responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are 
accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice . . . or the echo of a 




It is in the light of an elaboration of conscience as sacred that the Bishops assured the faithful 
that “Even when it is mistaken, [conscience] . . . is still an expression of man’s obedience to 
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God, provided it has sincerely followed the light given it.”
384
 However, it is also because of 
this inherent sacredness that the Bishops seek to identify and dispel some mistaken, even false 
notions centred on the rights and supremacy of conscience. For example the Bishops observe 
that when some people talk about the supremacy and the rights of conscience, they are 
actually talking about a conscience that is independent of all authority, including that of God. 
That this is a problem can be seen from Newman’s elaboration of what the Bishops describe 
as “this utterly false idea of the rights of conscience” which obtained in his day: 
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean 
the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to him, in thought and deed, of 
the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing and acting, 




Even when Newman goes on to remind his readers that conscience has rights because it has 
duties, both he and the Bishops are only too aware that this is interpreted by some sections of 
society as their having the “very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, 
to ignore a Law-giver and Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations.”
386
 However 
mistaken the Bishops consider this to be, they simply reiterate the teaching of Vatican II, 
specifically that teaching which asserts that every human being is entitled to freedom from 
coercion or constraint when following his or her conscience. And even if this freedom is used 
to disparage the teachings of the Church on conscience, the Council and the Irish Bishops see 
no other option but to declare the right itself to be an inalienable possession of each individual 
person.
387
 And what if those individuals are made aware of the true nature of the supremacy 
of conscience in terms of demonstrating respect for others and for the requirements of public, 
but choose to continue propagating and acting out of their mistaken notions? They do not 
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forfeit their right to a free and unconstrained conscience. As the Church teaches, that right is 
inalienable. 
5.2 7. The Church Answers Back 
 In its last four sections, the document addresses four questions or notions which, they 
claim are regularly utilised to intentionally or unintentionally dilute the objectivity of the 
moral order and/or the individual’s absolute responsibility for his or her actions. 
5.2.7.1 Good Intentions not a Sufficient Test of Morality 
 Intention according to Aquinas is essential in human action, but it is not enough. The 
bishops here respond to proponents of intention rather than the act itself. It has already been 
noted that the Church acknowledges that sincerely following a mistaken conscience will not 
incur the penalty of sin, and that even in such circumstance the supremacy of conscience is 
never forfeit. However, the Bishops take strong issue with contemporary writers, who, they 
claim, “have shown a tendency to distort the organic and living relationship linking the moral 
order, authority and conscience.”
388
 What they find specifically objectionable is these writers’ 
apparent exaggeration of the freedom of the individual relevant to general moral precepts. The 
Bishops assert that adopting this moral stance gives people the impression that: “certain 
actions that have always been regarded as sinful are not necessarily so in all circumstances, 
but may be good when performed with the right intention or with a good motive.”
389
 
 The Bishops draw examples from the teachings of the fifth and sixth Commandments 
to bring home to their faithful how straining the voice of conscience through the sieve of good 
intentions could impact on their day-to-day living. Relative to the fifth Commandment, the 
Bishops point out that it is now being asserted that it can be lawful to deliberately and directly 
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take innocent human life through abortion, euthanasia, or through the direct killing of 
innocent civilians through military action.
390
 In the context of the same Commandment, they 
also point out that the torture of human beings and the denial of genuine human rights to 
prisoners can also derive directly from this moral assessment of actions in terms of the 
intentions or motives being ascribed to their performance.
391
 The Bishops go on to note the 
main argument forwarded by those who condone or even perpetrate such actions:  
It is argued that cases sometimes arise where the evil involved in such 
acts is outweighed by the good achieved through them, and this is 
sufficient to make them morally permissible or even good. The overall 
demands of love are held to be better served by doing the action in 
question than by omitting it.
392
 
In short, such an approach to morality, according to the Bishops, sees no problem with an 
individual allowing or even perpetrating what is in reality an evil act, if some important good 
is seen to derive from it.
393
 
 With reference to the sixth Commandment, the Bishops also note that certain writers 
are condoning acts “that are in themselves morally evil and [which] no motives or 
circumstances can change their nature.”
394
 Among such actions they list are “pre-marital and 
extra-marital sexual intercourse, masturbation, homosexual acts, contraceptive intercourse in 
marriage.”
395
 Although the Bishops were aware that their labelling of some of these acts as 
sinful might not find favour with all of their contemporary Irish Catholics, they demonstrated 
no hesitation about listing these actions. Furthermore, they cited recent documents from the 
magisterium in support of their stance.
396
 In the eyes of the Bishops what certain writers were 
actually promoting was “that actions which have always been condemned by Christian 
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teaching . . . can be lawful and good if done from the motive of love.”
397
 We may ask if such 
love is an Agape love.
398
 
 The message that the Bishops want their Catholic faithful to continually bear in mind 
in these and in all circumstances, where there exists a “tendency to justify exceptions to 
unchanging moral norms”
399
 is clear and unambiguous:  
Even the best motives cannot change the nature of such actions. The 
end, in other words, can never justify the means: as St. Paul reminds 




They also remind their faithful of the moral implications for any person adopting such a 
relative approach to the moral judgements of his or her conscience, and so follow through in 
their actions. Their message to these individuals is unequivocal: by seeking to justify your 
conscience in such a manner rather than openly acknowledging your actions as wrong, you 
are making a false appeal to conscience.
401
 For the salutary benefit of all Catholics, the Irish 
Bishops spell out what the conscience of such a person has, in fact, degenerated into: 
Conscience has become for them a more or less independent judge of 
morality, an arbitrary rule of conduct. It is no longer firmly anchored 
to the real order of human values, but it is tossed about according to 
the changing requirements of personal or group advantage.
402
 
The Bishops also warn their faithful that such a relative approach to the injunctions of 
objective morality can have serious consequences for the welfare of society in general. They 
single out for particular attention relative to this debate the area of justice, and note that in this 
context there has never been a greater need for the recognition of and respect for such 
objective moral standards. 
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 Two comments can be made relative to the Bishops’ teachings in this particular 
debate. Firstly, they themselves cannot be accused of adapting their teachings to suit some 
modern day moral and philosophical transformations. In such fraught and controversial areas 
as attitudes towards homosexuality, masturbation and the use of torture, for example, their 
teaching is unequivocal, is definitely out of step with popular opinion, but is magisterially 
driven. Although their view on torture is congruent with many secular thinkers who abhor it, 
courting popularity was certainly not one of the Bishops’ intentions. Secondly, in this section 
we do not find the Bishops simply promoting the need for Church involvement in the 
formation of the individual conscience. Rather we actually see them ‘in action’, helping to do 
just that, participating in the formation of the individual conscience. 
5.2.7.2. Particular Acts and Basic Direction of Life 
Concerning this section, the document addresses the notion that a Loving God would 
never send anyone to Hell for just one individual sin, no matter how serious. Instead, He 
would judge individual actions in the context of a person’s overall relationship with Him.
 
 The 
document acknowledges that there is a certain amount of truth to be found in this tenet, but 
that it “errs insofar as it suggests that one can continue to love God while refusing to do his 
will in a serious matter.”
403
 The document offers the following reasons for this assessment. 
Firstly, it notes that an individual act can completely alter the direction of a person’s life, and 
can be an indication of a person’s general carelessness about lesser acts that, in fact, suggest a 
general drift away from God. Secondly, Catholics are reminded that the basic direction of 
their lives “expresses itself in particular actions.” Finally, they are reminded that a person, 
who deliberately acts in a manner which he or she knows to be seriously contrary to God’s 
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 Naturally, the Bishops would prefer to draw from the wisdom of the magisterium 
rather than the obvious commonsense of colloquialisms to validate their teaching. This they 
do by using the words of the Declaration on Certain Questions concerning Sexual Ethics 
issued by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: 
According to the Church’s teaching, mortal sin, which is opposed to 
God, does not consist only in formal and direct resistance to the 
commandment of charity. It is equally to be found in this opposition to 
authentic love which is included in every deliberate transgression, in 
serious matter, of each of the moral laws.
405
 
5.2.7.3 How Free Are Our Moral Choices? 
 This section of the document once again challenges what the bishops perceive as 
another attempt at diluting the individual’s moral responsibility for his or her freely performed 
actions. It identifies the challenge as emanating this time from the findings of modern 
psychological research and depth analysis, which indicate that all human decisions are 
surrounded by a complex of conscious and unconscious motives;
406
 and that “these pressures 
act so far below the level of consciousness that [individuals] never realise the influence which 
they have on [their] decisions.”
407
 The Bishops’ response to this is to assert that unless these 
pressures are so excessive as to seriously impair the individual’s ability to decide freely, those 
decisions are still deemed to be responsible and moral ones.
408
 Furthermore, while the 
Bishops acknowledge that the sinfulness of an action may be diminished in proportion to the 
strength of such ‘psychological’ pressures; such a ‘sympathetic’ stance does not relieve the 
individual of all moral culpability or blame. They remind their faithful that to adopt this 
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attitude would be tantamount to denying people their dignity as free and responsible human 




 The Bishops see their teachings as being highly relevant to the area of adolescent 
sexual morality. They characterise this specific area as one where confusion abounds because 
of the absence of firm guidelines.
410
 The Bishops implicitly attribute this problem to the 
exaggerated and one-sided ‘psychological’ statements that have been used by those seeking to 
emphasise the effects of conscious or unconscious factors on adolescent decision-making in 
the area of their sexual behaviour.
411
 While acknowledging the recent psychological advances 
in understanding the adolescent mind and distancing themselves from any attempt at 
introducing the element of guilt to this area, they advise both Catholic adults and adolescents 
that: “It does no service to the young to pretend that such actions are morally indifferent, or 




 What comes through in this section is the Bishops’ repeated resistance to justifying 
acts that are perceived to be contrary to the objective moral order as promulgated by the 
Church’s magisterium. In this case they have challenged what they see as the misuse or abuse 
of psychological findings centred on the role of conscious and unconscious motivational 
pressures in the individual’s moral decision-making process. In the minds of the Irish Bishops 
any derogation from the objective moral order can only be tolerated to the extent that there 
has been some ‘over-the-top’ psychological interfering with the individual’s freedom to act 
morally. The Bishops also seek to contextualise their teaching in terms of the day-to-day lives 
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of their faithful. Once again, they choose an area which is the subject of much debate, namely 
adolescent sexuality. In choosing this area, they would be well aware of the resentment of 
those adults who would consider that they are victims of the Church’s previous guilt-laden 
intrusion into this area of their lives. However, while acknowledging this past failure on the 
part of the Church, they do not hesitate in reminding both adult and adolescent Irish Catholics 




5.2.7.4 What Others Do 
 The attempt at diluting the individual’s moral responsibility which the Bishops 
challenge in this section can best be summed up in the colloquial excuse: “Ah, sure they’re all 
at it!” They cite some of the many areas in people’s lives where such an attitude is used to 
justify immoral behaviour to the extent that such behaviour is no longer considered in terms 
of its morality. The Bishops’ message to their faithful in this area, as in all areas where they 
identify an attempt at diluting individual moral responsibility, is forthright and 
uncompromising:  
It is simply not the case that the individual conscience can abdicate its 
responsibility by unthinkingly following the practice of others; at all 
times it is its duty to seek the right course of conduct in the light of 
rational reflection and with the help of authoritative teaching.
414
 
 They see this teaching as being particularly relevant in the domain of sexuality 
wherein, they note, that an “[a]ppeal to majority practice is also very frequently made in an 
attempt to justify sinful conduct.”
415
 The Bishops remind their faithful that, as in other areas 
of morals, “what is right and wrong in sexual morality is not changed by how people actually 
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 According to the Bishops, sexual misconduct will always remain “an offence 
against human dignity” and “against Christ, to whom the Christian belongs by Baptism.”
417
 
 While the Bishops may not have found many ready listeners for this particular 
message at the time they issued their document, the same may not hold today, where our 
attention is constantly being drawn to many well-publicised scandals centred on sexual 
misconduct, exaggerated expense accounts and exorbitant profit margins. Could it be that the 
notion of moral responsibility in the context of “Sure, they’re all at it” is gaining ground in the 
area of public opinion and judicial accountability? 
 The Bishops conclude their statement to the faithful by reminding them accordingly: 
Our purpose in issuing this statement is to deepen the awareness of 
moral values among our people . . . values, which embody God’s plan 
for human beings and are an expression of his wisdom, are reflected 
through the experience of the Church and its teaching in every age.
418
 
To the extent that their language throughout the entire document can be characterised 
as being uncompromising, unequivocal and unambiguous, the Bishops have definitely 
deepened an awareness of their stance in many areas of morality and moral responsibility. To 
the extent to which they drew on the teachings of Vatican II and other documents issued by 
the teaching magisterium to support their stance, they can be considered as being of one mind 
with the universal Catholic Church. However, the document can be considered as being 
“reactionary” in its overall tone. As expected, the document constantly reminds Irish Catholic 
faithful as to how they must morally respond or react to their environment. It specifically does 
this by seeking to contextualise its teachings in terms of the day-to-day lives of the faithful. 
Maybe, however, the Bishops could have also articulated a more pro-actively engaged social 









conscience which the individual Irish Catholic could unashamedly bring with him or her into 
the public domain.  
5.3. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB): Forming Consciences for 
Faithful Citizenships: A Call to Political Responsibility (2007) 
 In 1975, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops began a tradition of 
reflection on “political responsibility” or “faithful citizenship” in advance of each presidential 
election. Their statements addressed public life in terms of what they perceived as key moral 
and social issues. They identified the purpose of “faithful citizenship” as teaching, educating 
and informing American Catholic citizens on how they could participate in public life and, 
also, address these key moral and social issues in a manner compatible with the Church’s 
teaching. This document, issued in November 2007, continues that tradition. It focuses 
specifically on the political life of the American Catholic community, as a relevant aspect in 
the formation of conscience.
419
 The bishops specify how individuals should bring their 
Catholic consciences to bear on their political and social activities. The document also sets 
out the issues and objectives that American Catholics should seriously consider either as 
partisans or as elected officials. 
The document is divided into three parts. Part I is entitled “Forming Consciences for 
Faithful Citizenship: The U.S. Bishops’ Reflection on Catholic Teaching and Political Life”. 
It deals with the bishops’ involvement in formation of consciences of Catholic Americans on 
the need to be both politically and socially sensitive to the Catholic teachings on matters such 
as ‘The Right to Life,’ ‘The True Nature of Marriage,’ ‘The Rights of Workers and 
Employers,’ and ‘The Right of the Catholic Church to Freely Promulgate its Teaching.’ To 
help achieve this objective in their mission to their faithful, the Bishops, in the first part, 
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elaborated answers to four questions: (1) Why Does the Church Teach About Issues 
Affecting Public Policy? (2) Who in the Church Should Participate in Political Life? (3) How 
Does the Church Help the Catholic Faithful to Speak About Political and Social Questions? 
(4) What Does the Church Say About Catholic Social Teaching in the Public Square?
420
 
Part II is entitled “Applying Catholic Teaching to Major Issues: A Summary of Policy 
Positions of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops.” In this second part, the 
Bishops take four areas of concern already raised in Part I and undertake a more detailed 
analysis of these issues in terms of the teachings of the Catholic Church. Focusing on Human 
Life, Family Life, Social Justice and Global Solidarity, they announce that they are calling 
attention “to issues with significant moral dimensions that should be carefully considered in 
each campaign and as policy decisions are made in the years to come.”
421
 With regard to such 
issues, the document reminds the American Christian Catholic faithful that, as Catholics they 
“cannot ignore their inescapable moral challenges or simply dismiss the Church’s guidance 
that flows from these principles.
422
 
Part III which is entitled “Goals for Political Life: Challenges for Citizens, Candidates 
and Public Officials” lists ten objectives derived from the teachings of the Catholic Church 
that the Bishops hope American Catholics will bring to the attention of their candidates and 
elected officials. Their hope is that these stated goals or objectives can “help voters and 




 As the main interest of this thesis centres on the formation and judgements of 
conscience, the primary focus of this section will be on the bishops’ analysis of the 
relationship between those moral phenomena and American politics. Politics is a vital aspect 
                                                             
420
 Ibid., n.6. 
421
 Ibid., n.63. 
422
 Ibid., n.63. 
423
 Ibid., n.90. 
122 
 
of the social life of any country, especially because of its relevance to human lawmaking. 
Therefore, one of the activities that will be looked at closely will be the manner in which the 
document connects the American Catholic conscience to the ‘public square’. Another 
important aspect to be highlighted will be the reasons that the American Bishops offer for the 
Church’s involvement in teaching American Christian Catholics about the role their 
consciences should play in the political life of their country.  
5.3.1 The Church, the American Catholic Conscience and the “Public Square” 
In their introduction to Part I, the bishops state:  
For many years, we bishops of the United States have sought to share 
Catholic teaching on political life. We have done so in a series of 
statements issued every four years focused on ‘political responsibility’ 
or ‘faithful citizenship.’ In this document we continue that practice, 
maintaining continuity with what we have said in the past in light of 
new challenges facing our nation and world. This is not new teaching 
but affirms what is taught by our Bishops’ Conference and the whole 
Church. As Catholics, we are part of a community with a rich heritage 
that helps us consider the challenges in public life and contribute to 
greater justice and peace for all people.
424
 
The bishops are very clear about their intention on the need to foster the education of 
American Catholic political consciences. They are not out “to tell Catholics for whom or 
against whom to vote.”
425
 While they see the formation of the Catholic conscience as an 
essential part of their mission, their introduction and titles demonstrate that the Bishops are 
particularly interested in helping Catholics to bring their moral judgements to bear not only 
on themselves as individuals, but on “the public square” as either voters or elected officials. 
For example, they urge voters to “use the framework of Catholic teaching to examine 
candidates’ positions on issues affecting human life and dignity as well as issues of justice 
and peace, and they should consider candidates’ integrity, philosophy, and performance.”
426
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Catholic candidates and Catholic elected officials are strongly reminded that they may not 
leave their Catholic consciences at home or in church while they are performing their public 
duties. The Bishops strongly advise Catholic legislators and politicians that 
Worship pleasing to God can never be a purely private matter, without 
consequences for our relationships with others: it demands a public 
witness to our faith. Evidently, this is true for all the baptized, yet it is 
especially incumbent upon those who, by virtue of their social or 
political position, must make decisions regarding fundamental values, 
such as respect for human life, its defence from conception to natural 
death, the family built upon marriage between a man and a woman, 
the freedom to educate one’s children and the promotion of the 
common good in all its forms.
427
 
Addressing Catholic voters and candidates, citizens and elected officials, the Bishops 
specifically identified the showing of respect for the dignity of every person as “the core of 
Catholic moral and social teaching.”
428
 Therefore, all are reminded that because they are 
“people of both faith and reason, it is appropriate and necessary for [them] to bring this 
essential truth about human life and dignity to the public square.”
429
  
 The document asserts that far from threatening the American nation’s tradition of 
pluralism, it is enhanced by such a contribution from the Catholic community. This is 
because, in their opinion, the Catholic Church’s teaching is “in accord with the foundational 
values that have shaped [their] nation’s history: ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.’”
430
 In fact, the Bishops identify the moral judgements that derive from the 
Catholic community as assets to the political dialogue about their nation’s future. In support 
of this assertion they state that, as Catholic citizens or elected officials, for example, they 
bring “a consistent moral framework – drawn from basic human reason that is illuminated by 
Scripture and the teaching of the Church – for assessing issues, political platforms, and 
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 Accordingly, and relevant to the Catholic’s potential for contributing in a 
morally enlightened manner to the American political and social scene, the Bishops maintain 
that Catholics with properly formed consciences “are better able to evaluate policy positions, 
party platforms, and candidates’ promises and actions in light of the Gospel and the moral 
and social teaching of the Church in order to help build a better world.”
432
 
There is nothing to suggest in the Bishops’ approach to their task that they are overly 
aware of, or over-sensitive to the fact that they are delivering their message in a “political 
environment, where Catholics may feel politically disenfranchised, sensing that no party and 
too few candidates fully share the Church’s comprehensive commitment to the life and 
dignity of every human being.”
433
 The Bishops appear to be following their own advice to 
their lay faithful, namely, that “now is not a time for retreat or discouragement.”
434
 Instead 
they represent this era as a time for renewed engagement, especially on the part of Catholic 
laywomen and men who, having formed their consciences in accord with Catholic teaching, 




5.3.2 Are American Bishops Forming the Catholic Conscience or Simply Interfering 
Excessively in American Political Life? 
 A short response to the above is contained in a criticism of Part I of the document by 
Elizabeth F. Brown. While commenting on how useful the document has been in actually 
helping the average Catholic discern how to vote, she does refer to a particular flaw found in 
Part I. She particularly notes that: “Part I does not provide clear answers regarding how to 
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 While Part II does provide greater clarity and less ambiguity for Catholic voters, 
Brown maintains that they will mostly read only Part I, and will consequently seek guidance 
from “voter guides for Catholics . . . which are terribly flawed and full of errors for the 
unwary.”
437
 However, whatever the reasons in favour may be, the bishops emphatically state 
that it is neither their mission nor their intention to instruct any one concerning whom to vote 
for, or for what political party they should specifically cast their vote. They cite the words of 
Benedict XVI in Deus Caritas Est in support of their position: “The Church cannot and must 
not take upon herself the political battle to bring about the most just society possible. She 
cannot and must not replace the State.”
438
 As proof of their commitment to this stance, the 
Bishops, as Church Leaders, acknowledge that they must “avoid endorsing or opposing 
candidates or telling people how to vote.”
439
 
While strongly acknowledging Pope Benedict’s clear distinction between the 
functions of Church and State leaders, the Bishops also highlight one other conclusion to be 
found in the Pope’s Encyclical, namely that: “at the same time she [the Church] cannot and 
must not remain on the sidelines in the fight for justice.”
440
 The Bishops are quite clear as to 
the parameters of this “fight for justice.” They outline them both at the beginning and at the 
end of Part I, before going on to elaborate the most urgent and non-negotiable ones in Part II. 
In the introduction to Part I, for example, they profile a litany of moral and social disparities 
that exist between what could be described as ‘The American Dream’ and the ‘American 
Reality’: 
We are a nation founded on ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,’ but the right to life itself is not fully protected, especially 
for unborn children, the most vulnerable members of the American 
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family. We are called to be peacemakers in a nation at war. We are a 
country pledged to pursue ‘liberty and justice for all,’ but we are too 
often divided across lines of race, ethnicity, and economic inequality. 
We are a nation of immigrants, struggling to address the challenges of 
many new immigrants in our midst. We are a society built on the 
strength of our families, called to defend marriage and offer moral and 
economic supports for family life. We are a powerful nation in a 
violent world, confronting terror and trying to build a safer, more just, 
more peaceful world. We are an affluent society where too many live 
in poverty and lack health care and other necessities of life. We are 
part of a global community facing urgent threats to the environment 
that must sustain us. These challenges are at the heart of public life 
and at the centre of the pursuit of the common good.
441
 
At the end of Part I the document particularises these disparities, as can be seen in the 
following examples. Relative to “The Right to Life and the Dignity of the Human Person” the 
Bishops’ stance is unambiguous and forthright: “Direct attacks on innocent persons are never 
morally acceptable, at any stage or in any condition.”
442
 The Catholic layperson is left in no 
doubt as to the values that are under direct attack in their society: “human life is especially 
under direct attack from abortion . . . euthanasia, human cloning, and the destruction of 
human embryos for research.
443
 Furthermore, the document demand that its laypeople show 
solidarity with Catholic teaching about the dignity of life by demonstrating their opposition to 
torture, unjust wars, the use of the death penalty, genocide, attacks against non-combatants, 
and racism.
444
 The document concludes this moral challenge to its Catholic community, by 
urging them in their roles as voters or candidates to demonstrate a reverence for the lives of 
all human beings as children of God. 
 In terms of showing support for the family, community and participation, the 
document emphasises that human beings are not only sacred but social as well and that the 
family, based on the union between a man and a woman, is the first and fundamental unit of 
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 The Catholic electors and candidates are explicitly asked not to undermine or help 
redefine this “sanctuary for the creation and nurturing of children” by allowing same-sex 
unions or other distortions of marriage. In tandem with this notion of the human being as 
‘social’, the Bishops also address the concept of ‘Solidarity within the entire human family. It 
is the Bishops’ hope that the Catholic community will keep in mind that whatever their 
national, racial, ethnic, economic and ideological differences, they are all one human family; 
they are their brothers’ and sisters’ keepers.
446
 The document wants this solidarity extended 
by the Catholic community to immigrants “seeking work, a safe home, education for their 
children, and a decent life for their families. Such solidarity is also to be demonstrated by the 
exercise of a preferential option for the poor and vulnerable. The attention of the Catholic 
faithful is drawn to the Catechism which explains that 
Those who are oppressed by poverty are the object of a preferential 
love on the part of the Church which, since her origin and in spite of 
the failings of many of her members, has not ceased to work for their 
relief, defence, and liberation through numerous works of charity 
which remain indispensable always and everywhere.
447
 
In this manner, the particularisation of general social and individual moral principles 
continues throughout the Bishops’ teaching. 
At the conclusion of Part I the document acknowledges that it is involved in the 
political process, but that its involvement cannot be considered to be partisan, ideological or 
sectarian, but principled.
448
 The Bishops remind their critics and their fellow Catholics, 
however, that “As leaders of the Church in the United States, we bishops have the duty to 
apply these moral principles to key public policy decisions facing our nation, outlining 
directions on issues that have important moral and ethical dimensions”
449
 This assertion leads 
                                                             
445
 Ibid., n.46. 
446
 Ibid., n.53. 
447
 Ibid., n.50. 
448
 Ibid., nn.55, 58 and 60. 
449
 Ibid., n.56. 
128 
 
naturally to the next section, which seeks to establish by whose authority the American 
Bishops seek to “create awareness and form the consciences of faithful citizens” for their 
participation in the “public square.” 
5.3.3 Whence The Bishops’ Authority to Actively Form Consciences For Faithful 
Citizenship that are Socially and Politically Sensitive to the Teachings of the Church?  
Citing Pope Benedict XVI’s thought on the mission of the church to form consciences 
in political life amongst the laity, the bishops reaffirmed that it was also part of their mission 
to stimulate in the laity a greater insight into the authentic requirements of justice, as well as 
greater readiness to act accordingly, even when this might involve conflict with situations of 
personal interest.
450
 Thus, the Bishops saw it as their primary responsibility “to hand on the 
Church’s moral and social teaching.”
451
 Specifically, they saw it as their mission “to teach 
fundamental moral principles that help Catholics form their consciences correctly, to provide 
guidance on the moral dimensions of public decisions, and to encourage the faithful to carry 
out their responsibilities in political life.”
452
 
The above illustrates the objectives of the Church’s participation in shaping the moral 
character of Catholic consciences for faithful citizenship. Primarily, the bishops engage 
themselves in an “obligation”, which “is a basic part of the mission [they] have received from 
Jesus Christ, who offers a vision of life revealed to [all] in Sacred Scripture and Tradition.”
453
 
They claim that, in shaping the moral character of Catholic consciences, they are simply 
following in the footsteps of the Teaching Christ. They confirm that not only is this a mission 
imposed on them by Jesus Christ himself, but a mission deserving of the full support and 
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protection of American civil law because of the benefits that can accrue to society from its 
implementation: 
Some question whether it is appropriate for the Church to play a role 
in political life. However, the obligation to teach about moral values 
that should shape our lives, including our public lives, is central to the 
mission given to the Church by Jesus Christ. Moreover, the United 
States Constitution protects the right of individual believers and 
religious bodies to participate and speak out without government 
interference, favoritism, or discrimination. Civil law should fully 
recognize and protect the Church’s right, obligation, and opportunities 
to participate in society without being forced to abandon or ignore its 
central moral convictions. . . Indeed, our Church’s teaching is in 
accord with the foundational values that have shaped our nation’s 
history: ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ The Catholic 
community brings important assets to the political dialogue about our 
nation’s future. We bring a consistent moral framework—drawn from 
basic human reason that is illuminated by Scripture and the teaching 
of the Church— for assessing issues, political platforms, and 
campaigns. We also bring broad experience in serving those in need—
educating the young, caring for the sick, sheltering the homeless, 
helping women who face difficult pregnancies, feeding the hungry, 




In short, the Bishops are stating unequivocally that it is their duty as leaders within the 
Church to help shape the political scene in the United States, through their laity, whom they 
consider to be morally obliged to participate in political life. Their mission and that of the 
American Catholic community is an obligation that is rooted in the baptismal commitment of 
all Christians to follow Christ and to bear Christian witness in all that they do.
455
 The bishops 
invite the people to participate in a politics that recognises the dignity of the human person. 
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5.3.4 Catholics and Faithful Citizenship: A Different Sort of Political Engagement 
 The bishops observed that “politics in our country can often be a contest of powerful 
interests, partisan attacks, sound bites and media hype.”
456
 In contrast to such morally 
questionable practices, the bishops advocate a different type of political engagement, a 
politics that would be 
shaped by the moral convictions of well-formed consciences and 
focused on the dignity of every human being, the pursuit of the 
common good, and the protection of the weak and the vulnerable. The 
Catholic call to faithful citizenship affirms the importance of political 
participation and insists that public service is a worthy vocation. As 
Catholics, we should be guided more by our moral convictions than by 
our attachment to a political party or interest group. When necessary, 
our participation should help transform the party to which we belong; 
we should not let the party transform us in such a way that we neglect 
or deny fundamental moral truths. We are called to bring together our 
principles and our political choices, our values and our votes, to help 
build a better world.
457
 
There is no doubting the Bishops’ stance here. For Catholics, moral convictions must come 
before party allegiance or interest groups in all situations. Just as political leaders and 
legislators have already been reminded, such moral convictions are not a private affair, to be 
kept separate from their political activities in “the public square”. The Bishops tell Catholic 
political activists that they have a mission to transform their political parties by bringing 
together their principles and political choices, their values and their votes. To copper-fasten 
this moral injunction, the Bishops advise Catholic laymen and women regarding conscience 
formation and their involvement in political activities: 
Forming their consciences in accord with Catholic teaching, Catholic 
lay women and men can become actively involved: running for office, 
working within political parties, communicating their concerns and 
positions to elected officials; and joining diocesan social mission or 
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advocacy networks, state catholic conference initiatives, community 
organisations, and other efforts to apply authentic moral teaching in 
the public square. Even those who cannot vote have the right to have 




The message coming through both loud and clear to the American faithful is that it is their 
duty to let their Catholic voices, shaped by well-formed consciences, be clearly heard in the 
“public square”. 
5.3.5 Shaping the American Christian Catholic Conscience for Political Engagement 
As already noted, the American laity has been strongly urged to use the values of their 
faith to shape their participation in political life. In light of this robust recommendation, 
active participation in politics has become a matter of faith and morals for the Catholic. The 
Church’s role in this political scenario is that of helping its laity to form their consciences so 
they can make sound moral judgments about public choices. The document goes into much 
detail as to how such formation can best be progressed, beginning with their understanding of 
a well-formed conscience and its function: 
Conscience is not something that allows us to justify doing whatever 
we want, nor is it a mere ‘feeling’ about what we should or should not 
do. Rather, conscience is the voice of God resounding in the human 
heart, revealing the truth to us and calling us to do what is good while 
shunning what is evil. Conscience always requires serious attempts to 
make sound moral judgments based on the truths of our faith.
459
 
As with most definitions of conscience throughout the history of the Church, conscience is 
here defined as the voice of God revealing His truth to human beings, so that they can do 
good and avoid evil. By introducing the notion of God into the concept, conscience becomes 
a matter of faith and the truths of that faith, ensuring that the role of the person’s faith in the 
formation of conscience becomes paramount. This is obvious in the American Bishops’ 
description of the actual elements that must be present in the process of the formation of a 
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Christian conscience. Overall, they emphasise that a desire on the part of the individual to 
embrace goodness and truth must be present. For Catholics this will involve a willingness and 
openness to: (a) “seek the truth and what is right by studying Sacred Scripture and the 
teaching of the Church; (b) analyze the facts and circumstances of the available choices, and 
(c) reflect prayerfully to discern God’s will.”
460
 Finally, the laity are warned that to fail to 
form such a conscience leaves them open to making erroneous judgements.
461
 
 The document also emphasises the role of the virtue of prudence in the formation of 
conscience. Quoting the Catechism, the Bishops inform their laity that the virtue of prudence 
enables us “to discern our true good in every circumstance and to choose the right means of 
achieving it.” Specifically, they inform the faithful that the virtue of prudence will help shape 
and inform their ability to deliberate over available alternatives.
462
 It will also help them to 
determine what is most fitting to a specific context, and to act decisively. They caution the 
laity, however, that “Exercising this virtue often requires the courage to act in defence of 
moral principles when making decisions about how to build a society of justice and peace.”
463
 
Because not all possible courses are deemed morally acceptable when dealing with such 
moral and social issues as the inviolable sanctity of human life, the sanctity of marriage, the 
preferential option for the poor, seeking social justice for the immigrant and protecting the 
environment, for example, the Bishops see a crucial role for prudential judgement in 
“discerning carefully which public policies are morally sound.”
464
 Furthermore, emphasising 
once again that a well-formed conscience and its helper, prudence, are not meant solely for 
the home and the place of worship, the Bishops draw the attention of their laity to the fact 
that, as Catholics, they will be required “to make practical judgments regarding good and evil 
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choices in the political arena.”
465
 However, when it comes to the fundamental issue of doing 
good and avoiding evil, the document leaves absolutely no wriggle room. Citing the example 
of the intentional taking of innocent human life through abortion and euthanasia, the Bishops 
steadfastly and totally declared that: 
There are some things we must never do, as individuals or as a 
society, because they are always incompatible with the love of God 
and neighbour. Such actions are so deeply flawed that they are always 
opposed to the authentic good of persons. These are called 
‘intrinsically evil’ actions. They must always be rejected and opposed 
and must never to supported or condoned.
466
 
While acknowledging that decisions within the political arena can be complex and require the 
exercise of a well-formed conscience aided by prudence, the American laity and all people of 
good will, be they voters or candidates, citizens or leaders and legislators, are strongly 
reminded that any exercise of conscience must begin with: “outright opposition to laws and 
other policies that violate human life or weaken its protection. Those who knowingly, 
willingly, and directly support public policies or legislation that undermine fundamental 
moral principles cooperate with evil.”
467
 
This harsh and stark assertion can be regarded as a wake-up-call to voters, to party 
members and leaders, and to those who participate in the making and enacting of government 
policies that, as beings created in the Imago Dei, they cannot do things only to please their 
parties or political interests to the detriment of their own faith and morals. In this regard, they 
specifically presented the Catholic voter with clear and unambiguous guidelines as to how 
they should vote in situations where moral stances, incompatible with Christian beliefs, are 
being promoted by candidates. This is somewhat surprising in light of their previous assertion 
that it was never their intention to recommend to voters for whom they should or should not 
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 As already noted, this assertion was seen as their response to the claim made by 
Brown that the Bishops did “not provide clear answers regarding how to vote.” 
469
 However, 
while they felt morally-bound to refrain from selecting the ‘right candidate’ for their faithful, 
the document shows no hesitation in spelling out what Catholic voters must consider before 
voting.
470
 Far from being silent or apologetic about this course of action, the Bishops 
regarded it as being vital to fulfilling their mission to the Catholic believer. The Bishops 
delivered the following direct advice to voters:  
Catholics often face difficult choices about how to vote. This is why it 
is so important to vote according to a well-formed conscience that 
perceives a proper relationship among moral goods. A Catholic cannot 
vote for a candidate who takes a position in favour of an intrinsic evil, 
such as abortion or racism, if the voter’s intent is to support that 
position. In such cases a Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation 
in grave evil. At the same time a voter should not use a candidate’s 
opposition to an intrinsic evil to justify indifference or inattentiveness 
to other important moral issues involving human life and dignity.
471
 
As it is with the leaders and candidates, so it is for the voters; when it comes to voting for the 
morally indefensible, the Bishops’ teaching is clear: “A Catholic cannot vote”. In a situation 
where all candidates are seen to support a position in favour of intrinsic evil, however, the 
Bishops are seen to be pragmatic and realistic. On the one hand, they leave it to their laity to 
“take the extraordinary step of not voting for any candidate.” On the other hand, they do see 
room for some prudential judgement and participating in “the art of the possible.” Room is 
left for the voter to decide, after careful deliberation, “to vote for the candidate deemed less 
likely to advance such a morally flowed position and more likely to pursue other authentic 
                                                             
468
 Ibid., n.7. 
469
 Elizabeth F. Brown, “Trying to Vote in Good Conscience,” 245. 
470
 The Nigerian Bishops emphasised the role of conscience in voting by stating: “The electorate should exercise 
their civic rights responsibly by voting only for leaders who can be expected to serve honestly and selflessly, 
and by insisting on having only leaders of their choice. They should resist every temptation to sell their votes for 
money; for as we said in our 1983 Pastoral Letter, ‘It is criminal to buy or sell votes.’” See the Communiqué of 




 of September, 1998.  
471





 However, it must be noted that such flexibility in the face of “intrinsic evil” 
does not rest easy with the uncompromising stance demonstrated by the magisterium on such 
evil.  
5.3.6 Shaping a Pro-Active Conscience 
Through its promotion of the positive this short section of the bishops’ document 
serves as contrast to the previous one of warnings, cautions and admonitions. The Church 
was also anxious to demonstrate that its work of shaping Catholic consciences for ‘Faithful 
Citizenship’ is not exclusively centred on the principle of avoiding, shunning or rejecting 
evil. The document states clearly that opposition to intrinsically evil acts must be 
complemented by a positive contribution to the common good and by positive acts of 
solidarity with those in need.
473
 The document specifically refers to such basic needs as food, 
shelter, health care, education, and meaningful work and clearly states that addressing such 
needs must be regarded as a moral imperative, which is universally binding on all 
Catholics.
474
 Finally, in support of its assertion that both opposing evil and doing good are 
essential obligations, the document quotes from John Paul II: “The fact that only the negative 
commandments oblige always and under all circumstances does not mean that in the moral 




 This document can well be described as a Vade Mecum for any Catholic who wishes 
to vote, to seek election to office, to lead a political party or interest group, or to legislate in 
government, all in accordance with a conscience shaped by the teachings of the Catholic 
Church. The document itself can be regarded as being quite dogmatic in its pronouncements 
as to how Catholics should engage with the political public square. It leaves no doubt as to 
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what the Catholic Church would wish its laity to do when they are faced with political 
decisions that entail supporting actions which the Church itself would label as being 
intrinsically evil. However, as the Bishops emphasised that their role is to lead rather than 
drive, the document also demonstrates certain pragmatism in the Bishops’ advice to sincere 
believers. It speaks of the need for “prudential judgments” and operating, when absolutely 
necessary, within the terms of “the art of the possible”.  
What is not to be found in this document, however, are any philosophical or 
theological debates about issues such as the primacy of conscience, the nature of conscience 
in terms of synderesis or conscientia, or the infallibility of the Pope when pronouncing on 
conscience, for example. Its main focus is on helping the laity to form consciences that will 
assess their participation, as individuals or as groups, in political life in terms of the values of 
their faith.
476
 The Bishops’ right to engage in such activity is both divinely underwritten by 
Jesus Christ and protected by the American Constitution itself. Their arguments in this area 
are direct, ‘taken as read’ and distinctly lacking in any form of Apologia. Overall, it can be 
argued that the approach which the bishops adopted in this exposé on the formation of a 
Catholic conscience that should be politically sensitive to the teachings of the Church is 
experientially rather than theoretically driven.  
6. Conclusion 
This chapter which examined the nature of the human person traced the concept of 
conscience from its Greek and Roman root through to the Hebraic Old Testament, the New 
Testament, and teachings of the early Church Fathers, in particular those of St. Jerome. It 
must be noted that even where there was not found to be any direct reference to the notion of 
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conscience, as in the Hebraic tradition, it was actually found to exist within that tradition, but 
with a different name or designation.  
In the medieval era, the Scholastics especially Thomas Aquinas provided a 
paradigmatic study of conscience. Aquinas’ teachings on human action and law provide the 
principles for moral decision-making. This chapter then addressed modern day inputs to the 
concept of conscience by the Catholic Church through such media as the Documents of 
Vatican II, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, Papal Encyclicals and the pronouncements 
issued by National Episcopal Conference of bishops. 
Overall, the general thought on conscience through the ages is that of it being 
gradually brought down from the heady theoretical heights of philosophy, ethics and theology 
to its relevance in ordinary daily human living. Scholars who explain away or reject the 
notion of conscience, in whatever manner are not examined in this chapter. In subsequent 
chapters, we will be examining the thinking of Cardinal John Henry Newman, Germain 



















 John Henry Newman’s understanding of conscience is expressed in many of his 
writings. In Apologia Pro Vita Sua,
2
 a book he wrote in response to Charles Kingsley’s 
accusations especially of untruthfulness,
3
 he recounts his life history and various influences 
upon him, and acknowledges the significance of conscience as a major factor in both his 
living and in his thinking. Conscience was an important factor for him as Avery Cardinal 
Dulles clearly attests: 
Apart from the self, only one other reality was to Newman absolutely 
certain. This other reality was God, whose voice resounds in the 
testimony of conscience. All normal persons, Newman believed, have 
a conscience that commands them categorically to do what is right and 
avoid what is evil.
4
 
Dulles’ testimony demonstrates Newman’s perception of conscience as the personal channel 
through which God communicates with a creature. An indication of the respect and esteem 
accorded to Newman’s teaching on conscience may be seen in his being awarded that lofty 
title, Doctor of Conscience. Drew Morgan contends that: 
If the required investigation into Newman’s doctorate culminates with 
the formal conferral of the title, Doctor of the Church, it will be due in 
no small part to the factors that have led so many already to hold him 
to be the Doctor of Conscience.
5
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The importance of Newman’s teaching on conscience is therefore not only essential to much 
of his thinking and teaching, but, in the words of Luc Terlinden, it displays Newman’s 
sapiential or erudite ability to “unite originality and continuity.”
6
  
 This chapter will therefore look at Newman’s life; outline the manner in which he 
lived that life, as well as the methods he utilised in dealing with many external forces. We 
will then examine specifically his teachings on the nature and role of conscience. 
1.1. Newman’s Life and Writings 
 Wilfrid Ward, one of Newman’s earliest biographers writes: 
John Henry Newman was born in Old Broad Street in the City of 
London on February 21, 1801, and was baptized in the Church of St. 
Benet Fink on April 9 of the same year. His father was a London 
banker whose family came from Cambridgeshire. His mother was of a 
French Protestant family who left France for this country on the 
revocation of the Edict of Nantes. He was the eldest of six children—
three boys and three girls.
7
 
The purpose of this biographical path is to bring us face to face with the real, the actual John 
Henry Newman and to provide an adequate answer to Thomas J. Norris’s question: Who is 
John Henry Newman?
8
 Since there are numerous writings on Newman, we will attempt to 
present multum in parvo the essentials for this thesis. 
 When Newman was seven in 1808, he was sent to a private school at Ealing run by 
Dr. George Nicholas, who believed that beside Newman, no student progressed as quickly 
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through the school as he did.
9
 It was while at Ealing, however, that Newman experienced his 
first religious conversion inspired, as he narrated in his Apologia, by reading books given to 
him by the Reverend Walter Mayers. It is noted that the transformation that occurred as a 
result of the conversion was radical, changing him from a boy who had no religious 
convictions to a committed and devout Christian with beliefs and doctrines strongly 
influenced by the theology of John Calvin.
10
 Charles Stephen Dessain claims that this was the 
turning point, which gave to the rest of Newman’s life its unity
11
 while Newman himself 
describes this conversion as the beginning of divine faith in him.
12
 
 In December 1816, Newman gained admission to Trinity College, Oxford University, 
but only took up residence there on June 8, 1817, at sixteen years of age.
13
 Norris comments 
that, at Oxford, Newman had a remarkable spiritual, academic and apostolic career.
14
 Thus, 
Oxford was momentous to Newman. While he was a serious student, avoiding any 
overindulgence in alcohol, for which the students were famous, he suffered a setback in his 




 Once again we turn to Norris and his question: “Who is John Henry Newman?” as 
this will enable us to see Newman as a college student and beyond. Norris, himself, responds 
to his own question by claiming that while his writings about John Henry Newman “tell very 
little about the real Newman, [they do] little to enable us to meet the living person. [They 
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provide] some knowledge about Newman but [do] not provide knowledge of Newman.”
16
 
Therefore, Newman’s biographical pathway alone, suggests that any attempt at gaining 
access into the inner reaches of Newman’s life and thinking may be better achieved by a 
more comprehensive over-view of his more personal and autobiographical writings. 
1.1 1 Newman the Anglican 
 In Newman’s Apologia he is found narrating the history of influences on his life, 
more specifically those influences that led to changes in his worldviews and beliefs. Ian Kerr, 
for example, draws directly from the Apologia to include Newman’s own words as he 
elaborates on his early life as an Anglican: 
He had been brought up as an ordinary member of the Church of 
England. His parents were in no way Evangelical, but belonged to 
what their son was later to call ‘the national religion of England’ or 
‘Bible Religion’, which ‘consists, not in rites or creeds, but mainly in 
having the Bible read in Church, in the family, and in private’. He 
himself had been ‘brought up from a child to take great delight in 
reading the Bible’, particularly by his grandmother and aunt in whose 
house at Fulham he had stayed as a little boy.
17
 
Christian living and love of Scripture were therefore part and parcel of Newman’s early 
childhood. In his own words, he confirms: “I was brought up from a child to take great 
delight in reading the Bible; but I had no formed religious convictions till I was fifteen.”
 18
 He 
goes on to point out that the major turning point of his life started when, at age fifteen, he 
began to read literatures. He writes: 
When I was fourteen, I read Paine’s Tracts against the Old Testament, 
and found pleasure in thinking of the objections which were contained 
in them. Also, I read some of Hume’s Essays; and perhaps that on 
miracles. So at least I gave my Father to understand; but perhaps it 
was a brag. Also I recollect copying out some French verses, perhaps 
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Voltaire’s, in denial of the immortality of the soul, and saying to 
myself something like ‘How dreadful, but how plausible.’
19
 
As already noted by J. R. Connolly, the sowing of Newman’s convictions was triggered by 
his contact with the Reverend Walter Mayers, thus Newman speaks of this turning point: 
When I was fifteen (in the autumn of 1816) a great change of thought 
took place in me. I fell under the influences of a definite creed, and 
received into my intellect impressions of dogma, which, through 
God’s mercy, have never been effaced or obscured. Above and 
beyond the conversations and sermons of the excellent man, long 
dead, the Rev. Walter Mayers, of Pembroke College, Oxford, who 
was the human means of this beginning of divine faith in me, was the 




In this sense, Newman’s early faith convictions tended towards Calvinism and its emphases 
on predestination, the total depravity of human beings and the total sovereignty of God. It is a 
measure of his inherent eagerness to broaden his search for truth that Newman was not 
content to permanently sow all his newly discovered religious seedlings in those early, 
turning-point fields. For example, Newman recounts how, at fifteen, the writings of Thomas 
Scott of Aston Sandford also greatly influenced him: 
I so admired and delighted in his writings, that, when I was an 
undergraduate, I thought of making a visit to his parsonage, in order to 
see a man whom I so deeply revered . . . What, I suppose, will strike 
any reader of Scott’s history and writings, is his bold unworldliness 
and vigorous independence of mind. He followed truth wherever it led 
him, beginning with Unitarianism, and ending in a zealous faith in the 
Holy Trinity. It was he who first planted deep in my mind that 
fundamental truth of religion . . . Besides his unworldliness, what I 
also admired in Scott was his resolute opposition to Antinomianism, 
and the minutely practical character of his writing. They show him to 
be a true Englishman, and I deeply felt his influence; and for years I 
used almost as proverbs what I considered to be the scope and issue of 
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It can be claimed that if you want to know the qualities that a people value or despise most, 
simply ask them to describe what they like or dislike most in another. Here in the Apologia, 
Newman is very much in his praise of Scott’s “bold unwordliness and vigorous independence 
of mind”, his following “the truth wherever it led”, his “zealous faith in the Holy Trinity” 
“and the minutely practical character of his writing.” Few people may undoubtedly dispute 
that the student learned well from the master in this context, and fewer still would be 
surprised by Newman’s claim that it was Scott who first planted deep in his mind 
“fundamental truth of religion.” 
 Newman cites other literary encounters, which made a great impression on him. For 
example, his contact with the writings of the Church Fathers, show obviously how he is taken 
by what he reads. His mention of St. Augustine is not surprising, since both can be said to 
have displayed that restless spirit that tirelessly sought the answers to life’s most fundamental 
question about absolute Truth. Thus, St. Augustine’s famous words, “thou hast made us for 
thyself and restless is our heart until it comes to rest in thee,”
22
 could easily have come from 
Newman. Newman recounts how Newton’s writings on the prophecies
23
 convinced him in 
keeping with Anglican teaching of the time that the Pope was indeed the antichrist. What is 
interesting here is to witness how open Newman is to examining, challenging and even 
obliterating once deeply held beliefs. Of even greater interest, however, is to witness a young 
Newman having an awareness of and even dealing with the concept of an erroneous 
conscience. He has this to say concerning the effect of the writings of both authors, 
Augustine and Newton, on him: 
I read Joseph Milner’s Church History, and was nothing short of 
enamoured of the long extracts from St. Augustine and the other 
Fathers which I found there. I read them as being the religion of the 
                                                             
22
 Augustine, Confessions (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2004), Bk.1. 1. 
23 Thomas Newton (1704-1782) was an English Anglican theologian, clergyman, biblical scholar, author, 
biographer, bishop, Dean of St Paul’s Cathedral in London.  
144 
 
primitive Christians: but simultaneously with Milner I read Newton on 
the Prophecies, and in consequence became most firmly convinced 
that the Pope was the antichrist predicted by Daniel, St. Paul, and St. 
John. My imagination was stained by the effects of this doctrine up to 
the year 1843; it had been obliterated from my reason and judgement 




 But this was not to be the last for Newman, since he came under the influence of 
matters other than literary that were also to shape his intellectual and moral views. When he 
resumed as a resident student at Trinity College in 1817 he encountered John William 
Bowden, a “Commoner” or undergraduate student without either a scholarship or an 
exhibition, who would be expected to “earn his keep.” As part of earning his keep, Bowden 
was detailed to look after Newman.
25
 However, rather than having to act as Newman’s 
personal caretaker, Bowden became one of Newman’s closest companions at that time. In 
fact, they became such close companions and Newman remarked that 
the two youths lived simply with and for each all through their 
undergraduate time, up to the term when they went into the school for 
their B.A. examination, being recognised in college as inseparables—
taking their meals together, reading, walking, boating together—nay, 
visiting each other’s homes in the vacations; and, though so close a 
companionship could not continue when at length they ceased to be in 
a state of pupilage, and had taken their several paths in life, yet the 
mutual attachment thus formed at the University was maintained 
between them unimpaired till Mr. Bowden’s premature death in 1844, 
receiving an additional tie as time went on by their cordial agreement 
in ecclesiastical views and academical politics, and by the interest 
with which both entered into the Oxford movement of 1833.
26
 
Such accounts of exclusive closeness and intimacy show his appreciation of Friendship. In 
fact, as an Anglican priest, he expounded his theology of friendship in a sermon on the feast 
of St. John the Evangelist (traditionally thought to be the disciple “whom Jesus loved”) which 
he proclaimed: 
                                                             
24
 Ibid., 7. 
25
 See also Ian Ker, John Henry Newman, 7. 
26
 See Letter to Mrs Newman in LD I, 53; Anne Mozley ed., Letters and Correspondence of John Henry 
Newman, vol. I. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1891), 28. [Hereafter, Letters and Correspondence I].  
145 
 
There have been men before now, who have supposed Christian love 
was so diffusive as not to admit of concentration upon individuals; so 
that we ought to love all men equally. And many there are, who, 
without bringing forward any theory, yet consider practically that the 
love of many is something superior to the love of one or two; and 
neglect the charities of private life, while busy in the schemes of an 
expansive benevolence, or of effecting a general union and 
conciliation among Christians. Now I shall here maintain, in 
opposition to such notions of Christian love, and with our Saviour's 
pattern before me, that the best preparation for loving the world at 
large, and loving it duly and wisely, is to cultivate an intimate 
friendship and affection towards those who are immediately about us. 
27
 
Newman honed his capacity for friendship and intimacy to the extent that he could see both 
as reflections of a greater love, as a foretaste of heaven. For Newman, friendship was in 
reality that place where two intimate friends can get a glimpse of the life that awaits them in 
God.
28
 Another scholar of Newman believes that, while Newman’s autobiography is a treatise 
on the human and supernatural virtues that comprise friendship, someday he “may well earn a 
new title, that of Doctor amicitiae: Doctor of the Church on Friendship.”
29
 
 It has been noted how Newman used his remarkable intellectual abilities, his 
insatiable inquisitiveness and curiosity, as well as his capacity for cultivating close 
friendships to gain ever deepening insights into the complexity of his Maker’s Creation. 
However, as his friendship with John Bowden continued to blossom, Newman became the 
unwilling recipient of a new learning tool, one that was as novel to him as it was unwelcome: 
“failure.” While both friends had studied together in preparation for their final B.A. 
Examination in 1820, Newman’s performance was “Under-the-line.”
30
 In terms of his life’s 
ambitions, this meant he could not study Law and be called to the Bar. Newman’s coping 
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with this dashing of his life’s dreams serves to provide a measure of the depth and 
steadfastness of the inner spiritual beliefs and convictions of the younger Newman. Rather 
than opting out of academic life and applying his many talents elsewhere, he determinedly 
applied for the qualifying examination of Oriel Fellowship in April 1822. Academically 
successful, he was elected a Fellow of Oriel College on April 12, 1822.
31
 
 Newman’s reaction to his academic success and subsequent election is an interesting 
one. He exults on his becoming a Fellow of Oriel that the position “raised him from obscurity 
and need, to competency and reputation. He never wished anything better or higher than, in 
the words of the epitaph: ‘to live and die a Fellow of Oriel.’”
32
 His personal values are here 
highlighted. This enthusiastic embracing of such values as competency and status and his 
rejection of deprivation and insignificance may have been shaped by the failure of his father 
in his business life and the subsequent humiliation which followed this failure.  
 However, Oriel had more than security of income and status to offer Newman. It 
provided him with the opportunity to indulge his newly formed interest in a theological 
career, by giving him access to University society, intelligentsia and to the different schools 
of intellectual and ecclesiastical thought to be found at Oxford. Enthused of Oriel, he noted 
that it 
opened upon him a theological career, placing him upon the high and 
broad platform of University society and intelligence, and bringing 
him across those various influences, personal and intellectual, and the 
teaching of those various schools of ecclesiastical thought, whereby 
the religious sentiment in his mind, which had been his blessing from 
the time he left school, was gradually developed and formed and 
brought on to its legitimate issues.
33
 
Undoubtedly, Oriel College was a major turning-point in Newman’s life. His election enabled 
him to initiate contact with notable men as Edward Hawkins, Richard Whately, Richard 
                                                             
31
 See Newman’s correspondences in LD I, 128-131; Ian Ker, John Henry Newman, 15-17. 
32





Hurrell Froude, John Keble, and many others who introduced him to what hitherto he had not 




 On June 13
th
, 1824, Newman was ordained as an Anglican deacon and on May 25
th
, 
1825 as an Anglican priest. During the period of his Fellowship right through to his 
Ordination, there was one man who had a remarkable influence on him, namely Dr. Edward 
Hawkins, the then Vicar of St. Mary’s University Church, Oxford. Firstly, Hawkins provoked 
him and he in turn provoked him a great deal more.
35
 However, Hawkins helped Newman 
develop intellectual and debating skills and techniques which would stand him in good stead, 
when engaging in polemics. For instance, those centred on controversies connected with the 
defence of doctrine held to be essential to Anglican Christian truth. This is obvious in the 
following piece as Newman gives appreciative descriptive details of Hawkins’ assistance: 
He was the first who taught me to weigh my words, and to be cautious 
in my statements. He led to that mode of limiting and clearing my 
sense in discussion and in controversy, and of distinguishing between 
cognate ideas, and of obviating mistakes by anticipation, which to my 
surprise has been since considered, even in quarters friendly to me, to 
savour of the polemics of Rome.
36
 
Hawkins’ influence extended beyond training in polemical skills, however, and into matters 
theological. Newman notes how Hawkins got him to abandon Calvinism and replace it with 
the doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration, as enunciated in the Treatise on Apostolical 
Preaching, which Hawkins had given him to read. Besides the literature with which his 
mentor had provided him, Hawkins’ preaching on “Tradition” during Newman’s 
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undergraduate days also influenced him immensely.
37
 It introduced Newman to the “doctrine 
of Tradition,” a doctrine he acknowledges to be of great importance to Catholicism.
38
  
 During the era of Hawkins’ influence, Newman also read Bishop Butler’s Analogy of 
Religion (1736). Of it, he states: 
Its inculcation of a visible Church, the oracle of truth and a pattern of 
sanctity, of the duties of external religion, and of the historical 
character of Revelation, are characteristics of this great work which 
strike the reader at once; for myself, if I may attempt to determine 
what I most gained from it, it lay in two points, which I shall have an 
opportunity of dwelling on in the sequel; they are the underlying 
principles of a great portion of my teaching. First, the very idea of an 
analogy between the separate works of God leads to the conclusion 
the system which is of less importance is economically or 
sacramentally connected with the more momentous system, and of this 
conclusion the theory, to which I was inclined as a boy viz. the 
unreality of material phenomenon, is an ultimate resolution. At times I 
did not make the distinction between matter itself and its phenomena, 
which is so necessary and so obvious in discussing the subject. 
Secondly, Butler’s doctrine that Probability is the guide of life, led 
me, at least under the teaching to which few years later I was 
introduced, to the question of the logical cogency of Faith, on which I 
have written so much. Thus to Butler I trace those two principles of 
my teaching, which have led to a charge against me both of 
fancifulness and of scepticism.
39
 
Newman’s listing of the characteristics above is important because they shaped his 
ecclesiology as featured in his sermons.
40
 But the most significant gain for him, Ian Ker 
explains “helped place [Newman’s] doctrinal views on a broad philosophical basis, with 
which an emotional religion could have little sympathy.”
41
 His “two points” centred on the 
notions of “analogy and probability.” The detailed profundity with which he elaborates and 
used these principles he concludes “led to a charge against” him “both of fancifulness and 
scepticism.” 
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 Newman, while at Oxford also came under the influence of Richard Whately, who 
was later to become Archbishop of Dublin and a champion of unpopular causes. Newman 
acknowledges the importance of this influence as well as his indebtedness to Whately. He 
explains: “While I was still awkward and timid in 1822, he took me by the hand, and acted 
towards me the part of a gentle and encouraging instructor. He, emphatically, opened my 
mind, and taught me to think and to use my reason.”
42
 An anonymous work entitled Letters 
on the Church by an Episcopalian, ascribed to Whately had a gradual but deep effect on 
Newman’s thinking. The main tenet of this work centred on Church and State relations. 
Newman points to two focal points in the work which were of particular interest to him: “first 
that Church and state should be independent of each other . . . secondly, that the Church may 
justly and by right retain its property, though separated from the state.” 
43
 It is clear from this, 
the importance which Newman attaches to the notion of independence, whether it is of a 
personal nature, or in this case, at an institutional level. 
 Despite Whately’s great influence upon Newman, however, it eventually transpired 
that they could not agree on certain theological doctrines, which resulted in Whately accusing 
Newman of Arianizing in 1827.
44
 It appears that when it comes to the search for the truth, 
Newman would not even allow friendship to compromise the integrity of that search. Hence, 




 Newman, himself, became vicar of the University Church of St. Mary the Virgin in 
1828, a position he held until his resignation in 1843. The sermons he preached during that 
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period and published in the Parochial and Plain Sermons “made Oxford feel as though one 
of the early Fathers had come back to earth.”
46
 Robert Sencourt writes that: “By his sermons 
in St. Mary’s Newman quickly made himself the figure foremost in the eyes of all serious 
undergraduates. Witness after witness arises to describe the peculiar effect which those 
sermons procured.”
47
 This must have been more than satisfying for a man, whose 
undergraduate aspiration, as already noted, was to be raised from obscurity and need to 
competency and reputation. However, while his sermons did enlighten his audience on the 
mysteries of faith and the splendour of spiritual life, they were primarily moral discourses as 
is evident in the following extract from Ward: 
The parochial sermons at St. Mary’s . . . were the main instrument of 
Newman’s influence on the Oxford of those days. They appealed to a 
far wider class than the University Sermons, and the indelible 
impression they made on many minds has been recorded by eminent 
men of widely different schools of thought . . . They were primarily 
moral discourses, with little of theological elaboration.
48
 
Amongst the moral themes with which the Sermons dealt were: conscience and God, 
conscience and religion, conscience and reason, conscience and peace of mind. In Sermon 9, 
for example, he preaches: “Conscience, and Reason in subjection to Conscience, these are 
those powerful instruments (under grace) which change a man.”
49
  
In Sermon 17 titled “The Testimony of Conscience” he expressed his teaching on 
conscience as a personal witness in relationship to God and religion. A teaching that is best 
summarised in the scriptural quotation from St. Paul with which he opened the sermon: 
Our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in 
simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the 
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In Sermon 22, he speaks about good conscience to his audience accordingly: 
This is what is meant by the peace of a good conscience; it is the 
habitual consciousness that our hearts are open to God, with a desire 
that they should be open. It is a confidence in God, from a feeling that 
there is nothing in us which we need be ashamed or afraid of.
51
 
Thus the notion of conscience was very much part of Newman’s reflection with his audience 
as an Anglican pastor. 
 Besides the Parochial and Plain Sermons, his Oxford University Sermons
52
 are 
equally compelling. Though these sermons focused on the relation between faith and reason, 
his notion of conscience is quite overt in some of them. In the following passage, for 
example, he outlines the nature of conscience in relation to religion and human action: 
Conscience is the essential principle and sanction of Religion in the 
mind. Conscience implies a relation between the soul and a something 
exterior, and that, moreover, superior to itself; a relation to an 
excellence which it does not possess, and to a tribunal over which it 
has no power. And since the more closely this inward monitor is 
respected and followed, the clearer, the more exalted, and the more 
varied its dictates become, and the standard of excellence is ever 
outstripping, while it guides, our obedience, a moral conviction is thus 
at length obtained of the unapproachable nature as well as the supreme 
authority of That, whatever it is, which is the object of the mind's 
contemplation. Here, then, at once, we have the elements of a 
religious system; for what is Religion but the system of relations 
existing between us and a Supreme Power, claiming our habitual 
obedience: ‘the blessed and only Potentate, who only hath 
immortality, dwelling in light unapproachable, whom no man hath 
seen or can see’? Further, Conscience implies a difference in the 
nature of actions, the power of acting in this way or that as we please, 
and an obligation of acting in one particular way in preference to all 
others; and since the more our moral nature is improved, the greater 
inward power of improvement it seems to possess, a view is laid open 
to us both of the capabilities and prospects of man, and the awful 
importance of that work which the law of his being lays upon him. 
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And thus the presentiment of a future life, and of a judgment to be 
passed upon present conduct, with rewards and punishments annexed, 




In the above passage, Newman highlights conscience as an essential element of Natural 
Religion. He presents it in terms of a “connector” between the human being and an External 
Power of Excellence, innately superior to all human beings. He points to the benefits that can 
be gained by following the dictates of such a conscience. For example, he posits that the more 
the dictates of conscience are obeyed, the clearer its more varied demands will become. 
Furthermore, ongoing obedience to the dictates of conscience will also serve to bring the 
voice of the Supreme Authority which is the source of all moral convictions more sharply 
into focus. Above all, he presents conscience as a basis on which all human actions will be 
finally judged, sentenced or honoured. In assessing this piece from Newman, irrespective of 
the topic, the phrase “inward monitor” comes across the mind as his distinctive way to 
describe conscience. What is apparent from the extract then is that we do not have to wait 
until his “Catholic Years” to discover Newman’s treatment of conscience because later as a 
Catholic, he would describe conscience as a “stern monitor.” “solemn monitor” and 
“authoritative monitor.” The term “monitor” is therefore vital in Newman’s way of 
describing the role of conscience. 
His Letters and Diaries
54
 proves to be another pertinent source for exploring his 
teachings on conscience. Relevant to “letter writing” as distinct from “sermonising” or other 
genres of “academic writing,” Alan G. Hill and Ian Ker claim that  
Letter-writing always held a high place in Newman’s scale of 
priorities. It was not for him a marginal or leisure-time activity but an 
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integral part of his mission, and he devoted all his powers of mind and 
genius for human understanding and sympathy to it.
55
 
They believe that his “letters are intrinsically interesting . . . for their intimate revelation of 
Newman himself.”
56
 His letters, for example, reveal his personal use and more intimate 
understanding of the term conscience. For instance, writing to Miss Maria Rosina Giberne on 
March 30, 1845, he notes: 
Now I will tell just how things stand, and I am telling you more than 
any one in the world knows, except two friends of mine who are living 
here with me. My own convictions are as strong as I suppose they can 




This letter shows Newman clearly distinguishing between reason and conscience rather than 
trying to draw them together, a distinction, which will be elucidated later. Suffice it to say at 
this stage however, that Newman viewed reason as an instrument “in the service of spiritual 
discernment, led by conscience.”
58
 We can conclude then that Newman’s Letters and Diaries 
not only provide biographical details, but are also a valuable means for gathering and 
exploring his Anglican and Catholic views, thinking, theorising and philosophising. 
1.1.2 Newman’s Conversion Odyssey 
 Benedict XVI believes that Newman’s conversion is a journey of conscience as he 
declared: “The path of Newman’s conversions is a path of conscience – not a path of self-
asserting subjectivity but, on the contrary, a path of obedience to the truth that was gradually 
opening up to him.”
59
 Newman’s evolving religious life which was influenced at various 
stages by Calvinism, evangelical fundamentalism and liberalism peaked when he embraced 
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 However, before becoming a Catholic, he and some of his close Oxford 
friends and colleagues pioneered the publication of tracts, known as Tracts for the Times. As 
a group, these, clerics, scholars and theologians became known as the Oxford Movement, 
with Newman, himself, considered as the pre-eminent leader of the group. The founding and 
running of this group was to eventually culminate with Newman becoming a Catholic.
61
 
 The Movement was one of the leading groups or societies at Oriel at that time, and its 
foundation was largely due to the ambitions or desires of certain High Churchmen to reassert 
the hidden riches of Catholic theology and practice within the Anglican Church. These 
members wanted to highlight the Catholic heritage of the Anglican Church, at the same time 
preserving and protecting Anglicanism in a renewed way. It was for this reason that 
advocates of the Movement, as already noted, began to write and publish Tracts for the 
Times, a series of tracts or pamphlets that focused on different religious subjects. 
Consequently, members of the Oxford Movement became known as Tractarians.
62
 
 With reference to the foundation of the Movement, Newman wrote: “Mr. Keble 
preached the Assize Sermon in the University Pulpit. It was published under the title of 
‘National Apostasy.’ I have ever considered and kept the day, as the start of the religious 
movement of 1833.”
63
 Little did Newman realise that it was also to prove to be the day that 
would be an important stepping stone, his transition from Anglicanism to Catholicism. 
Whereas the foundation of the Oxford Movement instigated Newman’s shift in allegiance, it 
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was the publication of Tract 90 which would eventually trigger the actual shift.
64
 In this 
Tract, Newman critically examined the 39 Articles of The Church of England, which are 
considered to contain the key doctrinal teachings of the Anglican Church on such matters as: 
the rule of faith (Articles 6-8), individual religion (Articles 9-18), corporate religion (Articles 
19-36), and national religion (Articles 37-39).
65
  
 Newman, within the Tract, controversially highlighted the Catholic roots of the 
Anglican Church itself. The Tract’s opening remarks alone were guaranteed to 
instantaneously gain the undivided attention of most committed Anglicans (and Catholics). 
Wild assumptions where made about Newman and Tract 90 when it was first published. For 
instance, A.C. Tait, who later became the Archbishop of Canterbury, expressed concern over 
its effect on young people. He believed that the tract when read would persuade them to leave 
the Church of England for the Roman Catholic Church.
66
  
 Such is one example of the reactions that the publication of Tract 90 generated. Thus, 
Newman’s work was banned and was given Episcopal Charges over the erroneous theology 
allegedly contained in Tract. After being harassed by Bishops and the leaders of the Church 
of England, Newman resigned his appointment as vicar of St. Mary’s University Church and 
took domicile at Littlemore. 
 Converting to the Catholic Church required some bold practical actions on Newman’s 
part, actions from which he did not shirk, as evidenced in his account of two significant steps 
he undertook. He writes: 
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In 1843, I took two very important and significant steps:—1. In 
February, I made a formal retraction of all the hard things which I had 
said against the Church of Rome. 2. In September, I resigned the 
living of St. Mary’s, Littlemore inclusive.
67
  
These were no small steps for someone, who valued security and reputation so much, as 
noted from his Oriel days. On June 4, 1845, he wrote to John More Capes and told him: 
It is now near six years since I came to a clear conviction that our 
Church was a schism, and the Roman Church the true Church. I 
thought it a duty to set myself against the conviction, (and think so 
still—) I wrote against it, and went on as usual except that I did not 
speak as I had done about the Church of Rome and I told no one but 
two friends who were about me at the time. In this way I managed to 
overcome the feeling—i.e. by argument on the other side—there was 
much which I could not receive in the Roman system and much that 
was good and holy among ourselves. At the end of 1841 my 




These words testify to the convinced and reasoning mind of Newman, a Newman far 
removed, as it were, from the “fever pitch” emotive tirades that followed the publication of 
Tract 90. Having reached a conclusion or “conviction” and “dwelt” with it for six years, 
Newman eventually feels it is time to both follow up on the results of his reasoning and on 
the consequent dictates of his conscience. However, as demonstrated from the following 
passage, not only did Newman “reason” his way out of Anglicanism and into Catholicism, 
but he went on to support his case intellectually through evidence gained from his study of 
Church history. His meditations on Church history led him to elaborate on any seeming 
differences “in doctrine and discipline” between the “Early Church” and the current “Roman 
Church” in terms of maturing or growth as in the ongoing maturing of a child into a grown 
man. He wrote thus, to Westmacott: 
I suppose I may now tell you, that it is morally certain I shall join the 
R C. Church, though I don’t wish this told from me. It has been the 
conviction of six years—from which I have never receded . . . My 
conviction has nothing whatever to do with events of the day. It is 
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founded on my study of early Church history. I think the Church of 
Rome in every respect the continuation of the early Church. I think 
she is the early Church in these times, and the Church is she in these 
times. They differ in doctrine and discipline as child and grown man 
differ, not otherwise. I do not see any medium between disowning 
Christianity, and taking the Church of Rome.
 69
  
Newman also broke the news of his impending conversion to members of his family. Writing 
to his brother, Frank, on August 7, 1845, he left him in no doubt as to the moral and 
theological correctness of the action he was about to undertake: “My reason for going to 
Rome is this: I think the English Church in schism. I think the faith of the Roman Church the 
only true religion. I do not think there is salvation out of the Church of Rome.”
70
 He left it 
until the day before his reception into the Catholic Church to inform his sister, Jemima, of his 
impending conversion. Again, he is unequivocal in the outlining of his ‘intentions’ to be 
received into the Catholic Church: “This night Father Dominic the Passionist, sleeps here. He 
does not know my intentions, but I shall ask him to receive me into what I believe to be the 
One Fold of the Redeemer.”
71
 Though open and candid with his family, some of them were 
never to speak with him again, subsequent to his conversion. 
 Newman’s commitment to the teachings of the Catholic Church, as well as his 
unambiguous acknowledgement of it as being the One, True Church, is well attested to in his 
treatise, written in 1845, the same year he converted to Catholicism.
72
 Newman used the 
notion of “development of doctrine” to defend Catholic teaching from attacks by some 
Anglicans who viewed certain elements of Catholic teaching as distortions or actual 
innovations. He utilised an extensive and in-depth study of early Church Fathers to 
demonstrate that, although they were in a constant state of development, Catholic Church 
doctrines which were present from the beginnings of the Church, were still found to be 
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 In the work, Newman draws attention to the reality of conscience, declaring: 
“conscience, the existence of which we cannot deny, is a proof of the doctrine of a Moral 
Governor, which alone gives it a meaning and a scope; that is, the doctrine of a Judge and 
Judgment to come is a development of the phenomenon of conscience.”
74
 Here, Newman 
affirms the existence of conscience and its link to God. For him, the existence of conscience 
is a proof of the existence of God, who is the Moral Governor and Judge who delivers 
Judgements. This fundamental connecting of conscience to God-Judge is one of Newman’s 
most striking insights into the nature of conscience. 
 Still writing in Development of Christian Doctrine, Newman elaborates on the 
concept of conscience in terms of a comparison between natural and revealed religion, both 
of which demand obedience to their respective authorities: 
Moreover, it must be borne in mind that . . . the distinction between 
natural religion and revealed lies in this, that the one has a subjective 
authority, and the other an objective . . . The supremacy of conscience 
is the essence of natural religion; the supremacy of Apostle, or Pope, 
or Church, or Bishop, is the essence of revealed; and when such 
external authority is taken away, the mind falls back again of necessity 
upon that inward guide which it possessed even before Revelation was 
vouchsafed. Thus, what conscience is in the system of nature, such is 
the voice of Scripture, or of the Church, or of the Holy See, as we may 
determine it, in the system of Revelation. It may be objected, indeed, 
that conscience is not infallible; it is true, but still it is ever to be 
obeyed. And this is just the prerogative which controversialists assign 
to the See of St. Peter; it is not in all cases infallible, it may err beyond 
its special province, but it has in all cases a claim on our obedience.
75
 
Newman posits the “supremacy of conscience” as the essence of natural religion, while “the 
supremacy of Apostle or Pope,” for example, as the essence of revealed religion. He assigns 
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an inherent or “subjective authority” to the supremacy of conscience, while the supremacy of 
the Pope is assigned an externally imposed authority, an authority that is derived from 
‘Revelation’. In the absence of external authority and, at times, even in its presence, Newman 
leaves no doubt as to which voice must always be heard and heeded, that is, which voice has 
primacy. Even when in error, the voice of conscience, in Newman’s estimation, does not 
yield primacy to any other voice. He makes it unequivocally clear from the above excerpt, 
that in the event of an individual having to choose between the voice of an erroneous 
conscience or that of an erroneous Pope the former must ever be obeyed, while the latter 
merely has a claim on the obedience of his flock. 
1.1.3 The Roman Catholic Newman 
 Newman was received into the Catholic Church by Dominic Barberi, an Italian 
Passionist priest on October 9, 1845 at the village of Littlemore, a neglected “outpost” of his 
Anglican Parish of St Mary. Newman speaks of his new faith thus: “the Catholic religion is 
given from God for the salvation of mankind, and all other religions are but mockeries.”
76
 In 
the Apologia, he describes his experience of becoming a Catholic as “coming into port after a 
rough sea.”
77
 Avery Dulles described his conversion as follows: 
Newman became a Roman Catholic because deep study had 
convinced him that it was impossible to be in the one, holy, Catholic 
Church without being in communion with Rome. This remained his 
position for the rest of his life. He frequently spoke of the Roman 
communion as ‘the only true Church, the ark of salvation,’
 
as the ‘One 
Fold of Christ,’
 
and as ‘the only religious body . . . in which is 
salvation.’
 
The true Church, for Newman, must necessarily be a single 
communion and could not contain elements that were ‘independent of 
the whole, discordant with one another in doctrine and in ritual, 
destitute of mutual intercommunion.’
78
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Dulles points to “deep study” as the key to understanding Newman’s decision to convert. We 
may conclude that it was reason, conscience, emotion and the quest for truth that led him to 
the Catholic Church. Dulles makes clear that this was also a conversion characterised by total 
submission and unqualified acceptance of the principles of Roman Catholicism. This was the 
only approach that Newman could have honestly adopted, because, as noted by Dulles, many 
of Newman’s publications treated religious certitudes as normally being irreversible. 
However, subsequent to Newman’s reception into the Roman Catholic Church, there was no 
repudiation of previously held Evangelical or Anglican beliefs; rather, as Dulles explains, 
they were affirmed, not as static entities, but as dynamic creedal entities that were 
continuously evolving and developing: 
We have already seen that Newman as a Catholic continued to affirm 
what he had previously believed as an Evangelical Christian. He also 
retained the convictions he acquired as an Anglican regarding the 
existence of a visible Church, the sacramental system, and the 
dogmatic decrees of the early councils. His conversion was therefore 




 On becoming a Catholic, Newman was ordained a Catholic priest in 1847 after which 
he founded the English Oratory of St. Philip Neri, in Birmingham and spent the rest of his life 
as an Oratorian till his death in 1890.  
In 1851, Paul Cullen, Archbishop of Armagh proposed to Newman the plan to 
establish a Catholic University in Dublin, Ireland, which opened to the first students in 1854 
at 86 St. Stephen’s Green with Newman as Rector.
80
 In 1859, he founded the Catholic school 
in Birmingham. Thus, Newman was involved and devoted to the education of people. 
 As a Catholic, Newman dedicated much time defending, discussing and elaborating 
issues of the Catholic faith and truths. He also continued to examine the nature of conscience 
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and its role in the lives of human beings. Of himself, he paid particular attention to the 
concept of conscience and declared: 
I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am asked 
why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, 
for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence . . . without 
believing also in the existence of Him, who lives as a Personal, All-
seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience.
81
 
 Newman’s homilies and post-conversion writings such as An Essay in Aid of a 
Grammar of Assent
82
 and “A Letter to the Duke of Norfolk,”
83
 discuss the essential notion of 
conscience. Although the Grammar of Assent is not about conscience per se, S. A. Grave 
believes it still contains Newman’s “most extensive treatment of its nature.”
84
 In the work, 
Newman presents and explains diverse characteristics of the conscience. He refers to it for 
instance as the “voice”, “teacher” and “guide” of the moral Governor in the human person.
85
 
Joseph Ratzinger affirms this, as he stated that for Newman, conscience signified “the 
perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of truth in the subject himself.”
86
 
 The Grammar of Assent which took Newman about twenty years to complete is 
considered to be his seminal epistemological work.
87
 Hugo Maynell asserts that it “is 




 is in two parts, with 
each part consisting of five chapters. Part I is titled “Assent and Apprehension,” while Part II 
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is titled “Assent and Inference.” While the Grammar of Assent was written in the context of 
Newman’s efforts at grappling with the foundational questions of Christian apologetics, it 
was also written during the height of British empiricism, during which period Newman 
battled for the legitimacy and necessity of faith as a major component to the human intellect. 
Empiricism posits that knowledge is gained only through experiential data, and, in its 
extreme form, rejects rationalism. Empiricists maintain that it is only through the possession 
of factual data that a person can give assent to a proposition. Knowledge, they assert, is 
granted only on the basis of the evidence presented before it. In this way, its proponents deny 
the existence of any form of innate or universal knowledge or truth.
90
 It was in this way, also, 
that the Empiricist world of Newman’s day tried to totally exclude what could not be proven 
as fact, thereby making faith an increasingly irrelevant non-entity in an empirically scientific 
world. Against such claims, Newman argued that assent can be given to a proposition that has 
no material evidence, and that this is especially so in the case of propositions with religious 
emphases. To this effect, Newman explained that we can assent to the knowledge of the 
existence of God through the concept of conscience.
91
  
 The Grammar of Assent is Newman’s attempts to explain how we assent to both ideas 
and realities in particular the idea of God and religious certainty. He therefore propounds a 
theory of human judgment which he called the “Illative Sense.”
92
 He describes the term thus: 
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“Judgment then in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty; and what may be called the 
Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it.”
93
 He states further:  
I have already said that the sole and final judgment on the validity of 
an inference in concrete matter is committed to the personal action of 
the ratiocinative faculty, the perfection or virtue of which I have called 
the Illative Sense, a use of the word ‘sense’ parallel to our use of it in 
‘good sense,’ ‘common sense,’ a ‘sense of beauty.’
94
  
Explicating on the concept, Newman contends that the Illative Sense is “the power of judging 
and concluding, when in its perfection,”
95
 “it is, the reasoning faculty, as exercised by gifted, 
or by educated or otherwise well-prepared minds.”
96
 Newman examined the concept from 
four respective ways namely: “in itself, in its subject-matter, in the process it uses, and in its 
function and scope.”
97
 Upon this he writes: 
First, viewed in its exercise, it is one and the same in all concrete 
matters, though employed in them in different measures. We do not 
reason in one way in chemistry or law, in another in morals or 
religion; but in reasoning on any subject whatever, which is concrete, 
we proceed, as far as we can, by the logic of language, but we are 
obliged to supplement it by the more subtle and elastic logic of 
thought; for forms by themselves prove nothing. Secondly, it is in fact 
attached to definite subject-matters, so that a given individual may 
possess it in one department of thought, for instance, history, and 
another, for instance, philosophy. Thirdly, in coming to its conclusion, 
it proceeds always in the same way, by a method of reasoning . . . 
Fourthly, in no class of concrete reasoning, whether in experimental 
science, historical research, or technology, is there any ultimate test of 
truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the 
Illative Sense that gives them its sanctions.
98
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Bernard Mahoney believes that the “Illative sense” seeks to accumulate the observations of 
the five senses in order to arrive at highly probable conclusions, thereby guiding human 
beings toward the conclusions their consciences will form.
99
 
 According to Mahoney, the Illative sense is Newman’s response to the then Utilitarian 
notion of “moral sense,”
100
 which, in the theorising of Jeremy Bentham, posited that all 
human choices “would be based on quantitative amounts of pleasure or pain,” as assessed by 
a mathematically-based Pleasure-Pain Calculus.
101
 
 Mahoney explains that Newman’s Illative sense is also the intellectual counterpart of 
Aristotle’s Phronesis,
102
 In Aristotelian philosophy; this is the faculty of the human mind that 
closes the logic-gap in concrete situations, thus allowing for assent or acquiescence. Newman 
explained that in concrete life situations attaining indisputable proof in favour of a decision is 
not possible, and the best one could hope to achieve was a series of converging probabilities 
that pointed towards a conclusion.
103
 Newman concluded that the Illative sense, as he 
theorised it, functioned to close that gap, which must necessarily exist between converging 
probabilities and incontrovertible proof, in order to attain certitude in specific situations.
104
 
He also concluded that it is through the functioning of the Illative process that human beings 
can be certain that the voice of Conscience is really speaking to them.
105
 It must be noted, 
however, that the exercise of Newman’s Illative sense apparently depends on the level of 
sagacity, skill or prudence cultivated by a person, facilitated through practice and experience, 
both of which are also seen to be crucially important for reasoning well and making apt 
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 Such an implication cannot but have ramifications in such areas as ‘formation 
of conscience’ and ‘the erroneous conscience’ for example. 
 In terms of the above description, Newman’s Illative sense can be best described as a 
natural faculty of judgement, an informal and tacit ability for reasoning, developing 
intellectual skills and making apt judgements.
107
 It is also depicted as governing a natural 
process of reasoning by which a person arrives at the truth of a proposition without explicit 
investigation.
108
 This is comparable to Newman’s understanding of how the natural 
conscience functions; he theorised that it can arrive at the truth of a proposition that certain 
behaviours are right or wrong, in the absence of any apparent investigation.
109
 It seemed to 
Newman that the natural conscience had unconsciously combined various phenomena to 
form a judgement of this or that behaviour. It is in such a manner that Newman sees the 
Illative sense guiding individuals to conclusions that their consciences will go on to form.
110
 
In this perspective, it will not be wrong for Henri Bremond to state that the Illative Sense is 
“the name taken by the conscience when in quest of religious truth.”
111
 
 In the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk also, Newman looks at the nature and role of 
conscience. The Letter is specifically addressed to the Duke in acknowledgement of his social 
position as the leading Catholic layman in England. In the ten chapter write up, Newman 
discusses the evolution of the Papacy and the concept of conscience, amongst other matters, 
for the ‘enlightenment’ of the then British Prime Minister, William E. Gladstone, who had 
just virulently attacked Catholic teaching on papal infallibility enunciated at The First 
Vatican Council (1868-1870). With reference to Council’s teaching, Gladstone bitterly 
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complained about the effort to Romanise the Church of England as well as the people of 
England in his article “Ritual and Ritualism” published in Contemporary Review 24 (1874): 
663-81. He unashamedly sensationalised this allegation by questioning the patriotism of 
English Catholics in the context of the teaching of Vatican I as contained in Pastor 
Aeternus
112
. This Vatican 1 document promulgated as infallible the teaching authority of the 
Pope, when he taught ex cathedra, thereby indicating to Catholics that they would be 
expected to acknowledge and submit to Papal teaching authority.  
 Gladstone angrily remonstrated that English Catholics could not, therefore, be loyal to 
their country, on the one hand, and to the Church and the Pope, on the other.
113
 In an anti-
Catholic pamphlet entitled “The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance: A 
Political Expostulation” (1874), Gladstone blatantly called on English Catholics to reject 
papal infallibility just as they had patriotically opposed the Spanish Armada of 1588.
114
 
Within the same pamphlet, however, he rounded on the Church of these potential Catholic 
patriots; in a sectarian pique, deridingly equating their Church as “an Asian monarchy: 
nothing but one giddy height of despotism, and one dead level of religious subservience”, led 
by a Pope who wants to replace the rule of law with arbitrary tyranny, and then hide these 
“crimes against liberty beneath a suffocating cloud of incense.”
115
 
 In making his response, Newman used his Letter, in particular Chapters 4 and 5, to 
defend Catholics and the Pope, but, crucially, he used the opportunity to assert the primacy of 
conscience. What was crucial about asserting the Catholic position of the primacy of 
conscience was that it went directly to the core of Gladstone’s attack, namely the alleged 
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Papal interference with the supremacy of the individual conscience. Phrases such as “no 
mental freedom”, “a hold over their consciences”, “loss of mental and moral freedom” and 
“our state of bondage” used by Gladstone left Newman in no doubt as to the focal point of 
Gladstone’s sharp attack. In his pamphlet, Gladstone had not been slow to point out that if 
someone hands over control of their conscience to another, or if this control is taken from 
them, they will suffer a loss of mental and moral freedom, and will exist in a state of bondage 
to their controller. In Gladstone’s view, whosoever controls the conscience controls its 
owner. Such assumptions by Gladstone did not escape Newman’s attention, and so he  
situated the content of Gladstone’s emotive “vituperation” within the context of his own 
reasoned debate on conscience, pointing out that: 
The main question which Mr. Gladstone has started I consider to be 
this:—Can Catholics be trustworthy subjects of the State? Has not a 
foreign Power a hold over their consciences such, that it may at any 
time be used to the serious perplexity and injury of the civil 
government under which they live? Not that Mr. Gladstone confines 
himself to these questions, for he goes out of his way, I am sorry to 
say, to taunt us with our loss of mental and moral freedom, a 
vituperation which is not necessary for his purpose at all. He informs 
us too that we have “repudiated ancient history,” and are rejecting 
modern “thought,” and that our Church has been “refurbishing her 
rusty tools,” and has been lately aggravating, and is likely still more to 
aggravate, our state of bondage.
116
 
 That Newman had hit the proverbial nail on the head, despite the fact that Gladstone 
rarely used the word “conscience” is evident from the fact that Bismarck, the “Iron 
Chancellor” himself, joined in the debate on the side of Gladstone. John Finnis notes 
Bismarck’s “welcome on board” to Gladstone, in what he saw as their joint task of standing 
shoulder to shoulder in defending “liberty of conscience.” Finnis, himself, finds Bismarck’s 
use of such a phrase ironic in the light of subsequent bellicose events that occurred both 
within and between both countries. John Finnis continues: 
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Gladstone’s Expostulation made little use of the word ‘conscience’. 
But others besides Newman saw that conscience was the pamphlet’s 
theme. Bismarck wrote personally to Gladstone to express his ‘deep 
and hopeful gratification to see the two nations, which in Europe are 
the champions of the liberty of conscience encountering the same foe, 
stand henceforth shoulder to shoulder in defending the highest 
interests of the human race. The Reich Chancellor’s expression of 
favour for ‘liberty of conscience’ recalls for us the ambiguity of that 




Newman, however, maintained that there were reasons other than the defence of liberty of 
conscience underlying Gladstone’s issuing of his Expostulation. He noted Gladstone’s 
construal of acceptance of the Syllabus of Erroneous Propositions as being akin to placing 
one’s civil loyalty and duty at the mercy of another, that other being a foreign Pope. This 
alarm at citizens having to export their civil loyalty and duty outside the state was further 
exacerbated by the promulgation of the Definitions of Vatican 1 concerning the universal 
jurisdiction and doctrinal infallibility of the Pope. Interestingly, Newman noted Gladstone’s 
indignation at what he perceived as the Irish bishops’ interference in political matters at that 
time. It seemed to Newman, then, that rather than being a defence of freedom of conscience, 
Gladstone’s document was, in effect, a call for separation of Church and State, especially 
when that Church was the Roman Catholic Church. Thus, Newman notes some of 
Gladstone’s negative and alarmist reactions to specified developments within the Catholic 
Church of that era: 
He was alarmed, as a statesman, ten years ago by the Pope's 
Encyclical of December 8, and by the Syllabus of Erroneous 
Propositions which, by the Pope's authority, accompanied its 
transmission to the bishops. Then came the Definitions of the Vatican 
Council in 1870, upon the universal jurisdiction and doctrinal 
infallibility of the Pope. And lastly, as the event which turned alarm 
into indignation, and into the duty of public remonstrance, ‘the Roman 
Catholic Prelacy of Ireland thought fit to procure the rejection of’ the 
Irish University Bill of February, 1873, ‘by the direct influence which 
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Newman’s teaching on conscience, as outlined in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk is 
lauded by John Finnis for its successful attempt at raising the profile of conscience from the 
domain of untutored, primitive irrationality to the level of an intellectual ability “endowment” 
that can serve to connect rational human beings with their God. Indeed, the opening to the 
following extract from Finnis, could be read as an expression of gratitude to Gladstone for 
triggering such a “brilliant exposition” in Newman: 
It can be argued that Gladstone’s Expostulation brought forth in 
Newman a brilliant exposition of the notion of Conscience . . . Indeed, 
the Letter has its peculiar power from its celebration of conscience 
precisely as an ‘intellectual endowment’ enabling the ‘rational 
creature’ to share in ‘the Divine Light,’ the Divine Law, ‘Divine 
Reason or Will of God’ as against the theories of ‘the great world of 
philosophy now,’ which dethrone conscience as ‘but a twist in 




 Newman’s concept of conscience in the Letter to the Duke, as we will see later, did 
elevate the essential nature of conscience from that of a “simply irrational product of 
imagination” to a level on a par with the Divine. The Letter is classic for championing the 
authority and primacy of conscience. In this regard, Newman had this to say: 
I should look to see what theologians could do for me, what the 
Bishops and clergy around me, what my confessor; what friends 
whom I have revered: and if, after all, I could not take their view of 




Newman was equally unequivocal when it came to the relationship between conscience and 
the authority of the Pope. The primacy of conscience could not be compromised. It is an 
invaluable principle of the human person. In the following extract, Newman shows 
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commitment to this fundamental principle underpinning the inherent authority of the voice of 
conscience: 
Was St. Peter infallible on that occasion at Antioch when St. Paul 
withstood him . . . And, to come to later times, was Gregory XIII, 
when he had a medal struck in honour of the Bartholomew massacre? 
. . . or Sextus V when he blessed the Armada? or Urban VIII when he 
persecuted Galileo? No Catholic ever pretends that these Popes were 
infallible in these acts . . . and the Pope is not infallible in that subject-
matter in which conscience is of supreme authority, no dead-lock, 
such as implied in the objection which I am answering, can take place 
between conscience and the Pope.
121
 
The Letter to the Duke of Norfolk as a scholarly and a capable response to Gladstone’s attack 




2. The Specific Nature and Role of Conscience in Newman’s Thought  
 Newman’s teaching on conscience is very much God–centred.
123
 He believes it 
originates in God and leads to the knowledge of God. His teaching is founded on his faith. 
Amongst his homilies, we find his initial treatment of the origin of conscience. In his 
preaching, he maintains that conscience has been part of human nature from the outset of 
creation, having been placed there by God. In his Parochial and Plain Sermons, in particular, 
he situates the origin of conscience within the context of the Fall of Adam and Eve, a sin that 
involved their original disobedience to a Divine Injunction. Newman narrates: 
If there be this sort of connexion between God's knowledge and 
sufferance of evil, see what an ambition it was in our first parents to 
desire to know it without experiencing it; it was, indeed, to desire to 
be as gods,—to know the secrets of the prison-house, and to see the 
worm that dieth not, yet remain innocent and happy. This they 
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understood not; they desired something which they knew not that they 
could not have, remaining as they were; they did not see how 
knowledge and experience went together in the case of human nature; 
and Satan did not undeceive them. They ate of the tree which was to 
make them wise, and, alas! they saw clearly what sin was, what 
shame, what death, what hell, what despair. They lost God's presence, 
and they gained the knowledge of evil. They lost Eden, and they 




 This citation indicates that the story of the Fall in the mystery of creation is the first 
negative human response to the voice of God, a voice which told its original listeners what 
they could or could not do. Newman declared unambiguously that the experience of the 
couple gained them conscience which he defined as “the knowledge of good and evil.” That 
“they gained conscience” could mean that they became aware of a specific way of reasoning, 
a way to distinguish between right and wrong. 
 Newman elaborates on the Divine origin of conscience in another early sermon in 
which he taught that: 
We obey God primarily because we actually feel His presence in our 
consciences bidding us obey Him. And this, I say, confutes these 
objectors on their own ground; because the very reason they give for 
their unbelief is, that they trust their own sight and reason . . . more 
than the words of God's Ministers. Now, let me ask, if they trust their 
senses and their reason, why do they not trust their conscience too? Is 
not conscience their own? Their conscience is as much a part of 
themselves as their reason is; and it is placed within them by Almighty 
God in order to balance the influence of sight and reason; and yet they 
will not attend to it; for a plain reason . . . they love to be their own 
masters, and therefore they will not attend to that secret whisper of 
their hearts, which tells them they are not their own masters, and that 
sin is hateful and ruinous.
125
 
Newman maintains here in vehement words that God Himself placed conscience within the 
individual, not for His own delectation, but to moderate, monitor and executively direct the 
functions of his other human endowments, reason, and the senses. Newman pointedly 
contrasts the ease with which individuals are prepared to claim personal ownership of, and 
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lordship over, their capacity to reason and to sense, with their reluctance to “attend to that 
secret whisper of their hearts.” He explicitly attributes such reluctance to the human being’s 
desire to be his or her own master. The words of Satan to Eve, as he induced her to follow her 
own desires: “you will become like God, knowing good and evil” (Gen. 3:5), could not have 
been far from Newman’s mind as he penned the above conclusion. In other sermons, 





 “an original endowment”
128
 or “a guide from God.”
129
  
 Newman’s sermons are a reminder that a human endowment whether it be reason, the 
senses or conscience is inherent. All such endowments have a Divine origin, having been 
implanted within the individual by God Himself. His striking depiction of conscience as “that 
secret whisper of their hearts” is meant to convey that human beings “are not their own 
masters” since exercising any form of serious control over something that is “secret” and 
conveyed by a “whisper” must be considered quite a difficult undertaking. 
 In another of his sermons, Newman uses the mystery of the incarnation to elucidate 
on the origin of conscience. To understand his theological interconnecting will naturally 
require some insight into his perception of this Christian mystery. A straightforward account 
of his perception is to be found in his Parochial and Plain Sermons. Characteristically, 
Newman’s account leaves little room for speculation or second-guessing, as he pinpoints the 
notion central to this mystery: Jesus Christ, as Son of God and Son of Mary, has two natures, 
divine and human, united in his Person. Elaborating on this, Newman asserts: 
Before He (Jesus Christ) came on earth, he had but the perfections of 
God, but afterwards he had also the virtues of a creature, such as faith, 
meekness, self denial. Before he came on earth he could not be 
tempted to evil; but afterwards he had a man’s heart, and a man’s 
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wants and infirmities. His Divine Nature indeed pervaded his 
manhood, so that every deed and word of his in the flesh savoured of 
eternity and infinity; but on the other hand, from the time he was born 
of the Virgin Mary, he had a natural fear of danger, a natural shrinking 
from pain, though ever subject to the ruling influence of that holy and 
eternal Essence which was in him.
130
 
Having presented an explicit answer as to the nature of the mystery, Newman gave his 
listeners an understanding as to the purpose underlying such Divine-Human intermingling 
within the Person of Jesus. For Newman, Jesus Christ was primarily the “Word of God” 
whose incarnation was intended as God’s answer to mankind’s restless search for happiness, a 
search which commenced (as noted earlier) after it had lost Paradise, when it had lost His 
Presence. Therefore, according to Newman: 
Christ then took on our nature, when he would redeem it; He 
redeemed it by making it suffer in His own Person; He purified it, by 
making it pure in His own Person. He first sanctified it in Himself, 
made it righteous, made it acceptable to God, submitted it to an 
expiatory passion, and then He imparted it to us. He took it, 




 In Newman’s view, Jesus Christ could only achieve his mission of redeeming human 
nature and rendering it righteous and acceptable to his Father by incarnating his Trinitarian 
role of the “Word of God.” Newman, as a writer, preacher, and teacher, was aware, more than 
most, of the power of words to mediate information, meaning, expectation, counsel and 
advice, for example, at all levels from the very general to the finely nuanced. It is for this 
reason that, when dealing with the notion of conscience, Newman specifically identifies 
Christ as the Incarnated “Word of God”. It is Newman’s understanding that, when “The Word 
of God” imparts to humankind his Universal Law of Love, and His reasoned expectations as 
to how human beings should treat one another, for example, He is not only mediating between 
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God the Father and Humankind, but He is also providing each human being with his or her 
own unique, Divine-Human mediating tool namely, conscience. Newman elaborates thus:  
As it is said in the opening of the Gospel: ‘In the beginning was the 
Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.’ If we 
may dare conjecture, He is called the Word of God, as mediating 
between the Father and all creatures; bringing them into being, 
fashioning them, giving the world its laws, imparting reason and 
conscience to creatures of a higher order, and revealing to them in due 
season the knowledge of God's will.
132
  
It is in this manner that Newman clarifies that Christ, as Word of God incarnate endowed 
human beings with a conscience to reveal the requirements of God’s will to them. 
  Newman’s teaching on the divine origin of conscience enables him to take his 
teaching further and assert that 
obedience to our conscience, in all things, great and small, is the way to 
know the Truth; that pride hardens the heart, and sensuality debases it; and 
that all those who live in pride and sensual indulgence can no more 
comprehend the way of the Holy Spirit, or know the voice of Christ than 
the devils who believe with a dead faith and tremble.
133
 
At this stage, it should be obvious that, irrespective of his intentions, Newman has succeeded 
in situating the nature and function of conscience within an all-encompassing Trinitarian 
embrace. 
2.1 Conscience: Representative and Intermediary of God in the Human Person 
 In Newman’s eyes, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, there are only two 
unconditional realities in this world, personal existence of the self and that of God. The 
importance that Newman attached to human friendship has already been noted, and yet of 
friends in general, he suggests that they can only scratch at the surface of his personal reality. 
When it comes to a person’s deep and innermost self, according to Newman, friends cannot 
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get at his or her soul, or enter into their thoughts, or really be companion to them. He wryly 
suggests that human beings will have to wait till the next life for such in-depth relating. He 
goes on to conclude, therefore, that all that is then left for human beings is the 
acknowledgment of the reality of their own existence and that of the Presence of God within 
them. This God, however, is both Governor and Judge over each individual, is permanently 
represented within that individual by the presence and functioning of his or her conscience. 
Newman’s teaching in this regard is presented in the following extract, which indeed is classic 
for its structure as well as its unambiguous content: 
Sublime, unlooked-for doctrine, yet most true! To every one of us there 
are but two beings in the whole world, himself and God; for, as to this 
outward scene, its pleasures and pursuits, its honours and cares, its 
contrivances, its personages, its kingdoms, its multitude of busy slaves, 
what are they to us? nothing—no more than a show:—‘The world 
passeth away and the lust thereof.’ And as to those others nearer to us, 
who are not to be classed with the vain world, I mean our friends and 
relations, whom we are right in loving, these, too, after all, are nothing to 
us here. They cannot really help or profit us; we see them, and they act 
upon us, only (as it were) at a distance, through the medium of sense; 
they cannot get at our souls; they cannot enter into our thoughts, or really 
be companions to us. In the next world it will, through God's mercy, be 
otherwise; but here we enjoy, not their presence, but the anticipation of 
what one day shall be; so that, after all, they vanish before the clear 
vision we have, first, of our own existence, next of the presence of the 
great God in us, and over us, as our Governor and Judge, who dwells in 
us by our conscience, which is His representative.
134
 
 In the previous section we stressed Newman’s teaching on the divine origin of 
conscience but in the extract above, he considers conscience as an indwelling Divine 
Representative, and elaborates on the assumptions and expectations out of which this 
representative operates. As God’s representative; Newman’s teaching serves as an important 
foundation for theological personalism, which, in general terms, emphasizes the significance, 
uniqueness and inviolability of the person, as well as his or her inherently relational and 
communal nature.  
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 Geissler elaborates what happens for individuals when they operate out of such 
assumptions. For example, obedience to this Divine Representative will dispose people for 
knowledge-with (con-scientia) someone else. Loyal supporters of this Divine Representative will 
not allow themselves to be misused, and will choose not to remain imprisoned in an egocentric 
world.
135
 Obedience to the voice of this Divine Representative will serve to cultivate in the 
conscientious person an open heart for others and for Truth and Love. Consistent obedience to 
this voice will fashion conscience into an advocate of truth in the innermost part of the human 
person. It can be said that Newman’s own life was an impressive endorsement of this 
fundamental conviction.
136
 In substantiating such a claim, in terms of Newman’s conversion to 
Catholicism, Benedict XVI also made explicit what conscience, as the Indwelling Divine 
Representative, expects of its human host:  
Newman's conversion to Catholicism was not for him a matter of 
personal taste or of subjective, spiritual need . . . Newman was much 
more taken by the necessity to obey recognized truth than his own 
preferences, that is to say, even against his own sensitivity and bonds of 
friendship and ties due to similar backgrounds . . . he emphasized truth's 
priority over consensus, over the accommodation of groups.
137
 
2.1.1 Conscience: The Aboriginal Vicar of Christ 
 In Newman’s thinking, conscience is not what the philosophical theories of his time 
projected. Conscience is not the “self” speaking; rather it is the literal voice of God. As stated 
earlier in this thesis, the “voice of God” was “Incarnated” for the benefit of all humankind, 
for Newman; therefore, conscience not only represents the “voice of God” but also that of the 
Incarnate Son. In recognition of this Christ-centred attribute, Newman explains the nature of 
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conscience and calls it “the aboriginal Vicar of Christ,”
138
 with consequent role in the tria 
munera Christi: 
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be 
consistent with oneself; but it is a messenger from Him, who, both in 
nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules 
us by His representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ, 
a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest 
in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood 
throughout the Church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle 
would remain and would have a sway.
139
 
As with all of Newman’s writings, he characteristically leaves very little to chance or 
accident, when it comes to utilising his superb mastery of the English language in order to 
effectively transmit his message to his readers or listeners. So, he refutes what he views as 
wrong understanding of conscience and indicates that it is “a messenger of God.” Norris 
expounding on Newman declared: 
This appellation sets up what may be called ‘the Christological 
context of conscience’ which, as a component of human nature, 
belongs to creation, but belongs to Christ in virtue of the incarnation 
and resurrection. He who speaks in nature and creation by way of 
conscience is the same person who will speak in revelation, ‘the initial 
and essential idea of Christianity.’
140
 
Geissler on the other hand explicates on the tria munera Christi thus: 
Conscience is a prophet because it tells us in advance whether the act 
is good or bad. It is a king because it exhorts us with authority: ‘Do 
this, avoid that.’ It is a priest because it blesses us after a good deed - 
this means not only the delightful experience of a good conscience, 
but also the blessing which goodness brings in any case to people and 
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to the world - and likewise ‘condemns’ after an evil deed, as an 
expression of the gnawing bad conscience and of the negative effects 
of sin on men and their surroundings. [Conscience] is a principle that 
is written in the being of every person. It asks for obedience and refers 




 Geissler in concluding from Newman’s use of those Biblical metaphors that 
conscience is a principle written into the very being of every person, is merely reiterating 
Newman’s claim that the basic principles of the Natural Law are a part of the mind and heart 
of the very person.
142
 Since conscience is deemed an essential part of the Natural Law, which 
prefigured the New Law of Christ,
143
 Newman’s description of conscience as the Aboriginal 
Vicar of Christ, is due to his conviction that conscience is the Divine Law “as apprehended in 
the mind of individuals.”
144
 So Newman demands a dutiful obedience to that divine voice that 
speaks within us as he maintains: 
[O]bedience to conscience leads to obedience to the Gospel, which, 
instead of being something different altogether, is but the completion 
and perfection of that religion which natural conscience teaches. 
Indeed, it would have been strange if the God of nature had said one 
thing, and the God of grace another; if the truths which our conscience 
taught us without the information of Scripture, were contradicted by 
that information when obtained. But it is not so; there are not two 
ways of pleasing God; what conscience suggests, Christ has 
sanctioned and explained; to love God and our neighbour are the great 
duties of the Gospel as well as of the Law; he who endeavours to fulfil 
them by the light of nature is in the way towards, as our Lord said, 




Newman is quite explicit in his assertion that obedience to conscience is equivalent to 
obedience to the Gospels and to obedience to the sanctions of Christ, especially His primary 
sanctions concerning the Love of God and of one’s neighbour. 
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 In his treatment of conscience as divine-representative and especially of Christ, 
Newman has, in a way, bestowed on natural conscience a Christian aura. While the ultimate 
demands of a Christian conscience focus on love of God and Neighbour, Newman reminds 
his us that anyone seeking to fulfil those demands “by the light of nature” only is, in the 
words of Christ “not far from the Kingdom.” 
2.2 Conscience: A Christian-Religious Construct with Multiple Philosophical 
Undertones 
 Newman’s argument for the existence of conscience is very much connected with 
God. His method of presenting his argument is however very philosophical. In a sermon 
preached before the Catholic University of Dublin he proclaimed: 
What is the main guide of the soul, given to the whole race of Adam, 
outside the true fold of Christ as well as within it, given from the first 
dawn of reason, given to it in spite of that grievous penalty of 
ignorance, which is one of the chief miseries of our fallen state? It is 
the light of conscience, ‘the true Light,’ as the same Evangelist says, 
in the same passage, ‘which enlighteneth every man that cometh into 
this world.’ Whether a man be born in pagan darkness, or in some 
corruption of revealed religion,—whether he has heard the name of 
the Saviour of the world or not,— whether he be the slave of some 
superstition, or is in possession of some portions of Scripture, and 
treats the inspired word as a sort of philosophical book, which he 
interprets for himself, and comes to certain conclusions about its 
teaching,—in any case, he has within his breast a certain commanding 
dictate, not a mere sentiment, not a mere opinion, or impression, or 
view of things, but a law, an authoritative voice, bidding him do 
certain things and avoid others. I do not say that its particular 
injunctions are always clear, or that they are always consistent with 
each other; but what I am insisting on here is this, that it commands,—
that it praises, it blames, it promises, it threatens, it implies a future, 
and it witnesses the unseen. It is more than a man's own self. The man 
himself has not power over it, or only with extreme difficulty; he did 
not make it, he cannot destroy it. He may silence it in particular cases 
or directions, he may distort its enunciations, but he cannot, or it is 
quite the exception if he can, he cannot emancipate himself from it. 
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Newman argues here for the universality of conscience, he sees it not as an exclusive of 
Christians but of everybody. He describes it in the language of the Gospel of John as: “the 
true light.” Newman, however, indicates conscience’s special role by which in “its very 




 Newman’s perception of conscience demonstrates an assuredness that his teaching is 
the hallmark of a personal deep-seated faith conviction. Conscience suggested many things 




Conscience suggests to us many things about that Master, whom by 
means of it we perceive, but its most prominent teaching, and its 
cardinal and distinguishing truth, is that he is our Judge. In 
consequence, the special Attribute under which it brings Him before 
us, to which it subordinates all other Attributes, is that of justice—
retributive justice. We learn from its informations to conceive of the 
Almighty, primarily, not as a God of Wisdom, of Knowledge, of 
Power, of Benevolence, but as a God of Judgment and Justice; as One, 
who, not simply for the good of the offender, but as an end good in 
itself, and as a principle of government, ordains that the offender 
should suffer for his offence. If it tells us anything at all of the 
characteristics of the Divine Mind, it certainly tells us this; and, 
considering that our shortcomings are far more frequent and important 
than our fulfilment of the duties enjoined upon us, and that of this 
point we are fully aware ourselves, it follows that the aspect under 
which Almighty God is presented to us by Nature, is (to use a figure) 
of One who is angry with us, and threatens evil.
149
 
From the above quotation, Newman brings out his basic teaching concerning conscience and 
God: “a God of Judgment and Justice.” 
The quality and nature of Newman’s ‘pronouncements’ and ‘declarations’ concerning 
the inherent capacity of conscience to reveal the actual existence of God are indicative of 
“real assent”, which, according to Mahoney, one gives “to choices that we must make 
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immediately in our daily lives,” in contrast to “the notional assent”, which, he suggests, we 
reserve for “intellectual and scientific concepts that might take time to comprehend and 
understand fully.”
150
 In the words of S. A. Grave, when Newman undertakes to show “how 
we can come by the way of our conscience to a realisation that God exists . . . we shall find, 
he there works with an everyday conception of conscience.”
151
 This means that Newman 
applies the notion of conscience as a specific knowledge or reason. 
Newman’s real philosophical description of conscience comes from the phrases he 
used to describe conscience. For instance, he states: 
The feeling of conscience (being, I repeat, a certain keen sensibility, 
pleasant or painful,—self-approval and hope, or compunction and 
fear,—attendant on certain of our actions, which in consequence we 
call right or wrong) is twofold:—it is a moral sense, and a sense of 
duty; a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate. Of course its 
act is indivisible; still it has these two aspects, distinct from each 
other, and admitting of a separate consideration.
152
 
Grave seems to suggest that Newman represented these four philosophical constructs 
as forming a “double aspect” of conscience.
 153
 Conscience as a “Moral Sense” or a “Sense of 
Duty” comprises apparently contrasting components of one aspect, while conscience as a 
“Judgement of Reason” or a “Magisterial Dictate” comprises apparently contrasting 
components of the other.
 
 
 In dealing with these distinctions within distinctions, we are able to access the 
complexity and sophistication of Newman’s thought; which sometimes seems to re-interpret, 
further refine or even ignore previous stances or assertions. To this effect, we will focus 
mainly on outlining the role of each construct within Newman’s indivisible conscience. 
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2.2.1 Conscience: A Moral Sense 
 Newman’s philosophical discussion on conscience can be said to start with his 
recognition of conscience among our mental acts such as the action of memory, of reasoning, 
of imagination or the sense of the beautiful.
154
 According to Grave, Newman is making the 
point that conscience is as much an endowment of our nature as these other acts are, although 
Newman does clearly distinguish between the nature of their existence and that of 
conscience.
155
 Why does Newman identify conscience with the term “moral sense”? 
Grave notes that “moral sense” as used in the Grammar of Assent reflects its 
philosophical history.
156
 Terlinden tracing the history of the term states that moral sense was a 
prevalent theory in the eighteenth century and Newman adopted the notion from there.
157
 
While referring to Newman’s Oxford University Sermon, Terlinden notes that Newman 
defines moral sense as “the act of the mind which enables it to distinguish between good and 
evil but also able to perceive certain principles which underlie reasoning in matters of morals 
and religion.”
158
 Terlinden goes on to identify three qualities which Newman ascribed to the 
Moral Sense: (i) it perceives in a spontaneous and immediate manner; (ii) it is always placed 
under the control of reason, and, most importantly for Newman (iii) its perception of good 
and evil, as elaborated below, is not simply a matter of taste or personal feelings, but is rooted 
in human nature: 
The cultivated moral perception … is sometimes improperly termed, 
‘feeling’ – improperly, because feeling comes and goes, and, having 
no roots in our nature, speaks with no divine authority; but the moral 
                                                             
154
 John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent, 105; See Jouett L. Powell, “Cardinal Newman on Faith and 
Doubt: the Role of Conscience,” The Downside Review 99 (1981): 137. Powell expatiates upon Newman’s 
understanding of conscience as a mental act. Powell identifies and describes the two mental acts which Newman 
associates with conscience namely: Moral sense and Sense of obligation. 
155
 S. A. Grave, Conscience in Newman’s Thought, 30-31; See Bernard Mahoney, “Newman and Moral 
Liberalism,” 231. 
156
 S. A. Grave, Conscience in Newman’s Thought, 32. 
157
 Luc Terlinden, “Newman and Conscience,” 208; See also S. A. Grave, Conscience in Newman’s Thought, 
33-35. 
158
 Luc Terlinden, “Newman and Conscience,” 208. 
183 
 
perception, though varying in the mass of men, is fixed in each 
individual, and is an original element within us.
159
 
However, Grave points out that Newman not only elaborates on the main characteristics of 
conscience as moral sense, but explains in detail how right and wrong is brought to an 
individual’s knowledge and awareness by the conscience operating in such a moral capacity 
as there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel 
grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in us 
approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right or 
wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific 




Newman re-iterates his representation of “Conscience as Moral Sense” by suggesting that 
following upon their performance of certain actions, human beings can experience feelings of 
self-approval or disapproval.
161
 As a consequence of such self-assessments, human beings 
will call things, actions or behaviours right or wrong, based on their experiencing either 
feelings of self-approval or self-condemnation. Interestingly, Grave notes that such feelings 
arise out of conscience, understood as either a “Moral Sense” or as “Sense of Duty” on the 
one hand, or as a “Judgment of Reason” or “Magisterial dictate,” on the other.
162
 
 In the light of Newman’s attempts at integrating the concept of Moral Sense into his 
philosophising on conscience, it is surprising, then, to witness him criticise the former for the 
haziness with which it is perceived by “half the world.” Indeed, Bernard Mahoney cites an 
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extract from the Grammar of Assent in support of a claim he makes that Newman actually 
rejected the concept altogether:  
Half the world would be puzzled to know what was meant by the 
moral sense; but every one knows what is meant by a good or bad 
conscience. Conscience is ever forcing on us by threats and by 
promises that we must follow the right and avoid the wrong; so far it 
is one and the same in the mind of every one, whatever be its 
particular errors in particular minds as to the acts which it orders to be 
done or to be avoided; and in this respect it corresponds to our 
perception of the beautiful and deformed. As we have naturally a 
sense of the beautiful and graceful in nature and art, though tastes 
proverbially differ, so we have a sense of duty and obligation, whether 
we all associate it with the same certain actions in particular or not. 
Here, however, Taste and Conscience part company: for the sense of 
beautifulness, as indeed the Moral Sense, has no special relations to 
persons, but contemplates objects in themselves; conscience, on the 
other hand, is concerned with persons primarily, and with actions 
mainly as viewed in their doers, or rather with self alone and one's 
own actions, and with others only indirectly and as if in association 
with self. And further, taste is its own evidence, appealing to nothing 
beyond its own sense of the beautiful or the ugly, and enjoying the 
specimens of the beautiful simply for their own sake; but conscience 
does not repose on itself, but vaguely reaches forward to something 
beyond self, and dimly discerns a sanction higher than self for its 
decisions, as is evidenced in that keen sense of obligation and 
responsibility which informs them. And hence it is that we are 
accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice, a term which we should 
never think of applying to the sense of the beautiful; and moreover a 
voice, or the echo of a voice, imperative and constraining, like no 
other dictate in the whole of our experience. And again, in 
consequence of this prerogative of dictating and commanding, which 
is of its essence, Conscience has an intimate bearing on our affections 
and emotions, leading us to reverence and awe, hope and fear, 
especially fear, a feeling which is foreign for the most part, not only to 




A perusal of the above extract shows Newman attributing an essential role to the concepts of 
“dictating and commanding” in the effective functioning of conscience. In contrast, the moral 
sense is accorded a function similar to that of the individual’s sense of “beautifulnness,” 
namely, the contemplation of “objects in themselves.” It would appear that after all of 
Newman’s efforts at integrating the moral sense into his philosophy of conscience, he ends up 
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rejecting it as a useful “component” in favour of an understanding of conscience as a 
“Magisterial Dictate.” In fact, so determined does he appear to reject the notion of a role of 
the moral sense in the functioning of conscience that he proposes a role for his very own 
“Illative Sense” to replace it.
164
 
 How are we to interpret Newman’s actions and seeming reactions in this matter? On 
the one hand, we find him detailing the nature and functioning of the moral sense; on the 
other hand, we find him simply rejecting it as a concept. As a concept, “Moral Sense” which 
was prevalent in the eighteenth century, as cited earlier in Terlinden originated in the writings 
of one of the main proponents of Moral Liberalism, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of 
Shaftesbury (1671-1713). According to Mahoney, the concept subsequently “went through a 
series of definitions by philosophers and theologians who both agreed and disagreed with one 
another, or amended and corrected one another.”
165
 Newman was keenly aware, however, that 
no matter how they differed philosophically from one another, or amended or corrected each 
other’s views on moral–sense theory, Moral Liberalists of all hues were united in their belief 
that all moral judgements represented subjective solutions to human situations, and resulted 




 The fact that the concept of moral sense originated from within Moral Liberalism, and 
continued to dynamically exercise the minds of Moral Liberalists, may well have triggered a 
deep-seated wariness in Newman in terms of his managing this concept. Could such wariness 
have led him to expunge moral sense from his philosophising on conscience and replace it 
with a Sense contrived by him? Gerard Magill makes clear that Newman deviated from the 
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moral sense theory of Shaftesbury because it excluded a religious dimension from moral 
discernment and depended upon “discursive reason and aesthetics. . . . The reason why 
Newman rejected the moral sense theory of Shaftesbury was to associate the moral sense with 
autonomous reason in its non-discursive form.”
167
 Certainly, Newman’s rejection of the 
Moral Liberalist philosophy and of any of its selfish concepts that, in his estimation, could be 
used to enable its promotion was forthright and unequivocal in these words: “Conscience is 
not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself.”
168
 
 Again, although administered in a different context, in justifying obedience to the 
Pope, Newman’s advice is infused with disparaging description that he unapologetically 
ascribes to the nature of any individual who has embraced a Moral Liberalist philosophy of 
life: “He must vanquish that mean, ungenerous, selfish, vulgar spirit of his nature, which, at 




 Newman reminds us that we actually know where to look in search for “the standard 
by which to measure thoughts and actions”: 
You know very well, my brethren . . . that in the breast of every one 
there dwells a feeling or perception, which tells him the difference 
between right and wrong, and is the standard by which to measure 
thoughts and actions. It is called conscience; and even though it be not 
at all times powerful enough to rule us, still it is distinct and decisive 
enough to influence our views and form our judgments in the various 
matters which come before us.
170
 
As a contrast to the apparent philosophical disarray of the proponents of Moral Liberalism, 
however, Newman claims that the representation of conscience as the “voice of God” is 
acknowledged across history and literature, and remains unaffected by an individual’s age, 
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level of education, creedal beliefs, or status in society. Tongue-in-cheek, he notes that even 
philosophers, who otherwise disagree with one another, have been found to agree on this 
representation. In the Grammar of Assent he maintained: 
—that conscience is the voice of God has almost grown into a 
proverb. This solemn dogma is recognized as such by the great mass 
both of the young and of the uneducated, by the religious few and the 
irreligious many. It is proclaimed in the history and literature of 
nations; it has had supporters in all ages, places, creeds, forms of 
social life, professions, and classes. It has held its ground under great 
intellectual and moral disadvantages; it has recovered its supremacy, 
and ultimately triumphed in the minds of those who had rebelled 
against it. Even philosophers, who have been antagonists on other 
points, agree in recognizing the inward voice of that solemn Monitor, 




 Newman’s assessment of the role that the moral sense plays in shaping the voice of 
God for the benefit of the individual recipient, has not been as accepting or as sympathetic 
towards that construct as may have been expected. Given Newman’s support for the need for 
an objective morality independent of public support, reasons have already been offered for 
this, but cognisance needs also to be taken of Newman’s belief that conscience cannot be 
reduced to a moral sense, since, in his view, it does not limit itself to simply pointing the 
moral way, that there is right and wrong action, but also commands, dictates and sanctions. It 
is in this direction that conscience as sense of duty becomes primary. 
2.2.2 Conscience: A Sense of Duty 
 Edward A. Sillem holds that Newman’s teaching on conscience as sense of duty 
reveals its juridical role in our lives. He affirms that Newman’s argument for conscience 
proceeds from understanding it as a sense of duty and not from its consideration as moral 
sense. Sillem explains that as a sense of duty conscience imposes an absolute law and 
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obligation on each and every person, and a law that is one and the same in everyone.
172
 In this 
regard, conscience as a sense of duty is concerned with persons primarily.
173
 According to 
Terlinden, Newman’s notion of conscience as a “Sense of Duty” implies a relationship 
between the “self” and a “Superior Somebody” who commands or dictates it.
174
 Terlinden 
explains that Newman, himself, draws on experience rather than on theorising to validate his 
claim. Specifically, the experiences he draws on are the individual’s experiences of such 
contrasting feelings as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, serenity, and remorse, feelings which, he 
contends, are indicators of a good or bad conscience.
175
 For Newman, such feelings, which he 
reduces to feelings of inner peace versus feelings of confusion, suggest to the individuals 
experiencing them that they are not alone in this experience, but are in the presence of 
someone to whom they feel responsible. In the following extract from the Grammar of 
Assent, he identifies the Divine Nature of that someone who generates such feelings of 
responsibility within the individual. He also makes it quite clear that while such feelings may 
be reminiscent of the feelings experienced as a child on pleasing or displeasing its parents, for 
example, they are qualitatively different because “the cause of these emotions does not 
belong to this visible world.” Newman clarifies the contrasts and distinctions with regard to 
conscience as a “Sense of Duty”: 
If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at 
transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose 
claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, 
broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, 
on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same 
soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise 
from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, 
to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our 
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happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our 
pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These 
feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent 
being: we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame 
before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on 
breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these 
painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on 
the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a 
resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object 
to elicit. . . . If the cause of these emotions does not belong to this 
visible world, the Object to which his perception is directed must be 
Supernatural and Divine; and thus the phenomena of Conscience, as a 
dictate, avail to impress the imagination with the picture of a Supreme 
Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is 
the creative principle of religion.
176
 
Terlinden notes that, in the above extract, Newman demonstrates how specific emotions can 
contribute to imprinting the image of conscience as a supreme Governor and a just Judge on 
each individual.
177
 Furthermore, in Newman’s view, the experiencing of Conscience as an 
instigator of such contrasting feelings makes a real and concrete experience of God possible 
for the conscientious individual.
178
 
Terlinden explains further that Newman’s equating of the voice of God with 
conscience, operates as a “Sense of Duty,” as evident in his novel Callista: 
I feel that God within my heart. I feel myself in His presence. He says 
to me, ‘Do this: don’t do that.’ You may tell me that this dictate is a 
mere law of my nature, as is to joy or to grieve. I cannot understand 
this. No, it is the echo of a person speaking to me. Nothing shall 
persuade me that it does not ultimately proceed from a person external 
to me. It carries with it its proof of its divine origin. My nature feels 
towards it as towards a person. When I obey it, I feel a satisfaction; 
when I disobey, a soreness—just like that which I feel in pleasing or 
offending some revered friend. So you see, Polemo, I believe in what 
is more than a mere ‘something.’ I believe in what is more real to me 
than sun, moon, stars, and the fair earth, and the voice of friends. You 
will say, Who is He? Has He ever told you anything about Himself? 
Alas! no!—the more’s the pity! But I will not give up what I have, 
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because I have not more. An echo implies a voice; a voice a speaker. 
That speaker I love and I fear.
179
 
While Callista’s contribution to the dialogue reiterates the claim, already made in the 
preceding extract, that the specific emotions of conscience should not be mistaken for 
ordinary feelings, the God Callista presents is a very personal God who speaks intimately in 
the voice of conscience. The feelings that this voice arouse in her are similar to the feelings 
she experiences when she is “pleasing or offending some revered friend.” However, Callista 
knows that this is not just the voice of a “revered friend.” This voice is more real to her “than 
sun, moon, stars, and the fair earth, and the voice of friends.” In fact, for Callista, that voice is 
the voice of God, who, in her own words, is to be found “within my heart.” It is obvious, 
therefore, that to characterise the extract from Callista as simply depicting the informative, 
guiding and imperative nature of conscience, would be to reduce an intimate account of the 
role of the voice of God in human-divine relationships to a cold, clinical exposé of 
conscience as a “Sense of Duty.” 
 Callista’s words which highlight conscience as sense of duty, validate the obligation 
on every individual to treat all authoritative commands to do good and avoid evil as Divinely 
inspired personal and intimate communications. A transcendental interpretation of this nature 
clearly indicates that Newman considers conscience to be fundamentally a God-centred or 
theonomous reality as distinct from an autonomous, self-centring one. Furthermore, Newman 
assigns to the theonomous authority, which the dutiful conscience draws on to validate its 
commands and requirement, the enduring quality of permanence.
180
 This is obvious from 
Newman’s declaration: 
This law . . . though it may suffer refraction in passing into the 
intellectual medium of each, it is not therefore so affected as to lose its 
                                                             
179
 John Henry Newman, Callista: A Tale of the Third Century (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1890), 314-
315; See also Luc Terlinden, “Newman and Conscience,” 210.  
180
 See Gerard Magill, “Imaginative Moral Discernment,” 500-509. 
191 
 
character of being the Divine Law, but still has, as such, the 
prerogative of commanding obedience.
181
 
By not losing its character, the quality of enduring permanence is further reinforced in 
individuals who repeatedly and dutifully respond to the authoritative commands of 
conscience. Indeed, consistent repetition of acts of obedience by the dutiful conscience serves 
to enhance the very nature of that conscience, to the extent that, in the words of Newman it 
will be deemed as being “fully furnished for its office”: 
Conscience, too, teaches us, not only that God is, but what He is; it 
provides for the mind a real image of Him, as a medium of worship; it 
gives us a rule of right and wrong, as being His rule, and a code of 
moral duties. Moreover, it is so constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes 
clearer in its injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and 
completes the accidental feebleness of its initial teachings. 




Conscience understood as sense of duty is therefore fully furnished for its juridical 
office with an enduring theonomous prerogative of commanding obedience in us. But with 
the perception of good and evil varying greatly from one individual to the next, Newman was 
keenly aware that English society was finding it more and more difficult to reach agreement 
on what constituted an objective order of moral good and moral values, something which still 
persists in Western society to this day. Given the penchant for relativism in the Liberal 
society of his day, however, Newman had no difficulty in detailing what exactly happens for 
the human individual, in terms of individual’s duty to respond to the authoritative voice of 
conscience, when the interpretation of conscience is restricted solely to the values of the 
material world: 
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean 
the rights of the Creator, nor the duty to Him, in thought and deed, of 
the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, 
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according to their judgment or their humour, without any thought of 
God at all . . . Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this 
age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom 
of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a Lawgiver and 
Judge, to be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a licence 
to take up any or no religion, to take up this or that and let it go again . 
. . Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been 
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it 




 That the world continues to grow ever more relativist in relation to its interpretation of 
the nature and authoritative requirements of the dutiful conscience is evident in the words of 
Benedict XVI cited by Geissler. The Holy Father declared that, in contemporary thought, the 
word conscience: “for moral and religious questions, it is the subjective dimension, the 
individual that constitutes the final authority for decision.”
184
 The Pope went on to point out 
that such an interpretation was diametrically opposed to Newman who understood conscience 
as: 
man’s capacity for truth: the capacity to recognize precisely in the 
decision-making areas of his life — religion and morals — a truth, the 
truth. At the same time, conscience . . . imposes on him the obligation 
to set out along the path towards truth, to seek it and to submit to it 
wherever he finds it. Conscience is both capacity for truth and 
obedience to the truth which manifests itself to anyone who seeks it 
with an open heart. The path of Newman's conversions is a path of 
conscience — not a path of self-asserting subjectivity but, on the 




 Newman, himself, admits that his understanding of conscience, with emphasis on a 
dutiful sense of obedience would certainly not find favour at a scientific, literary or even 
populist level. He declared: 
This view of conscience, I know, is very different from that ordinarily 
taken of it, both by the science and literature, and by the public 
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opinion, of this day. It is founded on the doctrine that conscience is 
the voice of God.
186
  
 Indeed, were Newman alive today, he would immediately notice that God continues to 
remain “banned from conscience.” The painful consequences of living one’s life based on 
such a godless notion of conscience Geissler affirms has quickly become apparent. The 
human person operating out of a God-free conscience is 
inclined to separate himself from his neighbour. He lives in his 
egocentric world often without caring for others, without being 
interested in them, without feeling responsible for them. 
Individualism, the pursuit of pleasure, honour, and power, and 
unbounded unpredictability make the world dark and the ability of 
people to live together in society ever more difficult.
187
 
 In all, however, Newman is more comfortable within himself, when dealing with a 
notion of conscience that identifies one of its primary functions as inducing in the individual 
a dutiful sense of obedience towards that “One to whom we are responsible.”
188
 Such 
easiness contrasts with his marked ambivalence towards the reduction of conscience to a 
more abstract “intellectual sentiment,” tasked with supplying its human host “with the 
elements of morals, such as may be developed by the intellect into an ethical code.”
189
 The 
difference in Newman’s responses may possibly derive from the fact, that the latter concept 
was intellectually theorised from a philosophical perspective. Abstract in its conception, it 
was abstractly dealt with. The former notion, however, is demonstrably a product derived and 
elaborated from within Newman’s own personal life experiences. For Newman, this dutiful 
perception of conscience was personal in its origins, sensitive by its very nature, and cried out 
for a God that 
has a personal relationship with every person, who addresses him, 
who directs and guides him, who rebukes and reprimands, who shows 
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him his mistakes and calls him to conversion, who leads him to the 
perception of the truth and who spurs him on to do good, who is his 
supreme Lord and Judge.
190
 
 Such a dutiful conscience, would necessarily demand to be actively involved in an 
individual’s emotions, affections, relationships and feelings, but, most especially, in his or 
her sense of that One before whom they feel responsible. Newman elaborates on the 
existence, nature and functions of such a dynamic conscience, as well as on its relationship 
with its creator: 
Conscience . . . is something more than a moral sense; it is always, 
what the sense of the beautiful is only in certain cases; it is always 
emotional. No wonder then that it always implies what that [moral] 
sense only sometimes implies; that it always involves the recognition 
of a living object, towards which it is directed. Inanimate things 
cannot stir our affections; these are correlative with persons. If, as is 
the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at 
transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose 
claims upon us we fear . . . These feelings in us are such as require for 
their exciting cause an intelligent being: we are not affectionate 
towards a stone, nor do we feel shame before a horse or a dog; we 
have no remorse or compunction on breaking mere human law: yet, so 
it is, conscience excites all these painful emotions, confusion, 
foreboding, self-condemnation; and on the other hand it sheds upon us 
a deep peace, a sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which 
there is no sensible, no earthly object to elicit. ‘The wicked flees, 
when no one pursueth;’ then why does he flee? whence his terror? 




2.2.3 Conscience: A Magisterial Dictate 
 Having looked at conscience in terms of its function as “a moral sense” and as “a 
sense of duty”, Newman’s teaching on conscience as a “magisterial dictate” brings out its 
imperial role, whereby it commands or prohibits the doing of things it sees as right or 
wrong.
192
 According to Newman, conscience in this nous is not only “the ordinary sense of 
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the word” but it is “its primary and most authoritative aspect.”
193
 Indeed, Grave, notes that: 
“To the description of conscience as a Magisterial Dictate, the other two make a 
contribution.”
194
 Such claim corroborates with Newman, who, in the context of elaborating 
the magisterial role, identifies the contributory role of its critical and dutiful aspects in terms 
of their capacity to highlight or even validate its imperatival function. 
 Newman, for example, clearly distinguishes between the faculty of conscience that 
commands and its critical faculty as a supplier of elements of morals: 
Here I have to speak of conscience . . . not as supplying us, by means 
of its various acts, with the elements of morals, such as may be 
developed by the intellect into an ethical code, but simply as the 
dictate of an authoritative monitor bearing upon the details of conduct 
as they come before us, and complete in its several acts, one by one . . 
. Let us then thus consider conscience, not as a rule of right conduct, 
but as a sanction of right conduct.
195
 
Further elaboration of the critical and magisterial roles of conscience demonstrates the 
conditionality of the former role in contrast to the consistency of the latter. In Newman’s 
estimation, when conscience exercises its critical faculty, it functions as an overseer of moral 
rules, making judgements concerning the content of morality by determining what is really 
right and what is really wrong.
196
 Newman, however, stops short of identifying conscience 
“as an absolute determining factor of the content of morality.”
197
 For example, when 
speaking of conscience as “the rule of morals,” Newman points out that it only becomes the 
rule when it is “refined and strengthened” in individuals. Furthermore, he also notes of 
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conscience that: “its promptings in the breasts of the millions of human beings to whom it is 
given, are not in all cases correct.”
198
 
In an attempt to identify what actually causes the conscience to “prompt” incorrectly, 
Lipe distinguishes between it and the intellect. Specifically, he points out that, since the 
intellect can be educated concerning the content of morality, moral right and wrong will often 
be viewed differently by different cultures; false beliefs may be formed by individuals 
concerning the content of morality; in turn, this could lead to individuals doing what is 
wrong, although sincerely believing that they are following their consciences.
199
 In summary, 
such an interpretation of Newman’s view of conscience as “the rule of morals” represents it 
as a “critical faculty” which stands in constant need of refining, strengthening, modulating, 
and even of correcting. 
The assigning of such conditionality to the “critical faculty” of conscience, serves 
only to highlight the qualities of universality and consistency, which are represented as 
underpinning its magisterial role. Grave, contrasts the variable nature of the former with the 
universal consistency of the latter: 
In its magisterial office, Conscience has a universality which it does 
not have in the conjoint office Newman assigned to it, that of 
determining right and wrong in the actual situations in which we find 
ourselves. Its imperatival dictates are ‘one and the same in the mind of 




The consistency of the magisterial conscience, therefore, rests on the perception that it will 
always urge the right and discourage the wrong. Even when an individual is mistaken in his 
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or her moral judgement, it remains the universal experience that the magisterial conscience 
will consistently urge the doing of right and the avoidance of wrong.
201
 
Lipe considered objections by which some have argued that the moral sanctions of 
the magisterial conscience can differ radically. In response to such a claim, Lipe notes C.S. 
Lewis’ point that any such difference has not “amounted to anything like a total 
difference.”
202
 While T.C. Mayberry agrees that there are some universally accepted norms 
for example, that “lying, promise breaking, killing and so on, are generally wrong,” Lipe 
cites A.E. Taylor who situates any perceived difference firmly in the domain of moral 
content rather than in moral sanctioning. He asserts that while people may disagree with 
regards to moral content, there is universal acceptance of the essential role of conscience in 
sanctioning moral insight, specifically the insight that one is morally obligated to do or to 
avoid certain actions.
203
 Taylor argues thus: 
But it is an undeniable fact that men . . . also hold that there is a 
difference between right and wrong; there are things which they ought to 
do and other things which they ought not to do. Different groups of men, 
living under different conditions and in different ages, may disagree 
widely on the question whether a certain thing belongs to the first or the 
second of these classes. They may draw the line between right and wrong 




While Lewis’, Mayberry’s and Taylor’s arguments around the whole question of 
difference derive solely from philosophical and ethical insights, and thereby possibly appeal 
to secularist opinion, Newman, naturally, argues from a religious or theological perspective. 
He asserts that the difference between conscience as a “Moral Sense” and conscience as a 
“Magisterial Dictate” is so great, that he designates the former “the principle of ethics” and 
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the latter “the creative principle of religion.”
205
 Thus, in Newman’s opinion, it is not 
conscience as a “Moral Sense” in any meaning of the term, but conscience as a “Moral 
Dictate” that is foundational to religion.
206
 The creativity of the magisterial conscience is seen 
to derive from the potential of its phenomena “to impress the imagination with the picture of 
a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all seeing, retributive.”
207
 The 
phenomena, to which Newman refers, are “states of mind.”
208
 These can be dark, fearful, 
foreboding and shame-filled, when the conscience is bad, or peaceful, hopeful and light-
hearted, when that conscience is good.
209
 Bright or dark, however, all these phenomena share 
one quality; according to Grave their existence implies the existence of “another personal 
being.”
210
 It is this potential to creatively function as a “proof of theism,” that commends 
conscience as a “magisterial conscience” to Newman as foundational to religion.
211
 
We now come to the relationship between conscience as “Sense of Duty” and 
conscience in its “Magisterial” role. When Newman contrasts the magisterial sense of 
conscience with its role as an instigator of sentiments or feelings of obligation, he equates the 
former role with that of an authoritative voice with an inherent and universal capacity to 
impose certain sanctions.
212
 Relative to the concept of conscience as a sense of duty, 
therefore, Newman’s magisterial conscience functions within the human being as: a certain 
commanding dictate, not a mere sentiment, not a mere opinion, or impression, or view of 
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 Lipe, for example, is convinced that all human beings experience feeling morally 
obligated in certain ways, and that such a sense of duty is connected with God.
214
 He also 
points out that this sense of duty or obligation ties in with the meaning of religion itself, in 
that the word “religion” is a compound of the Latin re and ligare meaning “to bind back.”
215
 
It should be noted, however, that the claim that human beings can ordinarily expect to 
experience feelings of moral obligation or duty enjoys significant secularist as well as 
religious support. Lipe citing the secularist philosopher, Richard Robinson’s (1902-1996) 
seminal work, An Atheist Values, enunciated his understanding of the principle of moral 
obligation, as follows: 
No kind of act may be forbidden unless its discontinuance would 
lessen misery upon the whole. This principle may be translated to read 
either of two ways: (1) If an act increases misery upon the whole, then 
one ought to stop doing the act; or (2) If an act increases misery on the 
whole, then one ought not to do the act.
216
 
 Although Robinson defines the principle of moral obligation from the negative 
perspective of non-maleficence, his elaboration of that principle is not modulated in terms of 
its universality or inherency. Newman, however, situates the principle of moral duty or 
obligation within a “Divine” context, by elevating it from a sentiment or feeling to actual 
magisterial dictates or commands, which demand unconditional compliance on the part of the 
recipients of those commands. In practical terms, the magisterial dimension of conscience, as 
the authoritative voice of conscience, actually imposes the obligations in the expectation that 
they will be met, unconditionally.  
At this point, it is not an exaggeration to assert that, not only does Newman’s teaching 
in the area of conscience as a magisterial dictate draw from experience and scriptures, but it 
is also reflected in the teachings of the modern Catholic Church. At Vatican II, for example, 
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the Fathers of the Council obviously allude to Newman when they state that “conscience is 
the most secret core and the sanctuary of the human person. There they are alone with God 
whose voice echoes in their depths” (GS, n.16). 
2.3 “Reason” and the “Operations of Conscience” in Newman’s Thought 
 Thus far, we have examined Newman’s elaboration and representations of conscience 
as “a moral sense”, “a sense of duty” and as “a magisterial dictate.” As examined, Newman 
portrayed these three functions as being intrinsic to the nature of conscience. However, his 
elaboration of “reason” differs from these three in that it seeks to describe something external 
to conscience, but essential to its proper functioning, namely the relationship between 
conscience and reason, what Newman understands to be “divinely-given informant.”
217
 
Specifically, Newman attempts to demonstrate that this relationship is dualist but 
complementary, as is the case with Thomas Aquinas’ representation of a conscience-reason 
relationship, wherein the former is unequivocally portrayed as an activity of the latter.
218
 For 
Newman, however, not only is the conscience-reason relationship essentially dualist, but 
when it comes to their respective roles in the search for moral or religious truth, he depicts 




While Newman acknowledges that possession of the rational faculty “stands for all in 
which man differs from the brutes,”
220
 and has a role to play in “distinguishing between right 
and wrong, and [as] a directing principle in conduct,”
221
 he is also extremely keen to assign to 
reason: “that narrower signification . . . it usually bears, as representing or synonymous with 
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the intellectual powers, and as opposed as such to the moral qualities, and to Faith.”
222
 Here, 
Newman is making it quite clear that while reason may be of assistance in the individual’s 
dealing with matters of morals, religion or of faith, its role is that of an auxiliary or secondary 
agent to that of the “Ultimate Manager” in all such matters that is the individual conscience. 
As noted elsewhere in this work, Newman’s elaboration of conscience as “the 
Aboriginal Vicar of Christ” highlights his conviction that following its Divinely inspired 
dictates will lead to objective truth, since Christ himself is “The Way, the Truth and the Life” 
(John 14:6). For this reason alone, Newman would refute any suggestion that reason could be 
substituted, in any way or at any level, for conscience, a refutation eloquently elaborated in 
the following extract: 
No one will say that Conscience is against Reason, or that its dictates 
cannot be thrown into an argumentative form; yet who will, therefore, 
maintain that it is not an original principle, but must depend, before it 
acts, upon some previous processes of Reason? Reason analyzes the 
grounds and motives of action: a reason is an analysis, but is not the 
motive itself. As, then, Conscience is a simple element in our nature, 
yet its operations admit of being surveyed and scrutinized by Reason; 
so may Faith be cognizable, and its acts be justified, by Reason, 
without therefore being, in matter of fact, dependent upon it; and as 
we reprobate, under the name of Utilitarianism, the substitution of 
Reason for Conscience, so perchance it is a parallel error to teach that 
a process of Reason is the sine quâ non for true religious Faith. When 
the Gospel is said to require a rational Faith, this need not mean more 
than that Faith is accordant to right Reason in the abstract, not that it 
results from it in the particular case.
223
 
Newman repeatedly asserts the independent nature of conscience. He points out that although 
reason may through analysis identify the motive for an action, that is not, in fact, the actual 
motive itself. Again, he asserts that while the operations of conscience may be surveyed, 
scrutinised, and, as with faith, even cognisable and justified by reason, they are not dependent 
on its processes. Finally, he declares that proclaiming that the processes of reason are 
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essential for true religious faith is as erroneous as the Utilitarian attempts to substitute reason 
for conscience. In Newman’s view, while the dictates of conscience may need to be in accord 
with right reason, they do not necessarily result from it. As Terlinden noted, with reference to 




 What is the basis for Newman’s apparent relegation of the process of reason to a 
second-class or even superfluous status with reference to conscience? It can be noted, for 
example, in the following extract on the essential nature of prayer for the proper living of life, 
that Newman co-designates both faculties as “these divinely-given informants” and appears to 
assign them roles of equal importance in the promotion of prayerful living: 
[There] are two modes of praying mentioned in Scripture; the one is 
prayer at set times and places, and in set forms; the other is what the 
text speaks of,—continual or habitual prayer . . . These two kinds of 
praying are also natural duties. I mean, we should in a way be bound 
to attend to them, even if we were born in a heathen country and had 
never heard of the Bible. For our conscience and reason would lead us 




 Elsewhere, Newman extols reason as “our ultimate informant concerning all 
knowledge,”
226
 Yet, he continued to maintain that “moral and religious truths . . . fall under 
the province of Conscience far more than of the intellect.”
227
 Indeed, Luc Terlinden himself 
seems somewhat bemused at the fact that Newman “often sought to distinguish conscience 
and reason, rather than to draw them closer to one another.”
228
 The explanation underlying 
Newman’s determination to confine reason and it capacities within its own intellectual 
parameters, and at a distance from the domains of faith and morals, may be deduced from a 
closer examination of his writings on the conscience-reason relationship in the context of the 
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following extract wherein he outlines the varied capacities of the faculty of reason, euphoric 
in tone, and which could well be called an ode to reason. Newman proclaims: 
Reason is that faculty of the mind . . . by which knowledge of things 
external to us, of beings, facts, and events, is attained beyond the 
range of sense. It ascertains for us not natural things only, or 
immaterial only, or present only, or past, or future; but, even if limited 
in its power, it is unlimited in its range, viewed as a faculty, though, of 
course, in individuals it varies in range also. It reaches to the ends of 
the universe, and to the throne of God beyond them; it brings us 
knowledge, whether clear or uncertain, still knowledge, in whatever 
degree of perfection, from every side; but, at the same time, with this 
characteristic, that it obtains it indirectly, not directly . . . it is a 
faculty of proceeding from things that are perceived to things which 
are not; the existence of which it certifies to us on the hypothesis of 




As can be seen, Newman encapsulates the capacities of reason in the observation that “it 
brings us knowledge . . . in whatever degree of perfection from every side.” Crucially, 
however, Newman noted that all such knowledge, whether of external things or of facts 
beyond the range of sense and so on, is obtained “indirectly, not directly.” Such indirectness 
in its acquisition of knowledge, according to Newman, derives from the fact that it is in the 
nature of reason to proceed from things which are perceived to things which are not, with the 
latter thereby being assumed to be true. Hence, it is not surprising that he observed that reason 
was not so much a faculty that perceives, but rather one that infers.
230
 Furthermore, the 
validity and truthfulness of all knowledge obtained by such a rationalist process will depend 
“on premises which reason does not give itself, but which it receives from elsewhere.”
231
 
 For Newman, “elsewhere” could be internal or external, relative to the individual, with 
quite negative implications for the true functioning of conscience, in particular. Elaborating 
on Newman’s insight into conscience, Ratzinger specified the nature of the internal and 
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external knowledge from elsewhere. From an internal perspective, Ratzinger noted that the 
unexamined adoption of some subjectively constructed premises could result in conscience 
being equated with the individual’s personal wishes or tastes.
232
 From an external perspective, 
on the other hand, unexamined societal premises could result in conscience being reduced to 
social advantage, to group consensus or to the demands of political or social power.
233
  
 In Newman’s estimation, the reduction of the concept of reason to its formalised, 
explicit and conscious component, when managing issues of moral value and religious truth, 
resulted in a total disregard of that faculty’s instinctive and implicit component, the Illative 
sense, wherein, in his view, much of the reasoning in practical matters is actually 
performed.
234
 Newman’s refusal to acknowledge that such an emasculated concept of reason 
could serve any ethical role in the management of a religious conscience was indicative of a 
far wider consequence and, one could claim, a more intimidating mission that he had 
undertaken as a protagonist of Catholic morals and religious beliefs. This self-imposed 
mission took the form of a relentless campaign against the philosophy of his day, 
Rationalism,
235
 whose tenets, he argued, were designed to undermine the religious notion of 
conscience.
236
 The daunting nature of such an undertaking by Newman is well summarised by 
John Paul II, who, in a letter on the Bicentenary of Newman’s birth, offers a flavour of the 
context in which Newman ‘campaigned’. John Paul writes: 
Newman was born in troubled times which knew not only political 
and military upheaval but also turbulence of soul. Old certitudes were 
shaken, and believers were faced with the threat of rationalism on the 
one hand and fideism on the other. Rationalism brought with it a 
rejection of both authority and transcendence, while fideism turned 
                                                             
232




 Luc Terlinden, “Newman and Conscience,” 216-217. 
235
 Avery Dulles, John Henry Newman, 36. 
236
 Luc Terlinden, “Newman and Conscience,” 215. 
205 
 
from the challenges of history and the tasks of this world to a distorted 
dependence upon authority and the supernatural.
237
 
Although, John Paul II went on to acclaim Newman for eventually coming “to a remarkable 
synthesis of faith and reason which were for him ‘like two wings on which the human spirit 
rises to the contemplation of the truth,’”
238
 the fact that such a synthesis was eventually 
achieved despite Newman’s deeply felt hostility towards Rationalism, in particular, is all the 
more remarkable. The intensity of his hostility towards this philosophy of his day can be 
gauged from the fact that Newman branded it “a counterfeit, which eighteen centuries prior to 
it never heard of.”
239
 The source of this hostility is twofold for Newman. It derives, firstly, 
from the absolute rejection by adherents of Rationalism of any notion of “the rights of the 
Creator, [or] of the duty to him . . . of the creature.”
240
 Secondly, it derives from Rationalism’s 
unconditional promotion of the notion that all human beings have “the right of thinking, 
speaking, writing and acting according to their judgement and humour, without any thought of 
God.”
241
 In Newman’s view, such Rationalist propositions are nothing more than a usurpation 
of the true nature of Reason. 
2.3.1 Newman’s Religious Conscience versus Post-Thomist “Reason”  
 Aquinas theorised a substantive concept of Reason, which linked it to the perception 
of a moral order. He taught that “a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason 
emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community.”
242
 But “the whole universe is 
governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the 
Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law . . . called eternal.”
243
 Rational creature, Aquinas 
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posits further “has a share of the Eternal Reason whereby it has a natural inclination to its 
proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal in the rational creature is called the 




 Far from being abstract in nature, the language used by Aquinas to describe the 
relationship between the moral order and reason is real, tangible and concrete. The moral 
order is a “dictate of reason.” However, not only does this order reside in the reason or 
intellect of the ruler, but it is also “in that which is ruled.”
245
 To be rational, in Aquinas’ 
terms, therefore, is to have a correct and substantial understanding of the moral order and to 
conform to that substantial understanding.
246
 Hence, in order to act rationally, one had to 
possess a true vision of the order of the good, or in Aristotelian terms, to possess an ability to 
discern moral matters well.
247
 Aquinas’ concept of reason, as that intellectual place where a 
substantial moral law resides, would certainly have been afforded a prominent role in the 
activities of Newman’s religious conscience. 
 The advent of Modernism, however, saw Aquinas’ substantial conception of reason 
being superseded by a procedural one. Reason then came to be defined, not in terms of its 
ability to discern moral matters well, but in terms of a procedure or method, which was more 





England, according to Terlinden, this new concept of reason initiated an increasingly 
influential trend, whereby questions pertaining to morals or religion came to be dealt with in 
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the same manner as questions pertaining to the natural sciences through undergoing the 
procedures or methods of empirical rationalism.
249
 
 More than anything else, Newman’s attempt at establishing a clear distinction between 
conscience and reason can be said to derive from this modernist shift from the substantial to 
the procedural conceptualisation of reason. He believed, for example, that not only would the 
moral order remain ignored and undiscovered by a procedural form of reason, but that such a 
conceptualised reason would function to construct its own order, according to its own 
norms.
250
 It was also obvious to Newman that acceptance of such a procedural understanding 
of Reason would ensure that “it would only be possible to believe on the basis of evidence, 
and all that cannot be demonstrated by reason would have to be left aside.”
251
  
 Newman was dismayed that a procedurally-based faculty, whose method of “gaining 
knowledge . . . lies in asserting one thing, because of some other thing,”
252
 could undermine 
the very foundation of religion. He believed that it could do this by persistently “challenging 
the dogmatic principle according to which revealed truth is one and definitive”
253
 and must be 
accepted as it is, rather than constructed or reconstructed to suit the needs or tastes of the 
individual or of society. For Newman, the source of such persistent challenging would have 
derived from the conceptualising of procedural reason as 
a process, which, of course, a progress of thought from one idea to the 
other must be; an exercise of mind, which perception through the 
senses can hardly be called; or, again, an investigation, or an analysis; 
or it is said to compare, discriminate, judge, and decide: all which 
words imply, not simply assent to the reality of certain external facts, 
but a search into grounds, and an assent upon grounds.
254
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 Aquinas’ substantial moral and religious truths are no longer divinely installed 
residents of such a conceptualised intellect. Instead, they have been transformed into 
empirical data to be progressed from one subjective or socially amenable interpretation to the 
next, through a process of the mind that seeks to compare, discriminate, judge, decide, and 
even appease. In such an ongoing intellectual maelstrom, truth itself will never be afforded 
the opportunity to settle. Neither will any inputs from feelings, emotions or senses, which 
Newman regarded as essential elements in the true functioning of the religious conscience,
255
 
be acknowledged in this new order of objective empirical rationalism. 
Since the existence of a Creator can never be quantified, measured or analysed, all 
alleged divine inputs to the management of conscience will be deemed to be outside the remit 
of the processes of procedural reason and therefore discounted. When Newman opposed the 
rationalist conceptualisation of reason and its subjectivist/societal implications for the 
teachings of the Catholic Church on matters of conscience, he set in motion an ongoing 
confrontation to the tenets of that secular philosophy, which is as vocal today in its resistance 
as when he commenced that campaign in the 19
th
 century. The influence of his teachings in 
this particular area may be detected in modern day Church documents, the admonitions of 
theologians, and even in the advice of Christian psychologists to their peers. 
3. Conscience: Voice of God nevertheless to be Educated 
 We have addressed many aspects of Newman’s teachings on conscience but the key 
notion to which Newman repeatedly returns in the course of his theorising and teaching is 
that of “conscience as the authoritative Voice of God.”
256
 For him, conscience as an “inward 
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 is planted “in the heart and nature of man”
258




 Referring specifically to Christian believers, Newman holds that the notion of 
conscience as the authoritative voice of God is intrinsic to the creedal beliefs of many 
denominations.
260
 For him, while these Christians consider conscience to be “a constituent 
element of the mind,” they also hold that it is more than “a law of the mind.”
261
 They 
sincerely see it as “a connecting principle between the creature and his Creator.”
262
 
Furthermore, Newman points out that these Christians are aware that the voice which speaks 
to them during the course of this “connecting” is essentially distinctive from the “Voice of 
Revelation.”
263
 It is a voice that seeks to “enlighten, strengthen and refine” the human 
person,
264
 but speaks especially through Scripture and Tradition, but also through the 
teachings of their respective denominations. 
 Newman is quite explicit as to the distinctive aspect of God that the voice of his 
religiously constructed conscience will represent to the ‘conscientious’ listener. He is also 
quite clear as to the “tone” that this Voice will necessarily adopt as it communicates with 
those who are willing to listen. In his opinion, not only does the Transcendental Voice that 
emanates from conscience teach the individual about God,
265
 but more specifically, and 
strongly “its most prominent teaching, and its most cardinal and distinguishing truth, is that 
He is our Judge.”
266
 Newman then proceeds to elaborate what the religious or Christian mind 
may expect from such a Judge, and to describe the emotions which His judgements will 
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generate. With reference to conscience as the authoritative voice of God, therefore, Newman 
cautions that 
the special Attribute under which it brings Him before us, to which it 
subordinates all other Attributes, is that of justice—retributive justice. 
We learn from its informations to conceive of the Almighty, primarily, 
not as a God of Wisdom, of Knowledge, of Power, of Benevolence, 
but as a God of Judgment and Justice; as One, who, not simply for the 
good of the offender, but as an end good in itself, and as a principle of 
government, ordains that the offender should suffer for his offence.
267
 
 As for the tone which this authoritative voice adopts in its communication with the 
individual listener, Newman makes it absolutely clear that there is “nothing gentle, nothing of 
mercy” to be found in its tone.
268
 In fact, he points to terms such as: “personal, peremptory, 
unargumentative, irresponsible (sic), minatory, definitive” as the echoe of the voice of 
conscience.
269
 From Newman’s description, it is obvious that the “tone” of that voice does 
not suggest a willingness to negotiate, or overlook anything. Rather, in any conscientious 
encounter with this voice, the listener will find that its tone is: severe and even stern. It does 
not speak of forgiveness, but of punishment. It suggests to him a future judgement; it does not 
tell him how he can avoid it.
270
 If anyone is hoping to find words of support or consolation in 
the content or tone of this critical, judicial voice, Newman had this sobering observation to 
offer: 
Hence its effect is to burden and sadden the religious mind, and is in 
contrast with the enjoyment derivable from the exercise of the 
affections, and from the perception of beauty, whether in the material 
universe or in the creations of the intellect.
271
 
 Newman’s sombre description of this uncompromising relationship between the 
human listener and this relentlessly commanding Voice
272
 is captured and reiterated in 
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Vatican II’s account which describes conscience as “the most secret core and sanctuary of the 
human person. There they are alone with God whose voice echoes in their depths” (GS.16).  
 What Newman and subsequent commentators are seeking to emphasise by 
metaphorically consigning the individual to the isolation of a judicial “dock” is that 
conscience is that place where a conversation of responsible accountability takes place, a 
conversation exclusively between two voices, that of the Judicial and Authoritative Voice of 
God and that of an arraigned defendant. As the following words from the Grammar of Assent 
point out, Newman is in no doubt that conscience is that place where the individual is 
constrained to stand in and by oneself and bear one’s “own burden”: 
If there is any truth brought home to us by conscience, it is this, that 
we are personally responsible for what we do, that we have no means 
of shifting our responsibility, and that dereliction of duty involves 
punishment; . . . and that, when the time comes, which conscience 
forebodes, of our being called to judgment, then, at least, we shall 
have to stand in and by ourselves, whatever we shall have by that time 
become, and must bear our own burden.
273
 
 Since conscience, in its designated role as the authoritative Voice of God, possesses 
and has the undoubted capacity to wield such in-depth and pervasive control of an 




 We may ask at this point in terms of Newman’s own capacity-laden description of 
conscience that: If conscience is the “voice of God,” “aboriginal vicar of Christ” 
“discriminating right from wrong” and as a result “a prophet in its informations, a monarch in 
its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas,” and would continue to function 
effectively “even though the eternal priesthood throughout the Church could cease to be,” 
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why the need to add-to or subtract-from the potential of this “great internal teacher of 
religion”?  
3.1 The Need for Informing Conscience  
 Newman admits that conscience  
cannot perform [its office] adequately without external assistance. It 
needs to be regulated and sustained. Left to itself, though it tells truly 
at first, it soon becomes wavering, ambiguous, false; it needs good 
teachers and good examples to keep it up to the mark and line of duty; 
and the misery is, that these external helps, teachers and examples are 
in many instances wanting.
275
  
 Newman’s vigorous promotion of the need to form, inform or educate conscience 
besides some points enumerated above appears to be driven by other concerns, concerns that 
may be deduced in the course of his studies in this area. The first concern centres on his 
awareness of the growing popularity of what he perceived to be a Godless conscience, which 
advocated “complete independence, total autonomy, overall subjectivity and arbitrariness.” In 
Newman’s view this autonomous rather than theonomous phenomenon needed to be 
confronted by the notion of well formed religious conscience, understood as “a Divine Law” 
that continues to retain “the prerogative of commanding obedience.
276
 
The second area of concern regards the notion of erroneous conscience, a phenomenon 
which Newman personally experienced in his pre-conversion Anglican career vis-à-vis his 
attitude towards the Roman Catholic Church and some of its more traditional teachings and 
practices. Hence, he was personally aware that because conscience constitutes the use of 
human reason, it is fragile, fallible and prone to error. In this context, however, Newman was 
anxious to establish that every person is obliged and unconditionally entitled to follow his or 
her conscience, even if that conscience be erroneous, and in apparent opposition to certain 
                                                             
275
 John Henry Newman, Discourse V, 83. 
276
 John Henry Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 247.  
213 
 
teachings of the Church. However, rather than being confrontational in an area of fundamental 
importance to him, that is the Primacy of conscience, even an erroneous conscience, Newman 




 The third area of concern is the actual manner in which conscience, as the Voice of 
God, is perceived to communicate with us. Newman is here anxious to persuade his readers 
and listeners, particularly the Christians of their need to be sensitive to the nuances of this 
Voice, and to the context in which it is heard. Crucially, however, he seeks to establish that 
the more this Voice is obeyed the clearer it will become “in its injunctions [and] the wider in 
their range” such that it will correct and complete “the accidental feebleness of its initial 
teachings.”
278
 Rather than obeyed, conscience is however often dispensed. Newman therefore 
observed: 
man,—not being divine, nor over partial to so stern a reprover within 
his breast . . . as soon as he has secured for himself some little 
cultivation of intellect, looks about him how he can manage to 
dispense with Conscience, and find some other principle to do its 
work. The most plausible and obvious and ordinary of these 
expedients, is the Law of the State, human law . . . when the two come 
into collision, it follows of course that Conscience is to give way, and 
the Law to prevail.
279
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3.1.1 The Religious in Opposition to the Godless Conscience 
 As we have seen, the concept of conscience that Newman presented to his readers and 
listeners is a religious conscience that articulates both natural and religious laws to all, but 
especially to religious-minded people. Not surprisingly then, the notion of conscience that 
Newman favours, preaches and is intellectually and spiritually comfortable with, is one that 
“retains the old, true, Catholic meaning of the word.”
280
 Intrinsic to the Catholic meaning is 
an unconditional belief in the tenet that “It is One God, and none other but He, who speaks 
first in our consciences.”
281
 He maintains, for example, that the fundamental moral attitudes 
brought about by obedience to such a conscience form an “organum investigandi given us for 
gaining religious truth, and which would lead the mind by an infallible succession from the 
rejection of atheism to theism, and from theism to Christianity, and from Christianity to 
Evangelical Religion, and from these to Catholicity.”
282
 
 Elaborating on Newman’s understanding of the all-embracing nature of the Catholic 
connection with conscience, Michael E. Allsop claims that, in the learned philosopher’s 
estimation: 
God’s voice is heard in conscience and in the Magisterium. It is also 
heard in scripture, in the fathers and in the sensus fidelium – which do 
not fall outside the Church, but are under the Church’s authority. 




Newman, himself, explicates his views on the relationship between conscience and the 
Church in terms of his own understanding of the role of conscience vis-à-vis the Papacy.
284
 
Emphasising the intimate nature of the relationship between the Pope’s office and the 
religious notion of conscience, for example, Newman observed that if the Pope spoke “against 
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Conscience in the true sense of the word, he would commit a suicidal act. He would be cutting 
the ground from under his feet.”
285
 Newman did not confine the Catholic connection to the 
Pope’s Office, however, but also included the Church and the hierarchy as participants in a 




 It is obvious that, by promoting such a broad, faith-based understanding of conscience, 
Newman had in fact enrolled a wide-ranging and formidable array of potential contributors to 
the task of the ongoing formation and education of that conscience constituting the Church, 
the Papal office, the magisterium and schola theologorum, the laity, the Scriptures, tradition 
and the Church Fathers. Newman had no doubt as to the crucial role these potential 
contributors must necessarily play, both individually and collectively, in the formation of the 
religious conscience in an age when “for a large portion of the public . . . it had been 
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it had never heard of, and 
could not have mistaken for it, if they had. It is the Right of self-will.”
287
 In Newman’s 
opinion, therefore, the religious conscience needed to be well-formed, informed and educated 
if it were not only to survive, but actually thrive in a world where there were now 
two ways of regarding conscience; one as a mere sort of sense of 
propriety, a taste teaching us to do this or that, the other as the echo of 
God's voice. Now all depends on this distinction—the first way is not 
of faith, and the second is of faith.
288
 
 Newman was not surprised that an understanding of a Godless notion of conscience 
proved to be so popular with ‘a large portion of the public’ since he saw that it allowed 
personal opinion, individual taste, subjective feelings and self-will to masquerade as 
conscience in their daily lives. Indeed, the popularity of this Godless notion of conscience 
                                                             
285
 John Henry Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 252. 
286
 Michael E. Allsopp, “Conscience, the Church and Moral Truth,” 203. 
287
 John Henry Newman, Letter to the Duke of Norfolk, 249-250. 
288
 John Henry Newman, Sermon Notes of John Henry Cardinal Newman 1849-1878, ed. Fathers of the 
Birmingham Oratory (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 327. 
216 
 
was further enhanced, in Newman’s opinion, by the fact that it actively promoted 
independence, autonomy, subjectivity and arbitrariness for individuals in their management 
of their moral affairs. This is very modern also. In words that could just as easily have been 
uttered by Newman, the Australian Cardinal George Pell strongly advised against such 
desacralizing and subjectivist understanding of conscience on the basis that 
no person can guide his conduct purely by taste—for the simple 
reason that there are no infallible tastes. Everyone is affected by sin. 
Even non-believers must accept the human propensity to self-deceit, 
selfishness, and evil. We cannot rely on our tastes in moral matters 
because we are all vulnerable to acquiring the taste for immorality and 
egoism. This means that while we should follow a well-formed 
conscience, a well-formed conscience is hard to achieve.
289
 
 Pell’s awareness of how difficult it could prove to achieve a well-formed conscience 
led him to advise Catholics who suspected that their consciences were “under-formed or 
malformed” to temporarily follow a reliable authority, namely that of their Church. This is a 
somewhat understated reiteration of the advice offered by Newman to Christians who, on the 
one hand, suspected that their consciences could be “ill-informed” and, on the other, were 
concerned as to what could befall them as a result of following potentially “extreme or 
inexpedient” advice, offered by ecclesiastical superiors possibly teaching beyond their 
“legitimate province.” 
And as obedience to conscience, even supposing conscience ill-
informed, tends to the improvement of our moral nature, and 
ultimately of our knowledge, so obedience to our ecclesiastical 
superior may subserve our growth in illumination and sanctity, even 
though he should command what is extreme or inexpedient, or teach 
what is external to his legitimate province.
290
 
 It could be argued from the above extract that, in Newman’s view, some effort at 
religious conscience formation, no matter how suspect (within reason) the ecclesiastical 
involvement was better than no effort at all. This is indicative of the importance that Newman 
                                                             
289
 George Cardinal Pell, “The Inconvenient Conscience,” First Things, n. 153 (May 2005): 24. 
290
 John Henry Newman, Development of Christian Doctrine, 87. 
217 
 
attached to this process and to the involvement of the Church therein, especially in light of the 
Godless context in which, in his opinion, it must necessarily function. Pope John Paul II has 
noted, for example, that Newman taught and was convinced that, although conscience was 
within the human heart before it received any training, it was nevertheless the duty of a 
Christian to inform and educate that conscience through the guidance of the Church, in order 
to bring it to maturity.
291
 
 Newman’s teaching on the need to form, inform and educate the conscience, was not 
driven solely by a desire to counteract the influence and spread of a desacralized and Godless 
notion of conscience. Rather, he was convinced that it was of the very nature of conscience to 
stand in need of external assistance, good teachers and examples, as well as regulation and 
support, in order “to keep it up to the mark and line of duty.”
292
 Using the analogy of a clock, 
Newman perceptively demonstrated that “training and experience are necessary for [the] 
strength, growth and the formation” of conscience.
293
 He observed that: 
A clock, organically considered, may be perfect, yet it may require 
regulating. . . . [it] may be said to strike the hours, and will strike them 
wrongly, unless it be duly regulated for the performance of its proper 
function . . . [and] as the hammer of a clock may tell untruly, so may my 
conscience and my sense of certitude be attached to mental acts, whether 
of consent or of assent, which have no claim to be thus sanctioned. Both 
the moral and the intellectual sanction are liable to be biased by personal 
inclinations and motives; both require and admit of discipline.
294
 
Hence, Newman firmly believes that although a conscience will tell truly at first, when left to 
its own devices “it soon becomes wavering, ambiguous, and false . . . loses its way and guides 
the soul in its journey heavenward but indirectly and circuitously.”
295
 Newman also draws on 
the metaphor of an “inward light” which “grows dim” or “is removed out of sight” or 
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becomes “so eclipsed that [it] can catch and reflect few rays” to illustrate how an ill-formed or 
malformed conscience can become “powerless to illuminate the horizon, to mark out for us 
our direction, and to comfort us with the certainty that we are making for our Eternal 
Home.”
296
 Sustaining this metaphor of a poorly formed conscience as a problematic “inward 
light” that can dim, fade or be eclipsed, Newman concludes that a conscience with such 
untreated “lighting problems” will inevitably fail to achieve the ethical purposes for which it 
was intended and outlines as follows:  
That light was intended to set up within us a standard of right and of 
truth; to tell us our duty on every emergency, to instruct us in detail 
what sin is, to judge between all things which come before us, to 
discriminate the precious from the vile, to hinder us from being 
seduced by what is pleasant and agreeable, and to dissipate the 
sophisms of our reason.
297
 
3.1.2 Erroneous Conscience: Requisite for Formation 
While Newman is unequivocal in his assertion that conscience must be obeyed 
whether erroneous or not
298
 because it is “the echo of the voice of God,”
299
 he is equally 
adamant that all rational creatures have a duty to form that conscience so that it will allow 
God’s Law to shine through as purely as possible, and without refraction. Cardinal Ratzinger 
not only reiterates Newman’s assertion about conscience, but demonstrates how erroneous 
conscience dispenses with truth. Thus, formation of conscience should be about our capacity 
to attain truth.
300
 Ratzinger acknowledges that he is following in the philosophical footsteps 
of Newman for whom “the centrality of the concept of conscience is linked to the prior 
centrality of the concept of truth.”
301
 Hence truth and conscience dovetail. 
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 For Ratzinger, an individual’s commitment to the pursuit of truth and goodness will 
be demonstrated by the diligence with which he or she will search out ethical answers to 
moral choices from resources that are credible. High on the list of such credibility is 
anamnesis (memory) which Ratzinger describes as our “inner sense, a capacity to recall.”
302
 
This capacity allows us to recollect eternal truth imbued within us. So paying attention to this 
anamnesis brings to the fore Christian memory. Besides anamnesis, there is assistance “from 
without.” It “is not something set in opposition to anamnesis but ordered to it. It has a 
maieutic function, imposes nothing foreign, but brings to fruition what is proper to 
anamnesis, namely, its interior openness to truth.”
303
 In this regard, it suffices to 
acknowledge that the office of the Pope is assistance from without. While Newman himself 
was consistently careful to stress the primacy of a true conscience over Papal teachings, he 
did point out that “when he speaks ex cathedra . . . he is simply protected from saying what is 
untrue.”
304
 As such, as Ratzinger said:  
The pope does not impose from without. Rather he elucidates the 
Christian memory and defends it. For this reason, the toast to 
conscience indeed must precede the toast to the pope because without 
conscience there would not be a papacy. All power that the papacy has 
is power of conscience.
305
 
 Much of what Ratzinger proposed is both a reiteration and an elaboration of 
Newman’s teaching, who pointed out, for example, that:  
The natural conscience of man, if cultivated from within, if 
enlightened by those external aids, which are given him in every place 
and time, would teach him much of his duty to God and man and 
would lead him on by the guidance both of Providence and grace into 
the fullness of religious knowledge.
306
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In calling on all rational creatures to cultivate their consciences by drawing on internal and 
external aids, Newman himself was drawing on the teachings of Scripture, particularly as 
found in St Paul, who pointed out, for example, that in order to have a “good Conscience man 
must seek the truth and must make judgements in accordance with that same truth” 
(1Timothy 1:5). Paul further advised that the individual conscience must be “confirmed by 
the Holy Spirit” (Romans 9:1); it must be “clear” (2 Timothy 1:3); and it must not “practise 
cunning and tamper with God’s word,” but “openly state the truth” (2 Corinthians 4:2). 
Above all, Paul urged his readers not to be conformed to the mentality of the world, but to be 
transformed by the renewal of their minds (Roman 12:2), since he was doubtlessly convinced 
that it is the “heart” converted to the Lord and to the love of what is good which is, really the 
source of true judgments of conscience.
307
 
Crucially, however, no matter how committed any sincere, rational individual is to the 
process of the formation of a true conscience, its judgements will never be exempt from the 
possibility of error because they are, in fact, the judgements of human actions.
308
 Newman, 
himself, was aware that because conscience is an exercise that involves reason “it may suffer 
refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each.” Thus for Newman, the possibility 
of conscience arriving at an erroneous conclusion may also be a function of the manner in 
which it actually communicates. He pointed out, for example, that while the voice of 
conscience is peremptory and commanding, it may often speak softly and unclearly “as if 
behind a veil” thereby making it difficult for people to discern the appeals of conscience from 
those which come from the passions, from pride and self-love, from a mistaken notion of the 
autonomy of conscience and so on. The potential for conscience to be mistaken, therefore, 
derives not only from its function as a rational discriminator of the ethical nature of specific 
behaviours, but also from the secretive, even furtive manner in which it is perceived as 
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communicating with its receiving hosts. Newman describes the actual manner of 
communication between conscience and the human person as that between “[an] Unseen 
Lord, and Governor, and Judge, who as yet speaks to them only secretly, who whispers in 
their hearts, who tells them something, but not nearly so much as they wish and as they 
need.”
309
 Having clearly identified the aetiology of the erroneous conscience, Newman was 
then left with the task of outlining how its discordant judgements should be treated.  
In his teachings and philosophising on the issue of the erroneous conscience, Newman 
had the advantage of being able to speak from his own personal experience in this area. 
Specifically, in 1843, and solely out of his concern to remain true and obedient to the voice of 
his own conscience, Newman retracted all his accusations against the Roman Catholic 
Church, which up to that point he had believed to be a community in allegiance to the Anti-
Christ.
310
 That Newman had lived a substantial portion of his early Christian life “in error” 
might appear ironic to some, particularly in light of his effusive profession that, “My desire 
hath been to have truth for my chiefest friend, and no enemy but error.”
311
 
 Newman’s personal encounter with an erroneous conscience, coupled with the 
truthful and courageous manner in which he dealt with it, far from being ironic, suggest an 
individual with a profound understanding of, and a deep respect for conscience. It also points 
to an individual who believes that “conscience hears God’s voice within its depths, not its 
own voice.”
312
 This is most definitely the view of Ratzinger, who maintains that, for 
Newman, “conscience signifies the perceptible and demanding presence of the voice of truth 
in the subject himself. It is the overcoming of mere subjectivity in the encounter of the 
                                                             
309
 John Henry Newman, SVO, 66. 
310
 See John Henry Newman, Essay Critical and Historical, vol. II (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1907).  
311
 John Henry Newman, The Via Media of the Anglican Church, vol. I (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1901), xii-xiii. 
312
 Michael E. Allsopp, “Conscience, the Church and Moral Truth,” 202. 
222 
 
interiority of man with the truth from God.”
313
 It is for this reason that Ratzinger characterises 
Newman’s journey in terms of a verse composed by Newman himself: “I loved to choose and 
see my path but now, lead Thou me on!”
314
 Furthermore, it is also the reason Ratzinger went 
on to designate Newman as a man of conscience, equating him with Thomas More, another 




 The representation of Newman’s notion of conscience in this chapter leaves little 
room for doubt that John Henry Newman is a highly original and nuanced thinker. His 
theological and ecclesiological views defy any simple characterisation. His literary output in 
the form of essays, sermons, pamphlets, and letters can only be regarded as phenomenal. The 
originality and prolificacy of his didactic contributions to successive generations of Catholics 
and Christians is only matched by the sheer range of Church-related topics that became the 
object of his ceaselessly probing and in-depth scrutiny. These topics can be broadly 
categorised as those dealing with such long-standing, traditional Church teachings as 
infallibility, the role of the laity, development of doctrine, and relevant to this Chapter, the 
topic of conscience. It must also be noted that rather than being deferential to the views of 
academic, civil or ecclesiastical authorities, Newman’s treatment of aspects of these topics 
proved to be just as controversial, just as personally exacting, but as always, just as truth-
seeking, as those he presented when dealing with the notion of conscience. Not only is such a 
claim concerning topics other than “conscience” easily validated by numerous examples 
available in Newman’s vast literature, they, in turn, serve as a sort of external validation of 
his treatment of the notion of conscience. 
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 In his theology of conscience, he presented his thought using different methods, but 
the most characteristic was his emphasis on the Christian approach. Newman’s teaching is 
very emphatic as elucidated. As a nineteenth century theologian and scholar, Newman’s life 
both as an Anglican and Catholic testify to his teaching on conscience. His belief that 
conscience is the voice of God is primary and it leads to the summit of his belief that God is 
our moral governor. Consequently, Newman challenged false notions of conscience in his 
time. His specific Christian account of conscience as “the aboriginal Vicar of Christ” points 
to the value of objectivity since Christ is “the Way, the Truth and the Life.”
316
  
 Besides the fact that his teaching on conscience is rooted in Christianity, Newman still 
taught it to be judicial, critical, emotional, thus needing to be informed. To sum up therefore, 
Newman’s teaching and explanation of conscience are in line with Aquinas’. Like Aquinas,  
Newman affirms and upholds the primacy of conscience and draws the relationship between 
conscience and authority without giving in to subjectivity or relativity. 
 In dealing with Newman’s teaching on conscience, we referred to and mentioned his 
objection to false understanding of conscience but did not go into detailed discussion of false 
notions. In the next chapter, as we will be discussing the thoughts of Germain Grisez on 
conscience, we will examine his thought alongside some prominent twentieth century 
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Germain Grisez: An Epistemological Theory of Conscience 
1. Introduction 
 In his “Introduction” to a collection of essays centred on the thoughts and writings of 
Germain Grisez (1929- ),
1
 Robert P. George observed: 
For more than thirty years, Germain Grisez’s writings have generated 
intense controversy among Catholic moral theologians. Grisez’s 
theory of practical reasoning and morality has won the allegiance of a 
number of influential Catholic moralists . . . At the same time, it has 
drawn criticism from natural law theorists committed to neo-scholastic 
methods . . . on the one hand, and from proportionalist critics of 
traditional approaches to Catholic moral theology . . . on the other. . . 
Even Grisez’s most vigorous critics, however, acknowledge the 
significance of his philosophical achievement and the centrality of his 
thinking to contemporary debate among Catholic moralists.
2
 
Such an introduction suggests an individual scholar so prominent and pivotal in his academic 
field that his thoughts and writings seem capable of generating either intense collaboration or 
criticism from a range of philosophers or moralists. But in stark contrast with the high profile 
status of John Henry Newman discussed in chapter two, and the universal recognition and 
attention, which his actual life and works continue to command, Grisez’s life and works is 
comparatively limited, except, for the immediate academic and religious circles within which 
he himself works. In fact, he appears to be referring to this relative anonymity and obscurity 
when, in the context of his struggle against what he regarded as “the institutionalisation of 
theological dissent” in the field of morals within the Catholic Church,
3
 he pointed out that: 
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What I am doing is coming along and getting picked up in a few 
places. If I had been thinking about fighting and winning some kind of 
war, the whole thing would be completely impossible. You couldn’t 




Although Grisez acknowledges his inability to accomplish much, this chapter will endeavour 
to examine his theological pedagogy on the nature of conscience. 
2. Grisez’s Moral Thought and Method 
 Grisez’s thoughts are to be found in numerous articles and books, which he authored 
or co-authored with his colleagues. He has made significant contributions to everyday 
popular concerns especially about human sexuality and human life on issues like 
contraception, abortion, nuclear deterrence, Euthanasia and death penalty. His earlier 
work: Abortion: The Myths, the Realities, and the Arguments, (1970) was reviewed 
accordingly: “Professor Grisez has exhaustively analysed the problem in all its significant 
facets. . . . It is a mine of soundly penetrating analysis.”
5
 In Life and Death with Liberty and 
Justice: A Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate, (1979) co-authored with Joseph M. Boyle, 
they made significant contributions to the life and death debate in consonance with consent 
and conscience. They argued that “the conscience of the patient—even if it is sincere and the 
patient’s choice is in accord with it—is not sufficient to justify the action of helping”
6
 the 
patient to die. Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism, co-authored with John Finnis and 
Joseph Boyle, (1987) was described as “the most important contribution so far to the debate 
over the ethics of nuclear deterrence.”’
7
 In view of the death penalty, Grisez argues against 
capital punishment declaring that Thomas Aquinas’ “common good” justification of the death 
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penalty “is not really essential to protect the common good from injury by wicked persons. 
What may be necessary is their effective separation from society.”
8
  
 Grisez’s major theological output however is: The Way of the Lord Jesus, a four 
volume treatise.
9
 The fourth volume is still in progress. These volumes constitute his success 
or achievements in the eyes of his admirers. When Grisez was asked about what he had in 
mind in writing the The Way of the Lord Jesus, he simply responded: “Essentially, what I’m 
doing is trying to do moral theology the way I think it ought to be done.” Shaw then asked: 
“Hasn’t moral theology up to now ever been done as it should? “No” he replied, “it hasn’t 
been very adequate.”
10
 Grisez seeks therefore to articulate concepts such as “Freedom,” 
“Conscience,” “Basic Human Goods,” “Natural Law Theory” and address specific moral 
problems in consonance with the teachings of the Catholic Magisterium and respond to the 
renewal in moral theology called for by the Second Vatican Council.
11
 Reviewing Volume 2, 
in New Blackfriars, Anthony Fisher referred to Christian Moral Principles as “the greatest 
book since Vatican II NOT reviewed” by the New Blackfriars.
 12
 David Novak while 
concluding his review of the third volume writes: “In the book as a whole, Germain Grisez 
has once again shown how faith seeking understanding, when done by someone of great faith 
and great understanding, is the most impressive of all human efforts.”
13
 John R. Connery 
designated The Way of the Lord Jesus “a monumental work,”
14
 and Benedict Ashley 
maintained that the completed four-volume treatise “promises to be the most important work 
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in the field (at least in English) to appear since Vatican II.”
15
 These volumes therefore, 
elaborate Grisez’s essential ethical or moral thought particularly as it relates to his 
understanding of the concept of conscience. But before embarking on the task of searching 
out his thought on conscience, it is essential that we contextualize his moral thinking and 
method. 
 There are differing ethical theories or schools of moral theology among Catholic 
theologians and academia. Linda Hogan affirms this by declaring that: “Catholic moral 
theology today is characterised by deep divisions on a number of serious issues.”
16
 Upon this, 
she identified two main schools of thought. One is clustered around Grisez and his 
colleagues
17
 while the other is clustered around moral theologians such as Richard 
McCormick and Charles Curran. The description of McCormick as “a major figure in 
Catholic proportionalist dissent”
18
 leaves no doubt as to the essential nature of this cluster. 
Thus, those clustered around Grisez came to be identified as “traditionalists” or “non-




 Interestingly, while Robert J. Smith situates Grisez within the “traditionalist,” “non-
revisionist,” “man-in-relationship-to-law” model of conscience or school of thought,
20
 Grisez, 
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as has been his wont, strongly resists any attempt at what may be regarded as facile pigeon-
holing. He and his colleagues argue thus, for example: 
[S]ome wonder whether the theory we defend is teleological or 
deontological. The answer: Neither. Unlike teleological theories, this 
one shows why there are absolute moral norms. (We deal with this 
matter sufficiently in other works.) Moreover, unlike teleological and 
like deontological theories, the position we defend is that morally 
good free choices are intrinsic to the supreme good of human persons. 




What Grisez is postulating here is that, since the position that he and his collaborators defend 
is one where “morally good free choices are intrinsic to the supreme good of persons,”
22
 they 
are not teleological or deontological in their ethical outlook. More specifically, what he is 
claiming is that his ethical system is not one where actions are judged to be morally right 
based on how well they conform to some set of duties (deontological), or on the 
consequences of the actions (teleological). Grisez’s thoughts and writings make scholars 
postulate about his specific school of thought. However, since normative ethical systems deal 
with variant methods: virtue-ethics,
23
 deontological, teleological, relational-responsibility 
methods,
24
 there can be no doubt however that his opponents would place him outside these 
ethical niches due to his stance on conscience and morality. Whether Grisez has problems 
with being designated “deontological” or “teleological” or “virtue-ethical”, we might identify 
him as a “Contemporary Neo-Manualist” as James F. Keenan credits him.
25
 On the other 
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hand however, what is clear is that his is a protagonist of “the morality of principles”
26
 and a 
vehement antagonist of proportionalism. 
2.1 An Unrelenting Challenger of Proportionalism 
 Grisez, described as a “non-Revisionist” or “Traditionalist” has displayed zero-
tolerance for the proportionalist approach to moral decision-making, it should be noted that 
proportionalism actually shares certain fundamental characteristics with “morality of 
principle.” Steadfast “Traditionalists” as Ronald Lawler, Joseph Boyle and William May 
point out, for example, that:  
Both of these approaches are attempts to carry out the renewal called 
for by Vatican II; both seek to escape every kind of legalism and 
extrinsicism to show that morality is not a set of arbitrary rules 
imposed without concern for what the human person is and longs to 
be. Both explain the moral teachings of Christianity in terms of love 
of persons, and of the great human goods that animate all moral 
striving-goods . . . Both seek to be faithful to the larger vision of 
Scripture and Christian tradition, understanding that man was made 
not simply to keep rules but to serve God creatively as his image, 
intelligently striving to do what is really good, what love requires.
27
 
In the light of such fundamental commonalities, Grisez’s virulent opposition to 
proportionalism would seem to be somewhat over-the-top to some. For example, he describes 
“unrestricted proportionalism,”
28
 whether secular or Catholic in nature as being theologically 
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inadequate because it “confuses human responsibility with God’s responsibility.”
29
 
Concerning this misappropriation of responsibility, he caustically observes that: 
One who accepts both unrestricted proportionalism and the Christian 
doctrine of divine providence (God permits what is bad only to draw 
good from it) should also accept the following moral principle. If in 
doubt about what is right, try anything. For if one accomplishes what 
one attempts, one can be certain that on the whole it is best, since it 
must fit into the plan of providence.
30
 
Switching from the peremptorily derisive to the seriously didactic, however, Grisez proceeds 
to sternly remind supporters of both “restricted” and “unrestricted” proportionalism that: 
“We, however, are not responsible for the overall greater good and lesser evil—the good and 
evil of ‘generally and in the long run’— for only God knows what they are.”
31
 
 Even those proportionalists who tone down their approach by acknowledging that 
there are some moral absolutes, for example, “that one should never seek to lead another into 
sin”
32
 thereby admitting that there are serious limitations to the applicability of the 
proportionality principle, receive little or no philosophical or theological quarter from Grisez.
 
 
Refined, reformed or restricted, the application of this method of moral decision-making can 
draw such a devastatingly critical observation from Grisez, as: “even in so restricted a form, 
proportionalism is rationally unworkable.”
33
 All of this seemingly intransigent opposition to 
proportionalism on the part of Grisez begs the following questions: What precisely does this 
method of moral thinking entail? And what is it about this method that consistently draws 
such severe criticism from Grisez? 
2.1.1 A Traditionalist Account of Proportionalism  
Grisez outlines his understanding of the nature of proportionalism as follows: 
                                                             
29
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According to a simple version of proportionalism, a moral judgment is 
a comparative evaluation of the possibilities available for choice. Each 
is examined to see what benefit and harm are likely to come about if it 
is chosen and the choice carried out. Suppose one possibility promises 
considerably more benefit than harm, while another promises less 
benefit than harm. One ought to choose the first possibility, according 




Ronald Lawler et al., note that this method of moral thinking derives its title from its 
emphasis on the proportion of good and evil in actions, such that 
an act which would otherwise be immoral can be justified morally if 
the overall good or evil involved in doing the action compares 
favourably with the overall good or evil which the available 
alternatives would bring about. Thus, its basic principle can be called 




Accordingly, proportionalists postulate that “intelligent concern for the human goods requires 
an assessment of all the good and evil involved in alternative possibilities for action,”
36
 in 
order to determine, prior to the making of any choice, which of the alternatives promises the 
greater good or lesser evil. It is the outcome of this determination which dictates to the 
individual which of the alternatives he or she ought to choose.
37
 Hence, proportionalism is 
considered a form of utilitarianism or consequentialist theory. 
 Although, considered to be applicable to any moral problem, Lawler and colleagues 
do consider it to be somewhat ironic that 
Catholic thinkers have adopted a method of moral thinking that has 
been for over a century the centrepiece of secular humanist thinking at 
the very time when many secular moralists were despairing of its 
ability to withstand the objections raised against it.
38
 
                                                             
34
 Ibid., 141. 
35
 Ronald Lawler et al., Catholic Sexual Ethics, 79. 
36
 Ibid., 79. 
37
 Ibid., 79-80. 
38
 Ibid., 84. 
232 
 
Sir Bernard Williams (1929-2003), for example, who was regarded by some as the most 
brilliant and important British moral philosopher of his era
39
 is credited with successfully 
undertaking the project of exploring how utilitarianism and those who uncritically embrace it 
have accepted an unworkable standard for defining right actions. Specifically, Williams 
postulated the following unique and in-depth thesis: to define right action only by reference 
to whether it produces a good “state of affairs” necessitates a fundamental clash between an 
agent’s moral character and that allegedly right action.
40
 
2.2 Proportionalism: A Plausible Alternative? 
 Despite such criticisms, however, there are dissenting theologians who are prepared to 
defend and promote proportionalism as a method of moral decision-making within the 
Catholic Church.
41
 As space precludes an in-depth account from such apologists for this 
ethical system, we will draw on two arguments favouring this method that would certainly 
have exercised Grisez’s thinking. 
 Grisez notes, for example that Catholic proportionalists claim to have found 
“instances of the use of proportionalism in theological tradition”
42
 referring specifically to 
Richard McCormick’s overt utilisation of the thinking of Thomas Aquinas to justify 
contraception.
43
 McCormick is depicted as drawing on what he perceives to be a logical 
parallel between the act of contraception and Aquinas’s observation that, “whilst killing a 
person does involve a disorder, this can be made right by a particular circumstance,” namely 
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capital punishment for the sake of justice.
44
 Grisez sceptically observes, however, that the 
only evidence McCormick is presenting for concluding that Aquinas supports 
proportionalism is of the type where he equates the notion “By particular circumstances” with 
the notion of “by reason of the good of the person and persons.”
45
 Not one for apologetics, 
however, Grisez baldly asserts in bold print: “It is not true that the theological tradition 
endorses proportionalism,”
46
 before informing his readers that while some classical moral 
theologians may have occasionally proposed proportionalist-like arguments, that is very 
different from articulating and defending the method.
47
 
 Grisez’s abhorrence of subjectivism and relativism surfaces pretty instantly when he 
finds himself responding to the notion that proportionalism actually provides a much needed 
role for flexibility in moral decision-making.
48
 He firstly notes the argument that “many 
people find proportionalism’s flexibility attractive . . . [because] while moral absolutes could 
be maintained in an ideal universe, compromises are in order in the real universe broken by 
sin.”
49
 Grisez also noted the proportionalist insistence that account must be taken of the 
dynamism of human nature, of its historical character and openness to real change.
50
 Grisez’s 
response to what he perceived to be an attempt to justify the relativisation of Catholic 
teaching is, as usual, direct, uncompromising and unapologetic: 
Part of proportionalists’ impatience with moral absolutes is rooted in 
their reaction to an inadequate conception of moral obligation. If God 
is not being simply arbitrary in stamping “forbidden” on acts, there 
must be some plausible reason for his doing so-such as that they cause 
more  harm than good.
51
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2.2.1 Proportionalism: Nothing Plausible for Grisez “The Traditionalist or Non-
Revisionist” 
 Much of Grisez’s intense challenging of proportionalism has been targeted at 
undermining its fundamental philosophical, logical and ethical rationale. To focus primarily 
on these arguments, however, would be to critically overlook what can only be described as 
his life-mission, his raison d’être, the targeting of his not-inconsiderable intellectual skills on 
neutralising any threat that any method of moral thinking could pose to the teaching authority 
of the Catholic Church’s Magisterium. In Grisez’s opinion, proportionalism had proved itself 
to be most definitely one such legitimate target, if for no other reason than by that time in 
Grisez’s career it had become “the dominant school among Catholic moralists in the United 
States and countries like it.”
52
 What Grisez found to be deeply troubling about this ethical 
“takeover” was that: 
People who set aside the teaching authority of the Church as 
insufficiently reasonable on the basis of theological dissent grounded 
on proportionalism are making an act of faith in the untestable and 
rationally unsupportable intuitions of dissenting theologians.
53
  
Grisez unequivocally insisted that even where the Church’s teaching could be deemed to be 
rationally indefensible, at least in the eyes of such an eminent dissenting theologian as 
Richard McCormick: 
It would at least make more sense to entrust oneself to the 
accumulated wisdom of the Church proposed with bad reasons by the 
Magisterium, than to the consensus of dissenting theologians, 
proposed with bad reasons by Richard McCormick.
54
 
 What Grisez and his collaborators are deadly intent on bringing to the attention of 
Catholics, however, is their absolute conviction that proportionalism is far more radical than 
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its “dissenting” protagonists are prepared to acknowledge.
55
 For “Traditionalists” however, 
the most radical and grievous proportionalist position of all is one which asserts that, because 
the most common moral absolutes traditionally and insistently taught by the Magisterium are 
not valid, since they are proposed by a fallible body, any individual who deems he or she has 
sufficient reasons, may rightfully dissent from these teachings in specific moral matters.
56
 
What specifically appals such “Traditionalists” is that even though “recent popes, synods and 
episcopal conferences have very frequently reaffirmed the validity and importance of moral 
absolutes in the Church’s traditional sense,” 
57
dissenting proportionalist theologians continue 
to challenge received Church teaching by proclaiming that “not every act of contraception is 
immoral, that not every act of homosexuality or fornication is objectively wrong, that not 
every act of taking human life is absolutely prohibited.”
58
 
 In the eyes of “Traditionalists”, such a denial of insistently taught moral absolutes not 
only involves a rejection of the basic moral principle that one must not do evil that good 
might prevail,
59
 but most decidedly renders proportionalism inadequate as an approach to 
moral decision-making for thinking Catholics. This is particularly so, because 
“Traditionalists” see proportionalists as inventing the truth rather than embracing it, thereby 
denying the Christian belief that Jesus Christ, as “The Way, the Truth and the Life”
60
 can 
provide Catholics, through his teachings, with “an objective set of requirements which are 
part of an objective reality ultimately knowable by all.”
61
 As such, “Traditionalists” therefore 
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claim that proportionalism cannot be regarded as an authentic development of received 
Catholic morality, but rather as a radical rejection of its central positions.
62
 
 In Grisez’s opinion, dissenting proportionalist theologians have failed dismally in the 
very task he claims to have undertaken in his ongoing composition of the four-volume The 
Way of the Lord Jesus: “to reshape Catholic Moral theology in the light of the prescription of 
the Second Vatican Council.”
63
 According to Grisez, such a “reshaped” and renewed moral 
theology “Scripturally based, related to basic truths, and Christocentric, . . . strikes a proper 
balance between two ways of viewing Christian life—as oriented to fulfilment in heaven and 
as oriented to the betterment of this world.”
64
 As far as Grisez and his collaborators are 
concerned, proportionalism is “Utilitarian” based, rejects basic truths and denies a role for 
“The Way, the Truth and the Life” in the formation of objective truth  
2.3 Grisez: “Traditionalist” Promoter of “The Morality of Principles” 
 Typically, Grisez makes it quite clear from the outset that the writing on Christian 
Morals that he outlines is intended solely for the committed Catholic, for that “clearheaded 
and faithful” Catholic who seeks to be informed rather than persuaded. In such a partisan 
spirit he boldly declares that: 
In this book, I assume that the reader accepts everything the Catholic 
Church believes and teaches. This book is not apologetics aimed at 
nonbelievers nor is it an attempt to rescue the faith of those who have 
serious doubts. However, anyone who thinks has many difficulties 




Implied in the above is the notion that committed Catholics are thinking beings, who, on 
occasion, may stand in need of having the Church’s teachings clarified for them, a task 
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Grisez would enthusiastically undertake. The extract also serves to implicitly represent Grisez 
as an upholder of all that the Catholic Church teaches, and as one whose sense of moral 
thinking is therefore seen to be deeply rooted in Catholic moral teaching. Such a moral stance 
is blatantly obvious in the following extract where he actually celebrates his submissiveness 
to the Magisterium of the Catholic Church. He asserts that: “In what I have written here, as in 
everything I write—everything I think—I submit gladly and wholeheartedly to the better 
judgment of the Catholic Church.”
66
  
 His engagement with theorising the moral decision-making process also derives, as 
we have just seen, from his deep dissatisfaction with the response on the part of dissenting 
theologians whom he sees as being tainted by the influence of secular humanism to the call of 
Vatican II for a renewal and reshaping of moral theology within the Catholic Church. He 
decries the fact that 
much that has been published by Catholics writing in moral theory 
since Vatican II is negative. The Council called for a Christ-centered 
moral theology. Too much of what has been published in recent years, 
far from being centered upon Jesus, is vitiated by substantial 
compromises with secular humanism.
67
 
Thus, among the factors Grisez sees as impacting negatively on moral theology, post-Vatican 
II, are a “certain kind of continuing legalism, subjectivism, and rationalisations for 
theological opinions at odds with Church teachings.”
68
 As far as Grisez is concerned, the 
fundamental problem is that post-Vatican II moral theology, or the “new” moral theology  
provides no account in Christian terms of why one should seek human 
fulfilment in this life, what the specifically Christian way of life is, 
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3. Moral Principle: Free Choice and the Moral Connection 
 Grisez contends that free choice is the most important presupposition
70
 regarding 
humankind, and it is because of this belief that he is so meticulous in clarifying his 
understanding of this concept. For Grisez, therefore, free choice is concerned with “making 
up one’s mind to do this rather than that, or to do this rather than not doing that, when both 
alternatives are real possibilities for the one making the choice.”
71
 Thus, Grisez is simply 
pointing out how free choice is an experience that presents itself to individuals when they are 
confronted with alternatives. Specifically, he posits that: “The experience of free choice is a 
familiar one. It begins in conflict, the awareness that one is in a situation where it is not 
possible to pursue all the goods one is concerned with. This leads to conscious deliberation 
about the alternatives.”
72
 However, with observations such as: “There is a view that moral 
norms are in force only if they are adopted or accepted by choices,”
73
 and “Moral truth in its 
full development . . . comes to bear only when there is some possibility of choice,”
74
 Grisez 
takes his elaboration of free choice to another level by situating the concept in the moral 
realm. 
 Firstly, Grisez maintains that free choice is what actually places the human person in 
that realm.
75
 Rather than representing such an assertion as a bald statement of fact, however, 
Grisez, in keeping with his commitment to philosophical argumentation, specifies the 
conditions under which free choice can enter the moral framework. He argues that such a 
transition can only take place when the following two conditions are met: firstly, the 
individual recognises that it is in his or her power to do what is good or bad; and secondly, 
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that the individual not only perpetrates one or the other act by their own choice, but does so 
in a situation where that choice could have been otherwise.
76
 Grisez’s succinct assertion that 
“What we do makes up our moral life only insofar as our choice is free, not something which 
happens to us as a result of factors outside us,”
77
 not only summarises his understanding of 
the relationship between free choice and morality, but also explains why he is absolutely 
opposed to assigning the notions of determinism or coercion
78
 any positive role in his 
theorising of that relationship. It would be Grisez’s view that any alleged involvement by 
such controlling and constraining mechanisms in the individual’s exercise of choice, would 
suggest that since “what we do [is] determined by something other than ourselves, [then] not 
we but that other something would be responsible for our lives.”
79
 To argue for such an 
ethical or moral stance, would be to diametrically oppose Grisez’s pronouncement that: 
“Human persons are not simply subject to fate, to natural necessity, or to their heredity and 
environment. In what is most important, human persons are of themselves.”
80
 Robert Smith, 
in his account of Grisez’s theorising on free choice echoes this sentiment when he notes that 




 However, Grisez points out that “Free choice is not a normative principle—one which 
distinguishes right from wrong,” and can be considered to be a moral principle only in a wide 
sense.
82
 He makes the point that: “While the word “morality” is sometimes limited to moral 
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goodness, free choice underlies both goodness and badness.”
83
 He points out elsewhere, for 
example, that “one can render moral norms ineffective in one’s life by choosing to be 
immoral.”
84
 Thus, because free choice can ultimately prove to be “a source of both moral 
good and moral evil” it is, in Grisez’s view, “an existential principle.”
85
 
3.1 Basis of Free Choice 
 As is to be expected, Grisez is not satisfied to simply establish his own philosophical 
and ethical underpinning for the notion of free choice; characteristically, he seeks also to look 
for Biblical validation for his theorising on this concept. As an introduction to his teaching in 
this regard, he unequivocally asserts that: “The ability of human persons to make free choices 
is taken for granted throughout the Bible.”
86
 Supporting this claim, he cites Yahweh’s 
offering of the covenant and Jesus’ announcement of the kingdom, as divine invitations 
issued to human mortals on the basis that those who hear them are expected to respond in one 
way or the other.
87
 Grisez points to Sirach 15: 11-20 to illustrate what he believes is “a classic 
formulation of the sublime truth concerning the human power of free choice,” in terms of the 
human-divine relationship.
88
 The author of Sirach preaching to Jews who, like their Greek 
contemporaries, were tempted to evade moral responsibility “by thinking of divine, creative 
causality as being like fate,”
89
 taught that it was God “who created man in the beginning, and 
. . . left him in the power of his own inclination.”
90
 In light of this Divine bestowal, the Old 
Testament reminds his listeners that: 
If you will, you can keep the commandments, and to act faithfully is a 
matter of your own choice. He has placed before you fire and water: 
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stretch out your hand for whichever you wish. Before a man are life 
and death, and whichever he chooses will be given him. For great is 
the wisdom of the Lord; he is mighty in power and sees everything; 




From Grisez’s biblically-based viewpoint, therefore, “There would be no free choices if God 
did not cause them. The free choice to believe in God and to keep his commandments is the 
work of God’s grace; sinners and saints alike can do nothing, without God.”
92
 
3.1.2 Free Choice as an Exercise in Co-Creation with God 
 Grisez identifies the ability to make choices as one particularly notable way in which 
human persons become somewhat like God.
93
 He argues that just as God is not determined in 
any way by anything other than himself, so it is with a freely-choosing human person even 
though one as a creature remains dependent upon God while making free choices.
94
 From 
this, Grisez reasons that “In choosing freely . . . one not only brings about things other than 
oneself, one is one’s self-maker under God.”
95
 Thus, for Grisez, the power of free choice not 
only enables a form of self-creation as well as co-creation with God, but presents as “a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility,”
96
 and as “the principle of human dignity 
insofar as human persons are like God in being of themselves what they morally are.”
97
 
 From Grisez’s point of view, therefore, it is only fitting that this section concerning 
the relationship of morality to free choice, should conclude with his assertion that: “free 
choice and morality are not humankind’s burden, but humankind’s dignity—our natural 
similarity to God the creator and our natural power of sharing in the work of creation.”
98
 
Anxious, therefore, to demonstrate that his teaching on the free choice-morality relationship 
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derives from the teachings of the Catholic Magisterium, Grisez draws the attention of his 
readers to a single phrase in Gaudium et Spes, (n.17) a phrase which asserts that the power of 
free choice “is an exceptional sign of the divine image within man.”
99
 Grisez’s readers, 
however, will be aware that he includes this succinct reference merely to give a flavour of the 
magisterial requirements that go with being the recipient of this special “dignity”. A more 
complete reference to Vatican II, for example, reveals how at one with the Church’s teaching 
on free choice, Grisez’s theorising actually is. Indeed, the following excerpt could quite 
easily be represented as a type of “jointly issued statement” on behalf of both Grisez and the 
magisterium: 
It is . . . only in freedom that people can turn themselves toward what 
is good . . . genuine freedom is an exceptional sign of the image of 
God in humanity. For God willed that men and women should ‘be left 
free to make their own decisions’ so that they might of their own 
accord seek their creator and freely attain their full and blessed 
perfection by cleaving to God. Their dignity therefore requires them to 
act out of conscious and free choice, as moved and drawn in a 
personal way from within, and not by their own blind impulses or by 
external constraint. People gain such dignity when, freeing themselves 
of all slavery to the passions, they press forward towards their goal by 
freely choosing what is good, and, by their diligence and skill, 
effectively secure for themselves the means suited to this end. Since 
human freedom has been weakened by sin it is only by the help of 
God’s Grace that people can properly orientate their actions towards 
God. Before the judgment seat of God everybody will have to give an 
account of their life, according as they have done either good or evil. 
100
  
 As with much of his theorising and philosophising especially with regard to 
conscience, Grisez validates his points with Church teachings, thus showing that a “thousand 
ways lead men forever to Rome” (Mille viae ducunt homines per saecula Romam) or that 
“Rome has spoken, the cause is finished” (Roma locuta est, causa finita est) even if that 
journey originates in or is instigated by the use of a single concise phrase as he demonstrated. 
It could be usefully argued, therefore, that just as King Midas, of Greek Mythology, is 
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renowned for his ability to turn everything he touched to gold, so it is with Grisez, of whom it 
can be claimed that he possesses the ability to turn everything he touches to “Roman Catholic 
teaching.” That said, however, it must be acknowledged that Grisez presented his readers 
with a rigorously reasoned account of the concept of free choice, both in terms of its 
foundational role in helping human persons make ethical sense of life’s events, on the one 
hand, and in terms of making judgements of morality possible, on the other.
101
  
3.2 Free Choice: A Crucial Agent in Self-Determination and in the Realisation of 
Human Goods 
 While such free choice operational characteristics, as listed above, are quite obviously 
essential to the proper functioning of conscience, further elaboration of the former concept, 
by Grisez, serves to highlight other related connections, which seem to be just as equally 
important in arriving at true judgements of conscience. In particular, Grisez theorises: (a) that 
the exercise of free choice constitutes an Act of Self-Determination, as well as An 
Acknowledgment of Accountability
102
 and (b) that the Basic Human Goods can only be 
realised through a combination of free-choice and/or ‘effective action or good fortune.’
103
 
3.2.1 Free Choice: An Act of Self-Determination and an Acknowledgement of 
Accountability 
 Robert Smith asserts that a key aspect of Grisez’s thinking is that the ability to make 
choices reflects a radical freedom that is innate to the human person.
104
 The profundity of this 
human capability, for Grisez, derives from his belief that, in the process of making and 
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enacting choices, a person literally determines and forms him or herself.
105
 This self-
determining characterisation of the exercise of free choice by Grisez, suggests, in the words 
of Robert Smith that “the choices that underlie the acts are of lasting significance and help to 
determine the self one is to become and is, in fact, becoming.”
106
 This elaboration of the 
relationship between the exercise of free choice and the process of self-determination 
suggests a type of equivalence that prompts Grisez to maintain that “in making and carrying 
out choices, a person constitutes his or her own identity.”
107
 Robert Smith outlines Grisez’s 
thinking on how such a process of self-determination emanates from the exercise of free 
choice. He claims on Grisez’s behalf that 
the more we act in a particular way, the more we are likely to continue 
to act in the same fashion—for good or for ill. The more we make 
similar kinds of free choices, the more we are prone to continue to 
make similar types of free choices, and so on. Such is the process of 
character-building and self-determination in the moral sense when 
exercised in the process of authentic human freedom and choice.
108
 
In Grisez’s view, then, the ability to make free choices is a fundamental principle because it 
actually transforms the exercise of free choice itself, into an exercise in making “one’s 
actions one’s own, one’s life one’s own, one’s moral identity one’s own.”
109
 For Grisez, it 
follows naturally from such reasoning that, “free choices build up persons and 
communities—morally speaking, that is, choice determines their identity.”
110
  
 It is no surprise, then, to observe that, while Grisez lists “six kinds of freedom,”
111
 he 
argues that “the freedom to determine one’s self by one’s own choices is the freedom most 
                                                             
105
 Ibid., 50. 
106
 Ibid., 53. 
107
 Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles, 55. 
108
 Robert Smith, Conscience and Catholicism, 55; see also Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New 
Morality, 50-52. 
109
 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfilment in Christ, 16. 
110
 Ibid., 21. 
111
 According to Robert Smith in Conscience and Catholicism 51, Grisez suggests at least six kinds of freedom 
or meanings associated with the word “freedom”: 1) physical freedom in which one is not constrained in 
movement; 2) the kind of freedom that implies the individual ability to do as one wants or pleases; 3) ideal 
freedom in the sense of having the ability to work toward and live out of an “ideal”; 4) creative freedom 
245 
 
proper to a human being . . . [and as such] is the freedom with which ethics is most 
concerned.”
112
 In Grisez’s view, therefore, since freedom as self-determination is concerned 
with the very “shaping of one’s life, one’s self, by one’s choices”, 
113
 it is innately connected 
to questions of morality. Thus, he postulates that to the extent that human persons can 
determine for themselves who they shall be, they will be held responsible and accountable for 
their own lives.
114
 Continuing with the “Accountability” motif, Grisez teaches that: “To the 
extent that we can determine for ourselves who we shall be, we are responsible for our 
lives.”
115
 Indeed, with typical Grisez forthrightness, he reminds his readers that: “To be 
responsible ultimately means to be a self one cannot blame on heredity, environment, or 
anything other than one’s own free choices.”
116
 In Grisez’s opinion, therefore, human persons 
are ultimately and radically responsible not only for their own choices, but for the self they 
have become through those choices.  
 As is to be expected, however, Grisez is not content to present the concept of free 
choice in terms of its relevance to the Natural Law; he is naturally more interested in 
representing it as a principle of Christian morality. Hence, Grisez presents his Catholic 
understanding of the relationship between free choice, human responsibility, and self 
determination accordingly: 
There are three important ways in which freedom of choice is a 
principle of Christian morality. It is a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility. It is the central subject matter which moral norms are 
about; in this respect the power of free choice is the principle of 
human dignity, insofar as human persons are like God in being of 
themselves what they morally are. And finally, free choice is that by 
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which we accept God in faith, and so enjoy his love and can live as his 
children.
117
   
In this précis, Grisez is seen to envelop the entire relationship in an aura of Divinity. In terms 
of this Divine aura, free choice is firstly represented as an enabling gift from God in the area 
of morality. More crucially, however, with particular reference to the functioning of the 
Christian conscience, free choice is also represented as that which prompts us to accept “God 
in faith” in conjunction with the attendant responsibility of living “as his children,” which 
follows automatically from that acceptance. 
3.3 Conscience, Free Choice and Accountability 
 According to Robert Smith, Grisez’s understanding of the notion of conscience is 
underpinned by the following two foundational tenets: (a) nothing will make ethical sense for 
human persons, nor will judgements of morality be possible, in the absence of freedom; and 
(b) individuals must be free if they are to be held responsible for their choices and action.
118
 
Grisez maintains, however, that even with those underpinnings in place, “The ability to make 
free choices would be useless . . . if we could not know which choices are good ones.”
119
 The 
acquisition of such knowledge is possible, in Grisez’s opinion, if one avails of the 
“judgements distinguishing good choices from bad ones,” a distinction managed only by 
“conscience.”
120
 In light of this fundamental capacity of the judgements of conscience to 
distinguish good choices from bad ones, Grisez considers conscience to be “a basic 
existential principle, just as free choice is.”
121
 Thus, in the context of free choice, Smith 
emphasises the significance of conscience in terms of its contribution towards “making moral 
truths known and available to persons in their exercise of free, self-determining choices.
122
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Here, Smith is simply echoing an alternative description of conscience by Grisez, wherein he 
notes that: “One’s conscience simply is what one judges to be moral truth considered insofar 
as one has tried to know that truth, thinks one knows it, and compares one’s prospective or 
past choices with it.”
123
 Thus, it is obvious that Grisez sees the link between moral truths, free 
choice and judgements of conscience. 
 As for the relationship between the notion of accountability, moral truth and 
conscience, Grisez firstly maintains that while “Moral truth in its full development is not 
restricted to any area of behaviour . . . it comes to bear only when there is some possibility of 
free choice.”
124
 Grisez clarifies this assertion in terms of the notion of “responsible 
commitment” whereby he reminds his readers that: “One’s responsibilities for what one is 
involved in are determined by what one personally chooses, freely accepts, and so on.”
125
 
More specifically, and relevant to responsibility and moral truth and judgements of 
conscience, he asserts that 
for the mature, good person there is no free (that is, nonmoral) area; 
every act of one’s life is morally significant. One’s act of faith is a 
responsible commitment. Personal vocational commitments are made 
to carry out faith in one’s life. Fresh questions of commitment are 
settled by how well a new commitment comports with one’s already-
articulated personal vocation. Finally, all particular questions are 
settled by reference to one’s own personal vocational commitments. 
126
 
Thus, whereas Grisez theorises free choice in terms of its capacity to generate self-
determination, he theorises moral truth in terms of its capacity to generate responsibility, such 
that “the fulfilment of others and of oneself is seen to depend on oneself, and consistency 
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with one’s own care for fulfilment requires one to act reasonably for it.”
127
 In Grisez’s view, 
therefore, moral truth, as identified through the judgements of conscience, “defines the self 
by commitments and communion—for example ‘I am a Christian.’”
128
 
 In conclusion, however, it must be noted that there is far more to Grisez’s 
understanding of the notion of conscience than what has just been outlined above. This 
section has sought to give some insight into Grisez’s view of this existential concept in terms 
of its relation to free choice as self-determination and accountability. In the following section, 
the study takes a look at the relationship between free choice, conscience and Grisez’s own 
theoretical construct of “human goods.” Later still, Grisez’s concept of conscience will be 
compared and contrasted with notions of “superego” and “social convention.” For now, 
however, this study has analytically expounded on Grisez’s concept of conscience from the 
perspective of free choice to mean “judgments distinguishing good choices from bad 
ones.”
129
 Patrick Hannon makes this obvious, where he states: “If we are to choose between 
right and wrong we need to be able to distinguish between them, and the capacity to do this 
resides in the conscience.”
130
 
4. Good of the Human Person 
 In the course of Grisez’s writings on moral principles, moral norms and conscience, 
we see the significance he gives to the notion of “human goods.” For example, he formulates 
the basic principle of morality accordingly: 
In voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed 
to them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those 
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Elsewhere, he asserts that “there are goods for whose realisations one can act for their own 
sake, without reference to any other purpose . . . [these goods] serve as starting points for our 
choices and actions by providing us with reasons to consider some possibilities worthy of 
being chosen.”
132
 Not only are these goods “starting points” for “choices and actions,” but in 
Grisez’s view, they “are the fundamental reasons for which it is possible to act.”
133
 
Furthermore, his observation that human goods “provide reasons for intelligently wanting 
something and choosing to act for it as a goal”
134
 indicates strongly that Grisez believes that 
practical human reflection begins from such goods. The significance of the concept of 
“human goods” in Grisez’s ethical theorising is evident in The Way of the Lord Jesus. An 
inspection of many of the references to “human goods” reveal evidence of attempts at inter-
relating it with the notion of conscience which suggest that Grisez sees “human goods” as 
playing a key role in the areas of morality. For instance, he maintains that:  
Indeed, nothing clarifies the force of moral norms except the 
relationship of morality to human goods . . . [and] moral principles are 
indeed grounded in human goods, since these principles generate 




4.1 Goodness, Badness and Basic Human Goods 
 Grisez characterises “good” as whatever is “understood as fulfilling,”
136
and so, as a 
quality, he suggests that it stands “for something to be fully, to be all it should be-no lacks, no 
privations . . . [since a] good thing has all it is meant to be.”
137
 Mindful of the fact that 
creatures innately lack absolute fullness of being, Grisez stipulates that they can only possess 
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“real fullness according to their kind and condition—according to their specific and actual 
possibilities for their becoming and being more.”
138
 Grisez also cautions against the belief 
that “every realisation of potentialities is good,”
139
 since, for example, people can desire a 
variety of things, for instance pleasure, wealth and power, the pursuit of which [rather than 
fulfilling the person] seem, in fact, to empty that person. “Goodness” for Grisez “lies in 
fulfilment of potentialities which leads to being and being more.”
140
 
 In direct contrast with its central understanding of goodness, however, the Christian 
faith represents “badness as a privation, a real lack of something which should be present and 
perfect.”
141
 More specifically, Grisez maintains that: “The bad is present in what is distorted, 
damaged, and corrupted in creatures. The badness of what is bad is precisely the distorting, 
damaging, or corrupting factor.”
142
 However, because badness is “a real lack of something 
which should be present”
143
 the Church teaches that “there is no such thing as a nature of evil, 
because every nature insofar as it is a nature is good.”
144
 Thus, in Grisez’s eyes, “Badness is a 
gap in something which remains good to the extent that it remains the sort of thing it is.”
145
 
 Grisez further elaborates his notion of “goodness in badness” when he notes that, 
while badness is real rather than apparent, “Even things touched by sin can be redeemed, for 
their original goodness is not wholly corrupted.”
146
 He premised such a claim on the simple 
Old Testament assertion that: “God saw everything he had made, and behold, it was very 
good,”
147
 and on the more elaborate New Testament one that: “everything created by God is 
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good, and nothing is to be rejected if it is received with thanksgiving; for then it is 
consecrated by the word of God and prayer.”
148
 Such biblical teaching leads Grisez to 




 Such “redemptive” reasoning relative to the relationship between “goodness and 
badness” accords with much of what Grisez teaches about conscience. However, in the first 
place, what would be the point of possessing a conscience whose function is to distinguish 
good choices from bad ones
150
 if the human person was left with no choice but to remain in 
that state of being “touched by sin” he or she had originally chosen, for whatever reason. In 
such an ethical scenario, the need for a conscience would obviously become redundant upon 
the commission of one’s first sin. It is because the human person possesses the ability to 
choose “differently” that, for example, Grisez can rationally argue that: “The will to live a 
good life is the indispensable foundation of an upright conscience,”
151
 and that a person of 
mature conscience will think of “morality as a matter of real human goodness and 
reasonableness.”
152
 Similarly, such a person will view doing what is wrong as “a kind of self-
mutilation.”
153
 When viewed in this overall “goodness-badness” light, moral norms, those 
immediate guides to the formation of actual judgements of conscience will be accepted as 
“truths about how to act in ways that are humanly good,” rather than, for example as “being 
arbitrary demands made upon us by God.”
154
 
 It is obvious, then, that for Grisez, any good or combination of goods that genuinely 
fulfil the potential of the human person are, in fact, rooted in morality. In his view: “Things 
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which do [this] are human goods in the central sense that is intelligible goods.”
155
 Drawing on 
Aquinas to further explicate his notion of human goods, Grisez explains that: “These goods 
are aspects of persons, not realities apart from persons.”
156
 By this, Grisez means that 
while “Property and other things extrinsic to persons can be valuable to persons . . . the basic 




 Grisez declared that “there are goods for whose realisations one can act for their own 
sake, without reference to any other purpose,” and, as just noted, “serve as starting points of 
our choices and actions by providing us with reasons to consider some possibilities as worthy 
of being chosen.”
158
 “Goods like these are real parts of the integral fulfilment of persons. We 
call them ‘basic human goods’ – basic not to survival but to fulfilment.”
159
 Grisez believes 
that such “goods” are the fundamental reasons which potentially propel human persons into 
action; human practical reflection begins from them.
160
 In fact, “They are expanding fields of 
possibility which underlie all the reasons one has for choosing and carrying out one’s 
choices.”
161
 Grisez observes that “Scripture and reflection both point to the same basic 
goods”
162
 and lists out seven categories of these goods, which according to him are “intrinsic 
to personal fulfilment,”
163
 and “perfect persons and contribute to their fulfilment both as 
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individuals and in communities.”
164
 Within these seven, he designates four as being both 
“reflexive” and “existential” or “moral”
165
 consisting of: 
(1) self-integration which is harmony among all the parts of a person 
which can be engaged in freely chosen action; (2) practical 
reasonableness or authenticity, which is harmony among moral 
reflection, free choices, and their executions; (3) justice and 
friendship, which are aspects of the interpersonal communion of good 
persons freely choosing to act in harmony with one another, and (4) 
religion or holiness, which is harmony with God, found in agreement 
of human individual and communal free choices with God’s will.
166
 
Grisez categorises these four human goods as “reflexive” because he sees them as being both 
the reason for choosing, and also as being defined, in part, by choosing.
167
 In other words, 
these basic human goods can be regarded as being “reflexive” because choice is innate to 
their very definition.
168
 Grisez also regards these goods as being “existential” or “moral” 
because, he maintains, “they fulfil human subjects and interpersonal groups in the existential 
dimension of their being.”
169
 More specifically, these four human goods can be said to “fulfil 




 The notion of harmony is also a theme common to these four basic human goods. 
Thus, for example, self-integration is shown to be concerned with establishing harmony 
among aspects of the self; practical reasonableness and authenticity, with seeking harmony 
among moral reflection, free choices and their execution; justice and friendship with seeking 
harmony among human persons; and religion with establishing harmony between humankind 
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 Furthermore, Grisez makes the point that “One can infer [these] basic human 
goods from the privations which mutilate them,”
172
 a situation, which he characterises in 
terms of a striving or struggle for the establishment or re-establishment of inner harmony in 
response to the experience of inner tension by the individual.
173
 Thus, he notes that in a 
situation where the human person experiences “strained relationships and conflict with 
others,” they will be “propelled” towards seeking to redress the imbalance in harmony within 
the context of the human goods of justice and friendship.
174
 Similarly, where the human 
person experiences “sin and alienation from God” the goods drawn on to re-establish 
harmony will be “the peace and friendship with God, which are the concern of all true 
religion.”
175
 And so it would be with the remaining pair of human goods the re-establishment 
of inner harmony in the response to the experience of inner tension. 
 Of the remaining three basic human goods, Grisez observes that they can be 
designated “nonreflexive” or “substantive”, because “they are not defined in terms of 
choosing,” but, in fact, “provide reasons for choosing which can stand by themselves.”
176
 He 
lists the three remaining human goods thus: 
(1) life itself, including health, physical integrity, safety, and the 
handing on of life to new persons; (2) knowledge of various forms of 
truth and appreciation of various form of beauty or excellence; and (3) 
activities of skilful work and of play; which in their very performance 
enrich those who do them.
177
 
William May explains that Grisez calls these goods “substantive” because they “fulfil persons 
not as agents through deliberation and choice, but as intelligent, animate beings.”
178
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 Thus, with regard to the fulfilment of persons in their bodily dimension, Grisez notes 
that such a potential state “is acclaimed as a great blessing throughout the Bible . . . [with] 
Procreative fruitfulness, good health, and bodily integrity [deemed to be] aspects of the 
human good of life.”
179
 Anyone who would act against such a human good in whatever 
manner is advised by Vatican II that: “whatever is opposed to life itself or to bodily integrity 
is a great crime.”
180
 In terms of human fulfilment in the intellectual dimension, Grisez 
maintains that although this is seldom directly addressed in Scripture in terms of fulfilment 
through “theoretical truth and aesthetic experience . . . It is implicitly recognised and 
commended in various contexts, including that of the praise of God, the Creator.”
181
 Relying 
on current Magisterial teaching relevant to this human good, Grisez notes that “Vatican II 
explicitly commends work in philosophy, history, mathematics, and the sciences, as well as 
cultivation of the arts.”
182
 It offers such support, in Grisez’s view, because, in the words of 
Vatican II itself, this effort “can do very much to elevate the human family to a more sublime 
understanding of truth, goodness, and beauty, and to the formation of judgements which 
embody universal values.”
183
 Finally, with regard to activities of skilful work and play, 
Grisez once again draws on Scripture and the teachings of Vatican II to substantiate his 
assertion that “their very performance [can] enrich those who do them.”
184
 For example, he 
cites specific Biblical references
185
 as explicitly indicating that human work, insofar as it co-
operates with the work of God represents an “important aspect of human dignity.”
186
 He then 
draws on Vatican II’s explicit teaching that work is not merely instrumental, and that human 
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fulfilment demands culture, including external activities (other than work),
187
 because, in 
Grisez’s view, “Activities which are merely playful reflect the utter gratuitousness of God’s 
creative act, for such activities express a person and seek to acquire nothing.”
188
 
 Although the realisation of integral human goods is contingent on choosing rightly 
and serving all the human goods, reflexive and substantive, neither category can be perfectly 
realised during the brief span of a person’s life. This is because according to Grisez, “basic 
human goods belong not merely to the passing world but to the heavenly communion of 
fulfilment in the Lord Jesus.”
189
 Moreover, it is only in such a “heavenly” context that Grisez 
could validly and realistically represent the “Christian Promise of fulfilment” as one 
which includes the satisfaction of a great desire, unending joy, a noble 
life of individual excellence, a perfect community with interpersonal 
intimacy and personal liberty, and everlasting life after death. And this 
promise excludes—except during the brief span of this life—
frustration, misery, failure, and loneliness.
190
 
Not surprisingly, then, Grisez points out that it is “in heaven [that] the upright will be 
happy.”
191
 And, although he might be accused of explaining the obvious, Grisez does seek to 
justify his modulating of the potential of the capacity of human goods to completely fulfil or 
perfect dimensions of the human person during the term of their earthly existence. Thus, of 
existential goods, Grisez has this to say: 
The existential goods primarily are realised in and through choice 
themselves. Since choice has a communal dimension, however 
existential goods cannot be perfectly realised in an imperfect 
community. Thus, given the imperfect character of the world, the 
world cannot give perfect peace.
192
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As for substantive goods, William May, one of Grisez’s collaborators draws from Grisez’s 
own elaboration to point out that 
The realisation or instantiation of these goods is contingent both on 
effective action and, at times, good fortune; effective action is not 
always possible for persons of good will, nor is good fortune under 
their dominion. Persons, therefore, can be morally good, by rightly 
choosing to realise the reflexive goods pertaining to the moral order 
and perfecting persons as moral agents, yet remain ‘unfilled.’
193
  
Finally, it must be noted, however, that as well as providing his followers and readers with a 
detailed account of that state which can result from a total commitment to the realisation of 
all the basic goods in one’s life, Grisez also presents them with a biblically substantiated 
account of what a life lived in direct contravention of these goods would entail. Such an 
account proves useful here, insofar as it provides an insight into Grisez’s own understanding 
of what the refusal to follow the judgement of one’s conscience entails in terms of the 
individual’s relationship to him or herself, to their community and to God. 
 Pointing to the fact that the early chapters of Genesis have indicated what the basic 
human goods are, he baldly asserts that “sin is presented as making people worse in every 
aspect [of these goods].”
194
 Here, in one short sentence, Grisez makes it abundantly clear that, 
in his view; the antithesis to living a life in harmony with the requirements of the basic 
human goods is to opt for life lived in a state of “sin.” So, in outlining the consequences of 
contravening the demands of these basic human goods, Grisez is, in fact, detailing the 
consequences that will inevitably follow on from an individual’s refusal to follow the dictates 
of his or her conscience. As can be seen from the following extract, these consequences are 
explicated in terms of their impact on the individual’s “bodily reality”, “intellectual life”, 
“reality as a co-operator with God”, and in terms of his or her loss of a sense of existing in 
“harmony with God and His Creation.” In the following rather lengthy extract, Grisez, in true 
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neo-Manualist style, minutely details the dire consequences that follow from both 
contravening the requirements of basic human goods and the judgements of one’s conscience: 
The early chapters of Genesis suggest what the basic human goods 
are. Sin is presented as making people worse in every aspect. In their 
bodily reality, they are doomed to die—the great good of life is 
forfeited. In their intellectual life, they are ready to believe lies and 
think crookedly—the good of truth and knowledge is surrendered. In 
their reality as co-operators with God in the work of procreation and 
dominion over the earth, they are condemned to experience pain in 
their labor—fruitfulness now carries with it burdens as well as 
fulfilment. Moreover, harmony is lost on all levels in the existential 
domain. There is inner conflict, manifested by ashamed self-
consciousness; there is discrepancy between the capacity for 
intelligent action and what is actually done, a discrepancy which 
issues in self-deception, rationalisation, and untruthfulness; there is 
interpersonal conflict, expressed in the shirking of responsibility, the 




 In those early chapters from which Grisez draws to substantiate his ominous 
predictions, he portrays God, not so much as a lawmaker but as a lawgiver, with sin being 
seen as an act of choosing to disobey those laws. So, according to Grisez, the first and most 
crucial consequence of Adam and Eve’s sin-filled act of disobedience was to disrupt their 
harmony with God.
196
 From this initial sinful disruption there follows “its subsequent 
rationalisation [that] entail elements of self-deception and self-betrayal,”
197
 which Grisez 
suggests is captured in the verse: “The woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it 
was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise.”
198
 Grisez also 
draws from Genesis to illustrate: (I) how “The sin of man and woman leads to their loss of 
innocence and thus to an uneasy self-consciousness (see Genesis 3:7); (II) how “pain and 
frustration become part of the experience of the procreative and creative work of woman and 








 Genesis 3:6. 
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man” (see Genesis 3:16-19); (III) how there will be no respite from such painful and 
frustrating labour until “you return to the ground, for out of it you were taken; you are dust, 
and to dust you shall return” (see Genesis 3:19); and (iv) how until that final day “there will 
be some disruption of the harmony between man and woman” (see Genesis 3:16), and more 
radical interpersonal conflicts, as exemplified in Cain’s killing of his brother Abel, due to the 
former’s disturbed relationship with God (see Genesis, 4:6-8).
199
 
 Such a minute detailing of the consequences of failing to commit to the realisation of 
the basic human goods, or to the following of the judgements of one’s conscience, call to 
mind one of the characteristics of the manuals of the Manualist tradition, namely that 
the manuals, from which this tradition derives its title, are 
characterised by meticulous attention to detail, in particular with the 
details needed in order to establish the answer to what manualists 




 It is little wonder then that Grisez collaborator, should immediately follow his 
assertion that the whole point of the Christian moral life is that it be “a life in conformity with 
Christ’s”, with the Grisez admonition that Christians must not only avoid mortal sin, “since 
this is utterly incompatible with life in Christ. But they must also weed out of their lives 
deliberate venial sins and imperfections.”
201
 That such an admonition is administered 
immediately prior to May’s assertion that the Christian’s call is “to holiness and sanctity,”
202
 
speaks of an innate mistrust of human nature on the part of Grisez and his followers, a 
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mistrust that might be well captured in the following negative retake of the words of the 
English Poet, Shelly: “If Holiness comes, can Sin be far behind.”
203
 
4.2 Basic Human Goods and Conscience 
 While the construct of human goods is by no means unique or peculiar to Grisez’s 
ethical theorising,
204
 his introduction of this notion into his works is obvious in his debate 
against contraception.
205
 About his work, Contraception and the Natural Law, John C. Ford 
writes: “In the modern controversy [over contraception], Grisez’s work is the first 
philosophical attempt I have seen which makes a substantial constructive contribution to the 
Church’s natural law position.”
206
 Russell Shaw contends that the main thrust of the book 
remains that: “The choice to contracept is a choice against the human good of procreation and 
as such can never be justified, since it is never morally right to turn one’s will against a good 
of the person, not even for the sake of some other good.”
207
 Grisez, himself, with an eye, no 
doubt, to driving home his “human good,” ethically-based message to those Catholic 
moralists who were seeking to make the case that the oral “pill” was morally distinguishable 
                                                             
203
 Percy Bysshe Shelly, Ode to the West Wind.; italicised insertions, mine. Original lines from verse 5: “The 
trumpet of a prophecy! O Wind, If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?” in English Poems ed. Edward 
Chauncey Baldwin, (New York: American Book Company, 1908). 
204
 Other ethical or philosophical scholars have theorised lists of human goods. For example, John Finnis 
presented a list that includes: life, knowledge, aesthetic appreciation, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, 
and religion in Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 86-90. While Finnis’ 
list is much like that of Grisez’s, it includes one not on the latter’s list-“the marital good.” See John Finnis, “Is 
Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?” in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality, ed. 
Robert P. George (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 5. T. D. J. Chappell’s offers another list which 
includes friendship, aesthetic value, pleasure and the avoidance of pain, physical and mental health and 
harmony, reason, rationality, and reasonableness, truth and the knowledge of it, the natural world, people, 
fairness, and achievements in Understanding Human Goods: A Theory of Ethics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1995), 43. Then there is Mark Murphy’s list, which includes life, knowledge, aesthetic 
experience, excellence in work and play, excellence in agency, inner peace, friendship and community, religion, 
and happiness in Natural Law and Practical Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 96. 
Finally, Alfonso Gomez-Lobo theorises a list that includes life, the family, friendship, work and play, 
experience of beauty, theoretical knowledge, and integrity in Morality and the Human Goods: An Introduction 
to Natural Law Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 10-23. 
205
 For a concise teaching on contraception see Germain Grisez, Living a Christian Life, vol. 2 of The Way of the 
Lord Jesus, ch. 8, q. E. 
206
 Cited in Russell Shaw, “Pioneering the Renewal in Moral Theology,” 256.  
207
 Ibid., 255-256. 
261 
 
from older forms of contraception, pointedly dedicated his book to William Joseph Grisez 
and Mary Catherine Linderson Grisez with this phrase “who did not prevent my life.”
208
 
 In Grisez’s address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association, April 20
th
, 
1965, he strongly reiterated his implacable opposition to voluntary contraception because it is 
a definite violation of a “basic human good” on a “new human life.” He remonstrated:  
Contraception was immoral yesterday, it is so today, and it will be so 
tomorrow and forever, because it presupposes—on the part of anyone 
who is clearly aware of what he is doing—a willingness to act in a 
way that might be conducive to a basic human good (the initiation of a 
new human life) together with an unwillingness to permit life to begin 
to be. This unwillingness is no mere wish nor permission. Rather, it is 
an effective willing prepared to implement itself in such a way as to 
bring about its objective in reality.
209
 
Grisez is equally uncompromising with those who argue that pragmatism could dictate that 
any proscribing of the contraceptive act must be subject to the possibility of being over-ruled 
by the occurrence of exceptional circumstances or the need for compromise. He contends that 
justifying any exception to the violating of a fundamental moral principle, will, of itself, lead 
to similar justifications being argued for in other fundamental areas. Thus, while 
acknowledging that “It is all too human to set aside morality when pragmatism seems to 
demand compromise,” Grisez is adamant in his insistence that 
a sound ethics should safeguard human goods against the damage they 
will inevitably suffer if we begin justifying the violation of them in 
their role as principles by the apparent good results to be gained from 
making exceptions in particular cases. If ‘procreative contraception’ is 
to be approved, then life-saving abortion, truth-serving lies, and 
community-preserving discrimination also will have to be accepted. 
Actions such as these can seem natural and necessary to those who 
accept them as a solution to their human dilemmas.
210
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In this same uncompromising vein, Grisez points out that whether the actual act of 
intercourse leads to positive or negative outcomes, incidental to that of its innate purpose “the 
initiation of new life,”
211
 is entirely irrelevant, because “Contraception is intrinsically 
immoral.”
212
 He reminds his readers that: 
There is nothing new in the fact that intercourse between loving 
spouses can be an appropriate celebration of their special friendship 
and can have good psychological effects even when the initiation of a 
new life is not possible. There is nothing new in the fact that 




In his address, Grisez also challenges the notion that freedom and freedom of choice can be 
“extended to cover the entire domain of morality, as if nothing in that domain were 
determined directly by the requirements of intrinsic goods.”
214
 According to Grisez, such 
thinking suggests a legalistic take on ethics, since it implies that morality is no more than “a 
set of extrinsic demands that should be imposed no further than the right to impose them can 
be vindicated.”
215
 In the case of contraception, Grisez contends that this is a false premise, 
since the intrinsic immorality of the contraceptive act “is not imposed by anyone,” and 
cannot, therefore, “be modified by anyone.”
216
 Furthermore, where doubts are raised about a 
long-standing communal moral norm, not only should any presumption lie on the side of 
tradition, but also “on the side of the basic human good, since when any of them is at stake, 
the action which seems contrary to it is prima facie immoral.”
217
 In the case of any voluntary 
contraceptive act, therefore, Grisez maintains that 
for anyone who rightly recognizes the initiation of new human life to 
be a basic human good, the burden of proof . . . will appear to fall on 
the defenders of contraception, just as for anyone who regards human 
                                                             
211















life itself as a basic good, the burden of proof in the justification of 
warfare falls on those who seek to justify it.
218
 
For any committed Catholic who informs his or her conscience in line with Grisez’s own take 
on the morality of the contraceptive act, there can be no doubt as to what their judgement of 
conscience will require of them. Dylan James presents such a magisterially-guided take in the 
area of sexual morality thus: 
The Church teaches that there are many different sexual sins, but only 
one appropriate use of human sexual morality, namely in the mutual 
self-giving of married sexual intercourse that must always be 
exercised in a way that it does not pervert the act’s inherent ordering 
to its primary end of the procreation of life. Any argument supporting 
this conclusion . . . must be based not only on the notion that human 




Despite the content of the above extract, Grisez and his proponents continue to argue that 
“The morality of principles . . . does not defend Christian moral teaching, including the 
teaching on moral absolutes in a legalistic way.”
220
 They insist that while faith confirms the 
existence of, and necessity for, moral absolutes, these absolutes “are the requirements of 
love,” the implications of which “are not simply rules but guidelines for authentic Christian 
life.”
221
 Thus, with a voice at one with that of Grisez, his proponents point out that 
it is always wrong to do such deeds as faith has proscribed absolutely 
because acts such as these are incompatible with the goods of persons 
which God calls us to love and absolutely respect. To do such acts is 
always to act in ways contrary to the full perfection of human persons 
and communities, and so it is to act in ways unworthy of persons 
created in God's image and called to act as he does never willing evil, 
never harming love, and always respecting the dignity of persons.
222
 
It must also be noted here, that in supporting such an interpretation of human morality, 
wherein acts compatible with the goods of persons are assessed in terms of their response to 
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God’s call to always act in ways compatible with the full perfection of human persons and 
communities, Grisez and his supporters have “Christianised” and “Catholicised” his 
rigorously argued philosophical elaboration of the notion of human goods. Thus, in terms of 
his “Catholicised” version of human goods, Grisez and his supporters maintain that: “to act 
so as deliberately to harm a basic human good is to act against the fulfilment of a human 
person. And that is incompatible with loving the person.”
223
 
 During the course of his pro-magisterium interventions on the “contraception” debate 
of the 1960’s, Grisez,s prolonged intervention in this most sensitive Catholic ethical debates 
could be well summarised in terms of his emphatic defence of his fundamental premise that 
for a faithful and clearheaded Catholic, there is no right to follow a 
judgement of conscience against the teaching of the Magisterium . . . 
[where] ‘conscience’ means what one judges to be moral truth 
considered insofar as one has tried to know the truth, thinks one 
knows it, and compares, one’s prospective or past choices with it.
224
 
 For Grisez, the particular magisterial teaching, in this case, is contained in Pope Paul 
VI’s Encyclical Letter, Humane Vitae.
225
 In an interview with Catholic news agency, Zenit, 
given on the approach of the document’s 35
th
 anniversary, Grisez points out that: “With 
Humane Vitae, Paul VI re-affirmed the constant and very firm teaching of the Church 
excluding contraception.”
226
 Grisez goes on to state the primary significance of the document 
to reiterate his initial standpoint: 
I believe and have argued that teaching had already been proposed 
infallibly by the ordinary Magisterium--that is, by the morally 
unanimous agreement of the bishops of the whole world in 
communion with the popes. Together, they had taught for many 
centuries that using contraceptives always is a grave matter. Their 
manner of teaching implied that what they taught was a truth to be 
held definitively. Thus, the teaching on contraception met the 
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conditions for infallible teaching, without a solemn definition, 
articulated by Vatican II in ‘Lumen Gentium’ 25.
227
 
 For those bishops, priests or theologians who preached or published articles either 
suggesting that the received teaching on contraception had been mistaken, or that it was 
subject to exceptions, or that using the “pill” to prevent conception was somehow morally 
different to other methods, Grisez reserved this unequivocal response: “those who dissent 
from the Church’s teaching on sex, marriage, and innocent life are denying truths which 
pertain to faith and leading people into sins and other great evils, I believe that is so.”
228
 
Furthermore, Grisez’s outlining of how such dissenters should be held to account by the 
Catholic Church is just as unequivocal as he categorically states: 
I believe that the following is a true moral norm: Everyone of the 
Church’s pastors should make it clear to all those who have his 
authorisation to preach and teach that he cannot and will not tolerate 
their using that authorisation to dissent from Catholic Church 
teachings that he himself accepts. Instead, as soon as it becomes 
evident that anyone having his authorisation preaches or teaches 
dissenting opinions, he will withdraw the authorisation.
229
 
 From Grisez’s theological perspective, therefore, all voluntary acts of contraception 
must be deemed to be gravely or mortally sinful, and the perpetrator deemed to be a sinner, 
guilty of the commission of a grave offence against God and his Church. Furthermore, 
dissenting or pro-contraceptive theologians, insofar as they have sought to promote the 
relativisation of the dependable teaching of Humane Vitae, must be considered as being 
complicit in the promotion of the commission of that gravely sinful act, thereby rendering 
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 Such is the theological underpinning of Grisez’s support for the magisterium’s stance 
concerning voluntary contraceptive act. As has already been noted, however, although Grisez 
has always represented himself as a believer, “he is a believer who establishes his arguments 
on the rational foundation of careful and rigorous philosophical logic.”
231
 Crucially, while 
Grisez’s ethical system can stand independently of Christian revelation, “he wants to ensure 
that in the light of faith his philosophical ethics takes on a unique tone and distinct 
quality.”
232
 In his view, this transformation can occur when: “Christian norms add to 
common human moral requirements from within, by specifying them, not from without 
by imposing some extrahuman demands upon human acts.”
233
 It may observe, for 
example, Grisez’s commendatory observation that Pope Paul VI’s search for moral truth 
regarding the use of the contraceptive pill was driven by a determination “not to ask anything 
of married couples that God does not require of them.”
234
 In Grisez’s ethical opinion, the 
common human moral requirement that Christian norms could augment relative to 
establishing the rightness or wrongness of the voluntary contraceptive act can be derived 
from the proposition that: “Morality [lies] in the relationship between choice and action and 
the good of the human person . . . [such that] to be ‘for’ the different aspects of the well-being 




5. Conscience: Not Superego or Social Convention but an Awareness of Moral Truth 
 As the concept of conscience continues to undergo scrutiny among scholars thereby 
generating diverse connotations, Grisez can be credited for not only elaborating on the notion 
in terms of living the Christian life, but of presenting a depth teaching on conscience by 
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contrasting the concept with “superego” and “social convention.” He assessed these 
phenomena and, as it were, exorcises them of their insidious potential which mortally 
undermine the meaning of conscience thereby proposing an epistemological account of 
conscience to denote “Knowledge of Moral Truth,” and “in a full and strict sense an 
awareness of moral truth.”
236
 
 While Grisez did not seek to banish the notions of both the “superego” and “social 
convention” from his ethical writings about conscience, he painstakingly elaborated the nexus 
between these terms and conscience. Thus, for example, Grisez notes: “The feelings arising 
from superego and the awareness of social conventions are both often called 
‘conscience’, but they need not correspond to moral truth.”
237
 He observed further that 
“Most social requirements have at least some basis in moral truth. Yet because various 
groups have interests which are not always reasonable and which often conflict with one 
another, social convention also is often at odds with what is truly humanly good and bad.”
238
 
However, relevant to the superego, John W. Glaser declared that “too much theory and 
practice in the Church arises from data whose source is the superego,” such that “Many 
problem areas which have emerged in the recent past can be traced to a failure to recognise 
the nature, presence, and power of the superego.”
239
 
 This same author leaves his readers in no doubt as to the grave and pernicious 
consequences that can follow from allowing the superego unsupervised access to the religious 
mind. He cautions that: “Because the voice of the Superego is somehow cosmic, vast, and 
mysterious, arising as it does from the subconscious, it can easily be mistakenly called God’s 
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 However, he is unequivocal in his assertion that: “To associate the mystery of 
invitation, the absolute yes to man’s future, the radical call to eternally abiding love-God-
with the hot and cold, arbitrary tyrant of the Superego is a matter of grave distortion.”
241
 He 
goes on to warn his readers of the capacity of this “grave distortion” of God himself, to reach 
“into the totality of a person’s explicitly religious life and [poison] every fresh spring of the 
Good News.”
242
 This it does, according to Gregory Baum, by installing itself within the 
psychic makeup of the Christian as his or her “accuser, judge and tormentor all wrapped in 
one,”
243
 so that: 
When such a person hears the Christian message with the accent on 
God the judge, he can project his superego on the divinity and then 
use religion as an instrument to subject himself to this court and, 
unknown to himself, to promote his own unconscious self-hatred.
244
  
5.1 A Secularist Take on the Nature of the Superego and Social Convention  
 Sigmund Freud theorised and described three composite elements of the  mind: Id, 
Ego and Super-ego, respectively.
245
 Through this differentiation, he indicated their 
relationship in the human mind. Freud adopted the word Id from Georg Groddeck.
246
 He 
described it as the place where the “pleasure principle” reigns, 
247
 an area of “instinct” and 
“passion.”
248
 Such unconscious tendency, on the part of the id, is seen as the guideline for 
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conflict, because it demonstrates that the activities of the id are instinctually selfish, are 
totally lacking in social refinement, and have no regard for the needs of others.
249
  
Ego is derived from Latin meaning “I” and Freud uses the pronoun to refer to the 
“coherrent organization of mental processes” found in each individual. Freud maintains that 
“the ego controls the approaches to motility—that is, to the discharge of excitations into the 
external world; it is the mental agency which supervises all its own constituent processes, and 
which goes to sleep at night, though even then it exercises the censorship on dreams.”
250
 He 
concludes that consciousness is attached to ego
251
 even though he affirmed that “ the ego is 
also unconscious.”
252
 It is the area of perception, thus it “represents what may be called 
reason and common sense.” 
253
 According to Freud, however, during the second six months 
of its life, the child begins to recognise that its environment will not meet all of its instinctual 
needs, and, therefore, a part of the id splits to become the mainly conscious ego.
254
 Salvatore 
Maddi suggests that this Freudian rational force continues to seek gratification, but now only 
in terms of the reality principle.
255
 This principle, a type of forerunner of the notion of social 
convention is formed from the knowledge or information the child has begun to acquire 
through familial responses to its behaviour.
256
 In general, these responses serve to let the 
child know that operating only in terms of the id is unacceptable within the familial social 
environment.
257
   
 Specifically, Freud theorises the formation of the ego through a series of 
identifications with objects external to it, with each act of identification following the same 
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pattern of firstly loving the object and then interjecting it within itself in the form of a visual 
image, a voice, a set of values, a mannerism, or some other key features.
258
 According to the 
Freudian account, the ego seeks to refashion itself after that object, and offer itself to the 
anarchic id as a substitute for unacceptable behaviours it has been forced to renounce.
259
 It 
can be argued that this description of the Freudian identification mechanisms, insofar as it 
represents individual introjections of the values of another in order to become that other 
person, actually represents a Freudian psychoanalytic account of the formative role of social 
conventions in the early life of the individual. 
Super-ego is the third fundamental force to impact on, and to shape and determine the 
human person. According to Freud, this is the “ego ideal or super-ego, the representative of 
our relation to our parents.”
260
 It is a psychic construct formed within the child “for the 
purpose of representing the rules and regulations of society in terms of the abstract ideas of 
good/bad and right/wrong.”
261
 Freud theorised that during the period of child’s life, a number 
of unconscious psychic events occurred within the child, which are associated with Oedipus 
complex
262
 grouped under the “Oedipal rubric.”
263
 He maintained that the resolution of these 
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unconscious events was seen to determine the child’s personality for the rest of its life.
264
 
Furthermore, Freud described this unconscious phenomenon as occuring specifically within 
the context of the child’s relationship with its parents, whom he, Freud, viewed as bearers of 
society’s moral standards.
265
 Thus, once again, the child is psychoanalytically depicted as 
being introduced at a very early age to the compelling force of social convention. In Freudian 
terms, what actually occurs at this point is that the child, by unconsciously adopting its 
parents’ values, is, in fact, forming an ideal or super-ego.
266
  
 In terms of the identification or internalisation process and the Oedipal rubric, what is 
theorised as taking place at the formation of the super-ego is the son’s first and most 
important identification act, with his father.
267
 Moralists might well describe this psychic 
event as the birthing of a type of primitive conscience, which will continue deepening the 
male child’s awareness of the social unacceptability of many of the id’s anarchic impulses.
268
 
However, not only does the “son” identify with the father during this psychic occurence, but 
also he accepts that there are ways in which he can never be like his father. In other words, 
the son internalises an image of his own father in conjunction with the image of an 
unbridgeable gap that will permanently distance one from the other.
269
 Freudian theory 
concludes from this that the super-ego will function “throughout the history of the subject as 
the mirror in which the ego sees what it should be, but never can be”
270
 in relation to an 
internalised “father,” whose initial internalised image will be repeatedly replicated, for better 
or worse, in all the authoritative figures it will ever encounter.  
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 Interestingly, Silverman seems to apologise at this point for confining his remarks to 
the male subject, explaining that he is merely reflecting the contents of Freud’s account.
271
 If 
such be the case, then, according to Silverman, Freud’s account of the formation of the 
superego appears to reflect values which define and privilege male subjectivity within a 
patriarchal society, values which are consonant with repressiveness and potency, and which 
are institutionally replicated and supported by the state, the church, the educational system 
and texts.
272
 This certainly has implications for the universal valildity of the nature of both 
the social conventions and the superego, conscience being theorised and represented by the 
Freudian psychoanalytic approach to the development of the human personality. 
Since the id’s instincts, and many of the super-ego’s activities, as well as some 
anxiety minimising aspects of the ego
273
 are not in the conscious awareness of the individual, 
Freud considered personality to be the outcome of unconscious as well as conflicting 
determinants.
274
 He specifically noted that the ongoing conflicts between the three parts of 
the personality resulted from their continual striving for sexual and aggressive goals that 
could not always be reconciled.
275
 Thus, for example, where the child has learned that it will 
be punished by its society-shaped super-ego if it fully expresses the id’s impulses, the conflict 
will be deemed to be psychosocial
276
 with the child being subjected to the compelling force 
of Western, patriarchal-oriented social conventions. Even, where the child does not act on 
those impulses but becomes fully aware of them through ego and super-ego activity, the 
conflict will be intrapsychic.
277
 In this case, the child will be subjected to the dictates of the 
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voice of its socially constructed inner voice, the super-ego. This inner voice has been 
described as a type of conscientia antecedens, in that “it commands and prohibits certain 
concrete possibilities in a given situation.”
278
 It has also been represented as functioning in a 
manner similar to conscientia consequens, since “it accuses the offender, it condemns him 
when he fails to obey.”
279
 The capacity of this inner voice to overwhelm the individual child 
or adult is well captured by Edmund Bergler, in his description of “The fury of a violated 
superego,” by which he means an inner voice that has been either ignored or contravened. He 
warns that: “The extent of the power yielded by the Frankenstein which is the superego is still 
largely unrealised. . . . Man’s inhumanity to man is equalled only by man’s inhumanity to 
himself.”
280
 The reason proferred for such a merciless reaction to the spurning of its voice by 
the superego is that its dynamic is seen to spring “from a frantic compulsion to experience 
oneself as lovable, not from the call to commit oneself in abiding love.”
281
 More specifically 
it has been made clear, from a Christian point of view, at least, that 
the commands and prohibitions of the superego do not arise from any 
kind of perception of the intrinsic goodness or objectionableness of 
the action contemplated. The source of such commands and 
prohibitions can be described positively as the desire to be approved 




 It is in this distinction that the fundamental difference between the notion of 
conscience as moral truth and the super-ego is to be found. Indeed, in Glaser’s opinion, the 
title, “superego” suggests a mechanism whose thematic centre consists of an introverted 
sense of one’s own value.
283
 He contrasts this with what he sees as the extraverted thematic 
centre of a genuine conscience, namely a value which invites, and for whom “self-value is 
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concomitant and secondary to this.”
284
 Furthermore, in terms of its Western-patriarchal 
theoretical underpinnings, it is not surprising that the superego should be represented as being 
“authority–figure-oriented” in that it does not concern itself with “perceiving and responding 
to a value but [with] ‘obeying’ authority’s command ‘blindly’”.
285
 This is contrasted with the 
genuine conscience, which is characterised as being value-oriented, whereby “the value or 
disvalue is perceived and responded to, regardless of whether authority has commanded or 
not.”
286
 Finally, the psychosocial and intrapsychic activities of the superego, separately or in-
tandem, can induce in the individual’s feelings and judgements a “great disproportion 
between guilt experienced and the value in question,” because the superego promotes the 
notion that “the extent of guilt depends more on weight of authority figure and ‘volume’ with 
which he speaks rather than density of the value in question.”
287
 Furthermore, inappropriate 
feelings of shame cannot be that far removed from those of guilt. The seriousness of 
implicating shame in the potential activities of the superego can be gauged from the fact that, 
in itself, shame has been considered to be “a factor of paramount importance for shaping 
character structure in harmony with the standards of civilization since the beginning of 
human history.”
288
 However, its “shaping” function can have devastating consequences in 
that research has identified “shame as an important element in aggression, addictions, 
obsessions, narcissism, depression and numerous other psychiatric syndromes,”
289
 such that 
“[m]any psychologists now believe that shame is the pre-eminent cause of emotional distress 
in our time.”
290
 Such inappropriate guilt and shame inducing activities on the part of the 
superego are contrasted with the characterisation of a genuine conscience as an “experience 

















of guilt proportionate to the importance of the value in question, even though authority may 
never have addressed this specific value.”
291
  
 What is interesting about the above comparisons between the psychic activities of 
Freud’s superego and those of the genuine conscience (as promoted by Grisez and his 
followers) is that in light of the overall biological, psychological and philosophical approach 
of both to the shaping of the individual’s moral personality, both appear to have some serious 
questions to answer. However, since this section has set out to assess Freud’s superego from 
a secularist perspective, the final word on Freud’s approach is left to the secularists. Thus, 
Silverman and Maddi describe this psychoanalytic account of the structure, formation and 
maintenance of the human personality as a most pessimistic process, because the end result 
will be a partitioned personality, whose parts will often be in unconscious conflict amongst 
themselves. Furthermore, whether a person’s behaviour is considered normal or abnormal, 
that behaviour is largely driven by psychosexual and aggressive forces of which one is not 
consciously aware. Furthermore, blatantly absent from this account, in Grisez’s eyes at any 
rate, is any reference to a reality beyond the scientifically biological. Grisez’s reaction to such 
a flagrant omission in the understanding of conscience will be the subject of the following 
section. 
5.2 The Nature and Role of Superego and Social Convention in Conscience 
 The preceding section sought to elaborate a secular exposé of Freud’s representation 
of the superego as a primitive, psychic mechanism, whereby the child identifies with parental 
values and requirements. In Freudian theorising, it does this with the subconscious aim of 
exhibiting those values and requirements in its behaviour in order to secure parental 
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 It is for this reason that Freud, himself, for example, equated the superego with 
the notion of it being an ‘ego-ideal’ and “the representative of our relation to our parents.”
293
 
Reference was also made in the same section to Freud’s theorising of social convention as a 
process whereby the young child gradually interiorises the notion that, in order to secure 
solidarity with his or her peers, it “must limit its impulses, accept certain objectives as its own 
and affirm its identity as a member of society.”
294
 
It is now proposed, however, to explicate Grisez’s reining-in of both constructs in terms of:  
(a) Differentiating both from Grisez’s notion of conscience as awareness of moral truth 
(b) Outlining the limited positive contribution Grisez believes they can contribute to a 
committed Catholic’s moral living, and thereby to the ongoing development of that 
individual’s conscience 
(C) Exposing and detailing the considerable psychological, emotional and spiritual 
damage both mechanisms can inflict on well-intentioned Catholic individuals, when data 
from one or the other are wittingly or unwittingly allowed to be “the weightier element in 
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5.2.1 Differentiating the Superego and Social Convention from Conscience as Moral 
Truth 
 Grisez sets the tone for his ethically-based Catholic assessment of the superego and 
social convention in his declaration that while they “are both often called conscience, they 
need not correspond to moral truth.”
296
 With regard to social convention, for example, he 
points out that even though people “generally call violations of social conventions ‘wrong’” 
since most social requirements derive to some extent from moral truth, “[y]et because various 
groups have interests which are not always reasonable and which often conflict with one 
another, social convention also is at odds with what is truly humanly good and bad.”
297
 
Elaborating on his initial assertion with reference to the superego, Grisez also emphasises its 
problematic nature in relation to the notion of conscience as moral truth. He points out that, 
as a “subconscious source of one’s sense of requirement and guilt at the emotional level . . . 
formed by early [parental] training . . . [t]he superego tends to be rigid, non-rational, 
sometimes oppressive, and often irrelevant to what is truly humanly good and bad.”
298
 It is 
this latter psychic mechanism and its dynamic that will be addressed firstly. 
5.2.1.1 Superego: According to Glaser, the above outlined dynamic of the superego derives 
from “a frantic compulsion to experience oneself as lovable”, rather than “from the call to 
commit oneself in abiding love.”
299
 Glaser proceeds to describe such a dynamic as a “violent 
Reaction” that is triggered by the superego’s need, on a psychological, subconscious level to 
“provide for a person’s being loved” since it perceives itself as “the guardian of the 
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individual’s sense of value.”
300
 Freud, himself, theorised that the force driving this 
compulsion derived from the notion that “being loved was the equivalent of life itself for the 
ego.”
301
 Therefore, for example, parental disapproval or temporary withdrawal of love could 
quite possibly be experienced by the child as “a kind of self-annihilation,”
302
 or as “a 
mitigated withdrawal of life itself.”
303
 Furthermore, at this early stage of its life, according to 
Freudian theory, the only psychic tool or mechanism available to the child to manage such 
potentially catastrophic conflicts, is the primitive superego, which assumes the function of so 
regulating and orchestrating the child’s conduct that it “does not lose the primary object of its 
desires: love, affection, and approval.”
304
 
 It is this function of the superego, with its emphasis on selfish and self-centred 
motivation as the driving force for decision-making, which prompts Grisez to assert that any 
commands or prohibitions emanating from the superego do not arise from “an awareness of 
responsibility assessed by a judgement derived from some principle one understands in itself 
or accepted from a source (such as the Church’s teachings to which one has intelligently and 
freely committed oneself).”
305
 Elaborating further on the function of the superego, Hans 
Zulliger, for example, maintains that since “The primitive conscience is built on the basis of 
fear of punishment and a desire to earn love,” the source of such commands and prohibitions 
can be described positively as the desire to be approved and loved or negatively as the fear of 
loss of such love and approval.
306
 Eicke’s observation that since “[t]he superego has its 
source in the naked fear of retribution or withdrawal of love,” its organising function is 
centred on protecting the ego from the outside world.
307
 The observation, in turn, reiterates 
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Zullinger’s description of the superego as a psychic mechanism, which devotes its psychic 
energies totally and unconditionally to all-encompassing commitment to preventing the loss 
of love and approval. The neo-Freudian psychologist, Melanie Klein, connects the notion of 
guilt with the fear-of-loss element of the superego, claiming that: “Experience of guilt is 
inextricably bound up with fear (more exactly, with a specific form of fear, namely, 
depressive fear); . . . it emerges in the first few months of an infant’s life together with the 
early stages of the superego.”
308
  
 Grisez contends, therefore, that “while children learn to feel guilt and distinguish 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour even before they are old enough to make judgements 
of conscience and choices,” they do so only in a “childish sense” of what is required or 
forbidden by the superego.
309
 It would be Grisez’s view, then, that were this “childish” 
attitude towards moral choices and judgements to persist into adolescence and adulthood, it 
would serve to “reduce conscience to the superego”, such that judgements of conscience 
would be treated as “no more than expressions of internalised pressures,”
310
 or more simply, 
as “expressions of feelings.”
311
 This, in turn would make morality itself seem as if it is “a 
matter of taste, with the superego to serve as guide and monitor.”
312
 In Grisez’s estimation, 
this would be to “deny that there is any source of meaning and value beyond the human,”
313
 
thereby giving conscience an entirely different meaning, “according to which [it] becomes 
merely subjective opinion.”
314
 This, in turn, serves to represent conscience as being merely a 
product of that humanly constructed psychic mechanism, the superego, an assumption, that in 

















Grisez’s view leads to relativism,
315
 with all the negative consequences that follow on from 
such an attitude.  
 The renowned Swiss-born psychotherapists, Charles Odier and Paul Tourner sought 
in their writings to both highlight and emphasise that there can exist in the life of the average 
adult a ‘childish’, superego-constructed world, which if unchecked will continue to influence 
their attitudes towards moral norms throughout their entire lives.
316
 Specifically, their 
writings maintain that “there are two moral worlds existing in the normal person: a genuine 
moral world and a world of pseudo-morality and religiosity.”
317
 Thus, for his part, Dr Albert 
Gorres (1918-1996), the renowned German Psychoanalyst and author, suggests that the task 
of educational and pastoral practice should be “to reduce the influence of this childish censor 
more and more, and thereby allow genuine value perception to grow.”
318
 Grisez himself 
accords recognition to the role of the superego only insofar as he sees it as being the initial 
stage in a 3-stage process in the development of conscience, a process which should see “The 
meaning of “right,” “wrong” and “permissible” [change and mature] as a child grows up.”
319
 
From this initial step, the child is expected to advance to the second level of conscience, 
where he or she will situate “the authority of good and evil . . . in the group and in those who 
speak and act for it.”
320
 Interestingly, in Freud’s view the ‘group’ is indicative not only of a 
social sense, but of religion and morality, all of which he describes as being “the chief 
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elements in the higher side of man”, as well as being “originally one and the same thing.”
321
 
Grisez however concludes his description of the developmental process of conscience with an 
account of the third stage, noting that: “If all goes well, the young person in adolescence 
begins more and more to understand basic human goods and principles of responsibility . . . 
[which] open up the possibility of new and deeper relationships.”
322
 In conjunction with this 
increased awareness of a sense of responsibility, Glaser sees arising within the individual “a 
desire to share in a commitment to a worthy cause; to love and be loved in ways which go 
deeper than the rather superficial relationships of most groups formed by accident.”
323
 This 
description of the final stage of conscience development, could be characterised as Grisez 
superimposing a mature, responsible, extraverted conscience on a superego driven 
conscience, whose thematic centre is focused exclusively on the individual’s own value.
324
  
 In synopsis, Grisez’s account of these stages of development, firstly characterises the 
superego as generating a sense of compulsion, such that “one has to abide by its dictates or 
suffer the pain of violating them.”
325
 He views social convention as a social mechanism that 
generates a sense of obligation, in that “one either abides by the rules or is criticised and cut 
off from what one wants.”
326
 Finally, he describes the process of conscience development or 
maturing as being completed when the individual finds him or herself consciously operating 
out of a sense of responsibility; a sense that is underpinned by the personal conviction that the 
“fulfilment of others and of oneself depends on oneself,” and by a commitment to the notion 
that “consistency with one’s own care for fulfilment requires one to act reasonably for it.”
327
 
It could be argued, therefore that psychologists, theologians and ethicists would see growing 
up in terms of this developmental process as a lifelong battle. Indeed, Glaser citing Felicitas 
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Betz, pointed out that “the maturing of one’s conscience is a task that takes a lifetime; it is 
with us far beyond the end of adolescence.”
328
 Most importantly, however, Betz contends that 
for those who have “been the object more of conscience training [through conditioning by 
parental authority and social mores] than conscience education, this task of arriving at mature 
conscience will be particularly difficult, if not impossible.”
329
 Glaser crucially observes, 
therefore, that psychologists are agreed that such an organic development “from the primitive 
and pre-personal censor of the infant” that is the superego “to a mature and personal value 
perception” that is the conscience as moral truth, “does not automatically and infallibly take 
place.”
330
 With regards to the superego, he asserts that its very nature favours the familiar and 
the static rather than the new and the dynamic, pointing out that a fundamental characteristic 
of the superego is that it is “static, does not grow, does not learn, [and] cannot function in a 
new situation.”
331
 He contrasts this with what he describes as the “genuine conscience,” 
which he characterises as being dynamic, in that it demonstrates “an awareness and 
sensitivity to value which develops and grows; [and] a mind–set which can precisely function 
in a new situation.”
332
 Interestingly, Freud also proposes that individuals will not necessarily 
progress through the five psychosexual stages of development that he has theorised for 
personality development,
333
 and seeks to account for such developmental failure in terms of 
the individual remaining “stuck” or “fixated” in a particular stage.”
334
 Specifically, he 
maintained that at each developmental stage individuals would meet new challenges which 
would require them to make adjustments to the id, ego and superego.
335
 While successful 
adjustments would lead to personality growth, Freud’s account claimed that unsuccessful 
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adjustments would lead to the person becoming ‘fixated’ or stuck at an early stage of 
development, and probably heading towards adult abnormal functioning.
336
 For Freud, 
evidence for such abnormality in adolescent or adults will present in the form of neurotic 
and/or psychotic symptoms, both of which, in his view, serve to indicate “a rebellion on the 
part of the id against the external world, of its unwillingness-or, if one prefers, its incapacity-
to adapt to the exigencies of reality.”
337
 For Grisez, on the other hand, the abnormality that 
will arise from an absence of maturing or development of conscience will be evidenced by 
the fact that, the individual’s moral choices will continue to be driven by compulsive and 
guilty feelings.
338
 He contrasts this with the individual whose conscience continues to 
develop and whose personality is being integrated in a mature way; for such a person, 
according to Grisez, “feelings of guilt will more and more coincide with choices one knows 
to be wrong and will be in proportion to how serious one judges it to be.”
339
 Thus, in 
Freudian and Grisezian terms progress from conscience as superego, through to social 
convention and finally to conscience as moral truth, can be assessed in terms of the capacity 
of the individual to adapt “to the exigencies of reality,” human, spiritual and moral. 
5.2.1.2 Social Convention: Grisez maintains that just as the superego focuses only on a 
certain area of behaviour, namely “behaviour subject to disapproval which leads to guilt 
feelings,”
340
 so it is with social convention, which he views as “a restricted field,” in that 
reasons for acting are seen to be exclusively “backed by a social sanction.”
341
 He goes on to 
contrast this latter social construct with moral truth “in its full development,”
342
 which, he 
claims, “is not restricted to any area of behaviour.”
343
 Thus, while moral truth is postulated by 
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Grisez as generating a sense of responsibility, social convention is seen as superflous as 
generating a sense of obligation, in that “one either abides by the rules or is criticiesed and 
cut off from what one wants,”
344
 which, for the individual at societal level, is to “maintain 
solidarity with the group.”
345
 Therefore, as already noted, at this second level of conscience, 
social convention “the authority of good and evil is located in the group and in those who 
speak and act for it”
346
 unlike superego that is located in parent or authority figure. Grisez 
argues, however, that although “[m]ost social requirements have at least some basis in moral 
truth, yet because different groups have interests which often conflict with one another, social 
convention can often be at odds with “what is truly humanly good and bad.” 
347
In Grisez’s 
opinion, therefore, judgements of right and wrong by a person with a mature conscience must 
express more than “early [societal] training or awareness of what is socially required.”
 348
 
Furthermore, Grisez argues that to think of morality as “ a set of rules someone else imposes 
expresses an immature conscience.”
349
 It is for this reason, for example, that he contends that 
those who “perceived the Church’s moral teaching at the legalistic level of social convention” 
can be deemed to be “of limited maturity of conscience.”
350
 In his view, such individuals 
have failed to understand that the Church’s moral teaching “is more than a God-given body 
of rules, which one must accept in order to enjoy the benefits of Church benefits.”
351
 Indeed, 
in defence of the magisterium, Grisez maintains that the Church did not historically restrict 
morality to a legalistic system; he points out that: “although ‘moral’ was restricted to the 
minimal common requirements of Christian life, the Church continued to propose the fulness 




 Ibid., 89. 
346
 Ibid., 89. 
347
 Ibid., 73. 
348




 Ibid., 73. 
351
 Ibid., 73-74. 
285 
 




 While acknowledging that laws are necessary, and that there are moral grounds for 
obeying them, Grisez claims that to reduce morality to a system of laws is to limit it “to the 
social convention level of the development of conscience.
353
 Thus, in Grisez’s estimation, 
when an individual experiences doubts of conscience that he or she cannot think through for 
themselves in the light of faith, they should seek counsel by looking to their pastors for 
enlightenment about the way of Jesus, not for legal norms at the level of social convention.
354
 
For Grisez, therefore, the problem of resolving doubts of conscience assumes a different 
character when the individual begins to think about that problem outside a legalistic 
framework, but within the moral level of truth.
355
 This is because “[o]n the level of moral 
truth,” in Grisez’s opinion, “one wants to live in the truth and toward fulfilment; the 
committed Christian wishes to live toward God and to share in the redemptive work of 
Jesus.”
356
 For Grisez, the philosophy underlying this claim is that “when one’s conscience is 
unsettled, one asks which judgement is more likely true,”
357
 rather than solely seeking 
guidance from “a set of rules”
358
 whether or not these rules originate from within the Church 
or from within a so-called liberal society. 
5.2.1.3 Social Convention as a driving force: With regard to the drive underlying the 
controlling power of social convention, it can be argued that it is quite similar to that 
powering the superego, except that in the context of social convention, that controlling power 
extends beyond the family setting to the various other organs of society, for example schools, 
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governments, churches and peer-pressure. Thus, Zulliger’s observation that “[w]hen a child 
does something wrong, disobeying a command etc., he experiences a feeling of isolation,”
359
 
not only highlights the isolating power of the superego within that child, but it also speaks, 
according to Glaser, of “a powerful subconscious drive to recreate one’s sense of belonging 
and being accepted by his community, or re-establishing the harmony and solidarity he has 
forfeited by his fault.”
360
 The driving force of social convention can also be described in 
terms of flight from a feeling of acute alienation from that group represented by the authority 
figures in the life of the individual, “who have communicated what is expected of him if he 
wants to belong.”
361
 In Glaser’s view, while “[m]otivating an individual’s activity on the 
basis of ‘acceptance’ serves well the socialisation and normalisation of individuals to 
prevailing norms,” he claims that its dynamics are strikingly inadequate as a basis for 




 In Grisez’s view the inadequacy of such dynamics stems from the fact they actually 
define the person in terms of the extent to which he or she meets or falls short of societal 
expectations.
363
 Furthermore, they are seen to define society in terms of what it considers 
necessary to achieve its purposes, rather than in terms of what it ought to require.
364
 
Disturbingly, for Grisez, such motivation can lead to cultural relativism in the area of 
morality and of the formation of conscience, since “[i]t involves a confusion between social 
facts—what is actually required in various societies—and real moral norms.”
365
 This 
account by Grisez of the feelings of the superego and social convention functioning as 
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conscience rather than as elements or stages in the development of a mature conscience, 
suggests that, in his view: 
[T]hose for whom conscience is relegated to social convention, or 
control of the superego, or some variation of pure subjectivism have 
little appreciation for and derive scant benefit from their conscience in 




It is not surprising, then, in Grisez’s opinion, that “such people often perceive Church 
teachings and the Church’s role in the formation of conscience as burdensome, legalistic and 
generating resentment rather than ‘as a gift of truth.’”
367
 In other words, it can claimed that 
while Grisez does not want to completely abandon psychological, social and subjectivist 
factors in the functioning of conscience, he nevertheless strenously contends that “they do not 
adequateley capture the significance of conscience in the moral and Christian sense,”
368
 and 
so he evaluates them negatively.
369
 
5.3 Superego and Social Convention in the Formation of Christian Conscience 
 Joseph Casey provides an insight into Grisez’s attitude to the purported role of the 
superego and social convention in the formation of the mature Christian conscience. 
According to him, for Grisez, the initial moral dimension of conscience “is simply superego 
response, ‘an emotional or feeling’ response devoid of any insight, and wherein the notion of 
bad ‘simply means parents don’t want me to do this. I’ll be punished. They won’t love 
me.’”
370
 In Casey’s account, Grisez then theorises a progression of morality that consists of 
“social conventions”, in which it appears that “many, many people [eventually] identify what 
is right and what is wrong with what the culture declares to be such,”
371
 with some research 
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suggesting “that the majority of adults live on this level.”
372
 Within this moral framework, 
rules approved by the goup come to be adopted as the norm, such that the individual will both 
identify with the group and make its demands its own.
373
 The critical problem this represents 
for Grisez, in Casey’s view, is that, on the one hand, if the individual does not fully identify 
with the group, its moral demands can come to seem like impositions, while on the other 
hand, people who respond on this level lack any deep insight into reasons for the group’s 
evaluations.
374
 Casey points out that the only way by which the individual could be rescued 
from such flawed and deficient notions of conscience, in Grisez’s theorising at any rate, was 
for that individual to be guided to a final stage wherein he or she would “recognise the moral 
dimension as a matter of real human goodness and reasonableness.”
375
 In such a dimension, to 
do wrong would be adjudged to be “a kind of self-mutilation.”
376
 Such insight would be 
further deepened by the mature conscience being represented, to Catholics at least, as that 
dimension in which the mature person will ask: “What must I do to be good at being a 
person? What is the good and holy thing to do? What does God want with me?”
377
 It could be 
argued, therefore, that Grisez’s attitude to the notion of superego and social convention being 
treated as provisional and temporary stages in the ultimate development of a permanently-
functioning, mature, Catholic conscience is well-captured in St Paul’s assertion: “When I was 
a child, I thought like a child: when I became an adult I put an end to childish ways. . . . Now 
I know only in part: then I will know fully, even as I have been fully known.”
378
  
 We may now demonstrate that while Grisez provides scant explicit detail on how the 
superego and social convention can be positively integrated into the proper formation and 
functioning of the mature Christian conscience, his account of this latter religious dimension 
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does appear to implicitly mirror the dynamics of both secularist processes. Such a proposition 
seeks to take account of the caution issued by Malcolm A. Jeeves
379
 against assuming 
congruence between theological and psychological accounts of any human dynamic simply 
because of surface language similarities.
380
 The elaboration of the above proposition also 
seeks to take on board Jeeves’ warning against uncritically seeking to interweave human 
(secularist) and theological accounts into a composite model for the development of any 
human dynamic.
381
 Before proceeding to such an undertaking, however, it is now proposed to 
elaborate on the positive references made by Grisez and his supporters on the positive aspects 
of the superego and social convention.  
5.3.1 A Positive Secularist Contribution to the Formation of the Mature Conscience 
 Reference has already been made to the dearth of material provided by Grisez and his 
followers with regard to the dynamics of the superego and social convention in 
developmentally continuing the formation and functioning of conscience as moral truth. 
However, at this point, cognisance must also be taken of the fact that elaborations by Grisez 
of positive aspects of both psychological constructs are usually accompanied by quite 
detailed cautions. Thus, for example, on the one hand, Grisez can be found acknowledging 
that the superego is, in fact, a mechanism through which children learn to feel guilt and 
distinguish acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, even before they are old enough to make 
judgements and choice, that, in its capacity as “a childish sense of the required and the 
forbidden.”
382
 In itself, such an acquisition can be regarded as an asset in the moral 
development of the child, since it now appears to be able to interiorise the authority of good 
and bad within itself-through the dynamics of the superego “as a personal authority” to 
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oversee its own “desiring and scheming ego.”
383
 Rather than remaining with the mechanism’s 
potential for generating positive outcomes, however, Grisez somewhat peremptorily 
despatches its positive effectiveness by characterising its judgements as childish, emotional 
responses,
384
 or as “expressions of internalised pressures”
385
 or even as “rigid, non-rational 
oppressive dictates, which are often irrelevant to what is truly good or bad.”
386
  
 It is obvious that great emphasis is placed on the superego response as one that is 
proper to a child,
387
 or as a primitive, psychic pre-personal censor,
388
 or as a primitive stage 
on the way to the development of genuine conscience and value perception.
389
 However, 
while the content of such emphases are not being disputed, they do appear to overlook the 
fact that since this psychic mechanism was itself begotten by a ‘newborn’ to secure its basic 
needs within a tightly circumscribed environment, of itself, this mechanism could not be 
other than primitive, pre-personal and infantile - in the sense of ‘being of the infant.’  
 Rather than seeking to totally undermine the superego dimension of conscience, 
however, by repeatedly emphasising its primitive, pre-personal and infantile contexts, Grisez 
could usefully have adopted a more insightful approach towards the mechanism. He could 
have done so by initially educating his readers as to its origin and nature, and then outlining 
its potential usefulness in the infant, adolescent and adult worlds. In scriptural terms, Grisez 
could usefully have substituted the words of Jesus “I tell you solemnly, unless you change 
and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 18:3) 
for the already quoted words of Paul in 1Cor. 13: 11; 13. Under the terms of such a 
substitution, Grisez’s readers would have been advised of the superego’s practical usefulness 
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in the lives of infants, children, adolescents and adults. Thus, his readers would be made 
aware of its particular usefulness in the socialisation process of an infant, through its capacity 
to train it “to function well within a given set of limits.”
390
 Glaser specifically points to the 
area of infant toilet-training in this context, “without which” he wryly comments, “life would 
be far less pleasant.”
391
 As for the mature adult, Glaser cites a remark from Gorres to support 
his assertion that “the superego is not superfluous,” because “[i]n certain sectors of life it 
provides for a conservation of psychic energy and ease of operation.”
392
 Gorres goes on to 
elaborate: “When the superego is integrated into a mature conscience . . . it relieves an 
individual from having constantly to decide in all those situations which are already 
legitimately decided by custom, taste, and convention what one should do and what one 
should not do.”
393
 Indeed, Glaser also footnotes an observation by Odier, who pointed out 
that beside the functions mentioned by Gorres “the superego acts as a censor in dreams, 
thereby preventing every dream from becoming a nightmare,” a function Odier deemed to be 
of “no small service.”
394
 As for those adolescents and adults for whom the activities of the 
superego do not confine them to the healthy, integrated and useful functions just outlined, 
they can be assisted through educational and pastoral practices to reduce its influence more 
and more and thereby facilitate the continued growth of genuine value perception within 
themselves.
395
 This last suggestion can be taken as an acknowledgement that the well-
referenced characterisation of the superego as a “source of unconscious guilt [which] could 
actually cripple a person,”
396
 is not being swept under the philosophical or theological 
carpets. That aspect of its activities has already been partly outlined in this chapter, and will 
be further elaborated later.  
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 Despite the efforts by some of his followers to give a more balanced account of the 
role of the superego in the development of conscience, Grisez displayed little interest in that 
task. However, by demonstrating such a noticeable apathy to the extent that he consistently 
presented his readers with a one-sided elaboration of a two-sided account, Grisez has left his 
readers at a disadvantage. His opponents would maintain that his somewhat rigid and 
suspicious attitude toward what he would see as any form of psychologising of the 
development of conscience, derives from his determination to maintain the ongoing absolute 
control of the magisterium over the ethical beliefs, choices and judgements of Catholic 
believers, be they lay people, theologians, or members of the hierarchy.
397
 In fact, according 
to Russell Shaw he saw such an approach as a “‘strategy for socially controlling people’ so 
that they would act in society’s best interests.”
398
 From Grisez’s point of view, it is “the 
illumination of the Holy Spirit and the inspired Scriptures [that] should contribute to the 
formation of [the believer’s] conscience,” or make us aware of moral truth
399
 and not 
prompting from the superego. Furthermore, rather than attending in any way to the infantile 
promptings of the superego in arriving at a judgement of conscience, Grisez assured his 
readers that since “the Catholic Church speaking through her magisterium teaches all her 
members what they must do to be saved . . . [thus] faithful and clearheaded Catholics 
consider the moral guidance offered by the pope and the bishops in communion with him to 
indicate moral truths by which they must form their consciences.”
400
 What further need 
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should committed Catholics have, therefore, of inputs from the dimension of the superego? 
However, it can only be wondered that, if by investing such absolute control in the 
magisterium, has Grisez not wittingly or unwittingly simply delivered the individual from the 
superior power of an ‘interiorised, pre-personal censor’ and into the hands of an even more 
superior, exteriorised, controlling and manipulative one. 
 Resistance on the part of Grisez to treating the dimension of social convention as a 
serious and vital component in the development of the mature Christian conscience could 
also serve to deprive his readers of rich insights into the formation and functioning of 
conscience. It is not that Grisez is unaware of the importance of this dimension in the life of 
the believer. He has noted, for example, that the Christian life cannot be limited to the proper 
ordering of personal moral life; it must also have a social dimension, because, in his opinion, 
social or communal living presents the individual with dilemmas to which he or she must 
respond-although in ways that meet the Gospel’s demands.
401
 However, since every 
individual is also an existential, social being, that response, if it is to be authentic, must 
necessarily be guided by attitudes experientially derived from that specific form of human 
existence. Surprisingly, this is what Grisez himself asserts in his response to the following 
observation from Pope John Paul II:  
If the Church makes herself present in the defence of, or in the 
advancement of, man, she does so in line with her mission, which, 
although it is religious and not social or political, cannot fail to 
consider man in the entirety of his being.
402
 
Grisez follows up and upholds that not only must the believer’s existential Christian beliefs 
and experiences contribute to the development of this or her moral life and conscience, but 
there must also be an input from their existential social, cultural, work-related and even 
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‘surrounding cosmos’ life experiences and beliefs. Thus, in Grisez’s own words he contends 
that:  
True, only individual human persons believe and hope in God, and 
love him and one another. But human persons complete one another in 
various forms of society, and are fulfilled by work and culture. Indeed, 
“man in the entirety of his being” refers even to the surrounding 
cosmos, for people cannot live without the natural world, in which 
humankind dwells as in a womb. Thus, everything else in visible 
creation pertains to human beings, and their salvation would be 
incomplete were not all things brought back to God in Jesus.
403
 
In the above extract Grisez appears to be bestowing his theological and ethical seal of 
approval on the notion that the social dimension of morality and conscience formation must 
receive serious and deep attention in any theorising of the developmental formation and 
functioning of conscience. Noticeably absent from that account are such negativities as: 
“social convention is often at odds with what is truly humanly good and bad”
404
; or “morality 
itself can be identified with law only by being limited to the social-convention level of the 
development of conscience”
405
; or classically that, “the problem of resolving doubts of 
conscience takes on a different character when one begins to think about it outside a legalistic 
framework . . . on the level of moral truth rather than social convention.”
406
  
 Thus, it can be claimed that Grisez’s theorising of the social convention dimension as 
it appears in Living a Christian Life, is not only more comprehensive, insightful and 
educative in its scope, but also more respectful of what that mechanism’s dynamic can 
contribute to the development of conscience than his previous, terse acknowledgement might 
suggest. In this rather dismissive account,
407
 Grisez suggests that social convention can be 
regarded as being moral only to the extent that “it offers reasons for acting as distinct from 
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non-rational determinants of action,” while these very reasons for acting “need only be 
grounded in one’s actual desires, not in human goods understood as valuable in 
themselves.”
408
 Contrast this, for example with Casey’s appreciation of what he perceives as 
the potential for overlap in levels of importance, seriousness and sacredness that can and does 
take place between the social convention and moral truth dimensions of conscience. Casey 
asserts: 
Nevertheless, people responding on the conventional level can still 
relate to what their conscience so structured proposes as seriously, 
even sacredly obliging. Normal human development leads people to 
recognise the goods at stake in moral choices as related to their 
development as human persons. They see (understand) what one will 
require of oneself in order to act reasonably. They recognise the moral 
dimension as a matter of real human goodness and reasonableness. To 
do wrong thus is a kind of self mutilation.
409
 
6. Militancy in Grisez’s Method 
 There are two areas in Grisez’s teachings which clearly illustrate his militant and 
unapologetic approach to defending and promoting his own sincerely held Catholic beliefs. 
The first concerns the “infallibility of the ordinary magisterium” and the submissive 
obedience it demands of committed Catholics.
410
 The second focuses on the role of the 
magisterium in the moral lives of committed Catholics, particularly its role in assisting them 
in the formation of their consciences and in following the judgements of their properly 
formed conscience. 
 Grisez demonstrates a strong defence of the Catholic Church’s magisterial authority 
and its formative and guiding role in the functioning of the individual conscience. His 
defence of Humane vitae reiterates his support for traditional Church teaching on specific 
moral issues. Of particular interest in this section is Grisez’s counsel to Bishops on the 
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attitudes they should have towards dissenting theologians and the manner in which they 
should deal with them. In the matter of the role of the magisterium in the formation and 
guidance of the committed Catholic’s conscience, it is proposed to look closely at how Grisez 
utilises his considerable intellectual skills to validate his claim that “faithful and clearheaded 
Catholics” will never find following the judgements of their conscience to be incompatible 
with the moral teachings of the magisterium, thereby encouraging a submissive obedience.
411
  
 Grisez’s militant approach is fuelled by his intense aversion to what he perceives as 
the “institutionalisation of theological dissent from the magisterium,” which, he claims, has 
been ongoing since Vatican II.
412
 Furthermore, is Grisez scathing of the moral relativism and 
subjectivism which, in his view, such theological dissension has spawned and promoted, 
especially in the affluent nations.
413
 In the context of the teachings of the magisterium, Grisez 
maintains that subjectivism serves to transform “the moral truth handed on throughout the 
Church’s tradition” into “no more than one body of opinion among others.”
414
 In terms of 
individual moral responsibility, the relativisation of conscience means that, for Grisez, it no 
longer represents “an awareness of responsibility assessed by a judgement derived from some 
principle one understands in itself or accepted from a source (such as the Church’s teaching) 
to which one has intelligently and freely committed oneself.
415
 Instead, according to the 
teaching of Grisez, “the relativistic conscience ‘refers to the individual’s subjective 
judgement as to what is most authentic for himself or herself what will best serve his or her 
interests in the face of pressures to conform to others’ standards.”
416
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 Grisez succinctly defines conscience as “what one judges to be moral truth considered 
insofar as one tried to know that truth, thinks one knows it and compares one’s prospective 
and past choices with it.”
417
 Elsewhere, he draws on Aquinas to declare that “conscience is 
one’s last and best judgement concerning what one should choose. With this judgement in 
mind, one chooses, either in agreement with conscience or against it.”
418
 Focusing on 
Aquinas’ definition, Grisez concludes that since conscience is “one’s best judgement 
concerning what is right and wrong, an upright person has no alternative to following it.”
419
 
Some might view the preceding account as vintage Newman. However, lest that account be 
misinterpreted as a declaration of the “Primacy of Conscience,” Grisez qualifies it elsewhere 
with this unequivocal assertion: “for a faithful and clearheaded Catholic there is no right to 
follow a judgement of conscience against the teaching of the magisterium.”
420
 From the 
outset, however, it must be clearly noted Grisez’s ethical and theological efforts at buttressing 
such a remarkable claim are directed at “faithful and clearheaded Catholics,” a somewhat 
partisan label, which he repeatedly utilises throughout in the article: “The Duty and Right to 
Follow One’s Judgement of Conscience.” 
 Once again, he specifically chooses to exclusively speak only to the “converted” 
while choosing to ignore those others who “do not consider the moral guidance offered by the 
pope and other bishops in communion with him to indicate moral truths by which to form 
their consciences.”
421
 On the other hand Grisez’s cherished “faithful and clearheaded 
Catholics” are dutifully reminded that the Catholic Church, when it teaches through its 
magisterium has divine authorisation to speak to its members what they need to do. 
Therefore, committed Catholics are duty bound to “consider the moral guidance offered by 
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the Pope and the bishops in communion with him to indicate moral truths by which they must 
form their consciences.”
422
 In Christian Moral Principles, Grisez is more explicit and 
robustly assertive as to the implications of the divine “imprimatur” which he sees as 
underpinning the primary role of the magisterium in the moral functioning of the individual 
conscience. He asserts: 
By Jesus’ will it is part of the Church’s duty to state authoritatively 
“those principles of the moral order which have their origin in human 
nature itself” (DH 14). In carrying out this duty, the Church calls 
attention to principles of the natural law, rejects formulations which 
distort them, and spells out many of their implications. This work is 
necessary because sin leads individual and societies to rationalise their 




The above extract suggests that Grisez does not view the Church’s role on conscience 
formation and guidance in terms of an extreme imposition or guidance.
424
 Rather, he presents 
his “faithful and clearheaded” Catholics with a magisterium that is divinely sent out and 
authorised to assist and guide them in forming and following their conscience, not “by 




 Emphasising further that Catholic moral teaching does not seek to take over the 
intimate relationship that should exist between the committed Catholic and conscience, 
Grisez specifically points out that “the moral demands of the Church’s teaching are not alien 
to the requirements of morality which one can know naturally.”
426
 In his view, this is because 
these demands simply “specify the moral implications of natural law, which, according to St. 
Paul, is written on every individual heart” (Rom. 2:15). Therefore, according to Grisez’s 
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assessment, the magisterium merely specifies what is already implanted in the hearts of 
faithful Catholics. Furthermore, in the light of this assessment, Grisez deems it nonsense to 
talk about an authentic right to follow conscience against the magisterium’s teaching, because 
“the duty to follow one’s judgement of conscience cannot conflict with the duty to live 
according to the moral teaching which the magisterium proposes.”
427
 To those who would 
regard the Church’s moral teaching as an imposed set of social standards similar to civil law, 
Grisez is, as usual, explicit in his remonstration that: 
This view is false. The act of faith is a free personal commitment by 
which one becomes a member of the Church. For one who makes this 
act, such membership is part of his or existential identity. Thus, to 




Grisez’s point here is that since sincere Catholics are members of the Church by their own 
freely-embraced commitment of faith, their identity as Catholics has become part of their 
actual existential identity. This is a theme to which he returns frequently. Having gone to 
great moralist lengths to point out the actual impossibility of conflict arising between the 
judgements of conscience of a committed Catholic and the moral teachings of the 
magisterium, Grisez proceeds to make it quite clear that the magisterium, itself, neither 
possesses or seeks to possess any “legislative authority in moral matters.”
429
 He proposes, 
instead, that its teaching authority can be trusted because its divine authorisation to teach 
ensures that “it is endowed with an unfailing gift of truth.”
430
 The bona fides of the 
magisterium relevant to its advisory role in assisting committed Catholics to follow the 
judgements of their conscience having been established, Grisez closes the circle by again 
reminding these “faithful and clearheaded” Catholic adherents that honest commitment leaves 
them with no other logical option but to “form their conscience by conforming to God’s law, 
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submissive to the magisterium which interprets that law in the light of the Gospel.”
431
 
Addressing committed Catholics, Grisez categorically reminds them that if they wish to 
behave self-consistently within the context of their freely-entered-into act of spiritual self-
constitution, they have no other logical option but to abide by the Church’s moral teachings. 
He therefore states forthrightly that: “To wish to be a Catholic, while refusing to accept the 
Church’s teaching, would be as nonsensically illogical in his estimation as wishing to have a 
friend without being a friend.”
432
 
 As Robert J. Smith points out however, the difficulty with Grisez’s analogy is that 
“friends are friends not in spite of differences but because of differences that can be 
maintained with mutual respect, affection, and no less a commitment to the relationship.”
433
 
Nevertheless, it is in such a manner that Grisez logically ring-fences his assertion that “for 
faithful and clearheaded Catholics the duty to follow one’s judgement of conscience cannot 




 It may be argued rightly or wrongly, that what Grisez has sought to achieve here is to 
transpose the Pauline exhortation: “Let this mind be in you, which is also in Christ Jesus,” 
(Philippians 2:5), to read: “Let this mind be in you, which is also in the teaching 
magisterium.” While there can be no doubting that Grisez’s supporters would have no 
difficulty embracing the latter exhortation, Robert Smith points out that what these supporters 
do not seem to grasp is that Grisez “too easily collapses God, Jesus, church, and moral 
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teachings into one reality, where few distinctions or differentiations exist or matter. God and 
church are intimately related; but God is not the church nor is the church God.”
435
 
 Furthermore, in the light of Grisez’s understanding of conscience and of its 
relationship to the church and its teachings, Smith is not surprised at the fact that Grisez “has 
little appreciation for the insights of people of other faiths and philosophical traditions other 
than Catholic.”
436
 While Grisez does not treat non-Catholics as enemies, he does characterise 
them as failing “to appreciate the blessing Catholics enjoy in having a secure means of 
knowing what is morally true.”
437
 As far as Grisez is concerned, Catholics have the 
“marvellous grace of having received the truth for whose attainment conscience is given.”
438
 
Naturally, Grisez is referring to committed Catholics here, and, in his opinion, it is these 
“faithful and clearheaded” adherents that Vatican II addressed in the following extract from 
Gaudium et Spes, which Grisez considered to be a “very important paragraph” because it 
makes quite “clear that the Church’s role is to help form conscience by communicating 
truth.”
439
 The Document states: 
Laymen should also know that it is generally the function of their 
well-informed Christian conscience to see that the divine law is 
inscribed in the life of the earthly city. From priests they may look for 
spiritual light and nourishment. Let the layman not imagine that his 
pastors are always such experts, that to every problem or even every 
serious problem which arises they can readily give him a concrete 
solution, or that such is their mission. Rather enlightened by Christian 
wisdom and giving close attention to the teaching authority of the 
Church, let the layman take on his own distinctive role.
440
 
 If one were to make an educated guess at which section of this Council exhortation 
Grisez would underline for his readers, the evidence to date would strongly suggest: “and 
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giving close attention to the teaching authority of the Church, let the layman take on his own 
distinctive role.”
441
 Grisez’s own commentary on the above passage seems to substantiate 
such an assessment. As if issuing a “Licence to practice,” Grisez informs the committed 
Catholic that:  
Where one has formed one’s conscience in conformity with what the 
Church teaches, one is then on one’s own to discern moral truth in 
doubtful cases. The opinions of moral theologians are no longer to be 
taken as authoritative. Moralists can be useful only insofar as they 
help one to learn and understand what moral truth is.”
442
  
However, Grisez’s opponents would argue that in the case of committed, self-constituted 
Catholics, whose natural and educated desire will always be to behave self-consistently with 
their freely adopted beliefs, they will never be alone in that “most secret core and the 
sanctuary of the human person, [Where] they are alone with God whose voice echoes in their 
depths,”
443
 despite the fact that they discern the judgements of their conscience. Grisez’s own 
arguments strongly suggest that when it comes to the magisterium’s actively sought-after role 
of clarifying the moral demands of the Church’s teaching for “faithful and clearheaded” 
Catholics, out of ecclesiastical sight does not necessarily mean out of ecclesiastical mind. His 
claim that “the moral teaching of the Church forms Conscience from within, not by external 
imposition,”
444
 appears to imply the perpetual presence of a magisterial overseer. This is no 
baseless metaphor. Robert Smith observes, for example, that Grisez’s own interpretation of 
certain Vatican II documents not only indicate “a more nuanced position in regard to 
individual conscience and the church’s teachings,” but that he is positively arguing for “a 
much more restrictive approach and interpretation.”
445
 Smith claims, for example, that Grisez 
elaborates the notion of “giving close attention to the teaching authority of the Church” as 
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meaning that “conscience must always be ‘formed by,’ ‘conform to,’ and be ‘in conformity 
with’ church teaching.”
446
 Not only that, but in Christian Moral Principles, according to 
Smith, Grisez lays it down that such conformity of individual consciences to the church’s 
teaching must be done “in every question, every detail, every respect.”
447
 Subsequently, for 
someone, who championed free choice and the freedom to self-determination, Grisez’s 
teaching on submissiveness to the magisterium with the morally weighted reminder that “if 




6.1 Germain Grisez: A Legalist, Rule-Maker or Rule-Enforcer? 
 Grisez’s unstinting and unquestioning promotion of the superiority of the Catholic 
magisterium over one’s judgement of conscience presents both his opponents and the not–so–
faithful or clearheaded Catholic population with so many sticks with which to beat and 
pulverise his philosophical and ethical standpoint on the primacy of conscience. Thus, how 
seriously would both groups take his claim that he is not in any sense of the word a legalist, 
but rather an ethicist who operates from the belief that ethics “is concerned neither with 
making rules nor with enforcing them; it is concerned with finding standards–moral truths–
which no one makes . . . standards by which we can determine whether the things we choose 






                                                             
446
 Ibid., 62. 
447
 Ibid., 62; Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principle, 566. 
448
 See Robert J. Smith, Conscience and Catholicism, 62; Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principle, 566. 
449
Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Beyond the New Morality, 75. 
304 
 
6.1.2 The Anger and Resentment of the Not-So-Clearheaded Catholic 
 Would Grisez be at all surprised at the anger with which some Catholics would greet 
his assessment that: “To think of morality as an area in which one is made to feel guilty or as 
a set of rules someone else imposes expresses an immature conscience”?
450
 Many of these 
Catholics or their older relatives would have lived in an era where, it has been acknowledged, 
“too much theory and practice in the Church [arose] from data whose source is the superego. 
Many problem areas which have emerged in the recent past can be traced to a failure to 
recognise the nature, presence, and power of the superego.”
451
 
 Glaser, for example describes the superego as the “source of pseudo-moral guilt” 
which: “could actually cripple a person; it could keep the individual from seeing the genuine 
values at stake, values which alone could creatively call the person beyond his present 
fixation and the destructive circle of defeat, depression, ‘repentance’ and further failures.”
452
 
Grisez could not have been unaware of this lapse by the magisterium, itself, which allowed 
the superego and its armoury of ‘pseudo-moral guilt’ to run riot among its flock. Whence the 
resentment of the Church’s Authority? 
 These same “not-so-clearheaded” Catholics could also ask Grisez as to where the 
greater part of the responsibility lay for so many of them not only feeling a childish guilt 
when they violate the Church’s moral teaching (especially on salient moral issues in the area 
of human life and sexuality), and resenting the Church’s authority much as rebellious 
adolescents resent parental authority, but also remaining in an adolescent posture towards all 
authorities.
453
 Could there be a sense arising here of a bothered people being preached to by 
someone living in an “ivory tower”? Furthermore, this doubting population would 
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undoubtedly assure Grisez that they were in total agreement with his overall assessment that: 
“This resentment shapes and colours the entire attitude of many Catholics to the Church.”
454
 
6.2 A Patronised ‘Not-So-Clearheaded-Group’ Responds 
 This group of Catholics might take the opportunity to express their personal 
resentment towards Grisez’s portrayal of them as a group in need of helping and saving from 
the “quicksand of subjectivity into which so many have been led.”
455
 They would remind 
Germain Grisez that they are not a group in need of rescuing, but rather “that they represent 
another way of interpreting what conscience is and how it functions.”
456
 
6.2.1 Peer Group Opposition 
 The above points are, most likely, indicative of the experiential voices of a resentful 
Catholic population, a grassroots who feel barely tolerated by this promoter of unconditional 
obedience to the magisterium in all matters pertaining to the individual conscience. At an 
ethical and theological level, however, Grisez’s promotion of the superiority of the 
magisterium has been subjected to minute intellectual, rational and psychological analyses, 
and found to be seriously wanting. Citing Grisez’s own assertion that “In morals, as in faith, a 
faithful Catholic never will permit his or her own opinions . . . or the contradictory belief of 
the whole world outside the faith to override the Church’s firm teaching,”
457
 Smith presents 
two key objections to such a declaration. Firstly, he notes that Grisez has never clearly 
defined what he means by the “Church’s clear and firm teaching.”
458
 What Smith is alluding 
to here is that, whereas Grisez repeatedly refers to the concept throughout his work, mantra-
like almost, no one is clear as to whether he is referring to the Papal teaching ex-cathedra or 
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through an encyclical, or to documents emanating from an Ecumenical Council or a Synod of 
Bishops and so on. In Smith’s opinion, such a failure leads on to a second major problem, 
namely Grisez’s “unwillingness to distinguish between various kinds or degrees of church 
teaching.”
459
 Such reluctance, according to Smith, is indicative of Grisez’s failure to 
distinguish the levels or degrees of importance that should be accorded various types or kinds 
of teachings in the Church. The only concession that Grisez appears to make is his 
acknowledgement that doubt can only arise for a Catholic “in the absence of clear Church 
teaching on the matter under consideration.”
460
 Such a concession, however, naturally begs 
Smith’s original query as to what is meant by “clear Church teaching on the matter.” Having 
conceded that much, Grisez assumes his obvious responsibility once again to argue that 
“one’s own opinion in any doctrinal matter can be in error . . . so one realises that one’s 
opinion in any moral question can be mere rationalisation.”
461
 It appears that, once again, 
Grisez is playing his ‘relativism’ and ‘subjectivism’ cards. In the context of what Grisez 
describes as this “different notion of conscience,”
462
 these theses “refer to the individual’s 
subjective judgement as to what is most authentic for him or herself”
463
 as distinct from the 
Church’s magisterium. Grisez implacably maintains that such a belief system will leave 




7. The Muting of Germain Grisez 
 Grisez’s admirers do not necessarily agree with his modest self-assessment. Russell 
Shaw notes that “Perhaps the only sector of contemporary Catholic moral thought that, with 
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very few exceptions, systematically ignores Grisez is occupied by dissenters.”
465
 Indeed, 
pointing to the politicisation of contemporary Catholic moral thought, Shaw further 
elaborates on the apparent cold-shouldering of Grisez’s work: “Grisez’s achievement suffers 
an apparently calculated silent treatment from opponents on the left, even as conservative 
Catholic scholars fault him for deviations from the thought of Thomas Aquinas and other 
sins,”
466
 even though from his undergraduate student days the teachings of Aquinas had 
become a “revered model” for Grisez.
467
 
 Despite the praises heaped on Grisez’s magnum opus and even claims from his 
opponents that they could discern “his hand in Pope’s John Paul II’s Encyclicals, Veritatis 
Splendor (1993) and Evangelium Vitae (1995)”
468
 Grisez does not appear to have generated 
anything approaching the same immediate and enduring appeal as Newman’s writings and 
teachings did among the academic and ecclesiastical communities in particular, and among 
Catholic Christian and non-Christian populations in general. For example, many believers 
and non-believers hold Newman to be the Doctor of Conscience, because his teaching on that 
concept is deemed to be essential to much of his thinking and teaching, since, as already 
noted in Chapter 2 of this work, it displays Newman’s erudite ability to unite originality and 
continuity.
469
 In contrast, an inspection of the index to Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: 
Ethics, Metaphysics and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez
 
reveals that this 
comprehensive review of Grisez’s teaching does not contain a single reference to the concept 
of conscience. This is despite the fact that he deals with the concept at length in The Way of 
the Lord Jesus, as well as a Journal Article “The Duty and Right to Follow One’s Judgement 
of Conscience.” 
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 Such silence in acknowledging and critiquing Grisez’s work in the domain of moral 
and ethics in general, and in the area of the Catholic conscience, in particular, is attested to by 
his own supporters. Referring to the first two volumes of Grisez’s magnum opus, for 
example, Shaw claims that “these two volumes remain a long way from sinking in and 
producing the impact they are likely to have.”
470
 Elsewhere, in the course of outlining such 
key components of Grisez’s work as “his treatment of the fundamental goods of the person, 
[and] his identification of the modes of Christian response that make Christian morality 
distinctive,”
471
 as well as his treatment of moral questions ranging from contraception and 
abortion through to nuclear deterrence, Shaw points out that, “Taken as a whole, Grisez’s 
work constitutes an exceptionally rich source of ideas waiting to be mined.”
472
 Finally, 
following the same reticent vein, Shaw acknowledges that “Grisez appears to have made his 
presence felt to a real but limited degree up to now.”
473
 Elaborating on this particular claim, 
Shaw speaks of a core of fervent admirers who gladly use Grisez’s thought in their own 
teaching and writing on the one hand, while on the other he points to the existence of “a more 
numerous body upon whom Grisez has had at least some effect.”
474
 As evidence of this 
partial impact, Shaw goes on to cite the frequency with which current Catholic writing on 
morality refers to such concepts as “human goods” and “goods of the person.”
475
 However, 
with many of Grisez’s supporters’ claims being more of aspiration rather than substantive, 
some amongst his opponents would argue that this could be a case of much to-do about little. 
7.1 Why the extreme partisan uptake or rejection of Grisez’s thought and teaching? 
 This section seeks to establish the reasons underlying the limited and, at times, 
extremely partisan uptake or rejection of Grisez’s thought and teachings. Firstly, it must be 
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acknowledged that Grisez himself can, at times, be quite selective as to the audience he 
wishes to address. For example, while he claims that many in the non-clerical population 
“have taken advantage of the books’ [The Way of the Lord Jesus] well–organized and clearly 
written treatment of topics and the many study helps—highlighting essentials, putting 
secondary points in appendices and notes,” he limits the key readers of the book to Catholic 
seminaries where the volumes are meant to be used as textbooks or handbooks.
476
 In Benedict 
Ashley’s view Grisez’s targeting of his teachings and thought at American Catholic 
seminaries and theological schools was a high-risk strategy, since it exposed them to the 
strong possibility of being “misunderstood and slighted” because they challenged “so many 
received opinions” which had come to dominate the teaching of Christian ethics in these 
institutions.
477
 Significantly, Shaw elaborates on Ashley’s cautionary note to the effect that, 
in the case of the two volumes published at that time, they remained “a long way from 
sinking in and producing the impact they are likely to eventually have.”
478
 
 As for his opponents, some of them have gone so far as to suggest that Grisez’s finely 
tuned work smacks of “the products of the ivory tower.”
479
 In the eyes of his opponents, for 
example, the fact that Grisez has lived his entire working life, in the cut and thrust of an 
academic milieu, does appear to remove him, somewhat, from the vicissitudes of the daily 
grind.  
 Grisez’s supporters believe, however, that many of the ethical issues on which he has 
taught and written, do not speak of him as someone separated from the facts and practicalities 
of the real world. The systematic ignoring of Grisez’s teaching or what may be termed as 
“silent treatment” seems, at first glance to be unusual in academia, where it is common 
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practice for academics to analyse, criticise and debate what they find contentious in the works 
of their opponents. So, once again, the question needs to be asked as to what is it that 
generates such a “passive-aggressive” response from Grisez’s opponents to his thought and 
teachings? It can be productively argued that the “silent treatment” is fuelled by the 
uncompromising, unequivocal and unapologetic, militant, and strident manner in which 
Grisez presents his teaching at times and his persistent call to follow magisterial teaching in 
matters of conscience.
480
 For example, in his interview with Russell Shaw, he notes: “I don’t 
feel uncomfortable being in a room full of people all thinking one way and saying I disagree 
and why. That doesn’t bother me in the least. I feel rather good about it. What some people 
mistake for courage just comes naturally to me.”
481
 Furthermore, Grisez does not shy from 
putting “on hold” “people who do not desire to do what is right, are not instructed in the 
Church’s moral teaching, or are not willing to conform to this teaching”
482
 but preferentially, 
he will advise the person who “desires to know what is right and to do it, has been instructed 
in the Church’s moral teaching, is willing to conform to it,” and who seeks to resolve moral-
based doubts by direct personal reflection.
483
 For example, while arguing in support of the 
Catholic Church’s position on contraception, he unequivocally announces that he will be 
addressing his reflections only to those who either accept his theses on the infallibility of the 
teachings of ordinary magisterium, and the unlawfulness of dissenting from such teachings as 
established or, at least, willing to grant them for the sake of argument.
484
 In the context of 
advising Catholic bishops on the necessity of “avoiding crossing the fine line which divides 
justifiably tolerating [theological] dissent from unjustifiably cooperating with it,” Grisez 
makes it crystal clear that he is only concerned with those who comprise that part of the 
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magisterium “which continues to hold and teach the Church’s constant and firm moral 
teaching.”
485
 It can be argued from such accounts that Grisez, himself, is the author of his 
own “muting” insofar as he wilfully and deliberately seeks to exclude his theological and 
moralist opponents and their views from his audience. In short, it seems that Grisez is content 
to preach to the “converted.” 
8. Conclusion 
 Grisez’s thought as we have examined thus far illustrates the teachings and writings 
of a philosopher, an ardent Catholic theologian and an ethicist. His thought on conscience 
arguably starts with an epistemological approach to the concept. In his definition, he upholds 
that conscience in a full and strict sense is knowledge of, awareness of, or ability to know 
moral truth.
486
 This permits one to ask: is the lack of knowledge, awareness of or ability to 
know moral truth tantamount to absence of conscience? One thing however is very clear in 
Grisez’s thought, conscience principally entails — knowledge and judgement. Thus, it is the 
knowledge of moral truth and one’s best and last judgment about what may or should be or 
not be done here and now. It is a conglomeration of moral truth and the judgement of one’s 
choices of right and wrong action. 
 But with reference to his accounts of the formation, functioning and judgements of the 
conscience, Grisez’s unconditional loyalty to the moral teachings of the Magisterium remains 
startlingly captured in his assertion that “for faithful and clearheaded Catholics, the duty to 
follow one’s judgement cannot conflict with the duty to live according to the moral teaching 
which the Magisterium proposes.”
487
 “Catholics ought to conform their conscience to her 
teaching in every question, every detail, [and] every respect.”
488
 In this, Grisez does indeed 
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stand out as the “apostle of the primacy of the magisterium” in contrast with John Henry 
Newman the “Teacher of Conscience” and “apostle of the primacy of conscience.”  
 In conclusion, rather than end the chapter with a summary of Grisez’s concept of 
conscience, it is worthwhile to recount a story Russell Shaw narrates in his interview when 
Grisez was looking for a job. It is quite brief in its composition, but rich in meaning and 
significance. It is presented here without further comment to close this chapter and to afford 
us to see the extent of Grisez’s firm Catholic faith. 
Still planning on a career in a non-Catholic school, he [Grisez] sent 
off ‘probably hundreds’ of inquiries to such institutions—and ran into 
‘a good deal of resistance to the idea of hiring a Catholic who was a 
believer.’ This attitude was demonstrated in a particularly ‘brutal and 
grotesque’ fashion, Grisez recalls, at a well-known midwestern 
school. After an apparently successful interview, the philosophy 
chairman drove him to the airport and there, in the coffee shop, put 
one more casual yet crucial question about his religious faith: ‘You 
don’t really believe that stuff?’ 
‘You bet your life I do.’ 




                                                             
489




Linda Hogan: A Personalist Notion of Conscience 
1. Introduction 
 Linda Hogan (1964–) is a moral theologian from County Kilkenny in the Republic of 
Ireland. She has been conferred with degrees from St. Patrick’s College, Maynooth, and 
completed her doctoral studies at Trinity College, Dublin, in 1993. Presently, she doubles as 
Professor of Ecumenics and Vice-Provost at Trinity College. She is also a Fellow of Trinity 
College. She has written numerous books and journal articles in the fields of social and 
political ethics, feminist theological ethics, intercultural ethics and Catholic moral theology.
1
 
 Relevant to the subject matter of this thesis, James F. Keenan has pointed out that 
“Linda Hogan provided a robust, unapologetic defence of the primacy of conscience within 
the Catholic Church.”
2
 In his review of Confronting the Truth, Keenan remarks that “Linda 
Hogan empowers us to heed, protect, and treasure our consciences.”
3
 Such a stance provides 
an interesting and informative evidence for one to examine Hogan’s thought. She is also of 
interest because some of her teachings on conscience contrast with Germain Grisez in the 
previous chapter. Hence, while her literary output alone, especially in the area of ethics and 
moral theology; render her thoughts on conscience worthy of serious consideration, her voice 
as a female lay moral theologian in a patriarchal Catholic Church, gives her a distinctive 
mark on the conscience debate. It is with such a possibility in mind that this Chapter seeks to 
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examine her core thoughts on the concept of conscience. Her most wide-ranging assessment 
of the nature, role and formation of conscience is contained in Confronting the Truth,
4
 which 
will serve as our primary, though not exclusive resource for elucidating her thoughts in this 
chapter.  
1.1 The Battle of Paradigms: Key Source of Vagueness in Catholic Teaching on 
Conscience 
 Many who have attempted to write and discuss on the nature of conscience have done 
so using different approaches. According to Keenan,  
What makes Hogan’s work distinctive is her attempt to confront the 
fact that church teaching (deliberately?) leaves us confused about 
whether to have a primary allegiance to such teaching or to our 
conscience. Hogan argues that in the face of this ambiguity moral 
theologians have divided into two distinct camps: legalists and 
personalists. The former emphasise the need for us to conform 
obediently to church teaching; the latter to argue that we encounter the 
voice of God in our consciences and therein respond by seeking to 
realise responsible lives. We can only be responsible by reflecting on 
church teaching, the Scriptures, and our own experience and by 
attending to the demands and circumstances of our ordinary lives. 
Like this reviewer, Hogan clearly is among the personalists.
5
 
It is obvious from the above extract that Hogan is an emerging personalist voice of note 
within the twenty first century theology. She believes that the understanding of conscience 
that emanates from within Catholic theology itself is permeated with vagueness and 
equivocation and that her way of contributing to the theology of conscience is a personalist 
one.
6
 Hence, to set down her teaching on conscience, particularly with a view to assessing 
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whether she, herself, is merely further contributing to that vagueness, or whether she is, in 
fact, making an original and definitive contribution to the debate, it is essential that we 
examine the two distinct polemics or paradigms involved in the understanding of conscience 
before delineating her core thinking on conscience. 
 David E. DeCosse and his group in “Conscience Issue Separates Catholic Moral 
Camp,” which focused on the Catholic discourse on conscience in the American public 
square
7
 explain the paradigm problem in an unassuming form as follows:  
What the Second Vatican Council left unresolved has remained 
unresolved to the present day: Conscience within Catholicism is tugged 
in two interpretive directions. In its earlier, more theological section, the 
conciliar document Gaudium et spes refers to conscience as ‘the most 
secret core and sanctuary of a [person]. There he is alone with God, 
whose voice echoes in his depths.’ This formulation points to a 
personalist view of conscience. . . . By contrast, in a later passage, 
Gaudium et spes states that married couples should be ‘governed 
according to a conscience dutifully conformed to the divine law itself, 
and should be submissive toward the Church’s teaching office, which 
authentically interprets that law in light of the Gospel.’ This way of 
portraying conscience prioritizes a view of the person whose moral 
formation depends less on the workings of personal responsibility and 
more on conformity to hierarchical definitions. It can be called the 
‘ecclesial conscience’ and emerged in tandem with the heightened 
importance given to the centralized teaching office of the Church in the 
18th and 19th centuries.
8
 
What DeCosse and his group seek to achieve in this extract is to identify, describe and more 
or less contextualise the two apparently opposing paradigms of the Catholic concept of 
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conscience, that is, legalist (ecclesial) and personalist—which the Council Fathers utilised 
without comment or qualification, in their efforts to guide the modern Catholic layperson on 
matters of ethics and morality. It appears to be DeCosse’s opinion that it is this unexplained 
exploit between paradigms that accounts for the confusion, vagueness and ambiguity within 
Catholic discourse on conscience. Hogan believes that this is the origin of confusion in the 
Catholic theology of conscience.
9
 Of greater concern to DeCosse, however, is that in the 
midst of such uncertainty and even confusion “it is the ecclesial view that in the past decades 
has dominated Catholic discourse in the American public square.”
10
 He advises the Church 
that it “might draw on the personalist tradition of Catholicism and that would accord better 
with the experience of the Catholic democratic citizen in a pluralist society.”
11
 
 There is no wriggle-room for equivocation in DeCosse’s advice. He and his team of 
formulators having identified the two contrasting models of Catholic teaching on 
conscience—legalistic (ecclesial) and personalist—unconditionally reject the former as being 
totally out of sync with both traditional Christian views of conscience, as well as with the 
moral, theological, political and social requirements of contemporary Catholics. Hence, they 
have no difficulty in actually proposing the personalist model as the way forward for modern 
Catholic teaching on the nature, formation and functioning of conscience. Will this latter, 
unapologetically partisan attitude be the best approach to the formulation of twenty first 
century Catholic model of understanding the concept of conscience? Hogan provides 
researchers, students and interested readers with much more detailed material than a well 
underwritten essay, in her outlining of the history of both paradigms, an analysis of their 
structures, and a possible blueprint for a contemporary model. As will be made explicit in this 
work, Hogan from the outset, herself, attempts to get to the root of the divisions between the 
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Catholic models of conscience, maintaining that while Christians believe that “conscience 
involves the interaction of human and divine elements . . . explaining the precise nature of the 
relationship between the two has long been problematic.”
12
 She then proceeds to outline what 
she perceives to be the source of the problem, as follows: 
Difficulties arise on two fronts. First, the role of personal judgment in 
discerning the moral law has been disputed by some theologians. In 
addition there are problems in reconciling the role of conscience (as 
the personal apprehension of the moral law) with the other vehicles of 
the moral law, most especially with church teaching.
13
 
 Hogan appears to clarify the problem in terms of the difficulty inherent in reconciling 
the role of the right of the individual to unconditionally follow the dictates of his or her 
conscience with the role of an institutional church, which sees it as its duty to closely guide 
and monitor that individual in the formation, functioning and decision-making processes of 
conscience. This identification of the bi-lateral nature of the problem is well supported in 
DeCosse’s essay. With reference to the prioritising of “the role of personal judgement in 
discerning the moral law,” for example, DeCosse observed that in such a scenario: 
Conscience is not identified with the voice of God, much less with the 
hierarchical teaching office of the church. Rather, the encounter with 
the divine basis of moral obligation is mediated through the agency of 
a person and, hence, through the spirit, reason, affections, and 
relationships that constitute human agency. This view of conscience is 
rooted in a ‘personalist’ theology that reaches back to such sources as 




On the other hand, in the case of any model wherein the role of conscience is primarily 
identified with being obedient to the Church’s teaching office, DeCosse concludes: 
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This way of portraying conscience prioritizes a view of the person 
whose moral formation depends less on the workings of personal 
responsibility and more on conformity to hierarchical definitions.
15
  
2. Appraisal of the Legalistic (Ecclesial) Model of Church, Morality and Conscience  
 Fundamental to this model, according to Hogan, is that it identifies the Church’s 
magisterium as “the primary vehicle of moral truth.”
16
 Elaborating on this observation, she 
asserts: 
[T]he legalistic model, is characterized by an emphasis on the church 
teaching as the central way by which the objective dimensions of 
morality are known. It regards the magisterium as the primary vehicle 
of moral truth. Furthermore, it argues for the existence of absolute and 
universal moral principles. It is also deeply suspicious of any ethic 
that gives more than a superficial role to personal moral judgment. 
This seems to be the model that Veritatis Splendor endorses.
17
 
Furthermore, Hogan points out that underpinning such beliefs is the fact that the legalistic 
model promotes an image of the institutional church as being inherently hierarchical.
18
 More 
specifically, she accentuates the fact that the legalistic model 
draws a rigid distinction between the teaching church (that is the 
magisterium) and the learning church, comprised mainly of the laity. 
With this model the learning church owes a duty of obedience to the 
teaching church. The role of the individual conscience is to dutifully 




Thus, Hogan characterises the legalistic or ecclesial model of morality and conscience as 
follows:  
 It strongly advocates the notion of the existence of absolute and universal moral 
principles;  






 Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 28. 
18





 It is negatively disposed towards any subjective or personal involvement by the 
individual in forming moral judgements or arriving at conscientious decisions; and 
 It is inflexibly hierarchical in outlook and attitude in that it actively discriminates 
between an “upper” teaching church— magisterium and a “lower” learning church or 
laity, who, because of their inferior position, are duty bound to follow the dictates of 
the teaching church in all matters pertaining to the functioning of conscience.  
 While Hogan’s clinical description of the legalistic model provides us with much 
insight into its nature, structure and dynamics, it is her response to the key issues that the 
model has given rise to, that is, the Church’s role in the apprehension and transmission of 
values and consequently in the formation of conscience that reveals her particular stance in 
the paradigm’s debate. Thus, with reference to the formation of the individual conscience, she 
points out in “Forming and Following One’s Conscience” that 
one’s conscience is formed primarily in community – secular and 
ecclesial. It is, clearly, part of the tradition accepted by believers that 
the Church through its pastors has a duty to teach moral truth to its 
members, and that Church members have a serious obligation to 
respect that teaching in forming their consciences.
20
 
It would be a serious mistake, however, if one were to interpret Hogan’s specific call to 
Church members to respect the teaching of the magisterium in terms of the institutional 
Church being awarded a carte blanche with regard to its ethical and theological role in the 
formation of its members’ consciences. In the case of DeCosse and his associates, for 
example, the bestowal of such a carte blanche could not be countenanced because of what 
they perceive as the “diminished” and “narrow social nature of the ecclesial conscience.”
21
 In 
the context of the ongoing debate surrounding the issue of abortion in the American public 
square, they maintain that this social deficiency is “evident in the concept’s sharply restricted 
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space for moral formation.”
22
 They specifically point out that in the case of the ecclesial (or 
legalistic) model of conscience that:  
Too little credence is given to such things as professional associations; 
the American medical, legal, and political culture; and the prudence 
and insight gained by the practice of participants in contested fields 
like health care and politics. Instead, the ecclesial conception 
maintains that the overriding factor in the moral formation of a 
Catholic conscience is the hierarchical teaching office.
23
 
There can be little doubt that, in DeCosse’s estimation, such an ecclesial attitude 
demonstrates a blatant disrespect for these various respected bodies, as well as for the 
prudence, insight and vast experience which they can bring to any moral debate. In this 
restricted situation these bodies of expertise are now perceived as having been relegated to 
the status of “learning” bodies, essentially subservient to the hierarchical teaching office in 
the moral formation of a Catholic conscience. In such a scenario, Hogan’s observation that 
“A Church . . . which has faith in the virtue and values of its members will resist calling for 
external conformity in place of responsible choosing,”
24
 would be practically unintelligible to 
those committed to a legalist or ecclesial concept of conscience.  
 It is for reasons such as those just outlined that Hogan, for example, promptly 
followed her call to “learning” Catholics to respect the Church’s teaching in forming their 
conscience with a rather stark reminder to that same “teaching” Church that its “role in the 
apprehension and transmission of value is not as clear-cut as it is sometimes made to seem.”
25
 
Elaborating on this assertion, Hogan points out that:  
Official teaching sets out to formulate principles of general 
application; and whenever new questions arise (or old questions 
present themselves in a new context) it may take time before it 
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becomes clear – from experience as much as from official teaching – 
where the truth lies.
26
 
It is obvious from this extract that Hogan attaches as much importance to the personal 
experience of the individual as she does to the official teaching of the magisterium with 
regard to the resolution of “questions of conscience” much as DeCosse does with regard to 
institutions of expertise. Hence, when she advises Catholics that “informing one’s conscience 
is not simply a process of uncritically aligning oneself with views expressed by the 
magisterium,”
27
 it appears that she is, in fact, asserting that the extent to which the teaching 
church can intervene in the formation and functioning of the individual conscience is 
restricted, limited and finite. Indeed, she reminds the teaching Church that, “particularly in 
moral matters, the entire Church, including the magisterium, is engaged in a search for 
truth.”
28
 In thus admonishing the teaching Church, Hogan also seems to be reminding the laity 
of the learning Church that they have their own unique rationality, intellects, emotions, and 
personal experiences to contribute to insights in the formation and functioning of the Catholic 
conscience. This assumption is borne out in her subsequent and blatantly militant call to those 
same “learning” Catholics to “resist any suggestion that an informed conscience is always and 
necessarily one which is in agreement with an official position.” 
29
 Having arrived at such an 
uncompromising conclusion, it must have then seemed inevitable to Hogan that any model of 
conscience that she would either construct or endorse would have to address the fact that 
inevitably “choices made in accordance with an informed and educated conscience can lead to 
conflict with established values and practices – either secular or ecclesial.”
30
  
 Such thinking is most obviously part of a discourse that underlies and supports the 
concept of the “Primacy of Conscience”. It is little wonder, then, that Hogan should call for 
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the recovery of “the legitimate centrality of the individual conscience in the ecclesial 
context,” in order to counteract “the extension of the scope of [legalist] authoritative teaching 
on moral matters and of what Yves Congar termed a creeping infallibilism in magisterial 
teaching.”
31
 It is also not surprising that Hogan should call for greater clarification of the 
ecclesial concept of obsequium religiosum (religious assent/submission), a construct 
indicative of submissive obedience, or “a surrender to God speaking”
32
 for some Catholics. 
Indeed, such subservient undertones are to be found elucidated by Vatican II in Lumen 
Gentium: 
Bishops who teach in communion with the Roman Pontiff are to be 
respected by all as witnesses of divine and catholic truth; the faithful, 
for their part, should concur with their bishop’s judgment, made in the 
name of Christ, in matters of faith and morals, and adhere to it with a 
religious docility of faith. This religious docility of the will and 
intellect must be extended, in a special way, to the authentic teaching 
authority of the Roman Pontiff, even when he does not speak ex 
cathedra, in such wise, indeed, that his supreme teaching authority be 
acknowledged with respect, and that one sincerely adhere to decisions 
made by him conformably with his manifest mind and intention, 
which is made known principally either by the character of the 
documents in question, or by the frequency with which a certain 




Such an extract, with its rather startling demand that the Roman Pontiff’s supreme 
magisterium be reverentially acknowledged, even where his mind and will on matters of faith 
and morals are simply deduced from his manner of speaking can only be regarded by Hogan 
as being indicative of ecclesial legalism in its purest form.  
 Somewhat surprisingly, however, Linda Hogan does not dismiss the obsequium 
religiosum attitude out of hand. Rather, acknowledging that the precise meaning of the term 
“has been the subject of serious academic debate within the Church,” she appears to support 
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Ladislas Örsy’s suggestion that the meaning of the term is reliant “on the nature of the 
teaching to which the obsequium is due.”
34
 Hence, in line with Örsy’s thinking, she 
specifically agrees that “Certain teachings are due a faithful submission of the intellect and 
will of the believer, while others may be due serious attention or respectful listening.”
35
 
However, as with her stance on the role of the teaching church in the functioning and 
formation of the individual conscience, Hogan is careful to argue for limits and restrictions on 
the extent to which the notion of the obsequium can be called upon by that same teaching 
church. For that reason, she once again draws on Örsy’s thinking, specifically where he is 
seen to maintain that obsequium religiosum “is not and cannot be, a surrender to God 
speaking,” but rather it is “a response to the Church searching.”
36
  
 It seems obvious that Hogan’s description, analysis and evaluation of the legalistic 
model of understanding and teaching on morality and conscience indicates that, while she 
does reject this approach, she is not only anxious that its more absolutist tenets be curtailed 
and closely monitored, but, as will become clear, she pinned her thinking on conscience 
specifically to the personalist paradigm which emerged as a result of some salient factors. 
2.1 The Evolution of a New Theological Paradigm  
 Hogan lists three specific factors, which she maintains served to enhance the shift 
from the legalistic paradigm. These factors comprised: 
(1) the introduction of historical consciousness into theological 
reflection; (2) the growing resistance to neo-Thomism on the part of 
particular moral theologians; and (3) the controversy surrounding the 
situation ethics debates of the 1950s.
37
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The core argument amongst mid-twentieth century Catholic theologians advocating the 
introduction of historical consciousness into theological reflections was that they had come to 
the opinion that “It was impossible to speak of human beings as though they were all 
essentially the same, regardless of their culture, history or language.”
38
 In the words of 
Curran, “Historical consciousness recognises that the human subject, who is knower and 
actor, is also embedded in a history and culture that affect the ways in which the individual 
thinks and acts.”
39
 The relevance of this discourse in theology was facilitated by such 
renowned theologians and philosophers as Jean Danielou, Marie-Dominique Chenu, Henri de 
Lubac and Yves Congar.
40
 In Hogan’s opinion, these Catholic theologians “rejected the idea 
of a timeless theology uncontaminated by the exigencies of history,” insisting instead that 
since theology is an attempt on the part of human persons “to understand the mystery of God 
in time, it is unambiguously historical.”
41
 This rooting in history was to have a profound 
effect on the way theology was done, according to Hogan, in that each theological system 
now came to be seen as “primarily a product of its context.”
42
 In accepting such an 
assumption, it can be argued that implicitly “Historical consciousness recognises the need for 
both continuity and discontinuity . . . and is thus more open . . . to change and 
development.”
43
 This is why, for example, Curran asserts that: 
Such an understanding of the historically conscious approach with its 
recognition of possible change and development fits well with the 
historical reality that Catholic teaching on specific issues - slavery, 
usury, the defendant’s right to silence - and on the role of procreation 
in marriage have all changed in the course of history.
44
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 Such an assertion reiterates Hogan who in the context of an account of “Development 
and Change in the Moral Tradition,”
45
 pointed out that while the “concept of inviolable and 
natural rights was [once] anathema” in the traditional teachings of the Catholic Church, it 
currently “forms a central plank of the Church’s understanding of how the dignity of the 
person is to be protected and promoted.”
46
 She further pointed out that “The changes in 
Church teaching with regard to torture, religious freedom and the executions of heretics,” 
were just dramatic.
47
 In fact, Hogan herself, cites John Noonan wherein his article exposes 
“the real and substantial changes that have taken place in the church’s teachings over the 
centuries,” with regard to usury, marriage, slavery and religious freedom.
48
 She concludes 
with a somewhat remarkable claim from a personalist perspective that there has long been an 
acceptance of the idea of development in the Church’s teaching,
49
 a claim she surprisingly 
substantiates with an acknowledgement from Veritatis Splendor that “within Tradition, the 
authentic interpretation of the Lord’s law develops with the help of the Holy Spirit.”
50
 Thus, 
historical consciousness advanced the way theology was done and understood. 
 This nouvelle theologie and way of teaching and understanding came to be seen as a 
fundamental challenge to the legalistic model of moral theology, a model, which in its 
support for the manualist natural law tradition, not only assumes that “a monolithic natural 
law theory exists that can be applied deductively to moral problems and issues as they 
arise,”
51
 but also tends “to regard human nature as though it were abstract, disembodied and 
universal.”
52
 By contrast, according to Hogan, the introduction of historical consciousness 
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into Catholic theological reflections (i) brought to the fore theologians like Karl Rahner who 
sought to “direct attention toward the human person in his or her particularity”
53
 (ii) gave to 
“real human beings rather than abstract human nature”
54
 and (iii) “led to what Richard 
McCormick has called ‘the age of experience’ in moral theology.”
55
 Thus, the introduction of 
historical consciousness into theology became one of the major watersheds to boost paradigm 
shift.  
 Neo-Thomism which was a school of philosophy in the twentieth century and whose 
teaching was resisted by moral theologians like Odon Lottin, Fritz Tillmann and Bernard 
Häring greatly facilitated the development of a new paradigm in moral theology. Through 
their questioning and challenging of certain aspects of neo-Thomistic manuals which promote 
“a concept of universal human nature against which the particularities of individual existence 
were insignificant,”
56
 these theologians initiated immense paradigmatic reform. The level of 
such insignificance is made quite clear in an observation by Karol Wojtyla to the effect that 
“Aquinas’s use of the term ‘person’ is ‘all but absent from his treatise on the human 
being.’”
57
 In fact, Smith notes that Aquinas’s interest lies in “developing a metaphysical 
description of man, a description in terms of form and matter, rationality and animality,” an 
interest she contrasts with Wojtyla’s more personalist interest in “using man’s experience of 
himself, of his self-determining powers, to lead him to an awareness of his dignity.”
58
 If 
Aquinas’s major work can be characterised to a considerable extent by its absenting of the 
term ‘person’, the same cannot be said of Haring. He insists that “human beings ought to be 
thought of not in terms of their nature, but of their personhood.”
59
 He also argues that 
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“morality must arise from a personal relationship with God,” who, he maintains is the one 
“that enables the person to discern value.”
60
 
 Lottin’s contributions in the development of the new paradigm was due to his 
criticism of the moral manuals. In his view, canon law had overtaken moral theology, 
“forcing it to focus exclusively on external acts, when in fact, historically speaking, moral 
theology has been primarily interested in the internal life.”
61
 He also criticised the centrality 
of the Decalogue in the manualist method, arguing that the manualists used the Decalogue 
because it focused on what should be avoided. He contended that “This was not an adequate 
vehicle for the greatness of the Christian moral life, [because] it had a rather incomplete set 
of responsibilities to God and neighbour, and none at all to self.”
62
 Keenan notes that, as a 
historian, Lottin’s historical-critical method was developed from a set of assumptions very 
different from those manualists who were his contemporaries in moral theology. He points 
out that as far as Lottin was concerned: 
Truth was not … a series of always held, ahistorical, universal 
utterances. He did not believe that he would find one position held by 
all always. He presumed, instead, that the scholastics did not all share 
the same understandings of free will, conscience, law, and norms, etc. 
On the contrary they debated and contradicted one another and 
sometimes even themselves. Though the concerns were similar their 
quests for moral understanding and truth led them to differing 
positions. The tradition, then, was not monolithic: It was a series of 
debates and engagements that historically developed.
63
  
Such a discourse would undoubtedly have found favour with those who advocated a 
situationist approach to ethics, as indeed would that of Fritz Tillmann, an internationally 
renowned Scripture scholar, who in 1912 was ordered by the Vatican to desist from his 
Scripture studies because as editor of a collection of essays about the New Testament, he had 
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facilitated the publication of an essay that did not meet the approval of the Vatican. Availing 
himself of an offer by the Vatican authorities to work in another theological discipline, 
however, he opted for moral theology. Writing within his newly chosen discipline, Tillmann 
applied his knowledge of Scripture and published Die Idee der Nachfolge Christi, on the idea 
of the disciple of Christ. Considered a tremendous success, Karl-Heinz Kleber was to write 
70 years after its publication that “in the search to express what the foundational principle of 
moral theology ought to be, Tillman came forward and named it the disciple of Christ.”
64
 
Tillman later published a more accessible text for lay people, Die Meister Ruft or in its 
English translation, The Master Calls. This text is described as a handbook wherein lay 
morality is presented “not as a list of sins, but as virtues dominated by the idea of the disciple 
guided by Scripture.”
65
 Elaborating on his contention that Tillmann was inestimable in the 
shift in paradigm, Keenan lauds his wisdom saying: 
Catholic moral theology could not make the much-needed and 
extraordinarily urgent turn to the Bible if it did not have within its 
guild a superb scripture scholar. One can hardly imagine a moral 
theologian credibly developing a biblically based moral theology. 
Tillmann’s exile from the land of exegesis and his finding safety and 
sanctuary in the field of moral theology became itself the fundamental 
occasion for realizing one of the most significant developments in 
twentieth-century Roman Catholic moral theology.
66
 
Keenan’s words gives endorsement to Hogan’s who notes: “Tillmann attempted to make 
moral theology more consistent with the themes of the New Testament and sought to 
reconnect the religious and the moral dimensions of Christian life.”
67
  
 The undertaking by these theologians according to Hogan “introduced alternative 
ways of thinking about morality.”
68
 While the discourses enunciated by the preceding moral 
theologians undoubtedly shaped the approach to moral theology, Hogan specifically credits 
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the German Catholic theologian, Herbert Doms, with the introduction of “personalism into 
the field of moral theology.”
69
 According to her, Doms 
work conflicted with existing papal teaching on marriage because it 
did not focus on the procreative potential of all sexual intercourse. In 
fact his true innovation was that he began to write a theology of 




Hogan does note, however, that because he was aware that “giving priority to experience” 
could prove controversial and groundbreaking in his time that is, in the Pontificate of Pius 
XII, Doms neither highlighted nor developed this concept.
71
 Yet, Hogan does insist that 
Doms’ work became a major resource for the theology of marriage in Vatican II, which, in 
turn, was to become the basis of the personalist moral theology of the renewal.
72
 
 The final factor which Hogan believes played a key role in the introduction of 
personalist thinking in mainstream Catholic theology was “the situation ethics debate.” This 
phenomenon will be elaborated in a later part of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that as will 
be made explicit, the “Situation Ethics” debate generated significant implications and 
challenges for the personalist model especially on moral authority and the role of conscience. 
3. Integration of Personalist Paradigm into Catholic Moral Theology 
 As is evident thus far, Catholic moral theology, in its treatises and teachings on the 
nature, formation and role of conscience, was underpinned by the legalistic model. However, 
no matter how well supported theologically, scripturally or  magisterially, the model appears 
to have been, it currently does not meet with much popular approval amongst many sections 











of the Catholic Church.
73
 Richard M. Gula testifies to the shift away from the legalistic model 
and towards the new model, a more personalist one, on the part of some of the leading post-
conciliar theologians: 
The first generation of post-conciliar moral theologians, such as 
Bernard Häring, Josef Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, and Louis Janssens in 
Europe, and Richard McCormick and Charles Curran in the United 
States, were largely concerned with clarifying the rightness and 
wrongness of actions and solving moral problems. But they were 
beginning to make this analysis in a personalistic, rather than 
legalistic, context. One of the great contributions of this first 
generation of revisionists was to shift the axis of the moral life away 
from the law-obligation model that focused on individual acts and 
toward the personal, relational-responsibility model that gave 
centrality to the person. The theological foundation of this shift was to 
conceive the moral life as a response to God’s initiative of love.
74
 
 Writing on the origin of personalist doctrine, from both a secular and religious 
perspective, Jacques Maritain saw its emergence as an effort on the part of some theorists to 
bridge the gap between philosophical, political, theological, totalitarian ideas and 
individualistic driven errors. He maintained, for example, that “the development of a 
totalitarian or exclusively communal conception of society,” was, in fact, a reaction against 
“the errors of individualism” which occurred in the nineteenth century.
75
 Given such 
fundamental rivalries, Maritain states that “It was natural, then, that in a simultaneous reaction 
against both totalitarian and individualistic errors the concept of the human person, 
incorporated as such into society, be opposed to both the idea of the totalitarian state and that 
of the sovereignty of the individual.”
76
 In the light of such negatively oriented reactionary 
origins, Maritain maintains that “the ‘personalist current which has developed in our time,” is 
                                                             
73
 See Charles E. Curran, The Origins of Moral Theology in the United States: Three Different Approaches 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997). Curran explicates on the Legalistic model pointing out 
its errors. 
74
 Richard M. Gula, “The Shifting Landscape of Moral Theology,” Church, 2009 
http://www.churchmagazine.org/issue/0903/upf_shifting_landscape.php [accessed 12/11/2012]. [italicisation 
mine] 
75
 Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good, trans. John J. Fitzgerald (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 





actually the product of “minds related to widely differing schools of philosophic thought and 
quite uneven in intellectual exactitude and precision,” but, who are nonetheless seeking “in 
the notion and term of ‘person’” a middle way between the excesses of totalitarianism and 
individualism.
77
 It is for this reason, in Maritain’s estimation, that there now exist “a dozen 




 Current personalist theologians agree, however, that the special attention given to the 
human person is what is unique to personalist theology. For instance, “The Personalist 
Project”
79
 a Christian philosophical movement, which lists John Henry Newman, Dietrich 
von Hildebrand, and Karol Wojtyla (later John Paul II) as their particular guiding lights, 
characterises personalism in terms of a philosophy that concerns itself deeply with the 
interiority of the person, while also promoting the notion that each person exists as subject, 
not as object, as someone and not as something, as self-determining, not determined.
80
 The 
movement also contends that since “Moral good and evil form the axis of the personal 
universe, [t]he encounter with the moral law in conscience stirs the waters of personal 
existence like nothing else in our experience.”
81
 Furthermore, it teaches that “a human person 
does not exist just to provide an instance of the human kind, but exists as this unrepeatable 
person and stands in a sense above the human kind, being always more than an instance of 
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 Relevant to Catholic Personalist ethics and the emphasis it places on the freedom of 
persons, the “Personalist Project” also “takes seriously the moral existence of persons.”
83
 
  According to Hogan, personalist paradigm 
prioritizes the personal autonomy and responsibility of individuals in 
moral matters . . . focuses on conscience as the mediator of the divine 
moral law . . . rejects any account of ethics that relies on absolutist 
principles. . . believes that every moral theory should give due 
recognition to the role of circumstances and intentionality.
84
 
Hogan’s emphasis on personal autonomy and responsibility, the essential mediating role of 
conscience in the human/divine relationship is further underscored in DeCosse’s essay which 
postulates: 
Conscience is not identified with the voice of God, much less with the 
hierarchical teaching office of the church. Rather, the encounter with 
the divine basis of moral obligation is mediated through the agency of 
a person and, hence, through the spirit, reason, affections, and 
relationships that constitute human agency. This view of conscience is 
rooted in a ‘personalist’ theology that reaches back to such sources as 




This notion of conscience as a voice that echoes in a person’s very depths, mediating the 
divine basis of moral obligation is not only reiterated, but developed even further by Xavier 
G. Colavechio in “Conscience: A Personalist Perspective.” Specifically, he develops the 
notion that all human beings possess an innate desire that a state of harmony exist, or be 
achieved, amongst the totality of their relationships.
86
 He further maintains that, in the case of 
both  “teaching” and “learning” Catholics, this desire for relational harmony is particularly 
reflected in their efforts to harmonise each individual’s entitlement to assume personal 
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responsibility for his or her actions, with the Church’s right to exercise its right to act as guide 
and mentor to its members’ conscience.
87
 According to Colavechio, therefore,  
Conscience, in Personalist terms, is presented . . . as a harmonious 
production of man’s personality. By considering who a man is in the 
totality of his relationships and considering also the choices of action 
one makes relative to his person, the personalist places the conscience 
of man in the very depths of his being and strives to provide a 
framework within which a consistent theology of conscience, personal 
responsibility, the role of authority, the magisterium of the Church, 
etc., may be developed.
88
  
 Whereas, it is obvious that DeCosse and Colavechio’s articles depict Hogan’s 
conceptualisation of the Personalist model of morality and conscience, Hogan, herself, claims 
to have drawn extensively on the Vatican II documents, in particular, Gaudium et Spes in her 
attempts to construct a personalist understanding of conscience.
89
  
 The understanding of morality and conscience in the personalist approach according to 
Hogan is that “the person moved centre stage.”
90
 The significance of this ethical shift for 
Hogan and her Personalist model lay in the fact that the actions and choices of the individual 
come to be regarded as a “reflection of the kind of person one is and one will become.”
91
 As 
regards the characteristics of this particular person, who stands at the centre of this reoriented 
morality, Hogan strongly concurs with Kevin Kelly’s description of the human person as 
“part of the material world, interrelational with other persons, a social and historical being.”
92
 
Likewise, she remarks that Vatican II “puts forward a model of morality in which the person 
is the source of ethical discernment and action.”
93
 Thus, what Hogan attests to is that the 
human person is the measure of morality from a personalist perspective. Much of what Hogan 
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proposes as essential components of the personalist model for the understanding of morality 
and conscience are concisely identified in Smith’s article: “Natural Law and Personalism in 
Veritatis Splendor.” While comparing the Universal Catechism
94
 and the Roman Catechism
95
 
in their treatment of morality, she observed that although it might be an oversimplification, 
one could say that the Church has shifted from an emphasis on God 
the Father as Lawgiver, who has written his will into the laws of 
nature to an emphasis on Christ as our model of perfection and human 
dignity as the grounding of morality. . . Furthermore, the dignity of the 
human person is seen as rooted not so much in his status as a rational 
creature whose mind is able to grasp reality but in his status as a free 




This emphasis on a Christological model and on a human dignity that derives from each 
individual’s status as a free and self-determining creature is very much in keeping with 
Hogan’s account, as is Smith’s in the following incisive elaboration of the clear distinction 
she found between both Catechism’s approach to morality: 
[W]hereas the Roman Catechism began its moral section with the Ten 
Commandments, the Universal Catechism calls upon the Christian to 
‘recognize your dignity’ (1691) and calls him to a life in Christ. 
Whereas the Roman Catechism focused almost exclusively on the 
commandments and the law, the Universal Catechism sketches a 
Christian anthropology, begins with the beatitudes, and touches upon 
such topics as freedom and the conscience, and includes a long section 
on man as a member of a community.
97
  
Once again, attention is drawn to the Roman Catechism’s almost exclusive preoccupation 
with the law and the commandments as against the Universal Catechism’s identification of 
Christ’s values as portrayed in his beatitudes, as well as the notions of freedom and the 
individual as an inherently communal being, as elements that would be considered to be 
essential to a Personalist model. Here, Smith is reiterating conclusions reached by Hogan and 
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by DeCosse, although all three may be said to have reached their conclusions in differing 
contexts. Interestingly, in keeping with Hogan’s insistence that there must be room for the 
Church’s role in guiding and forming conscience, Smith makes the point that these “new 
emphases and starting points are not to be taken as a rejection of the old.”
98
 As with Hogan, 
however, Smith’s call for an acceptance of the old is a qualified one, in that it is presented 
with a “Personalist cast” as can be seen from the following extract: 
The natural law themes of the moral act, virtue, sin and grace and, of 
course, the natural law itself, are also covered in the new catechism 
but they are imbued with a personalist cast—that is, with a focus on 
man's dignity as manifested in his power to determine himself freely 
in accord with the truth.
99
 
It is obvious from her observations thus far that in Smith’s estimation “the Universal 
Catechism stresses that all moral law is in accord with the dignity of the human person.”
100
 As 
with Hogan, then, she places the person and his or her essential dignity at the centre of the 
moral debate, and as Hogan has done, Smith also points out that these were “emphases that 
began to emerge in the documents of Vatican II.”
101
 Going one step further, however Smith 
asserts that these emphases have “come to a fuller flower in the Universal Catechism.”
102
 
Although such a conclusion does not surface in Hogan’s work, there can be absolutely no 
reason for doubting that she would not subscribe to Smith’s analysis of the opening passage of 
the moral section of the Universal Catechism.
103
 According to Smith the contents of this 
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particular passage highlight “several of the main concepts that inform a personalist approach 
to ethics.”
104
 Concepts she identifies as follows: 
man as made in the image and likeness of God, man as determining 
himself by his deliberate and free actions, a concern with the interior 
life, the need of conforming our actions to the good that is made 




This extract sums up what may be considered as Hogan’s list of essential elements for the 
construction of a Personalist model of ethics and conscience. Hogan’s call for a Personalist 
approach to the understanding of a Catholic conscience is like the biblical call of “one crying 
in the wilderness”
106
 for change. For this reason, the body of this thesis will concern itself 
with assessing the extent to which Hogan elaborates her belief that “Gaudium et Spes puts 
forward a model of morality in which the person is the source of ethical discernment and 
action,”
107
 and incorporates her conclusions arising from both her own findings and from her 
own Personalist-based beliefs into her own model. This assessment will be undertaken with 
particular reference to the rights and duties that she identify with both the “teaching” and 
“learning” Church as they continue to reorient to this new Personalist model of morality and 
conscience. Such an assessment should eventually provide an indication as to the levels of 
enthusiasm or antagonism with which both the institutional Catholic Church and its 
“learning” laity are embracing or rejecting what Hogan describes as “a new paradigm, one 
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3.1 Vatican II and Personalist Paradigm 
 Having addressed the development of a personalist paradigm and its introduction into 
Catholic moral theology, Hogan proceeds to identify the main characteristics of the paradigm 
as articulated in the documents of Vatican II. She observes that by shifting the focus on to the 
“interior morality of the person,”
 109
 Gaudium et Spes has made the human person the source 
of ethical discernment and action.”
110
 It is her belief that such a refocusing “emphasizes 
personal responsibility rather than obedience.”
111
 Another significant step in Vatican II’s use 
of personalist paradigm is in the Council’s teaching on marriage, which designated the human 
person “as the criterion of what is morally right and wrong,”
112
 thereby supporting the moral 
stance taken previously by Doms.  
 As noted earlier in this chapter, one would imagine that the teachings of Vatican II 
would have solved the problems centred on the understanding of the Catholic tasks of 
conscience. However, Hogan, herself notes that:  
The popular perception is that the documents of Vatican II stress the 
dignity and autonomy of conscience. While this is true in a very 
general sense, there are a number of different, often conflicting, views 
about the nature and role of conscience present within them. The 




Citing James Gaffney, Hogan acknowledges that there still exists a certain incoherence in the 
use of the term conscience within the teachings of the Catholic Church. She claims that 
evidence of such incoherence can be found when Catholics come to deal with “(1) the 
relationship between conscience and law, (2) the issues of discernment and obedience, (3) the 
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problem of the erroneous conscience and (4) the role of the magisterium.”
114
 She also draws 
on the writings of Fuchs to illustrate the presence of divergent accounts of conscience in 
Dignitatis Humanae and Gaudium et Spes. Hogan refers to phrases where conscience is 
recognized as the capacity for moral discernment, on the one hand, while being identified 
with or reduced to implementation of church teaching, on the other. Furthermore, she believes 
Vatican II’s teaching on erroneous conscience complicates even further the Catholic 
understanding of conscience. In support of this claim, she cites Ratzinger’s words which state 
that “the Council’s position on the binding force of erroneous conscience is rather evasive.”
115
 
Hogan identifies the failure of the Council to “to deal with the authority of conscience and its 
relationship with the magisterium,”
116
 as an ongoing source of conflict. She believes that the 
ambiguities that are contained in Vatican II are as a result of the Council’s use of both the 
legalistic and personalist paradigms, and “were exacerbated by the fact that in the documents 
we can see one paradigm, that of law, collapsing and another, that of personalism, beginning 
to emerge.
”117
 However, for her, the resolution of such a problem can be found if it is 
acknowledged that: 
Vatican II simply began a process of renewal that it encouraged the 
faithful to continue. As a result many of the ambiguities can be 
resolved by developing the personalist paradigm in moral theology 
and situating discussions of conscience in that context.
118
 
It is not surprising then, that James F. Keenan acknowledges that “Not only does she endorse 
the personalist model, but rather than providing a position that would only react to church 
                                                             
114
 Ibid., 109-110. 
115









teaching, she proposes a proactive agenda . . . [and] develops an idea of the responsible 
Christian conscientiously seeking objective moral truth.”
119
  
4. Contrasting Concepts Fundamental to the Personalist Approach: 
Subjectivity/Objectivity and Concreteness/Universality 
 Hogan maintains that within the legalistic model of moral theology’s teaching on 
conscience, there is a deep reluctance on the part of its proponents to acknowledge that “the 
person’s intention or particular circumstances” is necessary in assessing a moral situation or 
action.
120
 In other words, she draws attention to the fact that the legalistic or ecclesial 
approach does not give attention to the individual’s subjective input in the role of conscience. 
The resolution of such a problem, in terms of understanding and catering for the subjective 
and concrete nature of morality and the task of conscience, on the one hand, and for their 
objective and universal nature on the other is fundamental to the construction of any model of 
Catholic morality and conscience. Failure in such an undertaking would, in Hogan’s words 
leave conscience with “no evaluative role because the particular circumstances of the 
individual are deemed to be irrelevant.”
121
 Accordingly, conscience, in such a moral scenario 
would be left with the solitary task of applying “universal absolute principles to every 
situation.”
122
 If such were the case, Hogan suggests that the activity of conscience would 
simply be “restricted to obeying orders.”
123
 The personalist paradigm in emphasizing 
personal responsibility rather than obedience
124
 admits of “the intention of the person and the 
circumstances in which they were acting in the moral description of the act.”
125
 This 
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according to Hogan “has far-reaching consequences, particularly in relation to moral 
absolutes and the concept of intrinsic evil.”
126
 
 To understand the task before Hogan with regard to incorporating subjectivity, 
objectivity, concreteness and universality into the new model, in a manner consonant with her 
personalist beliefs, it is pertinent to revisit the thoughts of proponents of objectivity and 
universality such as John Finnis. According to Hogan, he is “one of the most vocal 
proponents of the legalistic model,”
127
 who argues for and supports moral absolutes. Hogan 
cites him thus: 
even though intentions may sometimes be good, and circumstances 
frequently difficult, ...individuals never have the authority to violate 
the fundamental and inalienable rights of the human person. In the end 
only a morality that acknowledges certain norms as valid always and 




She claims that Finnis’ argument is in favour of a “version of morality that regards norms as 
universally binding (always and everywhere) and as absolute (allowing no exceptions).”
129
 
She notes specifically his utilisation of the commandment “thou shall not kill” to support his 
argument that “unless this and other norms are believed to be exceptionless and universally 
binding, morality will be robbed of its objectivity and eventually everything will be 
permitted.”
130
 Drawing attention to the slippery slope underpinning of Finnis’ argument, 
Hogan reminds him that, in terms of the objective and universal parameters he has outlined in 
the case of the commandment not to kill, for example, the traditional exceptions of war or 













self-defence will not hold.
131
 She claims that this is so, because in Finnis’ version of morality, 
the circumstances of a killing are irrelevant.
132
  
 Finnis, however, does not appear to have any problem with such a characterisation of 
his moral stance in general, but, according to Hogan, he actually argues and warns that “once 
we begin to include factors such as intentions and circumstances in the judgement of 
rightness and wrongness of our decisions, the whole edifice of morality crumbles.”
133
 While 
such a claim can be characterised as being indicative of his slippery slope approach, what 
follows can only be typified in terms of a catastrophic perpendicular drop. Promoting the 
view that it is wrong to take account of the context in ethics, he makes the claim that “the 
reaffirmation that there are intrinsically evil acts, exceptionless specific moral norms and 
inviolable human rights is philosophically defensible and manifestly necessary to preserve 
the moral substance of Christian ethics.”
134
 
 Interestingly, Hogan transposes Finnis’ theorising with the following conclusion and 
at the same time points to the implication for the debate on artificial contraception: 
 The sole role of conscience would be to unequivocally apply the church’s teaching 
that artificial contraception is morally wrong. 
 Conscience would not concern itself with the reasons why the person might consider 
using artificial contraception. 
 Conscience would have no use for such information as a couple may be seeking to use 
contraception because they can only just take care of their existing children, or that a 
woman may be trying to protect herself or her partner from HIV infection. In Finnis’s 
view, circumstances as these would be irrelevant. 
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 Exceptions to the absolute ban on artificial contraception could not be allowed 
because that would place morality itself under threat by robbing it of its objectivity.
135
 
Hogan’s assessment of such an outcome is to maintain that the role of conscience is 
undermined. Within such a legalistic model, she declares: “The role of conscience here is to 
apply church teaching to each situation. Everything else, according to this model, is 
superfluous. One might say that the activity of conscience is restricted to obeying orders.”
136
  
 In response to the absolutist claims that emanate from the legalist or ecclesial model 
and to its distrust of any input by individual conscience, personalist moral theology as Hogan 
asserts, seeks to “refresh emphasis on the moral authority of the individual.”
137
 And Hogan is 
quick to caution that “the new paradigm is neither individualistic nor isolationist.”
138
 
Consequently she remarks: 
In the Christian tradition, moral responsibility resides with the 
individual and cannot be circumvented by even the most precise and 
illuminating advice or teaching, regardless of the source. This is the 




As a result, she has this unequivocal advice to offer: 
Christian tradition has continuously insisted that moral responsibility 
and choice reside ultimately with each individual. We cannot export 
our moral choices, or hand over our decision making to any other 
person or body. As such we must be obedient to our own discernment 
of the Spirit; we must adhere to our own consciences. Obedience, 
therefore, can never  be construed as the blind submission of one’s 
will and intellect, even to the magisterium of the church, particularly 
if one’s considered judgement pulls one in the opposite direction.
140
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 A statement of this nature draw attention to Janet E. Smith’s words where she 
specifically contrasts the natural law, which she describes as being “interested in the abstract 
universal norm” with personalism, which, in turn, she describes as being “interested in the 
subjectivity of the concrete individual, a subjectivity characteristic of all human beings.”
141
 
Hence, elaborating on how the presentation of Veritatis Splendor begins with what could be 
characterised as “a dramatisation of a personalist moment”
142
 in the form of an “encounter of 
one concrete individual, one young man with Christ,”
143
 Smith firstly allows the document its 
own “personalist moment” as she cites the following extract: 
For the young man, the question is not so much about rules to be 
followed, but about the full meaning of life. This is in fact the 
aspiration at the heart of every human decision and action, the quiet 
searching and interior prompting which sets freedom in motion. This 
question is ultimately an appeal to the absolute Good which attracts us 
and beckons us; it is the echo of a call from God who is the origin and 
goal of man's life.
144
  
 Smith’s own commentary on the above passage places emphasis on personalism. She 
elucidates: “The emphasis here on the human heart and human interiority and its need for 
absolute truth for freedom are true to the emphases of personalism.”
145
 Having illustrated, 
however, the manner in which Veritatis Splendor represented the Rich Young Man’s 
encounter with Christ in terms compatible with personalism, Smith follows through with a 
“Natural Law” take on the same encounter and observed how the encyclical maintains that 
“Christ is first interested in the young man's allegiance to the commandments, to the Law, 
which laws are considered to be the precepts of the natural law.”
146
 Smith’s own interpretation 
of the above extract as affirmation of the legalistic tenet that “The person must not be guided 
by his own subjectivistic understandings of what is good and evil, but must submit to the 
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 would most certainly fail to find a single dissenting voice amongst 
legalistic proponents. Similarly, legalists would be unanimous in their support for Smith’s 
elaboration of the notion that while Veritatis Splendor takes care to acknowledge personalism 
or the dignity of the individual, the universality of the natural law is stressed throughout the 
document. To substantiate this claim, Smith cites a passage from the document, which, in her 
view, speaks especially to the point: 
 . . . the natural law involves universality. Inasmuch as it is inscribed 
in the rational nature of the person, it makes itself felt to all beings 
endowed with reason and living in history . . . inasmuch as the natural 
law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation 
for his fundamental rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and 
its authority extends to all mankind. This universality does not ignore 
the individuality of human beings, nor is it opposed to the absolute 
uniqueness of each person. On the contrary, it embraces at its root 
each person's free acts, which are meant to bear witness to the 
universality of the true good.
148
 
While the above passage addresses the parallel consideration of the universality of natural law 
with the dignity of the human person and his or her individuality and uniqueness,
149
 it can be 
argued that, for the legalistic model, it represents a grand apologia for its principles in general. 
4.1 Contrasting Assessments by Hogan of Papal Participation in the 
subjectivist/objectivist Debate  
 In referring to Finnis’ thoughts regarding the universal and the objective in ethics and 
in the task of conscience, note must be taken of the fact that his thinking and teaching can be 
interpreted as forceful re-iterations of Pope Pius XII’s well attested opposition to the position 
adopted by the so-called Situationist philospophers, ethicists and theologians of the mid-
twentieth century. Moderate situationists claimed that “the moral law should not be regarded 
as immutable . . . [that] moral theology should deal with persons in their concrete 









particularities . . . [and] that morality involves discerning ethical obligation by examining the 
situation itself.”
150
 Supporters of situationism were in direct contrast with that of the neo-
Thomism of the manuals which outlined “a concept of universal human nature against which 
the particularities of individual existence were insignificant.”
151
 
 Such a situational-driven change in emphases, is characterised by Hogan, herself, as a 
“turn to the subject,”
152
 a process whereby “Real human beings rather than abstract human 
nature became the subject of theological reflection.”
153
 While Hogan cites a number of mid-
twentieth century theologians, who maintained that “it was impossible to speak of human 
beings as though they were all essentially the same, regardless of their culture, history or 
language,”
154
 it is to Karl Rahner’s theological anthropology that she turns for an elaboration 
of his premise that “one could not speak of human beings in terms of immutable essences.”
155
 
Hogan points out further that Rahner’s model “was based on identifying the material, 
biological and spiritual dimensions of the person,
156
 each of which highlights his 
uniqueness.”
157
 Hence, in her view, Rahner would designate any conceptualisation of human 
nature as being essentially transhistorical and universal as inappropriate.
158
 Hogan sees the 
adopting of Rahner’s thinking as having crucial consequences in the area of moral theology. 
Specifically, she points out that where such a discipline has its basis in human personhood, it 
will differ substantially from one that is rooted in human nature, in that, instead of treating 
the human subject as an ahistorical, trans-cultural being, the particularity and the complexity 
of each subject or person will be acknowledged.
159
 It is for this reason that she writes 
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approvingly of Kevin Kelly’s summarising of the work of moral theologians over the past 
thirty years, a summary which “suggests that one consider the moral agent as ‘a subject, part 
of the material world, inter-relational with other persons, an interdependent social being, 
historical, equal but unique, called to know and worship God.’”
160
 
 Hogan, however, proceeds to identify one other crucial characteristic that pertains to 
the nature and identity of the person, namely that “we are always persons in process and that 
our identities are multilayered, multiple, ambiguous, and necessarily shaped by factors which 
are beyond either our consciousness or our control.”
161
 In her estimation, “persons are 
constituted in a complex unity of fragmentary and varying narratives, commitments and 
values that change over time and may pull us in different directions.”
162
 In support of this 
stance, she cites the feminist theorist, Rosi Brodotti, who describes persons “as nomadic 
subjects ever changing,”
163
 as well as the reluctance on the part of Judith Butler to accept that 
any unifying sense of personal identity exists.
164
 Even those feminists, like Seyla Benhabib, 
who maintain that it is possible to talk about a self and about personal identity, qualify their 
assertion with the stipulation that this can only be done in a provisional and partial manner, 




 The concept of the human person and morality that Hogan sought to portray to Finnis 
and proponents of the legalistic approach illustrates the fact of “a change in the way the 
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relationship between history and reality was conceptualised.”
166
 What this shift had achieved 
according to her was to challenge  
The classical understanding of reality, based on immutable and fixed 
essences, with the controlling norms being universal and fixed for all 
time. Instead, philosophers argued that change and evolution comprise 
part of the natural condition of human beings.
167
 
In consequence, Pius XII’s unreserved condemnation of “situation ethics” and thinking 
underlying such philosophy in 1952 and 1956 has been deemed as an attempt to uphold 
legalistic teachings about the human person and morality.
168
 Hogan notes that the Pope’s first 
area of concern focused on the situationist assertion that morality is fluid and changing, an 
assertion; he derives from the situationist belief in an evolving human nature.
169
 By making 
such a criticism, according to Hogan, Pius XII is rejecting the view that morality must be read 
from the situation, insisting instead that “it can be determined by the mechanical application 
of pre-determined universal laws to each particular situation.”
170
 Furthermore, she observes 
that in the Pope’s view, these moral laws were to be regarded as absolute and unchanging.
171
 
With regard to the source of Pius XII’s second objection, Hogan points out that it is related 
“to the way in which situationists think of the role of conscience in the moral life.”
172
 She 
specifically notes the Pope’s cutting criticism that where situationists accept their own 
principles and put them into practice, “they assert and teach that men are preserved or easily 
liberated from many otherwise insoluble ethical conflicts when each one judges in his own 
conscience, not primarily according to objective laws, but by means of that internal individual 
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light based on personal intuition, what he must do in a concrete situation.”
173
 Such 
unequivocal Papal condemnation, however, is driven not only by a deep-seated opposition to 
the principles of situationism itself, but by an almost virulent antagonism towards the 
relativistic values, in the direction of which the situationist principles appeared to be 
inexorably propelled. 
 While Hogan has not explicitly commented on the particular stance adopted by 
Benedict XVI in the relativist-situationist debate, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger sounded a dark 
note when, in a homily he delivered at the Conclave that subsequently elected him as Pope 
Benedict XVI, he raised the spectre of a societal “dictatorship of relativism” to which the 
church must respond.
174
 He warned his fellow Cardinals that “We are building a dictatorship 
of relativism that does not recognize anything as definitive and whose ultimate goal consists 
solely of one’s own ego and desires.”
175
 He went on to remind those same Cardinals 
accordingly: “We, however, have a different goal: the Son of God, the true man. He is the 
measure of true humanism. An ‘adult’ faith is not a faith that follows the trends of fashion 
and the latest novelty; a mature adult faith is deeply rooted in friendship with Christ.”
176
 
 Hogan’s criticisms of Pius XII’s statements give us an insight into what she would 
consider inappropriate or even alien in the articulation of a new paradigm of moral theology. 
She observed, for example, that whenever Pius XII commented on the role of conscience in 
situation ethics, it was always in terms of (i) “the role given to the intuition and interior 
judgement of the person,” (ii) his own deep reluctance to accept moral insight of this kind, 
and (iii) his explicit support for emphasising the rational dimensions of moral decision 
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 Hogan’s response to such Papal criticism and teaching was to point out that in 
condemning moral insight as he did, Pius XII had “failed to recognise a truth long accepted in 
the Catholic tradition that reason is but one component of moral decision making.”
178
 Indeed, 
she acknowledges the correctness of John Mahoney’s claim that Vatican II and much 
subsequent papal teaching on morality “have stressed the importance of not limiting moral 
decision making to its rational components.” 
179
  
 Hogan claims, however, that it was not so much the relationship between reason and 
moral insight which seriously troubled Pius XII, but rather the pastoral implications of 
acknowledging the importance of personal moral insight.
180
 While she does not explicitly say 
so, her subsequent argument appears to suggest that the core concern for Pius XII centred on 
the possibility of a diminution or weakening of the moral authority that was being wielded by 
the magisterium, and in particular by its central figure, the Pope, himself. Hence, she argues 
that while the tradition did naturally “recognise the legitimate functioning of the individual 
conscience in the moral life . . . its sphere of activity was carefully circumscribed by ‘the 
object of the moral law.’”
181
 In Hogan’s estimation, such “careful” legalistic monitoring 
resulted in excessive emphasis being placed on the external action, to the detriment of the 
attention, she maintained, that should be paid to the intention of the actor or to the 
circumstances in which the act, itself, was performed.
182
 In an attempt to rectify such a 
perceived imbalance, situation ethics, according to Hogan, “sought to re-establish the 
importance of intentionality in the moral realm,”
183
 an attempt that she saw as having 
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foundational implications for the prevailing legalistic paradigm if it succeeded.
184
 Essentially, 
Pius XII’s fears, and those of the legalistic persuasion, would be realised, in that “Moral 
authority would move away from universal pronouncements about the objective morality of 
particular acts and toward the individual in his or her particular situation,” with the role of 
conscience being similarly transformed.
185
  
 Is it possible to interpret Hogan’s spirited and insightful rejection of Pius XII’s anti 
relativist-situationist teachings as an unconditional declaration that there is no room 
whatsoever at the “personalist-legalistic inn” for objective moral orders or norms? According 
to Hogan, herself, this would not be a valid assumption; she noted that both paradigms 
actually “share a vision of ethics that involves the subjective discernment of the objective 
moral orders.”
186
 She goes on to point out, however, that the disagreements that exist between 
them “relate to how the objective or divine elements are known to the individual. The 
legalistic model insists that they are known through church teaching. The personalist model 
puts stress on the individual as the primary interpreter.”
187
 It is obvious, then, that even where 
elements of agreement between both models can be found, many more areas of fundamental 
disagreements are hovering just out of sight.  
 Hence proponents of the legalistic model can complain about the reluctance of 
personalist advocates to agree with the notion that principles and norms can be absolute in 
anything other than the most general and abstract terms.
188
 Dismissing such a complaint 
would not be such an easy task if it were addressed in terms of the statement by Veritatis 
Splendor, that “universal and permanent laws correspond to things known by practical reason 
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and are applied to particular acts through the judgement of conscience.”
189
 On the other hand, 
however, Hogan, herself, complains that 
while the principle of development and change in the church’s moral 
doctrine is widely accepted, individual moral doctrines are presented 
as if they were universal in their scope, exceptionless in their 
application and timeless in character. In short, when it comes to 
particular moral teachings, the possibility of change and development, 
which is conceded in the abstract, is rarely acknowledged. As a result 
certain moral teachings, such as those relating to contraception, 
homosexuality, or divorce and remarriage, are invested with an 
unwarranted degree of certainty and inflexibility.
190
 
Such rigidness in the Church’s moral teachings has many sources. However relevant to the 
legalist-personalist debate, one fundamental issue has been the position held by advocates of 
the personalist model that “the objective rightness or wrongness of an action can only be 
judged by taking account of the circumstances and the intention, not by ignoring them.”
191
 
Elaborating further on her persistent challenging of the notion of an exceptionless, universal 
and timeless morality, Hogan reiterates that “the moral meaning of an act cannot be 
determined by examining the object alone . . . that the intention, circumstances and 
consequences also have a direct bearing on the nature of the act performed.”
192
 Continuing 
her challenge, she asserts her belief that “Moral acts are not isolated, single actions that can 
be separated from the context in which they are performed.”
193
 In support of this assertion 
she cites Kenneth Melchin’s observation that moral acts be recognised as “complex unities 
involving decisions, historical contexts surrounding the decisions, goals intended by the 
decisions, and consequences that follow on the decisions.”
194
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 Hogan notes equally that the role given to conscience as it shifts from the legalistic 
model in the direction of the personalist model is changing. She demonstrates how, under the 
absolutist requirements of the legalistic model, conscience, in fact did not have a purpose.
195
 
In support of this claim, she observed that where a principle declares that stealing or killing is 
wrong, but, “in the process takes absolutely no account of the circumstances in which these 
actions are performed, then the role of conscience is redundant. If morality is simply about 
applying these specific concrete principles to one’s actions then there is no need for 
conscience. It has no purpose.”
196
 However, according to her, where norms and principles are 
“regarded as guides for behaviour, guides that “point us in a particular direction and highlight 
some aspects of morality that are relevant to the situation,” while at the same time not being 
thought of “as absolute or universal in their purchase,”
197
 the role of conscience is restored.
198
 
She therefore sets out for the advocates of the legalistic model, the terms under which their 
principles will be accommodated at the ‘inn’ of her new paradigm. As far as she is concerned: 
Norms and principles are important sources of moral wisdom and 
guidance. Traditional principles such as intrinsic evil remind us that 
we are dealing with very grave situations. They retain a very 
important role in informing and educating our conscience in moral 
sensitivity. However, they do not replace the conscience, nor do they 
provide us with shortcuts to making decisions . . . The conscience 
remains the centre of moral discernment.
199
 
 It can be argued, however, that Linda Hogan would not be satisfied to have her 
approach to morality and to conscience viewed simply in terms of a response or challenge to 
the principles of the legalistic paradigm. Her writings, particularly, Confronting the Truth, 
show that she is intent on expressly developing a personalist theology of conscience. 
Consequently, she purports: “In this new theological framework conscience denotes both the 
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fundamental orientation of the person to seek and to do the good, and the actualization of this 
desire in decisions of conscience.”
200
 If this is the case, then the purpose of her critiques of the 
legalistic model, in the course of the elaboration of her own model, may be seen as an effort 
to galvanise support for the personalist model, through emphasising the deficiencies of the 
other. As we have dealt at length with the fundamental principles of the legalistic approach 
thus far, we will now focus on the main thoughts of Hogan’s personalist theology of 
conscience. 
5. A Personalist Moral Theology and Personalist Theology of Conscience 
 We can maintain evidently that an understanding of the development of a personalist 
moral theology can serve to facilitate the comprehension of a personalist theology of 
conscience. Hogan highlighted how factors such as situation ethics debate, resistance to neo-
Thomist theory and historical consciousness brought about certain re-conceptualisations in 
theology and in particular, moral theology. She specifically demonstrated how the 
introduction of historical consciousness in moral theology resulted in the transformation of 
ethics, a transformation that enabled the personalist model of moral theology promote the 
notion that human experience be regarded as a vital source of moral insight and 
discernment.
201
 In conjunction with this inclusion of human experience into the Catholic 
moral process, the personalist paradigm, as noted earlier, also reopened the debate on the 
relationship between actions, circumstances and intentions in moral theology. Specifically, it 
has been noted that whilst the legalistic model focused on acts, personalist moral theologians 
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5.1 A Personalist Re-Conceptualisation of Norms and Principles 
 Another interesting re-conceptualisation which personalist moral theology brings to 
the development of a personalist theology of conscience is evidenced in the manner in which 
it seeks to portray norms and principles. As already noted, the personalist approach has 
challenged the notion of a legalistic understanding of the existence and application of 
absolute, exceptionless and universal norms and principles in all moral contexts. Hogan, 
herself, enters this debate, by asserting that there actually exist three different kinds of moral 
principle,—formal, tautological and material.
203
 With regard to the first two, she finds 
nothing controversial. Of the formal principle, for example, she comments that it is merely “a 
general, abstract principle identifying a particular value . . . [but] it tells us nothing about the 
morality of a particular action.”
204
 It is for this reason; Hogan maintains that it can be 
regarded “as universal in its scope.”
205
 She finds tautological principles equally as 
unproblematic; citing the example “Murder is wrong,” she explains that because the term 
murder means a killing that is unjustified, it is universal in its application because “it is 
possible to say that it is always and everywhere wrong to engage in unjustified killing.”
206
 It 
is concerning the third or material form of moral principle, however, Hogan and other 
advocates of the personalist approach express most disquiet. As already noted, Hogan 
asserted that: 
If a principle claims that stealing is wrong or killing is wrong, and in 
the process takes absolutely no account of the circumstances in which 
these actions are performed, then the role of conscience is redundant . 
. . However if, as the revisionists suggest, these principles are 
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5.2 A Personalist Approach to “Intrinsic Evil” 
 However, this debate on the material form of moral principles raises another issue for 
Hogan; it brings into focus the issue of the existence of intrinsic evil within the personalist 
model of Catholic moral theology. The problem for Hogan and other Catholic personalist 
theologians is that the concept of intrinsic evil emphasises the notion that certain acts are 
morally wrong no matter the intention, circumstances or consequences.
208
 In terms of the task 
of conscience, then, it can never entertain the possibility of carrying out those acts, which, in 
effect, means that such a prohibition “is absolutely and universally binding on the 
conscience.”
209
 In turn, this conclusion essentially means that conscience itself cannot 
exercise any role, because it has no role to exercise. That such a moral position on intrinsic 
evil is still strongly maintained at the level of the magisterium is demonstrated in Veritatis 
Splendor, wherein John Paul II declared: 
[T]he negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete 
actions or kinds of behaviour as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any 
legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally 
acceptable way, for the “creativity” of any contrary determination 
whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a 
universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is 




Janet E. Smith does not see the Church’s position as outlined in Veritatis Splendor in such cut 
and dried terms. She draws attention to a later reference wherein the Pope appears to invoke 
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the existence of intrinsic evil in terms of the need to protect the personal dignity and 
inviolability of all human persons. Hence, John Paul II asserts that: 
The relationship between faith and morality shines forth with all its 
brilliance in the unconditional respect due to the insistent demands of 
the personal dignity of every man, demands protected by those moral 
norms which prohibit without exception actions which are intrinsically 
evil. The universality and the immutability of the moral norm make 
manifest and at the same time serve to protect the personal dignity and 




However, while Smith, herself, seeks to represent this extract as an “overlap of natural law 
and personalism,”
212
 Hogan’s personalist attitude is less accommodating and far more 
combative, as she seeks to restore the role of conscience within a personalist model of moral 
theology.
213
 According to her, the main thrust of the personalist moral theological response to 
the notion of “intrinsic evil” has been “to expand the meaning of the moral act and to define it 
in terms of object, circumstances and intention, not in terms of the object alone.”
214
 In her 
own words, she claims: 
One can only speak of particular acts being wrong because of the 
intention of the person performing them in a specific context. 
However, such judgements pertain to specific situations, known in all 
their aspects, and not to ‘kinds’ or ‘classes’ of acts described without 
reference to circumstances and intention. 
215
 
Although Hogan concedes that the principles of “intrinsic evil” remind us “that we are dealing 
with very grave situations. . . [and] retain a very important role in informing and educating 
our consciences in moral sensitivity,” she is emphatic in her declaration that they do not 
replace the individual’s conscience.
216
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5.3 Revitalization of the Moral Authority of the Individual 
 Hogan asserts that another area of serious consideration for personalist Catholic moral 
theology is the “fresh emphasis on the moral authority of the individual.”
217
 Elaborating on 
her own understanding of what the moral authority of the individual entails for Catholic 
personalist moral theology, she states: 
In the Christian tradition, moral responsibility resides with the 
individual and cannot be circumvented by even the most precise and 
illuminating advice or teaching, regardless of the source. This is the 
case whether there is agreement or disagreement between the faithful 
and the magisterium. It is also the case even when the person is 
genuinely confused about the right decision in a particular context.
218
 
Situating the understanding of the Christian tradition of conscience within this sphere of 
moral authority, Hogan strongly reminds Catholics that although they may often displace their 
own moral authority and responsibility onto the magisterium, Pope or Church, because they 
themselves can find it too burdensome to bear, they must keep in mind that since “moral 
responsibility resides with the individual. . . [it] cannot be circumvented by even the most 
precise and illuminating advice or teaching, regardless of the source.”
219
 In the words of 
Colavechio,  
If in any given case, the choice a Christian makes is contrary to the 
judgement of the Church, he cannot disclaim personal responsibility 
simply be refusing to consider one choice or the other. If one cannot 
reconcile the choice of his conscience with the teaching of the Church, 
he nevertheless must make a responsible choice, one which will 
manifest himself as authentically as possible. 
220
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Indeed, Colavechio proceeds even further, he follows his caution that “It might be dangerous 
and even presumptuous to prefer a personal choice to the magisterium,”
221
 with the strong 
and unequivocal reminder that 
Should one choose to follow the magisterium, he must be ready to 
accept the responsibility for preferring it to his own judgement. Even 
here, one cannot avoid personal responsibility; one must in all choices 
strive to maintain the unity of his being and its expressions.
222
 
It is quite obvious then that Hogan’s understanding of the moral authority residing in the 
individual is in complete contrast with the teaching tradition of Germain Grisez, for example, 
a tradition which advocates that conscience must unconditionally conform to the teachings of 
the magisterium. As will be seen later, such emphasis on the primacy of conscience promotes 
dissent from certain teachings of the church. 
 Despite the strong stance that Hogan promotes on the notion of the personal authority 
of the individual, she maintains that personalist moral theology does not seek to promote 
individualism or isolationism, but rather seeks to promote that norms, moral principles, and 
church teaching should not be deemed to replace conscience as the only moral authority upon 
which a person should act.
223
 Hogan proceeds to point out numerous sources of wisdom 
available to an individual as the person engages in the moral tasks of conscience. She 
maintains, for example, that: 
Sacred texts and traditions of the church, too, are recognised as 
excellent sources of moral insight and discernment. The community in 
which we live and worship is also vital since it educates us in the 
vision and virtues of our faith. The fund of norms, principles, texts, 
traditions and witness within the church provides us with a rich source 
of moral insight. Together with the ongoing dialogue about our 
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behaviour in the world, which is properly the task of the church, these 
resources help us to unravel our moral confusions and uncertainties.
224
 
Furthermore, if, as Lottin has already suggested, a Christian theological morality is all about 
being a disciple of Christ, Hogan would also undoubtedly agree with the thrust of 
Colavechio’s assertion that 
as one progresses and establishes an ever deeper relationship with 
Christ and becomes more aware of this relationship, and its 
implications, he begins to be able to make decisions which are more 
and more in a Christian vein. He becomes aware of himself, not only 
as this person, but as this person who has a special relationship with 
Jesus Christ. . . We do not develop that understanding of Christ and 
relationship with him in a vacuum. We arrive at this understanding 
through the interplay of ourselves with the Word, The Cup, and the 
People, i.e., by our understanding of the Word of God as it is revealed 
to us, by our participation in the sacramental system, and by the 
interaction of the People of God, the Church and the individual. 
225
 
 Hogan would also undoubtedly agree with another observation from Colavechio to 
the effect that since people’s awareness of Christ and of the meaning of Christ in their lives is 
intimately connected with their awareness of the authentic Christ as he exists today, they 
must remain open to the magisterium in all of its teachings. 
226
 Hogan, however, would just 
as equally insist that a Catholic personalist moral theology should lay emphasis on the moral 
authority of the individual conscience and not on magisterium.
227
 She maintains that:  
when one is interested in the action in relation to the person who is 
performing it, motivation is a crucial factor. Obedient adherence to 
norms and principles, although perhaps admirable in itself, is not a 
substitute for a freely chosen, genuinely motivated decision.
228
 
In her view, although, the Church, the magisterium, the Community and tradition itself, for 
example may sometimes prove to be “excellent sources of moral insight and discernment . . . 













[they] do not in any sense replace the activity of conscience, which is an essential dimension 
of the moral life of the individual.”
229
  
 The significance of such a shift brought about by the re-conceptualisations and 
refocusing activities of a Catholic personalist moral theology is summed up by Thomas D. 
Williams who remarked: “The centrality of the human person in moral theology represents a 
shift of emphasis from a more nomothetic framework to an ethics based on philosophical and 
theological anthropology.”
230
 In lay terms, Williams is referring to a shift in focus and 
emphasis away from Law and on to the human being. It now remains to be seen how such a 
personalist-orchestrated shift will specifically characterise the concept of conscience.  
5.4 “The Person Integrally and Adequately Considered” in relation to the Personalist 
Model of Conscience  
 As noted earlier, Gula identified European theologians such as Bernard Häring, Josef 
Fuchs, Bruno Schuller, Louis Janssens, and the American theologians, Richard McCormick 
and Charles Curran, as modern-day moral theologians who favoured solving moral problems 
and clarifying the rightness or wrongness of actions from a personalist rather than from a 
legalistic perspective. In fact, it is agreed that their personalist, moral theological stance 
permeate the teachings that emanated from Vatican II, and subsequently triggered much of 
the post-conciliar discussions within the discipline of Catholic moral theology. 
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5.4.1 Häring’s Model of Conscience: a Product of a Personalist Model of Moral 
Theology 
 The preceding claim could be said to be particularly true of Häring, who, unlike  other 
moral theologians, participated in and drafted documents for the Council,
231
 and whose 
influence was such that Keenan cites John O’Malley as stating that the style of the Council 
itself was clearly Häring’s.
232 
To get a flavour of Häring’s style, then, one need only read 
Keenan’s citation of O’Malley’s in which he states that 
The style of the council was invitational. It was new for a council in 
that it replicated to a remarkable degree the style the Fathers of the 
Church used in their sermons, treatises and commentaries down to the 
advent of Scholasticism in the 13th century. The Scholastic style was 
essentially based on dialectics, the art of debate, the art of proving 
one’s enemies wrong. But the style the council adopted was based, as 
was the style of the early Fathers for the most part, on rhetoric, the art 
of persuasion, the art of finding common ground. That is the art that 
will enable previously disagreeing parties to join in action for a 
common cause. The style was invitational in that it looked to 
motivation and called for conversion. It looked to winning assent to its 
teachings rather than imposing it.
233
 
This is indicative of Häring’s influence in the area of moral theology, because, according to 
Keenan: “Style is not content-less; on the contrary, it shapes the text, the community, the 
Church.”
234 
Such contextualisation is important in assessing Häring’s teaching and thinking, 
because amongst other things, he is renowned, not only for his work in Catholic moral 
theology, but also for his extensive work on the nature and role of conscience.  
 While Häring’s treatment of the concept of conscience in his work, The Law of Christ, 
describes it as the moral faculty,
235
 his approach to the same concept in his subsequent post-
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conciliar work, Free and Faithful in Christ, seeks to present a personalist-driven 
understanding of conscience.
236
 In this work, he opens his discussion with the most cited 
passage of Vatican II’s document (GS no.16) on conscience, before proceeding to define 
conscience as “the person’s moral faculty, the inner core and sanctuary where one knows 
oneself in confrontation with God and with fellowmen.”
237 
His situating of conscience in a 
context of mutual confrontation with self, God and neighbour, suggests, according to Keenan 
that Häring had come to realise “the need to develop not a conforming, obediential moral 
theology, but rather one that summoned conscientious Christians to a responsive and 
responsible life of discipleship.
238
 In what some might interpret as a declaration of the 
primacy of conscience, he follows on with the assertion that: “There is something unique — 
one might even say ‘untouchable’ — about the conscience . . . it is the judgment of a person 
on his or her journey towards ever fuller light.”
239
 However, his teaching on the notion of the 
“reciprocity of consciences” can be taken as a reminder that, when dealing with the concept 
of conscience, cognisance must be taken of the existence of the relationship between the 
individual and other relationships such as one’s community and institutional authority.
240
 
Hence, he maintains that 
The main focus of a personalist Christian ethics is . . . on the human 
person and the reciprocity of conscience. We give greater attention to 
the individuality of persons and the uniqueness of historical occasions, 
although this does not at all rule out the need for serious study of the 
ethical traditions, norms and rules.
241
 
Häring, however, is also keenly aware that the individual conscience functions in relationship 
that is far more than institutional authority. Hogan cites a description of the notion of 
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“reciprocity of conscience” by Häring, wherein he is seen to extend its obligations to all 
members of humankind. In the citation, he maintains: 
I discover that dignity and strength of my own conscience through a 
profound respect for the conscience of my neighbour, and indeed for 
the conscience of every other human being. A genuine reciprocity of 
consciences is founded on freedom – freedom to love, freedom to 
listen to each other, freedom to help one another discover the 
innermost resources of truth, goodness and justice.
242
 
True to one of the fundamental aspects of the personalist approach to Catholic personalist 
moral theology, however, namely its commitment to focusing on the person, rather than on 
the law, Häring asserts that 
As a basic rule of preference, personalism stresses that persons must 
never be sacrificed for things, that conscience of persons ought never 
to be manipulated, and that healthy personal relations and community 
structures are more important than merely biological or other ‘laws’ 
pertaining to the subhuman world.
243
 
The passion underlying such an unequivocal declaration may have been generated by the fact 
that not only had he, himself, experienced being before military courts on four occasions 
during the Second World War, twice on matters of life or death, but had also witnessed how 
many of his fellow Christians had “recognized the truth, were convicted by it, and stood firm 
with it.”
244
 According to Keenan, it was these experiences that “irretrievably disposed him to 
the agenda of developing a moral theology that aimed for the bravery, solidarity, and 
truthfulness of those committed Christians he met in the war,” and that led him to find truth 
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6. Hogan’s Core Delineation of Conscience from a Personalist Model of Moral Theology 
 It is hoped that the preceding account of Häring’s situating of his construction of a 
Catholic personalist conscience within an experientially-driven and ever-evolving model of 
Catholic personalist moral theology, will help contextualise Hogan’s twenty-first century 
efforts at further personalising the notion of the Catholic conscience. She seeks to 
contextualise her own efforts by firstly outlining some traditional constructions of conscience 
– its habitual and actual components – to elaborate both the nature and the role of 
conscience. By habitual Hogan is traditionally referring to the innate sense of good and evil 
that all human beings are believed to possess; while by actual she refers to the concrete 
judgments of conscience in which the innate orientation towards good must be manifested.
246
 
Again, with reference to earlier traditional understandings of the notion of conscience, Hogan 
observes that the “habitual conscience corresponded to the term synderesis while the actual 
conscience corresponded to conscientia.”
247
 Hence, Hogan points out that the traditional 
church teaching of conscience had dual meaning whereby conscience is understood first and 
foremost as the “orientation to the good” a concept encapsulated by the term synderesis.
248
 
However, conscience is also understood to mean the “concrete decisions of conscience,” 
tasks which were seen to be the work of conscientia.
249
 Hogan goes on to note that although 
Thomas Aquinas managed to integrate the habitual and actual dimensions of conscience, this 
integrated model eventually “gave way to a theology pre-occupied with the morality of 
discrete compartmentalised decisions.”
250
 The implication of such a development, according 
to Hogan, was that theologians now focused on “the morality of contraception, of in vitro 
fertilisation and of warfare,” for example, rather than focus on the character and values of the 
                                                             
246











person who chose to engage in such activities.
251
 Specifically, she maintains that a personalist 
theology would demand that attention be paid not only to actions, not only on the workings of 
the actual conscience, for example, but also to “the character of the person and to her/his 
orientation vis-à-vis good and evil.”
252
 Hogan states that this is happening to the extent that in 
traditional terms the spotlight is once again on the workings of the habitual conscience. 
However, she maintains that the crucial difference that personalism will make to this shift is 
that it will place “the individual at the centre of moral inquiry and understanding.”
253
 Hogan 
interprets such a refocusing and re-emphasis as demonstrating evidence of “a radical change 
of emphasis and a reordering of the significance attached to acts and character,”
 254
  whereby, 
in personalist moral theological terms conscience will now denote “the fundamental 
orientation of the person to seek and do the good, and the actualisation of this desire in 
decisions of conscience.”
255
 Hogan’s description of and support for this shift in emphasis 
from action to the person in understanding the tasks of conscience is reiterated by Richard 
Gula, who unambiguously stated: 
Of morality’s two points of reference—actions and persons—more 
often than not, we associate morality with actions: ‘What is the right 
thing to do?’ This should come as no great surprise once we look in 
the rearview mirror and see where moral theology has been. Shifting 
from action to the person is not abandoning our interest in right action, 




Evidence of the promotion of this shift to “the personal context” is what made Colavechio, 
three decades before Hogan’s personalist theorising to describe conscience “as a harmonious 
production of man’s personality.”
257
 We could argue that Hogan’s personalist theorising is a 
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reiteration of much of what Colavechio has written. She would certainly support him in his 
attempts to expand the task of conscience beyond the narrow scope of intellect and will. She 
would have no problem in integrating into her own model such dimensions as: (i) considering 
the human person in the totality of relationships; or (ii) considering the choices made in terms 
of the personality of the actor; (iii) or interiorising “the conscience of man in the very depths 
of his being.” Hence, there is little difference between Colavechio’s and Hogan’s personalist 
understanding of the task of conscience: for Colavechio, conscience is about harmony;
258
 for 




6.1 Integration of the Fundamental Option into the Personalist Model of Conscience 
 In this new theological framework, according to Hogan, conscience possesses a 
number of denotations. Besides being “the fundamental orientation to seek and do the good, 
and the actualisation of this desire in decisions of conscience,”
260 
it denotes “the integrated 
and consistent thrust of the person toward goodness.”
261 
Nevertheless, Hogan introduces 
another construct by which she describes conscience as “the dimension of one’s character 
that determines the direction of one’s moral life, one’s self-conscious option for good.”
262
 
This for her is fundamental to any personalist description of conscience. Upon this, she 
introduces the notion of “fundamental option,” a construct, which she maintains is “crucial 
for rethinking the nature of conscience.”
263
  
 According to her, this notion of the fundamental option initially evolved from an 
effort to rethink the theology of sin, and in that context claimed that such a theology “should 
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focus primarily on the basic direction of a person’s life, on his or her fundamental option, 
rather than on individual acts of failure.”
264
 Hogan’s personalist model, however, broadens 
the concept beyond the remit of sin by describing it thus: 
The fundamental option is the term given to the basic orientation of a 
person’s life, either toward or against God. At a person’s core she/he 
either responds to the loving invitation of God, or she/he refuses it. A 
life lived in the context of a ‘yes’ response is a life oriented toward 
seeking goodness. A fundamental option that says no to such an 
invitation is directed away from this search.
265 
 
Elaborating further, Hogan observes that because “Each person’s fundamental option is 
actualised in the particular decisions that she/he makes and the virtues or vices that are 
cultivated,” then, relative to the task of conscience, it is through the “daily choices and ways 
of being, repeated over a lifetime,” that a pattern is developed, which, in turn, reveals the 
person’s fundamental option for good or for evil.
266
 However, according to Hogan, the daily 
choices and decisions made by a person not only express the fundamental option, they also 
reinforce it. This suggests to her that rather than being a static product, it must be considered 
to be a dynamic process “never fully determined once and for all,” but created instead “in 
repeated moments of choosing the good over a lifetime.”
267
 
 Such a re-interpretation of the fundamental option carries a number of implications 
for Hogan’s personalist model of conscience. Firstly, it suggests to Hogan, for example, that 
decisions of conscience are not simply reflections of the person’s fundamental option because 
“It is in and through the choices made, both at significant moments in one’s life and in the 
daily routine of minor ‘acts of attention’ that the person determines her/his basic 
orientation.”
268
 Incorporating her notion of the fundamental option into the personalist model 













of conscience, in Hogan’s view, also facilitates an understanding of conscience that connects 
intimately “the kind of person one is and the actions one performs.”
269
 Given Hogan’s 
repeated repudiation of any notion of conscience that is mostly preoccupied with adherence 
to rules and laws, this connecting of actor to action is crucial to her model of conscience, 
because it appears to assert that “the formation of conscience takes place, not by some 
superficial adherence to rules and laws but rather in working toward goodness rather than evil 
or indifference in every context, no matter how trivial.
270
 Furthermore, by embodying her 
interpretation of the fundamental option dimension into her model of conscience, Hogan is 
re-imagining conscience itself “as a continuous process, as an orientation embodied in 
different contexts and related, not only to past and present, but also to the person’s future.”
271
 
Most importantly for her model, however, Hogan’s integration of the fundamental option into 
her personalist model of conscience seeks to both broaden and redefine the notion of 
conscience, such that, from a personalist perspective, conscience is re-presented as the 
“promotion of the good of the person ‘integrally and adequately considered.” Such an 
expansion, Hogan claims, can be seen in her inclusion within the remit of conscience “both 
the (always incomplete) integrated moral character of the person, and the actions that flow 
from this and which embody her/his attraction to moral goodness.”
272 
She goes so far as to 
claim that such a “dual emphasis on the direction of the person’s life and on the actions that 
she/he performs has become a corner-stone of the personalist model.”
273
 Finally, Hogan seeks 
to substantiate her claim that much of what is required to enable the construction of such an 
integrated and redefined model of conscience by contending: 
This conceptualisation of conscience gives most attention to the way 
in which moments of choosing and ways of relating are patterned into 
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a unity that is the moral self. It allows one to expand discussions of 
conscience to include considerations of how the emotions, intuitions 
and imagination of the person shape the moral character. It also 
focuses attention on the role that the wider community (both secular 
and religious) has in forming the orientation of the conscience. In 
short, it requires us to abandon the reductionism characteristic of an 
earlier theology, which was concerned primarily with acts and with 
specific, unconnected decisions of conscience.
274
 
 We can remark then that to the extent that her contentions vis-à-vis the tasks of 
conscience and the exercising of the fundamental option are validated, then they should put a 
stop to her fears that some of the language about conscience can give “a false impression of 
our reality as persons” since “It can suggest that the person is constituted by one singular and 
unitary narrative.”
275
 This, in turn, however, begs the question as to who Hogan considers the 
person to be in relation to conscience. She insists that “persons are constituted in a complex 
unity of fragmentary and varying narratives, commitments and values that change over time 
and may pull us in different directions.”
 276
 Earlier in the chapter, she has already been quoted 
as stating that when she speaks about either the nature of the person or personal identity “it is 
with a recognition that we are always persons in process and that our identities are 
multilayered, multiple, ambiguous and necessarily shaped by factors which are beyond either 
our consciousness or our control.”
277
 In the light of such an interactive and dynamic 
collection of complexities both in the nature and the formation of the person, Hogan would 
argue, for example, that any attempt to reduce the notion of the tasks of conscience to a 
simple adherence to laws and principles, through enacting intellectually-driven and 
rationally-underpinned decisions and choices would be to miss the point entirely. Instead, she 
argues that her model is more suited to dealing with “the complex unity of fragmentary and 
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varying narratives, commitments and values that change over time”
278
 that actually constitute 
the personalist possessor of a conscience, since as stated earlier, it allows for the expansion of 
conscience to include considerations of how the emotions, intuitions and imagination of the 
person for, example shape, the moral character and conscience.
279
 It is to these dynamics and 
others that we now look, as they elaborate, from Hogan’s personalist perspective, how it is 
possible for the conscience of such a complex being to arrive at harmonious and unified 
decisions and judgement. 
6.2 Integrating the Inward Dynamics of the Human Person 
 The words of Colavechio are quite pertinent in this section, since he presents 
conscience in terms of dynamic struggles, drives, instincts, rifts and re-forming. Citing 
Häring, for example, Colavechio introduces the notion of conscience as “the spiritual instinct 
for self preservation, arising from the urge for complete unity and harmony.”
280
 This 
development arises from the scholastic teaching of Bonaventure’s notion of conscience which 
confers “its ultimate determination” upon the knowing intellectual faculty, but only insofar as 
it is united in some way “to the faculties of will and operation.”
281
 Hence, according to 
Häring, the spiritual instinct for self-preservation ‘kicks-in’, as it were, when the intellect and 
will in the soul fail to co-exist in a healthy manner, causing a split; this, in turn, causes “a 
profound rift in the soul, which wound demands to be healed.”
282
 In personalist terms, then, 
this rift that is demanding to be healed is, in fact, the conscience. Colavechio concludes from 
this dynamic that the person can only be one with him/herself if he/she is in accord with the 
true and the good.
283
 However, Colavechio cautions against identifying conscience solely in 
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terms of intellectual conclusions or motivating influences on the will.
284
 It is in this context 
that Colavechio proceeds to expand on his account of the motivating energy of conscience to 
include not only the instinctive drive for spiritual self-preservation through the healing of rifts 
between the intellect and the will, but also in terms of the person’s instinctive struggle for 
harmony in his existence “with the world around him, [and] with all those with whom he 
comes into contact.”
285
 Such a driving struggle is particularly demonstrated by the attempts a 
person will make to adjust the situation when such harmony ceases or fails to materialise. 
Such disharmony can occur within a person, according to Colavechio, when that person 
realises that “the manifestation of himself through his action does not conform to his 
awareness of who he is.”
286
 As with the relationship between the intellect and will, this 
disharmony also causes a rift, “profound rift in the very depths of man’s being.”
287
 The 
dynamic energising conscience, in this case, he denotes as a crying-out for healing. More 
than this, however, for Colavechio, the actual crying out is conscience.
288
  
 Another source of energy that drives the formation and functioning of conscience is 
one that derives from the person’s instinctive struggle for authenticity. Accordingly, for a 
person to choose to manifest who he or she authentically is, it is paramount that the action 
which they choose to perform or omit should manifest nothing else but themselves.
289
 When 
the opposite occurs, according to Colavechio, that is where the person chooses to perform or 
omit an action “which does not manifest that which he is aware of himself” and it will 
generate tension.
290
 For Colavechio, such an inner tension between the individual’s 
awareness of him/herself as they are and the manifestation of this awareness by their chosen 

















actions, can be called conscience.
291
 Interestingly, Christians are reminded that when they 
make a choice that does not reflect their awareness of the authoritative teaching of the 
Church, they are not only failing to manifest their baptismal relationship with Christ but they 
are also “not following that spiritual instinct of self-preservation, which is conscience,” and 
therefore will find themselves in tension.
292
 However, they are also reminded that in the event 
that they cannot reconcile the choice of their conscience with the teaching of the Church, they 
are required to make a choice which will manifest themselves as authentically as possible.
293
 
From a personalist perspective, however, whether this inner struggle for authenticity involves 
the individual’s relationship with him/herself, his/her neighbour, the Church or even with 
God, “This inner voice, this cry for authenticity, is conscience.”
294
 It is for this reason, 
therefore, that Colavechio asserts that: 
Conscience then, is not simply the intellect arriving at a judgement 
that this act is or is not in conformity with the norm of morality. Nor is 
it a drawing of the will to the good; rather it is the innermost voice of 
the self, at the very basis of our person, which says to man that he 
must be authentic . . . It is by refusing to listen to this call, this demand 
for unity and authenticity within ourselves, that we, in a very real 




Colacechio’s elaboration of the dynamics that energise the formation and functioning of 
conscience, allowed him to identify such energy sources as the struggle to achieve inner 
harmony and authenticity. But while he acknowledges some role for the will and the intellect 
in such dynamics, as just noted, they are just a part of a greater dynamic that involves inputs 
from many other different sources.  
 Häring is firm on this dynamics as he observed that “One’s conscience is healthy only 
when the whole person — the emotional as well as the intellectual elements and the energies 













of the will — is functioning in a profound harmony in the depth of one’s being.”
296
 Gula 
acknowledges the relevance of the dynamics thus: “Conscience includes not only cognitive 
and volitional aspects but also affective, intuitive, and somatic . . . an expression of the whole 
self as a thinking, feeling, intuiting, and willing person.”
297
 
 Hogan however, elaborates on each of the dynamics in details. She believes that 
conscience needs the interplay of reason, intuition, emotion, and imagination to operate 
sensitively and successfully.
298
 In general terms, what Hogan appears to be driving at here is 
that “we best make decisions of conscience through an integrated, recursive process in which 
we direct and focus attention back and forth, within and without, activating, mutually testing, 
and monitoring all our human capacities of thinking, feeling and self-consciousness.”
299
 The 
exercise of a person’s conscience in this sense, according to Hogan, herself, is clearly a 
process that involves “the intellectual, intuitive, emotional and imaginative levels.”
300
 
Moreover, she maintains that when a personalist driven moral theology highlights all the 
various elements that constitute the judgments of conscience then each gains significance.
301
 
Such significance for instance, is captured in the words of Daniel Goleman who states that “A 
view of human nature that ignores the power of emotions is sadly shortsighted.”
302
 Hence, in 
Hogan’s estimation, “Good choices reflect a coherence of these important aspects of the 
personality, so that no one level is ignored or silenced.”
303
 This, in turn, suggests to her that 
“far from being objective, dispassionate judgements of reason, decisions of conscience are 
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embodied and emotional, engaging the whole person and not just the intellect.”
304
 
Furthermore, it is for this reason that Hogan (i) asserts the necessity for a personalist model 
of conscience to emphasise the multidimensional aspects of its decision making; and (ii) 
rejects as “an untenable view of the person” the Western philosophical and theological 
assertion that “the subject is rational and objective only to the extent that it is disengaged 
from natural and social worlds and even from its own body, which then can be seen as an 
object of study and a source of deception.”
305
 We will not engage in an in-depth description 
of each of the dimensions listed by Hogan, but we will examine the essence of those 
bypassed, relegated or passed over by advocates of legalist approach, namely the emotional, 
intuitive and imaginative aspects of conscience. 
6.2.1 Conscience and the Emotions 
 Goleman writing about the nature of the human mind describes and distinguishes it 
thus: 
In a very real sense we have two minds, one that thinks and one that 
feels. These two fundamentally different ways of knowing interact to 
construct our mental life. One, the rational mind, is the mode of 
comprehension we are typically conscious of: more prominent in 
awareness, thoughtful, able to ponder and reflect. But alongside that 
there is another system of knowing: impulsive and powerful, if 
sometimes illogical—the emotional mind. . . These two minds, the 
emotional and the rational, operate in tight harmony for the most part, 
intertwining their very different ways of knowing to guide us through 
the world. Ordinarily there is a balance between emotional and 
rational minds, with emotion feeding into and informing the 
operations of the rational mind, and the rational mind refining and 
sometimes vetoing the inputs of the emotions. Still, the emotional and 
rational minds are semi-independent faculties.
306
 
Such a description points out the essential nature of emotion in the human person. Hogan 
opens her account of the relationship between the emotions and conscience by insisting that 
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they have an essential role to play in its activities, the understanding of which would be 
seriously flawed if their contribution, both negative or positive, was not appreciated.
307
 As a 
basis for this claim, she points to the fact that the making of difficult and important decisions 
of conscience is “usually accompanied by a high degree of emotional intensity,”
308
 motivated 
by emotions that can “range from occasional excitement and anticipation, to distress, anger, 
anxiety about the future, shame and guilt-each has an effect on the decision-making 
process.”
309
 However, anticipating claims that the admission of such a litany of emotions into 
the decision-making process of conscience would be a recipe for the relativisation and even 
the disintegration of the notion of conscience, Hogan cautions and advises that: (i) “one 
should think of the emotions as providing important information and insight for moral 
deliberation, information that cannot be accessed without reflecting on our emotions.”
310
 (ii) 
although emotional responses may be generated from a place outside the governance of the 
intellect, this does not mean that emotions are beyond the individual’s voluntary recognition 
and control;
311
 (iii) it is crucial when allowing the admission of the emotions into the process 
of conscience, that individuals reflect on these emotions, and engage critically with them so 
that they can be confident that the information they provide is reliable;
312
 (iv) while emotions 
are spontaneous, it is within the individual’s capability to decide whether or how he or she is 
going to act on these emotions;
313
 and finally, (v) the need to recognise that the existence of 
impairments or dysfunction in an individual’s emotional life can result in “inappropriate or 
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disproportionate emotions, lack of control of one’s emotions or sometimes the absence of any 
emotion,” which, in turn can lead to unethical behaviour or serious moral failure.
314
 
 Having outlined such cautions and advice, however, Hogan asserts that the most 
evident thing is that “our emotional reactions are part and parcel of our moral 
deliberations.”
315
 Interestingly, Hogan concludes her account of the involvement of emotions 
in the process of moral decision-making by drawing on a function of reason to demonstrate 
how the marginalization of the emotional dimension could endanger the process of making 
holistic and integrated decisions of conscience. She claims that such a process “involves 
interplay of reason and emotion” in that “Reason shapes and evaluates the emotions; emotion 
contextualises and gives dynamism to reason.”
316
 For this reason, according to Hogan: 
“Neither ought to be abandoned, nor should one be considered marginal or peripheral.”
317
 
6.2.2 Conscience and Intuition  
 The situationist according to Hogan while referring Mahoney emphasised that 
conscience “is a faculty which under the guidance of the Spirit of God is endowed with a 
certain power of intuition and discovery which allows it to find the original solution 
appropriate to each case.”
318
 From this observation, Hogan pointed out that while Pius XII 
preferred to focus on the rational dimensions of moral decision-making, Mahoney 
emphasised how “Vatican II and much subsequent papal teaching on morality have stressed 
the importance of not limiting moral decision-making to its rational components.”
319
 Thus, in 
the case of intuition, this begs the question as to what exactly, in Hogan’s view, comprises 
the nature and function of intuition, relative to the process of conscience. 
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 For Hogan, the essence of an intuition is that it comes from a non-conscious place, is 
not part of explicit awareness and, therefore, cannot be tested by purely intellectual means.
320
 
While also classified as instinctive or tacit knowledge, Hogan claims that intuition can be an 
important source of information in a person’s moral life, in that it can help that individual to 
assess the reliability of people or the way relationships are likely to work out, for example.
321
 
Furthermore, she claims that because “Intuition is usually based on knowledge and insight 
gained through sensitivity to all that is implicit and nonconscious in other people’s 
behaviour,”
322
 its evaluations usually have “some basis in actual experience . . . [and] are 
rarely completely arbitrary and random.”
323
 Specifically, for Hogan, however, its importance 
relative to the decision-making process of conscience lies in the fact that it can encourage 
individuals to take an unpopular stand on some issues, while also making them wary of 
potential but unseen treachery.
324
 In addition, she also suggests that “Intuitive responses to 
moral dilemmas can cause one to attend to often forgotten or ignored values and can 
highlight neglected dimensions of the moral life.”
325
  
 As with her theorising in support of acknowledging an essential role for emotion in 
facilitating the tasks of conscience, however, so it is with her work on intuition. At a general 
level, she cautions against simply appealing to one’s intuition that something is wrong, 
because she does not find that to be sufficient from a Christian point of view.
326
 Furthermore, 
she claims that because intuitions can be influenced by “memories, dreams, emotions, 
suppressed experience and anxieties,” this can sometimes result in their being mistaken or 
unreliable.
327
 Because an intuition may comprise non-conscious knowledge, Hogan also 
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insists that it must not remain unexamined, nor allowed to function as reinforcement for 
prejudices and blind spots without being adequately evaluated.
328
  
 She advises strongly, therefore, that when operating out of one’s intuition, the 
individual “has to determine if the intuition is well founded, if the conclusions drawn from it 
are warranted, if . . . [it] is consistent with the rest of one’s beliefs and values, if the normal 
requirements of evidence are fulfilled.”
329
 As with her treatment of emotion, what Hogan is, 
in fact, demanding here is that rather than treating intuition as an independently operating 
dimension of conscience, it be treated as a dynamic component of the integrated activity of 
conscience. By insisting that the key to reliability of intuitions “rests on the ability of the 
person to articulate reasons why such intuitive knowledge ought to be trusted,” she can claim 
to be invoking that dynamic.
330
  
6.2.3 Conscience and Imagination 
 Amongst the explanations offered by Hogan for failure in an individual to implement 
good moral decisions are: the possible clouding of reason, failure to control emotion, or, 
relative to this section, fear of “the leap of imagination” that may be required to resolve a 
particular problem.
331
 While Hogan considers the entire construct of imagination the most 
difficult aspect of the integrated activity of conscience to discuss, because she views its 
operations as being both nebulous and hard to quantify,
332
 she, nonetheless clearly asserts 
that: “Far from being redundant in the moral field, one’s imagination helps to articulate one’s 
sense of virtue and enables one to engage in the vital task of constantly renewing one’s moral 
vision.”
333
 Elaborating on this claim, Hogan emphasises how creativity and imagination can 
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play a significant role both in relation to decisions of conscience made in the present, as well 
as in the formation of a person’s moral character.
334
 In her view, use of the imaginative 
process can help achieve such objectives by facilitating the cultivation of different values, by 
encouraging individuals to be braver in their pursuit of their moral vision, and by directing 
individuals towards confronting and then progressing beyond the limits of their moral 
heritage.
335
 Hogan interprets this imaginative process of re-evaluating commitments and of 
re-describing reality as part of the process of being human, to the extent that people’s 
imaginative engagement with other cultures, religious traditions and moral communities can 
help them confront the partiality of their own perspective.
336
 
 Amongst the advantages that Hogan identifies as deriving from integrating the 
imaginative process into the task of conscience are: (i) it encourages the individual to view 
his or her activities and choices as an outsider would evaluate them on the basis of decisions 
made; (ii) it enables an individual to view the problem from the perspective of others who 
may be involved, so that it can be claimed that imagination takes the place of listening; and 
(iii) it can promote a constructive empathy with others, a vital dynamic for an individual 
tasked with making decisions for people he or she has never met.
337
 
 Although made with reference to failure of imagination within institutions, Hogan’s 
causal identification of such a failure as arising from becoming “locked into a mindset and 
way of being,”
338
 is equally applicable to the individual. One specifically catastrophic 
consequence of a failure in integrating the imaginative process into the process of conscience, 
on the part of entire peoples, is aptly elaborated by the Dutch theologian, Wilhelm Visser’t 
Hooft, when he spoke about the Holocaust. Speaking about the human tendency to self-
                                                             
334




 Ibid., 149. 
337
 Ibid., 148. 
338
 Ibid., 187. 
380 
 
deception he suggested that “people could find no place in their consciousness for such . . . 
unimaginable horror . . . they did not have the imagination, together with the courage, to face 
it.”
339
 In the view of Visser’t, when people choose to restrict, limit or censor the moral 
decision-making activities of the imaginative or creative process, they are actually choosing 
to live in a self-imposed “twilight between knowing and not knowing.”
340
 
6.2.4 Conscience and Spiritual Discernment 
 Spiritual discernment is a vital dimension of the tasks of conscience; this is so because 
while reason, intuition, emotion and imagination are deemed to be features common to all 
human beings, spiritual discernment is considered to be specific to people of faith. Thus, 
according to Hogan, Christians profess the belief that within conscience each person has an 
inner source of moral evaluation that is not entirely reliant on the individual’s personal 
resources, but derives from an inner source that is “informed by faith and shaped under the 
guidance of the spirit.”
341
 As already alluded to in Chapter 2 of this work, for example, John 
Henry Newman described conscience as being the “aboriginal Vicar of Christ”, by which he 
meant that it is through conscience that Jesus Christ speaks to believers. Hogan, herself, 
defines the process of spiritual discernment in terms of the individual bringing “an element of 
prayerful reflection and stillness” to bear on the evaluations of conscience. Elaborating on 
this observation, she cites Mahoney’s comment to the effect that whiles the exercise of 
conscience necessarily entails “a personal uniqueness and a human solitariness” for people of 
faith, it also suggests a sense of this human endeavour being constantly worked out “in the 
shadow of the spirit.”
342
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 With regard to the origins of denoting spiritual discernment as a dynamic dimension 
of an integrated model of conscience, Hogan cites Mahoney’s observation in The Making of 
Moral Theology, that the importance of spiritual discernment was part of the traditional 
understanding of conscience from the earliest centuries.
343
 While Hogan then proceeds to 
note the manner in which Mahoney then characterises this understanding in terms of a 
Johannine tendency “to emphasise the role of the spirit as internal teacher of all the faithful. . 
. ”
344
 she also highlights his claim that the importance of spiritual discernment to the process 
of conscience was also “highly significant in Aquinas’s discussions on the role of 
conscience.”
345
 Hogan would certainly regard such a claim as being of fundamental 
importance to her notion of a dynamically integrated model of conscience, because not only 
did Aquinas operate within a moral framework that presumed the unity of the moral and 
spiritual realms, but he did not regard reason and spiritual discernment as being separate. 




 Finally, as she has done with reason, emotion, intuition, imagination, Hogan insists on 
the need for a type of reflective process to authenticate whatever insights might arise from 
engaging in this interior process of discernment.
347
 She maintains that such a process is 
essential because, as a process, she feels that spiritual discernment “is difficult to describe 
and still more difficult to have confidence in.”
348
 While having made some effort herself to 
clearly define it, she also points out, for example, that in the Christian tradition spiritual 
discernment is often referred to simply as the voice of God. Furthermore, her reference to 
Mahoney’s description of “this interior moral discernment” as a type of taste or feel for that 
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which is good in particular contexts, which Christians are specifically credited with 
possessing, was made in a lead up to her claim that Mahoney, himself, found the process to 
be inherently ambiguous.
349
 Hence, it appears that Hogan’s enthusiasm for including this 
dynamic dimension in her personalist, integrated model of conscience is tempered somewhat 
by Mahoney’s observation that, because of its inherent ambiguousness, the process of 
spiritual discernment could, in fact, be simply characterised as “insight in search of 
arguments,” or as “Christian experience seeking understanding.”
350
 It can be argued, 
therefore, that while Hogan definitely admitted the spiritual discernment dimension into her 
personalist model of conscience, that admission is, as it were, to a “junior ministry” until 
more detailed research is undertaken. 
6.3 The Extinguishing or Compromising of the Conscience  
 While Hogan has drawn attention to the possibility of the existence of various defects 
in the constituent elements of the inner working of conscience, and to the impairments that 
these could likely exercise on the judgement of one’s conscience, she expresses very grave 
concern about two specific contra-dynamics which, in her view, suggest that the true voice of 
conscience can either be totally and deliberately extinguished or very seriously compromised. 
 With regard to the deliberate extinguishing contra-dynamic, which she describes as 
“the most worrying,” Hogan speaks of the capacity of human beings to voluntarily and 
deliberately choose evil, a capacity she sees epitomised in the actions of Adolf Hitler. Her 
deep concern at this dynamic is expressed in the form of a question, wherein she asks:  
whether it is possible for a person to turn away completely from the 
habitual conscience, that is, from the orientation toward good, which 
people are believed to possess . . . whether an individual can so reject 
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even the most minimal conditions of morality as to freely and 
deliberately, continually over a lifetime, choose evil? 
351
 
Hogan is not talking here simply about the sinful behaviour of individuals who generally lead 
good lives, and who because of selfishness, cowardice or inertia, for example, find 
themselves engaged in activities they know to be wrong, or refraining from activities they 
know to be right.
352
 Rather, she is specifically referring to individuals who engage in 
wrongdoing, not because of inner conflict and weakness, but because of deliberately choosing 
evil. Hogan’s deep concern here is that while such behaviour may be rare in human 
experience, she maintains that it has accounted for some of the worst excesses of human 
behaviour.
353
 Such extreme behaviour is characterised by an avowal of contempt for all 
morality; a delight in disregarding even the most basic requirements of ethics; and by 
individuals setting themselves up as absolute arbiters of their own behaviour, and where 
possible, that of others.
354
 In Hogan’s own words, as far as such individuals are concerned, 




 Although Hogan has already alluded to the rarity of such cases, she asserts that they 
nevertheless fundamentally challenge the Christian optimism about the goodness of human 
nature,
356
 because they demonstrate that individuals can radically turn away from good.
357
 
They certainly appear to challenge the thinking of Jerome and subsequent medieval thinkers 
who adamantly maintained that our fundamental moral inclination is indestructible.
358
 Such 
grievous moral excesses or degradation, in Hogan’s opinion would certainly test the validity 
of Jerome’s own claim concerning habitual conscience, which he claims “refers to such a 
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basic orientation that, even though it may be dulled or dormant as a result of deliberately 
choosing evil, it is never completely extinguished.”
359
 She, herself, appears to be at a loss in 
her attempts at explaining “why certain individuals dedicate their lives to the pursuit of 
evil,”
360
 by apparently extinguishing the moral decision-making functions of conscience. 
Hogan half-heartedly turns to the doctrine of original sin with its emphasis on “the limited 
and fallible nature of human beings”
361
 in her search for possible explanations. 
Acknowledging, however, that the traditional definitions and boundaries can prove to be of 
little help in such extreme cases,
362
 she turns to psychologists and other interested experts 
who, in the interests of society’s welfare, for example, continue to examine the role that such 
factors as genetic inheritance, social background, parenting and education may play “in the 
disintegration of a person’s moral sense.”
363
 Could it be that their findings will eventually and 
seriously challenge Jerome’s proposition that a human being’s fundamental moral inclination 
is indestructible, by concluding, in the words of some old equine adages, that “People like 
horses will only do what they have a mind to do,” as demonstrated by the fact that “You can 
lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink.” Is it all a matter of free choice carried to 
morally unacceptable extremes? 
 The second contra-dynamic that can negatively impact on the tasks of an integrated 
conscience is identified by Hogan as the conscious or unconscious practice of self-deception. 
Furthermore, with specific reference to the magisterium and the institutional Church, she 
makes the point that such a form of “moral failure” can occur at the level of both the 
individual and the institution. Maintaining that, for most of the time, there is likely to be 
some degree of self-deception operating in the lives of individuals even well-meaning and 
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 Hogan points out what exactly this mal-practice entails, its motivating force; 
what ethical consequences can ensue for both individual and institutional moral decision-
making; and how such a self-serving strategy can be eliminated at both levels. 
 At the individual level, Hogan opens her explication of “this sort of evasion” by 
proposing that it can “help explain moral failure in a person who is essentially committed to 
living a morally good life.”
365
 She maintains that such prevarication occurs when individuals 
attempt to (i) put a positive spin on their motives and intentions; (ii) rationalise and explain 
their morally suspect actions; or (iii) silence the voice of internal criticism.
366
 According to 
Hogan, individuals attempt to implement such self-centring objectives by employing such 
specific strategies as: “Avoiding finding things out, ignoring vital information, looking the 
other way, burying inconvenient information.”
367
 She interprets such mal-practices as 
unambiguous efforts on the part of individuals to provide themselves and their respective 
consciences with alternative and more acceptable accounts of their morally dubious 
behaviour, in order to avoid confronting the true moral reality of that behaviour.
368
 More 
specifically, she characterises the implementation of such unethical strategies by individuals 
as “avoidance of self-knowledge.”
369
 In her view, this evasively-driven dynamic serves to 
facilitate individuals in the creation of false descriptions of reality and of their own moral 
character.
370
 This, in turn, facilitates their deliberate participation in behaviour they believe to 
be wrong, while simultaneously pretending to themselves that they are acting with 
integrity.
371
 Psychologically, some experts would suggest that the individual in this situation 
is seeking to resolve a stressful mental state which the experts themselves denote as 
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“cognitive dissonance,” a state they claim arises when an individual simultaneously holds 
two cognitions that are psychologically inconsistent.
372
  
 Ethically, however, Hogan sees such mal-practices epitomised in Hitler’s war-time 
minister for armaments, Albert Speer, who exploited Jews and other “enemies of the Reich” 
in his war-time factories. She notes that when Speer was questioned as to the extent of his 
knowledge about the Auschwitz concentration camp, he admitted that while at one level he 
knew that terrible things went on there, he deliberately chose not to know.
373
 Of such 
deception, Hogan would maintain that, psychologically and ethically, Speer and those who 
engaged in such evasion exist in a state of “middle knowledge,”
374
 a state she subsequently 
designates, relevant to institutional self-deception, as the “twilight of knowing and not 
knowing.”
375
 In such a psychological state or condition, by selecting and filtering what they 
allow themselves to know, such individuals are choosing to live in a type of self-imposed 
ignorance or false naiveté.
376
 As Hogan succinctly remarks, “it is a choice of ignorance that 
isn’t really ignorance at all.
377
 
 In the matter of the institutional Church, Hogan claims that it, too, “is subject to some 
of the same difficulties that complicate individual moral difficulties,” since that institution is, 
in part, a human one.
378
 Hence, self-deception within the institutional Church is seen to 
operate to preserve its reputation and standing, and is not infrequently evidenced, for 
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example, by: (i) refusals to accept or acknowledge the reality of past moral failures; (ii) the 
rationalisation of bad decisions; (iii) the self-serving reconstruction of historical memories or 
narratives; and (iv) the silencing of inner critics.
379
 A more indirect style in institutional self-
deception has also been identified, whereby, for example, “The institution can avoid finding 
things out, it can ignore uncomfortable or troubling signs, it can bury inconvenient 
information and it can look the other way.”
380
 In the light of such wide-ranging, institutional 
practices in self-deception, it is not surprising that Hogan would conclude that “The 
avoidance of self-knowledge or the construction of false and flattering accounts of one’s past 
and present is a temptation as real for institutions as it is for individuals.”
381
   
 Such mental and ethically challenging gymnastics, on the part of the individual and 
the Church as an institution, poses the question as to whether such mal-practices can actually 
achieve the evasive objectives desired by their perpetrators; specifically, “whether we can, in 
fact, lie to ourselves, whether we can be so divided in ourselves to allow a complete 
fragmentation.”
382
 Hogan’s rather terse response is to assert unequivocally that an important 
truth relative to all self-deception is that “at some level and in some essential way the truth is 
known, a person cannot close her/his consciousness completely. The self-deception can never 
be absolute.”
383
 After all, no matter how intricate, no matter how convoluted the evasive 
process, it is clear from Hogan’s account that choices are being actively canvassed and 
engaged-in throughout the procedure. 
 This practice of what Hogan eventually designates as “the all-too-human tendency to 
deceive oneself”
384
 has implications at both individual and institutional levels for the 
formation, education and operation of Hogan’s personalist model of conscience. For example, 
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she points out that the process of educating and shaping the individual conscience can only be 
properly undertaken, if cognisance is taken by all parties concerned of: (i) the very human 
impulse to hide from or reinterpret the reality of past and present moral failures; and (ii) the 
need, consequently, for a significant degree of honesty with regard to all such mal-
practices.
385
 Furthermore, in the same context, Hogan reminds those with a teaching role 
within the institutional Church that “When the institutional church, through the magisterium, 
comes to a judgement regarding whether or not a particular practice or process is acceptable, 
it does so using the same resources that are available to the faithful.”
386
 She insists, therefore, 
that such “teachers” need to remain keenly aware that while they may believe that the moral 
judgements of the magisterium “are made with the guidance of the Spirit, in dialogue with the 
inherited wisdom of the tradition and in the context of the community’s narratives and 
symbols. . . [t]hey are also made by people who are subject to the limitations of the human 
condition.”
387
 Consequently, in her view, they should never lose sight of the repeatedly 
demonstrated reality that “The avoidance of self-knowledge or the construction of false and 




 The preceding elaboration of the tendency on the part of the individual and of the 
institutional Church to frequently engage in self-deceptive misconduct is a stark reminder that 
the process of shaping and educating must always be fully cognisant of such ambivalence 
about moral failure. Such cognisance can be effective in terms of self-consciousness, self-
evaluation or vigilance, practices that can assist in the authentic development of conscience 
by encouraging and enabling the individual and the Church to be absolutely hones with 
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regard to past and present behaviour.
389
 At a practical level, self-consciousness or vigilance, 
which Hogan designates “a central component of the formation of conscience,” can be 
gradually assimilated “through attempting to confront the reality of one’s actions, through 
scrutinising one’s motivations, through checking one’s own memory of the events.”
390
 The 
teaching Church, itself, also gets a practical  reminder that “In instances of suspected moral 
failure it can draw significant insight from scrutinising its own motivations and checking 
official versions of events,” practices which Hogan believes will allow it to reconstruct a 
more truthful account of the past, thereby enabling it to create a more promising future.
391
  
 No matter what the strategy, however, the key factor for both the individual and the 
magisterium, according to Hogan, remains “the recognition that a well-formed conscience is 
prepared to confront its own failures and learn from them.”
392
 In short, Hogan would 
maintain that both entities need to take account of their own moral failures and must learn 
from their past sinfulness. The current institutional Church, in particular, imprisoned as it 
appears to be in a “dark night” of sexual, financial and infighting scandals, is forcefully 
reminded by Hogan that such accounting and learning when it assumes the form of “a process 
of remembering and repentance of past sinfulness, together with a determination to learn 
from such failures”
393
 is the only way out of this imprisoning prison.
394
 Otherwise, for either 
the individual or the Church to continue to malfunction in those ambiguously moral states of 
“middle knowledge” or the “twilight of knowing and not knowing” could likely incur that 
starkly unambiguous Divine rebuke found in Revelation 3:15-16:  
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I know all about you: how you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you 
were one or the other, but since you are neither, but only lukewarm, I 
will spit you out of my mouth. 
In this section, Hogan sought to deliver a clear, substantial and convincing account of the 
dynamic components of the personalist model of conscience. In her account, the human being 
is treated as a holistically integrated entity, possessing such specifically human dimensions as 
reason, emotion, imagination and intuition, and in the case of persons of faith, spiritual 
discernment. Hogan does not seek to detail the unique contribution each dimension 
contributes to the formation and functioning of conscience as it seeks to ethically manage the 
harmonious production of the human personality, but she attempts to emphasise how they 
operate in tandem to holistically achieve that outcome. Equally, she is also keen to draw 
attention to how impaired or dysfunctional human dimensions can impact negatively on the 
formation of the integrated conscience. 
 In her account, Hogan displays no fear about following through on theologically or 
ethically controversial or sensitive areas into which her personalist theorising leads her. 
Hence she does not refrain from offering personalist based insights and comment on such 
theologically and ethically sensitive notions as the existence of innate evil, the destructibility 
of conscience, as well as on the practice of ethical self-deception on the part of the individual 
and teaching Church. 
  Her communicating style here is engaging on a number of counts. Where she is 
uncertain of her argument or feels she is not in possession of the relevant knowledge, she 
explicitly acknowledges that, and where possible simply cites “experts.” As a personalist 
advocate, her language seeks to persuade, engage and debate, rather than to proselytize, win 
over, or even silence. Significantly, the simplicity and forthrightness of her language, in this 
section in particular, suggest an expert in theology and ethics, seeking to meaningfully 
communicate in lay language with a laity she so often seeks to champion. 
391 
 
7. Some Litmus Tests for Hogan’s Personalist Model of Conscience 
 Hogan’s personalist elaboration of the notion of conscience in terms of its meaning, 
role, primacy and formation have been methodically elaborated and analysed in different 
sections of this Chapter. Furthermore, the fundamental components which integrate or merge 
in the inner working of conscience have received similar treatment. In addition, the 
methodology she employed in the elaboration and analysis, in both cases, was comparative in 
approach, in that her theorising and claims were described and assessed with constant 
reference to a legalistic (ecclesial) model of conscience. In this section, we will critically 
assess her personalist model in conjunction with the notion of an erroneous conscience and 
basic sources of moral failure. 
7.1 Personalist model of Conscience and Erroneous Conscience 
 Following from Catholic traditional thought, both Hogan and John Paul II are agreed 
that, by its very nature, conscience could be erroneous and susceptible to erroneous decisions. 
Both open their accounts by citing the teachings of Vatican II as a basis for this claim. 
Elaborating on the Council’s teaching that “not infrequently conscience can be mistaken,”
395
 
John Paul II cautioned that “Conscience, as the judgement of an act, is not exempt from the 
possibility of error.”
396
 He further emphasised this when, in the context of St. Paul’s 
admonition to his readers to be mindful of the possibility of error as ever-present in the 
judgements of conscience, the Pope flatly insisted that “Conscience is not an infallible judge; 
it can make mistakes.”
397
 For her part, Hogan simply concurs with the teachings of Vatican 
II, which hold that, even though it is voice of God echoing in the depths of the person, 
                                                             
395
 Gaudium et Spes, no.16. 
396
 VS, no.62. 
397
 VS, no.62 [italicisation in text]. 
392 
 
conscience can be in error. It is, here, at this initial and basic stage, however, that any 
semblance or meeting of minds ceases.  
 From the outset, Hogan’s account focuses on the person who actually manages the 
erroneous conscience, rather than on the theological construct itself. Thus, she opens her 
account in Confronting the Truth by quoting the Council’s relational description of 
conscience as the Voice of God echoing in the depths of the person.
398
 This person is 
portrayed by Hogan in positive terms, in that he or she is presented as making this error 
despite the fact that “they aspire to make the right judgement.”
399
 Reference to the 
individual’s aspirations indicate that Hogan sees the individual’s intentions as being 
particularly relevant when assessing any moral decision-making process, erroneous or 
correct. In adopting such an approach, she is simply implementing her own personalist 
principle that when assessing the morality of an action or behaviour, “we do not focus 
exclusively on the action itself, endowing it alone with moral significance. Rather, we try to 




 In seeking an explanation as to why well-intentioned people can make seriously 
erroneous moral decisions, despite the fact that conscience itself has been designated as that 
place where one is alone with God and God can be heard directly, Hogan turns to the 
“distinction between goodness and rightness”
401
 however, from a personalist perspective, she 
turns to the concepts of “original and social sin.” She claims that by demonstrating how 
human decisions “are limited by factors constitutive of both the human condition (original 
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sin) and … social embeddedness (social sin)” light may be thrown on “why decisions of 
conscience are always immature and imperfect.”
402
 
7.1.1 The Erroneous Conscience and Original Sin 
 Drawing on the theology of the Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas, and anxious to 
assert the essential dignity of conscience, even an erroneous one, and to acknowledge the 
sincerity and goodness of the individual sincerely engaged in moral decision-making, Hogan 
attempts to theorise an explanation of erroneous conscience that revolves around the 
distinction between goodness and rightness. In this task, she specifically draws on the 
writings of James Keenan, who claims to have found a basis for such a distinction in the 
theology of Aquinas.
403
 Based on his Thomistic findings, Keenan views goodness as 
pertaining to the heart, and maintains that it is focused on whether it is out of love that one 
strives to attain a rightly ordered self.
404
 By way of contrast, Keenan designates rightness as 
being concerned with judgement of reason, which, in turn, focuses on the extent to which the 
individual “actually attains a rightly ordered self.”
405
 Commenting on Keenan’s interpretation 
of Aquinas’s distinction between goodness and rightness, Hogan makes the point that it 
“allows one to recognise that a decision may be in error but may arise from moral goodness. 
Erroneous judgments can come from the desire to do what is truly loving.”
406
 Based on this, 
Hogan concludes that when the distinction between goodness and rightness is placed at the 
core of the problem of the erroneous conscience, it makes it possible to explain “how a 
person acting out of goodness (the heart), through an error of reason, can make a decision that 
is objectively wrong.”
407
 Since this is the case, according to Hogan, the dignity of the 
erroneous conscience and the decision-maker are preserved, because both remain oriented 
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towards the good, even when they are mistaken.
408
 Thus, the distinction she maintains “would 
allow one to endorse the Council’s view that conscience is the voice of God calling the 
person to love and do the good.”
409
 
 True to her personalist approach however, Hogan chooses to highlight the very real 
and painful consequences that follow from having to live life in the shadows of the human 
condition. For her, therefore, the account of the Fall in Genesis is not all about theological 
and philosophical theoretical concerns as human disobedience and Divine retribution, or 
whether the command not to eat of the forbidden fruit was a test of love and loyalty or a form 
of entrapment, or even about the apparent naivety of man in the face of the wiliness of 
woman, and so on. Instead, she sees the account as “a story about a man and a woman in their 
struggle to confront their conflicting desires and avoid temptation . . . a narrative in which 
they fail and subsequently have to come to terms with the consequences of that fact.”
410
 In 
short, this very account of humanity’s first encounter with the Divine, speaks to Hogan “of 
the frailty and vulnerability of people’s moral sense,”
411
 restricting and disabling features 
that, in her view, are essentially embedded in peoples’ origins, and in the context of which 
their desire to do good has to be consequently lived.
412
 Such an interpretation is succinctly 
affirmed in Louis Janssen’s observation that “being limited and being subject to the 
consequences of original sin, the human person is exposed to ignorance and error. He can be 
deceived in good faith, even to his judgment of conscience concerning the most essential 
decisions of his existence.”
413
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 In the light of her ethical implications of the doctrine of original sin on the human 
person, we could well re-designate the Biblical account as the story of the Original 
Erroneous Conscience, because, for her, the human participants point to the reality that our 
knowledge was always incomplete and partial, our desires conflicting and our emotions 
immature.
414
 In positing such an explanation for the susceptibility of well-intentioned human 
beings to perpetrating acts of erroneous moral decision-making, Hogan is further 
demonstrating that her take on this Biblical narrative is typically personalist. Her explanation 
specifically presents the human participants as holistic beings, who, by consciously or 
unconsciously integrating their defective rational and emotional and spiritual personality 
dimensions into their moral decision-making process eventually generate a defective 
product—an erroneous conscience. Summarising the usefulness of the metaphor itself as an 
aid to explaining and understanding the dynamic directing of the erroneous conscious, Hogan 
claims that 
one thing we can draw from the concept is that as human beings we 
are born into a situation characterised by moral failure. It is part of our 
heritage and will inevitable form part of our future. . . In part it 
articulates a fundamental truth about our condition, that is, that 
limitations of many sorts are embedded in our origins and that our 
desire to do good is lived out in this context of frailty and finitude.
415
 
Hogan however, is not satisfied to simply provide a Hebraic underpinning for her explanation 
of the proneness of conscience to err; she is also keen to reinforce the explanations from the 
relational character of the human person. 
7.1.2 The Erroneous Conscience and Social Sin 
 Human frailty and finitude are not the only factors causing malfunctioning of 
conscience. Rather, since the human being is a rational as well as a relational person, the 
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social, cultural and religious contexts that one inhabits possess the potential to produce a 
similarly negative influence on one’s conscience. It is the awareness that conscience is under 
constant exposure to the frailties of the human condition that prompts Hogan to insist that 
there can never be an absolute certainty about the rightness of an individual’s decisions.
416
 
Indeed, her theorising on the notion of conscience is replete with references concerning her 
belief in the capacity of these communal contexts to exert a strongly determining influence for 
good or evil on the individual’s moral decision-making. To substantiate this belief, she cites 
the following arguments or propositions: 
 The exercise of conscience is “both an individual and a community event”;417  
 Since “conscience is formed in community, [the] individual does not construct her/his 
basic orientation from a tabula rasa”;
418
 
 To the extent that an individual’s moral judgement is exercised in the context of “the 




 Because the moral self is a self-in-relation, Christian individuals seeking to exercise 




 Specifically, Hogan is arguing that “the values and virtues that a community 
embodies play an important role in the formation of conscience.”
421
 Furthermore, she insists 
that while this holds for the cultivation of positive dispositions, it also holds for the 
limitations and moral blindness of communities with problematic consequences for the 
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individual’s moral decision-making process. Just as with an individual who operates morally 
out of personality dimensions that are deficient or dysfunctional, so it can be for an individual 
who lives an unexamined life within the spoken and unspoken biases of a morally flawed 
social, cultural or religious milieu; he or she will be inclined to constructing an erroneous 
social conscience, which will serve to facilitate their witting or unwitting participation in 
social or communal sin. 
422
 According to Hogan, this inclination is further amplified by the 
fact that, within such flawed contextual milieus, biases may be hidden, priority given to 
inessentials and the individual desensitised to particular injustices, such as sexism, racism and 
homophobia, for example.
423
 Indeed, in her writings Hogan cites three historical episodes: the 
Holocaust, the Inquisition and the Church’s current financial and sex scandals as examples of 
the catastrophic human and moral consequences that can ensue, for perpetrators and victims, 
as well as for local, national and international communities, when such strategies are 
consciously or unconsciously adopted by the individual.
424
 Hence, Hogan theorises that the 
key to understanding the dynamic that can lead individuals to erroneously believe that their 
active participation in such appallingly immoral practices is that the values justifying those 
actions were hidden in ideologies and subtly “reinforced in many cultural assumptions and 
patterns of behaviour.”
425
 It is for this reason, Hogan would argue in the words of Hooft that 
people would have no need to find a “place in their consciousness for such . . . unimaginable 
horror,” neither would they have need for “the imagination, together with the courage to face 
it”
426
 because they were often unaware that they were participating in social sin.
427
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 Hogan’s treatment of the mistaken moral decisions emanating from an erroneous 
communal conscience does not appear to be as fulsome in its emphasis on the essential 
goodness and sincerity of the decision-maker as it was for the individual malfunctioning out 
of his or her dysfunctional personality dimensions. It could be that the enormity of the 
consequences that ensued as a result of the communal misappropriation of the individual’s 
judgements of conscience would suggest that the use of terms such as “essential goodness or 
sincerity” in that context, would demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to, or appreciation of, the 
devastation that was the Holocaust, the Inquisition and many of the crimes against humanity. 
However, Hogan is anxious to include the social sinner within her personalist model of 
conscience, and so she explains on behalf of the erroneous social decision-maker that “[t]he 
pervasiveness of social sin profoundly influences the ability to see and resist these destructive 
attitudes and actions,” and, consequently, the individual would find it “difficult to maintain a 
sense of self-direction in the context of all the external factors that ground and influence 
one’s morality.”
428
 In the case of the erroneous social conscience, Hogan’s advice would 
centre on the necessity of each individual addressing their unexamined beliefs, assumptions 
and behaviours, through the practises of vigilance and self-scrutiny. Hence, she designates 
vigilance “a central component of the formation of conscience,” and states that it can be 
learned, amongst other things “through scrutinising one’s motivations.”
429
 Indeed, she 
advises what she regards as one of the main perpetrators of social sin, the historical 
institutional Church that “[i]n instances of suspected moral failure it can draw significant 
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insight from scrutinising its own motivations and checking official versions of events.”
430
 
However, as keen as Hogan appears to be in accounting for, and dealing with, social sin in 
terms of her personalist model of conscience, she unapologetically advises the perpetrators of 
social sin not to offer the pervasiveness of social, cultural and religious biases, or the notions 
of hidden ideologies or subtle promptings as “conversation-stopping” explanations for their 
erroneous decisions or behaviours. She simply reminds such individuals or communities that 
the Christian tradition is built on the assumption that although social 
and cultural practices play an important role in shaping our sense of 
morality, they do not determine it. We do have a sort of freedom that 
enables us to evaluate, and then either reject or endorse the dominant 
culture. Social embodiment is important but not decisive in the 
individual’s pursuit of good.
431
 
 It seems from the preceding account that Hogan has left no stone unturned in her 
efforts to explicate the notion of erroneous conscience and the potential effects of original 
and social sin on the moral decision-making process. Her account also demonstrates the 
philosophical and theological lengths she has gone to in order to incorporate her conclusions 
on the interrelatedness of those different variables into her personalist model of conscience. 
However, in the course of her theorising in this particular area that is the erroneous 
conscience, there seems to be, so to speak, “an elephant in the room.” A close inspection of 
her work, Confronting the Truth, for example, reveals reference to the key concepts of 
culpable and invincible ignorance only in her treatment of “Aquinas on conscience”
432
 and in 
“Conscience in the Documents of Vatican II.”
433
 In her reference to Vatican II, rather than 
seeking to address the implications of vincible and invincible ignorance, she seems merely to 
decry the fact that “Vatican II documents limited the discussion of the erroneous conscience 
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to the issue of whether the error was caused by vincible or invincible ignorance.”
434
 For 
Hogan’s model, this begs the question as to whether her assertion that “the concept of the 
erroneous conscience ‘presupposes that, despite one’s mistake, one is striving to obey its 
summons to fidelity,’” is conditional on whether the ignorance out of which the mistake 
arises can be considered to be vincible or invincible.
435
 It may be that moral terms such as 
vincibility or invincibility, in conjunction with their inevitable insertion into the theology of 
conscience, carry undertones that, for Hogan at any rate, are overly legalistic, even clinically 
so. John Paul II, however, has no such reservations; in fact, his anxieties could be said to 
centre on clinically outlining the acceptable and unacceptable face of the erroneous 
conscience, as far as the magisterium is concerned, at any rate.  
7.1.3 John Paul II and the Erroneous Conscience 
 Although we expounded on John Paul II’s teaching in chapter one, it is significant 
that we expatiate on it in this section as it will enable us to look critically at Hogan’s 
teaching. From the outset, John Paul II seeks to distinguish between a correct or good 
conscience and one that is erroneous, in terms of how they are regarded by the magisterium. 
It is his opinion that, first and foremost, the correct conscience is one that concerns itself with 
“the objective truth received by man;” and “in the case of the erroneous conscience, it is a 
question of what man, mistakenly, subjectively considers to be true.”
436
 Consequently, in 
order to ensure that a person’s conscience is correct and good, the individual “must seek the 
truth and must make judgements in accordance with the same truth.”
437
 Truth is therefore an 
indispensable feature of conscience. Hence, in Grisez’s thought, he describes conscience as 
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“knowledge of moral truth.”
438
 To characterise correct or good conscience, John Paul II refers 
to Scripture, particularly St. Paul, where he finds that a correct conscience is one that is (i) 
“confirmed by the Holy Spirit” (Romans 9:1); (ii) “clear” (2 Timothy 1:3); and does not (iii) 




 John Paul II’s emphasis on the Scriptures as a reliable source of truth is an indication 
of his support for the notion that truth is “objective” and is “out there” beyond the individual. 
He does, however, acknowledge that conscience has subjective and interiorised dimensions, 
but only to the extent that these are directly linked to God, and function as internal witnesses 
of the individual’s faithfulness or unfaithfulness to God’s law. Thus, he asserts that 
conscience in a certain sense confronts man with the law, and thus 
becomes a ‘witness’ for man: a witness of his own faithfulness or 
unfaithfulness with regard to the law, of his essential moral rectitude 
or iniquity. Conscience is the only witness, since what takes place in 
the heart of the person is hidden from the eyes of everyone outside. 
Conscience makes its witness known only to the person himself.
440
  
John Paul II moderates the subjective dimension of conscience even further by pointing out 
that not only does it function as a “witness” for man,
441
 but also as witness of God himself 
442
, 
by testifying to the individual’s obedience to His law. Elaborating on this notion, John Paul II 
claims that because conscience also functions as “a dialogue of man with God, the author of 
the law, the primordial image and final end of man,” it also acts as “the witness of God 
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 Addressing the matter of an erroneous conscience that is deemed to have resulted 
from invincible or non-imputable ignorance, an ignorance of which the subject is not aware 
and which he is unable to overcome by itself, John Paul II notes Vatican II’s assertion that in 
such a situation the erroneous conscience does not forfeit its dignity.
444
 Speaking from the 
Council’s perspective, John Paul II explains that even when an erroneous conscience directs 
an individual “to act in a way not in conformity with the objective moral order, it continues to 
speak in the name of that truth about the good which the subject is called to seek 
sincerely.”
445
 Not straying too far from its original legalistic base, however, this ecclesial 
amnesty is issued with some specific cautions and caveats attached. John Paul II reminds all 
Christians that: 
 A subjective error about moral good must never be confused “with the ‘objective’ 
truth rationally proposed to man in virtue of his end;”  
 The moral value of an act performed with a true and correct conscience must not be 
equated with “the moral value of an act performed by following the judgement of an 
erroneous conscience;”  
 While the evil perpetrated as a result of a non-culpable error of judgement may not be 
imputable to the agent, it still does not cease to be a disorder in relation to the truth 
about the good; 
 And even in the case of a good act, it will not contribute to the moral growth of the 
person who performs it, if that act is not recognised as such from the outset.
446
 
It is obvious then that John Paul II’s overall treatment of the erroneous conscience is one that 
is focused on truth. Individuals who do not make effort to achieve truth are however 
reminded that: 
Conscience, as the ultimate concrete judgment, compromises its 
dignity when it is culpably erroneous, that is to say, ‘when man shows 
little concern for seeking what is true and good, and conscience 
gradually becomes almost blind from being accustomed to sin.’
447
 
Hence the Christian faithful are reminded that:  
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The Church puts herself always and only at the service of conscience, 
helping it to avoid being tossed to and fro by every wind of doctrine 
proposed by human deceit (cf. Eph 4:14), and helping it not to swerve 
from the truth about the good of man, but rather, especially in more 




John Paul II’s approach to the treatment of an erroneous conscience proves to be seriously 
problematic for Hogan’s personalist approach which places great emphasis on human 
goodness and little accent on truth. 
8 Conclusion 
 Hogan’s specific use of the personalist paradigm to explain the theology of 
conscience, offers a precise background from which to comprehend her teachings. Focusing 
on the human person, personalist writers lay emphasis on the subject rather than the object. 
For instance, economic personalism of our time while focusing on the human person rather 
than goods, has redirected global economic order to promote market activity that does not 
reduce the human person to another economic element. Thus when attention is centred on the 
human person, we are able to glean the essential elements of the human person in 
relationships and that is what personalist theory is all about. 
 Hogan and personalist moral theologians in their teaching on conscience reaffirm 
their concern for persons by asserting freedom for autonomous thinking, action and 
responsibility. Hogan seeks to promote the personal and private nature of conscience. 
Through her criticism of the legalistic model, which for her upholds norms and principles as 
absolute, exceptionless and universal in their application, and her tenacity about 
circumstances and intentions in moral evaluation of an action, she seeks to emphasize the 
vital role of conscience to discern, scrutinize, evaluate and inform a person about what one 
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thinks is good and right. Her teaching however has great challenges and consequences for 







John Henry Newman, Germain Grisez and Linda Hogan: 
 Comparisons and Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
 In chapter one, this thesis set out to identify the essential nature of the human person; 
outline the implications of understanding the human person in a holistic rather than a 
partitioned manner; and assess the extent to which the human person is free or constrained to 
be the social and divinely-relational he/she is meant to be. The divergent views that surfaced 
not only impacted on the individual’s religious and moral understanding of reasoning and 
behaviour, but shaped the historical development of humanity’s essential moral compass—
the conscience. This, in turn, leads to an outlining of the overall aim of this thesis, namely the 
tracking of the philosophical and moral divergences and convergences that arose as the 
theology of conscience did not so much develop, but journeyed through the course of human 
history, in particular Catholic Christian history. This moral and theological journeying of the 
human conscience was undertaken with particular reference to:  
 Scripture: The Old and New Testament As already noted, Hebraic Old Testament 
authors did not use the term conscience itself, drawing, instead on the metaphor of the 
heart to illustrate its functions. This metaphor, according to Grisez and Shaw, referred 
not just to feelings, but also to the entire inner self, with its functions of thinking, 
judging and willing.
1
 Old Testament writers portrayed a good heart as being a wise 
heart, in that it possesses God’s light, sees reality and acts accordingly.
2
  In the New 
Testament, St Paul’s famous observation that even non-believers “do instinctively 
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what the law requires,” because that law “is written on their hearts, to which their own 
conscience also bears witness”
3
 attests to the Greek term in Scripture. Paul’s text is a 
celebrated quote as it was taken up by Vatican II in words that are very well 
celebrated.
4
 St. Paul’s contribution to the theology of conscience merits serious 
attention, because even in those early days of Christianity, he drew attention to the 




 The teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas: Aquinas’ teaching is at the forefront of 
theorising on conscience. According to Grisez, he sought to distinguish between 
“principles of moral thought, moral reasoning and judgements of what is right and 
wrong, [before] reserving his own use of the word ‘conscience’ for the latter.”
6
 The 
respect in which his contribution to the theology of conscience is held is evidenced by 
the fact that it merited allusion in Vatican II and “is used constantly by the 
magisterium and in theology.”
7
 As with St. Paul, Aquinas contributed significantly to 
the theology of the conscience, insisting that an individual ought to do what he or she 
believes is right even if they are wrong, because in doing what they think is wrong 
they are always morally guilty.
8
  
 The Neo-Manualist Tradition: Justification for the inclusion of the manualist tradition 
in any list of notable contributors to the development of a theology of conscience is 
found in an article authored by Charles E. Curran. He notes that “The most extensive 
development in the understanding of conscience in the Catholic tradition came in the 
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context of the manuals of moral theology that emerged at the end of the sixteenth 
century and continued until Vatican II.”
9
 During this period, the manuals followed a 
legal model which, by continuously emphasising the extrinsic character of law, 
implied “that something is good because it is a matter of law.”
10
 Such a legalistic 
approach contrasts with an intrinsic or natural law approach, which emphasised “that 
something is commanded because it is good.”
11
 
 The Documents of Vatican II: While references to conscience or to conscience–related 
topics are to be found throughout documents of Vatican II, this thesis drew mainly on 
Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae. Some modern moral theologians have 
been quite critical of that contribution. David E. DeCosse’s observation that even after 
Vatican II “the concept of the Catholic conscience is ill-defined or offered as a 
conversation-stopping absolute”
12
 has been noted. Furthermore, his explication of his 
post-Conciliar observation that “Conscience within Catholicism is tugged in two 
interpretive directions” has featured in this Dignitatis Humanae thesis, as has Linda 
Hogan’s criticism of Gaudium et Spes for its representation of “the two strands of 
conscience [synderesis and conscientia] that had been relatively successfully 
integrated by Aquinas” as competing rather than complementary accounts.
13
 On the 
other hand, theologians like Germain Grisez, Russell Shaw and William E. May, for 
example, have been zealous in their praise of the Vatican Documents. They celebrate 
the Council’s perceived blanket rejection of a subjectivist notion of conscience, noting 
that by doing so, “the Council is insisting that there is an objective norm of morality, 
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which it is conscience’s task to discern and conform to.”
14
 While this thesis has also 
drawn on the teachings found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church on conscience, 
much of the material found therein very obviously derives from the Conciliar 
documents. Indeed, as has been made clear throughout this thesis, the work of pre- or 
post-Vatican II moral theologians relevant to the theology of conscience is generally 
assessed in terms of how much they contributed to the formation of that theology in 
Vatican II (e.g., Aquinas and John Henry Newman), or subsequently expanded, 
clarified or challenged those Conciliar teachings (e.g., John Paul II, Benedict XVI), 
specific documents from regional Episcopal conferences (Canadian, U.S and Irish 
Bishops’ Conferences), as well as the works of Germain Grisez and Linda Hogan. 
2. Newman, Grisez and Hogan – Juxtaposition 
 It is against this broad introductory background that the contributions of John Henry 
Newman, Germain Grisez and Linda Hogan to the Catholic theology of conscience were 
studied and analysed in chapters two, three and four, respectively. Each of them brought to 
the understanding and development of the concept of conscience something that was not only 
unique, but also indicative of the religious, cultural, political, social and academic 
environments they inhabited.  
 A convert to Catholicism from Anglicanism, and subsequently a member of the 
Catholic hierarchy in the nineteenth century, Cardinal John Henry Newman’s thought 
impacted on the deliberations and teachings of Vatican II on the nature and functions of 
conscience. His impact gave him the niche as “one of recent history’s more forceful 
spokespersons for the centrality of conscience.”
15
 Germain Grisez, a twentieth century, 
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American lay-Catholic moral theologian, is a strident, unapologetic and unquestioning 
proponent of the supremacy of the moral teachings of the church as the “monitor” in the 
formation and functioning of the Catholic conscience. His approach earned him the disdain of 
the liberal wing of the Catholic Church, a scorn demonstrated by the silence with which much 
of his teachings were received by Catholic liberals. On the other hand, it earned for him the 
admiration of the more “traditionalist” Catholic followers, an admiration demonstrated by the 
efforts of some of his followers to “out-Grisez” themselves in their elaboration of his 
teachings.
16
 Linda Hogan’s contribution to the “conscience” debate centres on the fact that 
she enters under the “Personalist” umbrella. Hence, in keeping with the tenets of that 
philosophy, chapter 4 finds her insisting that the personal autonomy and responsibility of 
individuals in moral matters be prioritised; the role of conscience as the mediator of the 
divine moral law be emphasised; any account of ethics that relies on absolutist principles be 
rejected; and that every moral theory be required to acknowledge the role of circumstances 
and intentionality in moral decision-making.
17
 Thus, while Newman may be the champion of 
conscience itself, and Grisez the magisterium, Hogan may be considered the champion of 
those who demand that individuals have the ultimate say in their own moral decision-making. 
Not only is Hogan a lay-Catholic moral theologian, but a female one with considerable 
feminist and ecumenical credentials. This may have left her open to influences beyond the 
reach of the Catholic magisterium. Her position criticises the culture of patriarchy which 
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suppresses female conscience decision-making. Such an advocacy as detailed by Anne E. 
Patrick
18
 suggests decisive differences in the male and female process of moral decision-
making. 
 The works of Newman, Grisez and Hogan in elucidating the understanding of 
conscience as presented in chapters two, three and four, allow for comparison and contrast on 
the teachings on conscience. The concept has come to be understood – over time and across 
the different schools of theology, philosophy and morality – in ways that cannot be 
considered to be either consistently standardised or homogeneous. Specifically, their 
“Catholic” moral thinking and teachings when juxtaposed with that of the teachings of the 
Church on “conscience” have pointed to contrasting emphases and divergent approaches on 
the understanding of this concept. This is so not only when it is considered with reference to 
its role in the moral life of the individual, but also when the roles of the individual, the church 
and social institutions are considered in relation to its formation, functioning and monitoring 
or guidance.  
 In light of these generalised findings, this concluding chapter seeks to undertake an 
assessment of the work of these three Catholic moral scholars in terms of their contribution to 
a “theology of Conscience” that is consonant with, or challenging to the teachings of the 
Catholic magisterium. More importantly, however, the actual “conscience” that each one of 
the three presents to their readers will be measured against the fundamental demand made by 
Newman, for example, that conscience must function as a way of establishing contact with a 
personal God. In Christian terms, then, when measured against the redemptive role that Jesus 
Christ seeks to play in the lives of his followers as “the way, the truth and the life”
19
 to what 
extent does the specific understanding of conscience as presented by Newman, Grisez and 
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Hogan actually function as “the Aboriginal Vicar of Christ”, who invites his followers, in 
their journeying of conscience to “seek and find.”
20
 
3. The Nature and Meaning of Conscience: A Three-in-One Consideration 
 Can the account posited by Newman, Grisez and Hogan on the meaning and nature of 
conscience be synthesised – to use a Trinitarian analogy – into a composite “Three-in-One” 
entity, or must they remain simply three distinct entities with their own unique and mostly 
incompatible features? To help with this question, the work of Timothy O’Connell in the area 
of conscience will be drawn on in order to provide a useful touchstone against which to 
assess whatever unique, compatible or complementary characteristics each of the trio may 
possess. Synderesis and conscientia as analysed and understood by O’Connell from historical 
and biblical perspectives allow for the thought of the three scholars to be juxtaposed. 
O’Connell outlines his explication of synderesis and conscientia by distinguishing three 
features, which he designates as: conscience/1, conscience/2 and conscience/3, respectively.
21
 
It is along this parameter that Newman, Grisez and Hogan will be put together. 
3.1 Conscience/1: Human Characteristic and Capacity 
 Conscience/1 is posited as the first and basic level of conscience in O’Connell’s 
model. This corresponds more or less to the level the scholastics or medieval scholars called 
synderesis in their debate on the nature of conscience as elaborated in previous chapters. 
Conscience/1, however, has a far wider remit, as is evidenced in O’Connell’s own elaboration 
of this notion. He posits accordingly: 
                                                             
20
 See Matthew 7:7. It is useful to note at this stage that although some of the criteria for the Christian 
conscience have been drawn from the works of Newman, this does not imply that at this stage it can be taken as 
read that his version of conscience meets the overall requirements. 
21
 Timothy E. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality, 110. O’Connell’s Model of Conscience: “We shall 
assert that the word ‘conscience,’ as it is generally used both in theology and those ordinary conversational 
usages that refer to anterior conscience, points at one or another of three quite distinct facets of this reality of 




Here we are referring to conscience as an abiding human 
characteristic, to a general sense of value, an awareness of personal 
responsibility that is utterly emblematic of the human person.
22
 
Such a notion of conscience, according to O’Connell, presumes a human being who accepts 
the idea of accountability for actions, has the capacity to take charge of their lives, and 
demonstrates a capacity to assume responsibility for direction toward the good.
23
 Proof of the 
existence of such a morally discriminating entity, in O’Connell’s view, can be garnered from 
the extent and the contentiousness of moral debate that is evident in contemporary society.
24
 
O’Connell maintains that such moral “turmoil” can only occur in an environment where, 
despite the disparity of views on what exactly constitutes the rightness or the wrongness of 
actions, people “share the common realisation that it makes a difference whether a thing is 
right or wrong.”
25
 Hence, O’Connell not only designates conscience/1 as an “abiding human 
characteristic,” but he characterises the “capacity” of the human person to determine good 
and evil as what makes the human person “truly human.”
26
 Again, although not actually 
spelling it out, as such, O’Connell would admit that St Paul is referring to the substance, 
implications and, in particular, the divine origin of conscience/1 as he explains how he linked 
the Greek concept with the Hebraic notion of the “heart” in this most quoted passage: 
Pagans who never heard of the Law but are led by reason to do what 
the Law commands, may not actually ‘possess’ the Law, but they can 
be said to ‘be’ the Law. They can point to the substance of the Law 
engraved on their hearts—they can call a witness, that is, their own 
conscience—they have accusation and defence, that is, their own inner 
mental dialogue (Romans 2: 14-15).
27
 
Reference to this level of conscience can also be found in Eastern Orthodox writings. 
According to Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, for example this notion “is strikingly amplified in 
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the great monastic rule of St. Basil” wherein it is written that: “We have received interiorly 
beforehand the capacity and disposition for observing all divine commandments. . . . These 
are not something imposed from without.”
28
 Further example of Eastern Orthodox 
appreciation of this level of conscience is also to be found, in the writings of John of 
Damascus who wrote of it in terms of the “law of our mind.”
29
 
 From the perspective of Western theology, Aquinas himself taught that conscience/1 
derives from eternal law, which, in his view is “Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and 
movements.”
30
 Furthermore, since it is through the natural law that humanity participates in 
this Divine Wisdom, such a Divine characteristic is, in turn, mediated to humanity through 
the natural law.
31
 It can therefore be concluded from such an observation that through 
Conscience/1 “Wisdom” as a Divine characteristic can become “an abiding human 
characteristic.” Newman reiterates such a conclusion when he teaches: 
This law, as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called 
‘conscience;’ and though it may suffer refraction in passing into the 
intellectual medium of each, it is not therefore so affected as to lose its 
character of being the Divine Law, but still has, as such, the 
prerogative of commanding obedience.
32
 
This understanding made him declare that “conscience is a connecting principle between the 
creature and his Creator.”
33
 An echo of this understanding is in Vatican II, particularly where 
it teaches that: “By conscience, in a wonderful way, that law is made known which is fulfilled 
in the love of God and of one’s neighbour.”
34
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 That a preoccupation with this level of conscience continues to exercise the minds of 
contemporary theologians and church teaching is evidenced, for example, by Cardinal 
Ratzinger who, claiming that the exact meaning of the term synderesis is unclear, sought to 
substitute it with the term anamnesis, which, he believes should be taken to mean exactly 
what Paul meant it to mean in Romans 2:14.
35
 Conscience, at this level is not only essentially 
objective, but it also functions at a level of absolute truth that is shared by every human 
being. It is for this reason that Vatican II asserts that it is: “Through loyalty to conscience, 
[that] Christians are joined to others in the search for truth and for the right solution to so 




 Newman, Grisez and Hogan all agree on the understanding of conscience/1, most 
especially as a repository for the principles of rightness and wrongness in human action. They 
also agree that it is the aspect of conscience that “demands, insists, requires (nonnegotiably) 
that we seek to do good and avoid evil.”
37
 In Newman’s terminology, this may be regarded as 
the level of “moral sense” that is the distinctive capacity to determine right and wrong.
38
 
Grisez phrases this level as “an awareness of moral truth.” Furthermore, his assertion that: 
“Only at this level are moral good and evil fully understood and rightly in a freely choosing 
person. . .”
39
 strongly indicates that conscience/1 is the basic ontological level of conscience. 
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From a personalist perspective, Hogan describes this level as a person’s orientation or 
direction toward the good, and associates this level with the “theology of fundamental option” 
because the theory highlights how human persons can be oriented toward good or evil.
40
 
Because of the universal emphasis on the sense of right and wrong at the level of 
conscience/1, Hogan centred her personalist theology of conscience on this level. We can 
conclude then that conscience/1 — as human characteristic, human capacity or “habitus” is 
intrinsic, pure, inerrant, and a lasting part of the human person, and which facilitates our 
remaining attracted to rightness and repulsed by wrongness — finds favour with Newman, 
Grisez and Hogan. 
 This consensus understanding of conscience/1 is however in danger of becoming 
fragmented due to personalist emphasis on change in the nature of the human person and 
morality. O’Connell makes two claims in this regard. Firstly, and relevant to the nature of the 
human person, he points out that since “persons are temporal beings subject over time to 
evolution and change,” it is quite likely that “what once was good [and] truly serving their 
humanisation and spiritualisation, may someday become the opposite.”
41
 It is obvious that 
whilst Hogan may see this as support for some form of contextualisation, Grisez would 
consider it as an attempt at installing a bête noire, relativisation, into Catholic teachings on 
conscience. Secondly, however, and of relevance to Church teachings, O’Connell asserts that 
while church teaching 
may well have been both adequate and accurate at one time, it does 
not follow that it will always be so. On the contrary, there may well be 
need for revision and rearticulation. What was once adequate teaching 
can become inadequate. And we ought not to be surprised.
42
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In light of what has been elaborated in this thesis on Grisez’s unquestioning support for the 
role of the teaching Church in the formation and functioning of conscience, we would not be 
surprise should he castigate such an assertion. On the other hand, this would sit easily with 
Hogan’s belief that the Church must be more open to and accepting of the reality that as a 
human institution, though guided by the Holy Spirit, it remains open to the possibility of 
error. Therefore, she would be in complete agreement with O’Connell’s conclusion that 
although the Church has an important role in the process of moral education it is a limited 
role, “limited by the possibility of error, the possibility of incompleteness, and the possibility 
of inadequacy.”
43
 Finally, it is as though O’Connell is responding to any criticism that Grisez 
may level against the assertion of vulnerability to error in the institutional Church when the 
former suggests that “The prudent person acknowledges this, yet seeks from the Church 
whatever wisdom it is able to give her or him.”
44
 The challenge before the teaching church in 
terms of conscience/1 is a proper deciphering for itself and for its followers of what comprises 
the objective truth about rightness and wrongness, good and evil so as not to confuse its 
faithful. Newman, Grisez and Hogan would agree that the challenge for each individual 
human moral person is to remain docile and seek the moral wisdom of the teachings of the 
church in this respect. 
3.2 Conscience/2: A Moral Process 
 O’Connell designates conscience/2 as process, and he sees it as being on a par with 
Aquinas’ level of conscientia. We may see process or conscience/2, as the first stage of 
conscientia. This suggests, therefore, that the mere possession of conscience/1, which 
O’Connell also believes is the “human capacity for self-direction”
45
 is not sufficient, since 
that capacity if not put into effect remains dormant. It is for this reason, that it can be claimed 
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that the effective exercise of conscience/1 is what is central to the existence of conscience/2. 
Specifically, O’Connell maintains that it is the human being’s innate feeling of obligation to 
analyse his or her behaviour and context in an effort to discover what is the really right thing 
that constitutes conscience/2, insofar as this search constitutes an “exercise in moral 
reasoning.”
46
 According to O’Connell, therefore, “Conscience/2 deals with the effort to 
achieve a specific perception of values, concrete individual values. It is the ongoing process 
of reflection, discernment, discussion, and analysis in which human beings have always 
engaged.”
47
 Aquinas, himself, appears to capture the essence of the relationship between 
conscience/1 and conscience/2 in his description of conscientia as being literally “the relation 
of knowledge to something,”
48
 such that conscience/1 is transformed from being a mere 
characteristic or “capacity” to a process that is applied to a particular case. Indeed, it is this 
act of applying moral truth or principles contained in conscience/1, which O’Connell 
properly designates as process, a procedure that is essentially fundamental to the exercise of 
conscience, in general, and to conscience/2, in particular, insofar as it is at this level that 
conscience can be seen to be actually performing its roles or function.  
 From Newman’s perspective, the exercise of this special human capacity is captured 
in the notion of conscience as the “sense of duty.” In his view, therefore, conscience as a 
process must be deemed to be fundamentally different from the function of human reason 
because it functions in the capacity of a “magisterial dictate.” Moreover, it is at this stage of 
process, that subjectivity is seen to engage with objectivity and, as John Paul II teaches, it is 
at the stage of process that “the link between freedom and truth is made manifest.”
49
 By 
trailing backwards and forwards, conscience discovers, scrutinizes, teaches, guides, chooses 
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and applies what should be done or avoided. It can be concluded, therefore, that the manner 
in which conscience/2 functions is representative of conscience itself. Thus the role of 
conscience as generally understood can be regarded as the specific feature of conscience at 
this level.  
 O’Connell regards this particular stage of conscientia as the most delicate, because it 
allows or facilitates error in the process. It is at this stage, for example, that conscience may 
be seen to operate as superego, social convention, and group consensus or promotes an 
individual’s own culture value or political ideology. It is not surprising, then, that O’Connell, 
himself, should advise that because of the “fragile reality” of conscience/2, as an aspect of the 
human person, it “needs all the help it can get. It needs to be educated.”
50
 Furthermore, he 
notes that since individuals operating at this level “are not always able to ‘see what’s there’”, 
they continually stand in need of assistance.
51
 In O’Connell’s view, therefore, the sincere 
person will facilitate the obtaining of such assistance by undertaking the process of 
conscience formation. He regards such a formative process as being the mark of 
conscience/2, in that it essentially stands in need of being formed, guided, directed, 
illuminated and “assisted in a multitude of ways.”
52
 
 O’Connell draws two conclusions from his observations, conclusions that could be 
deemed to be “matters of interest” to Newman, Grisez and Hogan. Firstly, conscience/2 is 
quite distinct from conscience/1 in that its conclusions and judgements cannot be regarded as 
being either universal or infallible.
53
 It is for this reason, he claims that in the realm of 
conscience/2, the search for truth must take priority, and that the truth must always remain 
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“the object of what is sought.”
54
 Indeed, he unequivocally asserts that the functional aim of 
conscience/2 must be to “sincerely and docilely undertake the task of finding and respecting 
that truth.”
55
 This reiterates John Paul II’s chief interest and advice over the 
subjectivity/objectivity conundrum that human subjectivity and freedom requires that the 
human person be concerned with the truth.
56
 The second conclusion that O’Connell draws 
from his observations on conscience/2 centres on the fact that since the Church is a teacher of 
moral values, it is at the level of conscience/2 that it “has its greatest role.”
57
 Specifically, he 
asserts that: 
Even viewed simply as a human institution, the Church deserves to be 
heard. And when one adds the belief of faith that the Holy Spirit 
somehow guides the Church, not protecting its every word from error 
but nonetheless providing it with some illumination, it stands to 
reason that the prudent person will listen to its declarations.
58
 
However, while reminding Catholics, in particular, of the validity of the Church’s role in 
assisting them in their formation of conscience/2, O’Connell also reminds them that 
conscience/2 is not directly accountable to the Church. Rather, as he has already asserted, 
conscience/2 “is accountable to the truth and nothing else.”
59
 Even a cursory reading of 
Newman, Grisez and Hogan on the relation of the individual conscience to the teaching 
Church, suggests that each of them certainly have their own take on that claim.  
 In Newman’s teaching, conscience as process assumes the form of a voice, a divine 
voice which seeks first and foremost to communicate with the human person. When a person 
experiences that voice urging him or her to do this or to avoid that, then they are, in fact, 
“experiencing” a function of conscience. As has already been noted in the chapter on 
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Newman, he described conscience as “a messenger from Him, who, both in nature and in 
Grace, speaks to us behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by His representatives. [It] is the 
aboriginal Vicar of Christ.”
60
 Elaborating on the role and function of conscience, he describes 
it as being the voice of Christ, which aspires to undertake the role of “a prophet in its 
information, a monarch in its peremptoriness, a priest in its blessings and anathemas.”
61
 In 
fact, he forcefully claims that “Were it not for the voice, speaking so clearly in my conscience 
and my heart, I should be an Atheist, or a Pantheist, or a Polytheist when I looked into the 
world.”
62
 Not surprisingly, echoes of Newman’s understanding of conscience as process is to 
be found in the teachings of Vatican II, specifically where it reminds Christians that the voice 
of conscience is ever calling them to love and do what is good and to avoid evil, particularly 
on those occasions when it tells them “inwardly at the right moment: do this, shun that.”
63
 
 In Grisez’s thought, conscience as process is seen to function through the exercising 
of the virtue of prudence at a level which would suggest that such a practice has become 
connatural with, or like a second nature to, the individual.
64
 As process, the commanding 
dictate of conscience to “do good and avoid evil” is brought to the fore through such 
“connaturality,” as the nonrational way by which conscience operates. Drawing on the 
teachings of Aquinas, Grisez’s concludes that such phenomena constitute the ideal process by 
which conscience enables the functioning of conscience/1. In order to identify what is ideal 
about this process, Grisez specifically refers to Aquinas’s pronouncement that “a virtuous 
person” is one who “has integrated the moral norms, so that his or her moral reasoning is 
facilitated and made certain.”
65
 For Grisez, in other words, prudence, as one of the cardinal 
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virtues, is a “practical wisdom” which enables people to easily tell what is right. In short, he 
is asserting that “For prudent persons . . . their own character is a standard of morality 
because it embodies moral norms.”
66
 Finally, Grisez would certainly agree with the notion 
that the hallmark of conscience/2, insofar as it facilitates “sound practical judgement” 
through the exercise of “connaturality” or the virtue of prudence is not “psychological ease 
and immediacy, but agreement with moral truth.”
67
  
 Insofar as Hogan’s model of conscience seeks to elaborate an understanding of 
conscience in terms of its “inward dynamics,”
 68
 her thought provides an apt way for not only 
understanding conscience as process, but also the nature of the person who engages in that 
undertaking. Hence, relative to conscience as process, or conscience/2, Linda Hogan points 
out that: (i) “Good, integrated and fully personal decisions engage the individual at the 
intellectual, intuitive, emotional and imaginative levels;”
69
 (ii) “Conscience needs an 
interplay of each of these elements to operate sensitively and successfully;”
70
 and (iii) “Good 
choices reflect a coherence of these important aspects of the personality so that no one level 
is ignored or silenced.”
71
 Unlike Grisez, Hogan is not anxious to emphasise the nonrational 
aspects of conscience as process, rather she seeks to identify the role of rationality in the 
moral life of the person, a rationality, however that far from being “languageless, cultureless, 
history-less,”
72
 is “embodied and contextual, shaped by the conventions of culture, by 
religious sensibilities, by desires both conscious and unconscious, by imaginings and fears.”
73
 
As to the nature of the person who engages in such a process, Hogan maintains that “the 
person at the centre of this theology of conscience” must not be treated as an abstract mind, 
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but, instead,  must be engaged with as “a person who is located in culture and history, one 
who is relational, embodied and ultimately in progress.”
74
 Newman somewhat lyrically 
addresses much of what Hogan has just claimed about conscience as process and the human 
person as a being “in progress” in the following extract wherein he states:  
Conscience has a legitimate place among our mental acts; as really so, 
as the action of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, or as the sense 
of the beautiful; that, as there are objects which, when presented to the 
mind, cause it to feel grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things 
which excite in us approbation or blame, and which we in 
consequence call right or wrong; and which, experienced in ourselves, 
kindle in us that specific sense of pleasure or pain, which goes by the 
name of a good or bad conscience.
75
 
 Of another elaboration found in Hogan, wherein she seeks to integrate the concepts of 
transcendental and categorical freedoms—concepts elaborated by Karl Rahner,
76
 it can be 
claimed that she is, in fact, distinguishing between the functions of conscience/1 and 
conscience/2, respectively. According to Rahner’s account, as presented by Hogan, a person’s 
transcendental freedom is concerned with “one’s entire orientation and direction in life,” 
whereby the individual’s choice lies between the acceptance and refusal “of a loving 
relationship with God”, a fundamental option that will determine whether he or she will 
choose the good or the bad.
77
 Such characteristics, as outlined by Hogan, are indicative of the 
function of conscience/1, and according to Hogan completely shape “the moral character of 
the person and becomes the basis on which the person exercises choice and makes 
decisions.”
78
 It is this “daily exercise of choice”, however, that Hogan designates as 
categorical freedom,
79
 and which in turn, can be said to characterise the process that is 
conscience/2. According to Hogan, therefore, it is through the daily exercise of categorical 
choice or freedom, that the individual realises and implements the “fundamental option” or 
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our capacity toward good or evil,
80
 thereby invoking the process or the dialectic that is 
conscience/2. To the extent that such choices are connatural or second nature to the 
individual, therefore, they can be said to have “become the incarnation of our fundamental 
option,” according to Hogan.
81
 Following from this, it can be claimed that conscience, at the 
stage of process, comprises a search for human authenticity, which is evidenced in a 




 Finally, reference has already been made to O’Connell’s observation that 
conscience/2 or process is the most delicate stage because of its potential to facilitate the 
entry of error. Hogan’s model of understanding conscience goes a long way towards 
providing a reason for this. Specifically, conscience as process use information garnered from 
multiple sources to ascertain right and wrong, goodness and badness. However, in processing 
such information, it is possible for the individual to become, as it were, entangled in a web of 
subjectivism. It follows, therefore, that in the daily exercise of choice, or process that is 
conscience/2, mistakes can thrive through the entry of subjectively generated errors. Indeed, 
such a feature can be deemed to be what most distinguishes conscience/1 from conscience/2. 
 Hogan, however, not only explains how error can enter and undermine the process of 
conscience she also explains how such error can and does contribute to moral failure. She 
notes in Confronting the Truth that: 
The conscience engages the reason, intuition, emotions and 
imagination of the person. However, distortions can occur at any or all 
of these levels. Likewise, the process of integrating these dimensions 
can be problematic. As a result we live with both the history and the 
prospect of moral failure. Most people experience failure through 
some kind of dysfunction. Our capacity to make or to carry through 
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good moral decisions can be restricted because some dimensions of 
our ethical discernment may fail. We may be confused or divided over 
what is in fact good. Our reason may be clouded. Our emotions may 
be out of control or we may be afraid of the leap of imagination 
required to resolve a particular problem
83
 
 What is interesting in Hogan’s account is her observation that not only is moral failure 
an actual part of every human being’s history, but so is the inevitability of its becoming a 
reality for them. It is for this reason that the exercising of this phase of conscience demands 
that the human person be well-informed; reference has already been made to O’Connell’s 
comment of how the process that is conscience/2 stands in crucial need of being formed, 
guided, directed, illuminated and “assisted in a multitude of ways.”
84
 Furthermore, there can 
be no doubt that Hogan would wholeheartedly agree with O’Connell’s identification of where 
such assistance should be sought from or sourced. Hence, no matter how inevitable the entry 
of moral failure into the life of the individual, O’Connell claims that 
if they are sincere persons, if they have accepted the fundamental 
responsibility implied by conscience/1, then they will seek that 
assistance. They will turn to their friends, their colleagues, their peers, 
and seek to benefit from their insights. They will list to the larger 
culture, to the wisdom of previous generations, and they will listen to 




As for the role of the Church in providing such assistance, O’Connell asserts that “the church 
has its greatest role in the realm of conscience/2, for the church is, among other things, a 
teacher of moral values.”
86
 As noted, earlier in this chapter, however, O’Connell qualifies this 
acknowledgement with the caveat that the Church needs to understand that conscience/2 is 
not directly accountable to the Church, but rather to the truth. While such a caveat fits easily 
with Hogan’s elaboration of her model of conscience, Grisez, ever-wary of the potential for 
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relativistic voices to enter the process, might not be that enthusiastic about welcoming so 
many voices into that process. In conclusion, however, it can be said that the one sure area of 
unanimity in the debate surrounding conscience as process, is that Newman, Grisez, Hogan 
and the Church are united in their assertion that the proper “formation of conscience” is 
essential for Conscience/2 as process to properly exercise its function. 
3.3 Conscience/3: A Consummately Concrete Event 
By way of introduction to the notion of conscience/3, O’Connell observed that since 
human persons are not only thinkers and analysers of fact, but doers of deeds also, they 
cannot exist solely at the level of conscience/2 as perennial observers, or commentators on the 
current scene. Rather, he insists that 
we must act. We must make a decision, we must judge our own 
behaviour. At some point we must finally declare: ‘it is theoretically 
possible that I may be wrong, but it seems to me that I ought to do 




In O’Connell’s understanding, therefore, “conscience/3 is consummately concrete. It is the 
concrete judgement of a specific person pertaining to her or his own immediate action.”
88
 
Hence, for O’Connell, while conscience/1 is a characteristic and conscience/2 a process, 
conscience/3 is an actual event.
89
 As an event it is vital to the nature of conscience and 
represents the second stage of the level of conscientia. The concreteness of the nature and 
activity of conscietia can be seen in Aquinas’s description of it as being the “application of 
knowledge to activity.”
90
 O’Connell describes the activity of conscience/3 as that which 
actualises the human person’s ability to establish personal moral convictions (based on 
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individual moral decisions) and engages in acts that facilitate either the execution of a 
concrete good or the avoidance of a concrete evil.
91
  
 In the context of this thesis, for example, Newman’s decision to convert from 
Anglicanism within which he was reared and educated to Roman Catholicism, which he 
innately distrusted, is a very practical demonstration of conscience/3 in action. Indeed, a 
comment he made just prior to his conversion in 1844 sheds some light on the awe-fullness 
that such a step represented for him at the time. He observed: “No one can have a more 
unfavorable view than I of the present state of Roman Catholics.”
92
 With reference to the 
concrete event, which transformed Newman from being an Anglican into a follower of 
Roman Cathollicism, Ratzinger points out, for example, that: “Newman’s conversion to 
Catholicism was . . . more taken by the necessity to obey recognised truth, that is to say, even 
against his own sensitivity and bonds of friendship and ties due to similar background.”
93
 
Thus, in the following extract, Newman, himself, describes how, having become convinced 
of the truthfulness of the Roman Catholic position, he had to decide to commit to choosing 
the good by becoming Catholic over the untruthfulness of doing nothing by remaining 
Anglican. He states: 
I am a Catholic by virtue of my believing in a God; and if I am asked 
why I believe in a God, I answer that it is because I believe in myself, 
for I feel it impossible to believe in my own existence (and of that fact 
I am quite sure) without believing also in the existence of Him, who 
lives as a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in my conscience.
94
 
For Newman, therefore, conscience/3 is actualised when the individual firstly commits to the 
conviction that there exists a Personal, All-seeing, All-judging Being in his or her conscience, 
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and then concretises that conviction by deciding to act or refrain from acting in light of the 
Truth that emanates from this Being. 
 Grisez, on the other hand, believes that this level of conscientia, the event must 
correspond with the moral teachings of the church; that is, a person’s convictions, decisions 
and commitments to act or refrain from acting must not differ from what the teachings of the 
church designate as being good or evil. In fact, this is where there exist some fundamental 
differences, not only between the teachings of the three scholars in this thesis, but also 
between some of their teachings and that of the magisterium. Grisez, for example, would 
have little difficulty with those who point to the Church’s admonition that individuals must 
follow their conscience and have the freedom to do so, as long as these same individuals also 
accept that the individual conscience must “conform to the objective standards of moral 
conduct.”
95
 Grisez and the church’s teaching, therefore, would argue that the event that 
constitutes the concrete activity of conscientia or conscience/3 “must always be governed 
according to a conscience dutifully conformed to the divine law itself, and should be 
submissive toward the Church's teaching office, which authentically interprets that law in the 
light of the Gospel.”
96
  
 Such a conclusion raises the question of whether the standards which the church 
promotes are universally objective or not. For example, many Catholics experience inner 
moral conflict when they attempt to integrate elements of objective church teachings with the 
subjective conclusions at which their individual consciences have, in their opinion, 
responsibly arrived. It is not surprising, therefore, that not all Catholics engaged in the 
activities of conscience/3 eventually accept every established moral answer, position or event 
provided by the Church, especially as it relates to some specific moral issues generally 
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designated as “intrinsic evil.” It is for this reason, for example, that integrating the church’s 
teaching on either life-altering or life-taking actions (e.g., Euthanasia, Abortion, and Stem 
Cell research), or sexuality (e.g., Same-Sex sexual activities or marriage, or Contraception) 
with the individual conscience has been found by many to be extremely difficult and, at 
times, personally very painful. However, as has been demonstrated by the models of 
conscience outlined by Newman, Grisez and Hogan in this thesis, such moral dilemmas have 
been found to be partly rooted in, and reinforced by, the existence of contrasting or differing 
theological strands in the Church’s traditions and teachings in the area of morality.  
 Thus, as has already been well noted, Grisez’s theological stance, relative to moral 
teachings, promotes an ecclesial conformist attitude or framework, which insists that 
conscience/3 must never deviate from what Grisez considers to be the normative, moral 
teachings of the Church. This stands in stark contrast with the personalist strand advocated by 
Hogan. Her assertion, for example, that “the task of conscience involves scrutinising one’s 
intention, evaluating all the relevant circumstances and informing oneself of church teaching 
and other sources of moral wisdom,”
97
 emphasises her belief that the events generated by 
conscience/3 may or may not correspond to Church teaching. So, at one end of the 
subjective-objective moral spectrum is to be found the personalism of Hogan, which “rejects 
any account of ethics that relies on absolutist principles . . . [and] believes that every moral 
theory should give due recognition to the role of circumstances and intentionality.”
98
 Then, at 
the other end lies Grisez’s strand, which operates out of his ecclesial conviction that a faithful 
and clearheaded Catholic conscience should conform unconditionally to the normative 
teachings of the Church. Indeed, in support of his own denial that his strand of moral 
theology has a purely legalistic basis, he claims that such a conformist requirement is a matter 
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of faith rather than one of legalism. Take, for example, the following extract wherein he 
insists and states:  
Catholics ought to conform their consciences to her teaching in every 
question, every detail, every respect. If they are faithful, they will: not 
only because they hear the Lord Jesus’ voice, speaking for the Father, 
in the teaching of the Church, but because by their conscientious 
commitment of faith they have accepted the Church as their own, more 
than humanly wise, moral guide.
99
 
Here, Grisez absolutely insists that ensuring the event generated by conscience/3 conforms 
completely to church teaching is not only a moral requirement, but it is also an essential 
demonstration of one’s commitment to Catholic faith. He later sets these moral theological 
expectations in stone, as it were, when he declared: “Catholics who wish to be faithful and 




 Many would consider Grisez’s advocacy of absolute conformism, with its 
implications that individuals must be prepared to abdicate any notion of ultimate personal 
responsibility in their exercise of conscience/3, to be excessive and even morally suspect in 
itself. There is a real danger here that his approach will actually serve to portray the church as 
a sort of a fascist controller of morals. For example, his intense antagonism towards what he 
calls “radical theological dissent,”
101
 which he sees being exhibited by theologians who 
disagree with the notions of “moral absolutes” or “intrinsic evil” speaks of his apparently 
unshakeable belief in the maxim: Roma locuta est, causa finita est. It is obvious; therefore 
that Grisez would find incomprehensible O’Connell’s final analysis of the relationship 
between the wisdom and judgement of the church and that of the individual conscience, 
wherein he observed that 
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the genuinely important role of Church teaching must never be 
allowed to deteriorate into a “loyalty test” for Catholics. . . . For just 
as to use Church teaching properly is to celebrate it, to ask it to be 
more than it is is to destroy it. And to make of that valuable and 
cherished source of moral wisdom a tool for ecclesiastical discipline 
or a measure of religious fidelity is to betray it. Indeed, to see the 
moral teaching of the Church as a test of Catholic loyalty is ultimately 
to violate the nature of the Church, the nature of humanity, and surely 
the nature of conscience.
102
 
It is also obvious that Grisez would have little truck with Hogan’s advocacy of conscience as 
“an active faculty that discovers and discerns the good within the complexity of each 
situation,” or as “the site of autonomous moral decision making [that] bears the responsibility 
for acting rightly.”
103
 Such reluctance on his part is all the more puzzling since Hogan’s 
above elaboration of conscience fits easily with Vatican II’s description of conscience as the 
“most secret core and sanctuary of the human person. There they are alone with God whose 
voice echoes in the depths.”
104
 The fit between both accounts, that of Hogan and Vatican II, 
is to be found in their common emphases on the autonomous nature of the relationship 
between individuals and their God as they exercise their conscience, an autonomy that is 
certainly picked up in the descriptions of conscience/2 and conscience/3 as operations that 
occur within the self but in direct relation to God. Furthermore, with reference to 
conscience/1 and conscience/3, O’Connell speaks of their “unique personal character and 
inviolability.”
105
 Indeed, both Hogan’s and O’Connell’s personalist descriptions of  
conscience/3, in particular, as an event in the course of life’s spiritual journeying, are 
suggestive of the opening words of a hymn attributed to the Irish Saint, Columba: “Alone 
with none but thee my God I journey on my way.”
106
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 However, while Hogan reiterates O’Mahoney’s elaboration of the personal 
uniqueness and human solitariness that necessarily characterises the valid exercise of 
conscience,
107
 she, like Grisez, believes that the individual conscience should be open to 
being informed by the wisdom of the church. Unlike Grisez, however, she also believes – and 
insists – that the individual is not obliged to unconditionally follow the ecclesial teaching that 
may emanate from such an encounter. She points out that 
the Christian tradition has continuously insisted that moral 
responsibility and choice reside ultimately with each individual. We 
cannot export our moral choices or hand over our decision making to 
any other person. As such we must be obedient to our own 
discernment of the Spirit; we must adhere to our own consciences. 
Obedience, therefore, can never be construed as the blind submission 
of one’s will and intellect, even to the magisterium of the church, 




This extract serves not only to highlight the fundamental differences that exist between 
Grisez’s and Hogan’s respective approaches to “the exercise of conscience” but, more 
specifically, to conscience/3. Thus, on the one hand, advocates of the liberal tradition would 
claim that by accepting Grisez’s approach, the individual is actually relinquishing his or her 
fundamental human entitlement to exercise the judgement of conscience in favour of simply 
conforming to whatever the magisterium teaches. On the other hand, however, 
“traditionalists” would claim that following through on Hogan’s model could result in the 
“learning church” eventually accepting the tenets of subjectivism, with grave implications for 
both the very image and authority of the teaching church in its role as purveyor of the 
historically accumulated wisdom of the entire Church, both “learning” and “teaching.” These 
traditionalists are alarmed at the prospect of the notion of human morality “degenerating” 
into that which every individual determines to be uniquely suited to their specifically 
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subjective requirements and standards, with seriously grave implications, therefore, for the 
“objective standard of moral conduct” advocated by Vatican II. How both these obviously bi-
polarised approaches would treat the exercise of conscience/3 can be specifically assessed in 
terms of O’Connell’s observation that while it is “the concrete judgement of a specific person 
pertaining to her or his own immediate action . . . [it] is also supremely powerful . . . 
[because] it constitutes the final norm by which a person’s action must be guided.”
109
 Indeed, 
the importance that O’Connell attaches to the exercise of conscience at this level can be 
gauged from his assertion that it is “by the personal decision either to accept or to refuse to 
accept the demand of conscience/3, the moral agent engages either in an act of sanctity or in 
actual sin.”
110
 What should be of interest to both approaches, here, is that in the case of 
conscience/3, salvation or damnation follow on from the individual’s personal decision to 
accept or deny the demands of that conscience, rather than from obeying or disobeying the 
demands of the magisterium. Such a conclusion should rest easily with Hogan’s insistence 
that at its most basic level, conscience should be understood “as a personal discernment of 
good and evil, in the context of relationship with a loving God.”
111
 Such an understanding of 
conscience, she claims, “draws heavily on the personalist theology of Vatican II,” while also 
acknowledging that the judgements of conscience cannot be considered to be “purely 
subjective, arbitrary [or] private.”
112
 
 As has already been outlined, however, while Hogan’s model allows for a certain 
level of subjectivity, arbitrariness and solitariness in the exercise of conscience, she, herself, 
is absolutely opposed to arguments in favour of the existence of “moral absolutes” or 
“intrinsic evil.” In her view, as noted earlier, such concepts render the role of conscience 
either irrelevant or even non-existent. Of course, Grisez will object to this as he believes that 
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the role of conscience is not made redundant but that its task is to appropriate the church’s 
teaching.
113
 Thus, for Grisez, for example, there can be no reason, intention or circumstance 
that could justify the commission of acts of “rape” or “paedophilia” – acts labelled as ontic 
evil. Hence, he would point out that although conscience/2 constitutes “the ongoing process 
of reflection, discernment, discussion, and analysis, in which human beings have always 
engaged,”
114
 it would be expeditious in transmitting its conclusions to conscience/3 for 
concrete and appropriate decision-making and judgement. This derives from the fact that the 
vast majority of human persons already possess conscience/1, or that “general sense of value” 
characterised by “an awareness of personal responsibility, that is utterly emblematic of the 
human person.”
115
 It seems, therefore, that in the matter of such acts of ontic evil as “rape”, 
“paedophilia” or “genocide” for example, O’Connell’s thought on conscience engages in a 
concerted three-pronged strike against any notion whatsoever of accepting or even tolerating 
the commission of these acts because of the catastrophically poisonous impact such tolerance 
could have on the human soul and nature.  
 Interestingly, Hogan cites John Noonan’s listing of such issues as “usury, marriage, 
slavery and religious freedom”
116
, as examples of where real and substantial changes took 
place in what seemed to many Catholics to be “a singular tradition of moral teaching”
117
 that 
was unconditionally proposed by the magisterium. Furthermore, drawing on her own 
research, she cites such moral teachings “as those relating to contraception, homosexuality, or 
divorce and remarriage” as cases where the moral teaching of the magisterium is invested 
“with an unwarranted degree of certainty and inflexibility.”
118
 While slavery is now 
universally condemned as an inexcusable moral evil, it is certainly the case that the jury is 
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still out in such cases as contraception and homosexuality. Hogan cites such ingrained moral 
ambivalence as supporting her arguments against the existence of intrinsic evil. However, the 
overall approach of this thesis in the question of conscience, suggests that the universal 
response of horror, disgust and revulsion at reported acts of rape, paedophilia and genocide, 
is a very strong indication that people with consciences that function at all of their levels and 
stages, consider these acts to be in a different league from those of masturbation, 
contraception and divorce, for example. For the vast majority of people, it can be argued that 
such a league can be titled “intrinsic evil.” To argue otherwise could be taken by some as an 
attempt at engaging in a game of pretence, where the actor claims to “see no evil, hear no 
evil, and speak no evil,” even where he or she is a witness to the commission of intrinsic evil 
acts.  
 Despite arriving at such a conclusion, however, it must be acknowledged that the 
concept of intrinsic evil has deeply divided theologians over the years, a division that can be 
characterised by the bitterness of the debates that still ensue and the theological dissent that 
continues. Unlike Grisez’s approach, Hogan’s personalist theory allows for such dissent, as 
illustrated by her comment that: “Disagreement on moral matters is seen as an inevitable 
feature of the business of ethics and faithful dissent from particular church teaching is 
accepted.”
119
 However, she is also keenly aware that the church strongly opposes such a 
stance and “has become preoccupied with the question of dissent, including who can dissent, 
under what circumstances, for what reasons and from what kind of teaching.”
120
 This thesis 
makes the case, however that if conscience as process after undertaking a painstaking 
evaluation, scrutiny, consultation, and spiritual discernment remains faced with the biblical 
option which Joshua put to the people of Israel – “choose today whom you wish to serve,”
121
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then it will most definitely opt for Newman’s choice of toasting “to Conscience first, and to 
the Pope afterwards.”
122
 By allocating such a position of primacy to conscience, it can be 
argued that Newman has, in fact, placed it beyond the argumentative reach of both loyalists 
and dissenters in a league of its own. 
3.4 Filling the Gap: The Consequent Stage of Conscientia 
 Conscience/2 as process and conscience/3 as event constitute the first and second 
stage of conscientia respectively. But there is a third stage, a stage that may be considered as 
the ultimate stage of conscience as a whole. This may be regarded as the apex stage of 
progress in conscientia. It commences after the activities of conscience/3 have been put into 
effect. This third stage is what is generally known as “consequent conscience.” In short, what 
transpires from conscience/1 up to process or conscience/2 and unto conscience/3 or event, is 
regarded as the antecedent realm of conscience or legislative conscience, the realm with 
which O’Connell was chiefly concerned. In concentrating on this realm of conscience, 
O’Connell failed to theorise to any meaningful extent on what follows on from the event 
constituted at conscience/3, particularly in the context of the rightness or wrongness of that 
event. Thus, O’Connell is not preoccupied with the role of conscience after conscience/3 or 
event. When conscientia enters the consequent stage, a stage wherein, it may be argued, most 
judicial operations occur, conscience/2 as process evaluates and judges a person’s choice on 
the basis of actions done or omitted, utilising an internal dialectical process that constantly 
reviews and revises its decisions, and according to Grisez, prevents the uncritical acceptance 
of “the movement of values clarification.”
123
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 Although not referring to this third or consequent stage of conscientia by name, 
Newman is quite explicit and informative in his elaboration of what actually occurs when 
conscience/2 proceeds to laud conscience/3 for the right events. It concretises or reprimands it 
for the wrong events it has facilitated. He maintains: 
No fear is felt by any one who recognizes that his conduct has not 
been beautiful, though he may be mortified at himself, if perhaps he 
has thereby forfeited some advantage; but, if he has been betrayed into 
any kind of immorality, he has a lively sense of responsibility and 
guilt, though the act be no offence against society,—of distress and 
apprehension, even though it may be of present service to him,—of 
compunction and regret, though in itself it be most pleasurable,—of 
confusion of face, though it may have no witnesses. These various 
perturbations of mind which are characteristic of a bad conscience, 
and may be very considerable,—self-reproach, poignant shame, 
haunting remorse, chill dismay at the prospect of the future,—and 
their contraries, when the conscience is good, as real though less 
forcible, self-approval, inward peace, lightness of heart, and the 
like,—these emotions constitute a specific difference between 
conscience and our other intellectual senses,—common sense, good 
sense, sense of expedience, taste, sense of honour, and the like,—as 
indeed they would also constitute between conscience and the moral 
sense, supposing these two were not aspects of one and the same 
feeling, exercised upon one and the same subject-matter.
124
 
In the preceding elaboration, Newman, firstly refers to the internal nature of the activities of 
the consequent stage of conscientia, and particularly to the fact that its evaluations are 
independent of such external influences as the judgement of society, the usefulness or 
pleasure the activity afforded the actor, or whether the activity was witnessed or not. None of 
these phenomena will significantly influence the psychological and emotional tools that will 
be employed during the consequent phase of conscientia to show the individual that he or she 
is being held to account by their individual consciences for their actions. Thus, Newman lists 
the “various perturbations of mind” that may befall the individual as a consequence of 
                                                             
124
 John Henry Newman, Grammar of Assent, 108.  
437 
 
allowing a “bad conscience” the upper hand in his or her moral decision-making. On the 
other hand, he also refers to the consequent, positive “contraries” that can follow “when the 
conscience is good.” It is quite obvious, therefore, that for Newman, the role performed by 
conscience/2 at the consequent stage is vital because it is during this phase that a person is 
being held fully accountable. Furthermore, it is also at this stage that the onus is placed on the 
individual to acknowledge to whom it is he or she is being held ultimately accountable for the 
goodness or wickedness of their actions. In the following extract, Newman leaves no doubt as 
to the identity of this being, when he asserts thus: 
If, as is the case, we feel responsibility, are ashamed, are frightened, at 
transgressing the voice of conscience, this implies that there is One to 
whom we are responsible, before whom we are ashamed, whose 
claims upon us we fear. If, on doing wrong, we feel the same tearful, 
broken-hearted sorrow which overwhelms us on hurting a mother; if, 
on doing right, we enjoy the same sunny serenity of mind, the same 
soothing, satisfactory delight which follows on our receiving praise 
from a father, we certainly have within us the image of some person, 
to whom our love and veneration look, in whose smile we find our 
happiness, for whom we yearn, towards whom we direct our 
pleadings, in whose anger we are troubled and waste away. These 
feelings in us are such as require for their exciting cause an intelligent 
being: we are not affectionate towards a stone, nor do we feel shame 
before a horse or a dog; we have no remorse or compunction on 
breaking mere human law: yet, so it is, conscience excites all these 
painful emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation; and on 
the other hand it sheds upon us a deep peace, a sense of security, a 
resignation, and a hope, which there is no sensible, no earthly object 
to elicit. ‘The wicked flees, when no one pursueth;’ then why does he 
flee? whence his terror? Who is it that he sees in solitude, in darkness, 
in the hidden chambers of his heart? If the cause of these emotions 
does not belong to this visible world, the Object to which his 
perception is directed must be Supernatural and Divine; and thus the 
phenomena of Conscience, as a dictate, avail to impress the 
imagination with the picture of a Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, 
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just, powerful, all-seeing, retributive, and is the creative principle of 
religion, as the Moral Sense is the principle of ethics.
125
 
According to Newman, then, the Being that prompts conscience to excite “all these painful 
emotions, confusion, foreboding, self-condemnation . . .” or, on the contrary, to shed upon us 
“a deep sense of security, a resignation, and a hope, which there is no earthly object to elicit . 
. . does not belong to this world.” Instead, that Being, that source and object of “the 
phenomena of Conscience” is “a Supreme governor of religion, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, 
all-seeing, retributive, and . . . the creative principle of religion,” and in the case of every sane 
human person is to be found “in solitude, in darkness, in the hidden chambers of his [or her] 
heart.” By characterising the relationship between conscience/2 and the consequent stage of 
conscientia in this manner, Newman appears, once again, to remove the very concept of 
conscience itself from the never-ending contentious debates about the proper role of the 
church, the individual, theological dissent, moral failure and so on, in its functioning, and 
attempts to connect it directly, and without any intermediaries, to both the Source of its 
enlightenment and the Object of its accountability – the Moral Governor or Judge. 
 The dissection of conscience into diverse components, evident throughout this chapter 
in particular, is didactic in intent, and should not be taken as an indication that this thesis 
seeks to promote a more mechanistic understanding of the concept. In fact, for Newman, the 
act of conscience is indivisible.
126
 It is in such an “indivisible” context, Newman, himself, 
uniquely takes conscience as being the “illative sense” or “the power of judging and 
concluding.”
 127
 It is also under such an “indivisible” umbrella that Newman, Grisez and 
Hogan, in conjunction with church teaching, concur with the notion of conscience in terms of 
synderesis (anamnesis) and conscientia, whereby: (i) synderesis comprises the realm of the 
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human characteristic or capacity and moral legislation as they relate to the performance of 
good or evil, and the magisterial dictate to do what is right and avoid evil; and (ii) conscientia 
is understood as the realm of process, event and moral judiciary. 
4 The Obligation to Follow One’s Conscience – But Which One? 
 The much used maxim “one must follow one’s conscience” which has long been 
propagated and supported in the teaching tradition of the church
128
 is scrutinized in this 
section, not in terms of its validity and applicability, but rather in an effort to establish exactly 
which level or stage of conscience the maxim is referring to even though it is indivisible. 
4.1 Following Conscience/2 
 There is no doubting the fact that conscience must be followed at both levels of 
synderesis and conscientia. O’Connell states, for example, that “Throughout the whole 
exercise of conscience/2, as we maturely and prudently listen for whatever wisdom we can 
receive, we never forget that we are looking, not for the ‘approved’ not for the ‘permitted,’ 
but for the ‘good.’”
129
 It is for this reason that truth is of the essence in conscience/2, thereby 
making the finding and respecting of that truth in a respectful and docile manner the primary 
task of conscience.
130
 It could be argued here that such lofty moral aspirations alone would 
justify the inclusion of conscience/2 within the remit of the obligation to follow one’s 
conscience. Such a stance, however, would serve to overlook a problematic dilemma, namely 
that the judgements and conclusions of conscience/2 cannot be considered to be universal or 
infallible, as is alluded to by O’Connell in his comment that “One does not follow 
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conscience/2; rather, conscience/2 follows truth—and, indeed, does not always do that very 
well.”
131
 To ignore such a caveat would be to miss out on the import of O’Connell’s 
considered response to this dilemma. In short, while O’Connell acknowledges that in 
following an innately fallible conscience/2 a person “may do that which is (objectively) 
wrong,”
132
 he emphatically points out that in committing such a wrong the “perpetrator” has 
not acted in a morally wrong way, because: 
It is the quintessence of human morality that we should do what we 
believe to be right, and avoid what we believe to be wrong. The 
fallibility of our objective judgement (conscience/2) in no way 
obviates that fundamental moral obligation.
133
 
O’Connell, here, is simply reiterating the traditional teachings of the Church and of the vast 
majority of its moral theologians throughout history. The response of the three scholars at the 
centre of this study, however, to O’Connell’s observation concerning conscience is best 
described as being nuanced or qualified in its support. Grisez, for example, acknowledges 
that “According to common Christian teaching, one must follow one’s conscience even when 
it is mistaken.”
134
 However, his allocation of a primary role to conscience in moral decision-
making, is couched in his own conviction that, for as long as that conscience submits itself 
unconditionally to the guidance of the magisterium, it simply cannot err, because “the 
Church’s role is to help form conscience by communicating the truth.”
135
 On the other hand, 
as has already been outlined, Hogan, while also acknowledging the primacy of conscience, 
seeks to explain the notion of the erroneous conscience in terms of (i) the potential of the 
Church itself, as a human institution, to perpetrate erroneous judgements; (ii) a distinction 
between rightness and goodness, which suggests that while “a decision may be in error,” that 
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error “may arise from moral goodness;”
136
 and (iii) an emphasis on the innate goodness of the 
human person, which implies that, despite the mistake made by the erroneous conscience,  
“one is striving to obey its summons to fidelity.”
137
 Thus far, therefore, we have one 
theologian championing the omnipotent role of the Church in the prevention of error and 
another claiming that the actual error is evidence of innate goodness of the actor.  
 As with Grisez and Hogan, Newman also asserts the primacy of conscience “whether 
it tells truly or erroneously.”
138
 However, his response to the potential for a fallible 
conscience/2 to perpetrate “sincere” errors seeks neither to champion the role of the 
magisterium nor the inalienable rights of the individual over the “maintenance” of his or her 
conscience. Instead, Newman’s response to such a propensity focuses on the human-divine 
relationship and on the communication that occurs between both parties in that relationship. 
Thus, as Newman pointed out that conscience is “the voice of God,”
139
 then it is necessary 
that rational creatures have a duty to form that conscience according to God’s law and be sure 
that it shine through as purely as possible and without refraction. According to Newman, the 
fundamental reason underlying such a task is relational in nature, in that such a conscience 
would educate the individual in his duties towards God and his or her fellow human beings as 
well as lead them on by the guidance both of Providence and grace into the fullness of 
religious knowledge.
140
 Despite such lofty aspirations, however, the problem with the 
erroneous conscience (fallible conscience/2), in Newman’s opinion, may lie in the actual 
manner of communication that occurs between the individual conscience and the actual 
source of its enlightenment, that is, between the ‘listening’ conscience and an “Unseen Lord, 
and Governor, and Judge, who as yet speaks to them only secretly, who whispers in their 
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hearts, who tells them something, but not nearly so much as they wish and as they need.”
141
 
In Newman’s thought, therefore, the solution to the problem of the erroneous conscience is 
not to be found solely in the teachings of the magisterium or in the enhancement of the 
individual’s awareness of his or her rights to “own” their conscience. Rather, as with all 
“couples” who experience relationship problems, the solution is to be found in the 
consistency of one’s efforts at improving a loving communication with the divine through 
prayer, reflection, mediation, reading and plenty of “alone with none” time with God, 
practices much favoured by Newman, himself. 
4.2 Following Conscience/3  
 Whereas “proceed with caution” might constitute the advice that theologians might 
offer in the matter of following conscience/2, such may not be the case with conscience/3. 
The movement from the realm of conscience/2 to that of conscience/3 can be characterised as 
a movement from a place of uncertainty and doubts to one of absolute certainty and clarity. In 
short, according to O’Connell’s account the dictates of conscience/3 simply must be 
followed. In support of such uncompromising insistence, O’Connell cites Joseph Fuchs’ 
observation that the judgement of conscience/3 is both infallibly true and absolutely certain, 
because “it dictates that the person ought to act according to the personal judgement he has 
concerning the act.”
142
 O’Connell, himself, is actually reiterating Aquinas’s teaching, in 
particular, when he asserts that the judgement of conscience/3 is supremely powerful because 
“it constitutes the final norm by which a person’s action must be guided.”
143
 Indeed, such is 
the potency that conscience/3 is capable of exerting, it is O’Connell’s view that the human 
person should kneel before its altar of truth.
144
 In explanation for such an uncompromising 
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call to docile obeisance, O’Connell states: “If I genuinely believe that I should do something, 
it is not only accurate to say that I may do it. More than that, I should do it. Indeed, I must do 




 O’Connell, however, does not see conscience/3 as operating in solitary, dictatorial 
splendour; rather he points out that “conscience/3, to deserve its name, can only follow on the 
responsible exercise of conscience/2.”
146
 Indeed, as an example of how both consciences can 
work in tandem to ensure the centrality of conscience, even in the face of Papal 
pronouncements, O’Connell notes the American Bishops’ use of an extract from the 
teachings of John Henry Newman in their response to the encyclical, Humanae Vitae. They 
attached great significance to Newman’s observation that 
when I speak of Conscience, I mean conscience truly so-called. . . . If 
in a particular case it is to be taken as a sacred and sovereign monitor, 
its dictates, in order to prevail against the voice of the Pope, must 
follow upon serious thought, prayer, and all available means of 
arriving at a right judgement on the matter in question.
147
  
 At this stage, it must be noted that, as with conscience/2, all three scholars have voiced 
their support for the notion of the centrality or primacy of conscience/3 in moral decision-
making and action. Grisez’s support seem to derive from the fact that he would see 
conscience/3 as a type of magisterium “sponsored” construct, although it is to be wondered 
what he would make of O’Connell’s attaching of the quality of infallibility to the events of 
that conscience. Grisez’s accounts do appear to reserve that characteristic solely for the 
teachings and judgements of the Pope and the magisterium. As for Hogan, her support for the 
centrality of conscience/3 could be said to derive from her perception of that conscience as a 
type of personal property that is off-limits to all but personally invited guests. Once again, 
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Newman’s championing of that centrality derives simply from his understanding of the event 
of conscience/3 as being the very voice of God, “the Aboriginal Vicar of Christ,” in direct 
communication with his human creation. Indeed, John Paul II picks up on Newman’s 
understanding in his description of conscience as “a dialogue of man with God, the author of 
the law, the primordial image and final end of man.”
148
 
5. Relating the Sources of Moral Wisdom to the Binding Power of an Informed 
Conscience  
 Numerous sources of moral wisdom contribute to the formation of the conscience of 
the human person. Thus, if the centrality or primacy of conscience as guided by conscience/2 
and concretised in conscience/3 is a type of ‘privileged’ divine-human communicative 
faculty, it is also one that carries a grave responsibility deeming a person to be duty bound to 
accept and act upon its judgements. St. Bonaventure taught that 
conscience is like God's herald and messenger; it does not command 
things on its own authority, but commands them as coming from 
God's authority, like a herald when he proclaims the edict of the king. 
This is why conscience has binding force.
149
 
As well as being an appropriate attitude to adopt in the face of divine commands, the binding 
force of the judgements of conscience is about seeking and following the truth. Hence, John 
Paul II points out that since “it is always from the truth that the dignity of conscience 
derives,”
150
 “in order to have a ‘good conscience’ (1 Timothy 1:5), man must seek the truth 
and must make judgements in accordance with that same truth.”
151
 For Colavechio, however, 
respecting the “binding force of conscience” is also concerned with promoting authentic self-
realisation in the individual. Specifically, he asserts that “conscience is the deepest self-
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consciousness of man, insofar as it acts as a power of discrimination deciding on every choice 
what will promote authentic self-realisation and what will stand in its way.”
152
  
 Daniel C. Maguire emphasises a completely different take on the notion of the 
binding power of conscience. He maintains that to focus solely on the notion of  that binding 
power, not only serves to ignore another vital attitude needed in the proper exercise of 
conscience, but it also imposes on that faculty an autonomy it neither possesses nor needs. 
Maguire declared: “To the general statement that one should always follow one’s conscience 
should be added that one should also always question one’s conscience. The autonomy of 
conscience is not absolute. It would be inhuman if it were.”
153
 Maguire’s challenge to the 
notion of an absolutely autonomous conscience can be regarded as a reiteration of John Paul 
II’s assertion that to represent the judgements of conscience as the products of an autonomous 
moral mechanism is to totally miss the point that they are, in fact, the outcome of “an 
insistent search for truth” whereby individuals allow themselves to be guided by that truth in 
their actions.
154
 Furthermore, in the preceding extract, as well as calling for obedience to the 
voice of conscience, Maguire also insists that individuals demonstrate vigilance in the face of 
the demands made by that voice. Hence, he would doubtlessly agree with Hogan’s assertion, 
that such an inquisitive and alert mind-set “is a central component of the formation of 
conscience [and] is learned through attempting to confront the reality of one’s actions, 
through scrutinising one’s motivations, through checking one’s own memory of the 
events.”
155
 For that reason, if the aim of the formation of conscience is achieved, namely the 
production of an informed conscience, then to obey the judgements of that conscience is 
tantamount to heeding to the objective truth by which the conscience is formed. To this effect 
the Canadian Bishops proclaim: “The right to act according to one’s conscience must 
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therefore be accompanied by accepting the duty to conform it to the truth and to the law 
which God has engraved on our hearts.”
156
 It is important, therefore, that the treatment of 
conscience formation and its relation to the binding power of an informed conscience by 
Newman, Grisez and Hogan be assessed together. 
5.1 Newman, Grisez and Hogan on the Formation of Conscience and the Exercise of an 
Informed Conscience 
 Newman, Grisez, Hogan are all in agreement with the Church’s belief in the necessity 
of the proper formation of the individual conscience. The Church, herself, declares that 
in forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention to 
the holy and certain teaching of the Church. For the Catholic Church 
is by the will of Christ the teacher of truth. It is its duty to proclaim 
and teach with authority the truth which is Christ and, at the same time 
to declare and confirm by her authority the principles of the moral 
order which spring from human nature itself. 
157
 
The reference to the involvement of “human nature” in the formative process, suggests that 
the church, itself, acknowledges that it is not the only party involved in that process, a fact 
which is attested to by Hogan, as she insists that: 
As the source of free and responsible decision-making, conscience is 
regarded as the primary authority in ethics, and always to be obeyed. 
However it is not seen in isolation from the other authoritative sources 
of Christian morality, which include the teaching of Jesus; the 
collective wisdom of the tradition preserved in the Church’s norms 
and principles; and the guidance of the magisterium. . . It is shaped by 
the collective experience of the church community and formed in 
dialogue with the tradition’s central beliefs. It is to this dialectic of the 
personal and the communitarian that the term ‘informed conscience, 
refers. This integration of collective moral wisdom with personal 
insight is precisely the goal of an informed conscience.
158
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In Hogan’s view, therefore, the human person has at his or her disposal a communitarian 
“collective” of moral wisdom and practical information in conjunction with their own 
“personal insight” as they seek to form conscience. Accordingly, the communal moral wealth 
and experience of the community are deemed to exist to serve the moral educative needs of 
the individual human beings as they embark on the task of forming conscience. Hence, it is 
obvious from Hogan’s account that such a formative task will involve individuals integrating 
the knowledge acquired from multiple sources of moral wisdom with their own innate or 
personal insights so that, in the context of each specific act of moral decision-making, they 
will ultimately achieve that state of knowing what to do, how to do it, and when to do so. 
 It is obvious from Hogan’s extract that, in the context of the formation of conscience, 
knowledge is a key factor, since individuals are obliged to know the truth of what they are 
doing hic et nunc. In the context of the formation of conscience, therefore, Grisez attests to 
the importance of acquiring such knowledge when he insists that “The formation of 
conscience requires learning and thinking about three areas: the principles of natural law, 
practical possibilities, and the application of the principles to the facts of each situation of 
choice.”
159
 The acquisition of such knowledge by the individual through “learning and 
thinking” not only suggests to a non-personalist Grisez that the Church is but one of a number 
of shareholders in this project, but is also indicative of the strategic qualities that a properly 
informed conscience can actually bring to the table of moral-decision-making. Grisez 
specifically identifies these as the “clear understanding of norms, accurate and adequate 
information about possibilities, and readiness to engage in moral reflection before every 
choice.”
160
 Here, Grisez’s reference to the understanding of norms is concerned with 
clarifying the principles of natural law, a law, which according to St. Paul is written in the 
heart of every individual. The reference to “information about possibilities” is a reminder of 
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the necessity of checking for realistic alternatives, a skill that can be learned, for example, 
through catechesis, spiritual direction, vocational guidance and counselling. The need for 
engaging in moral reflection before every choice arises, according to Grisez, from the fact 
that “A great deal of conscience formation, especially in children, consists simply in getting 
people to think about their behaviour from a moral point of view and to question the 
reasonableness of the demands of superego and social convention.”
161
  
 In Grisez’s view, however, there is much more to the formation of conscience than the 
acquisition of knowledge, the clarification of norms and the appropriate selection of moral 
choices. For him, this task also includes an act of faith, that there exists a personal 
relationship between the individual and God, a belief that, in turn, validates the Church’s call 
that its moral teachings be internalised as part of the formation process. Such an ecclesiastical 
call can be trusted, according to Grisez, because “the Church’s teaching authority . . . is 
endowed with an unfailing gift of truth, not as if it had legislative authority in moral 
matters.”
162
 It can also be trusted because it is his belief that Jesus has willed that “it is part of 
the Church’s duty to state authoritatively ‘those principles of the moral order which have 
their origin in human nature itself.’”
163
 For those Catholics who continue to remain wary of 
the church’s involvement in the formation of their conscience, Grisez’s advice is that 
the moral demands of the Church’s teaching are not alien to the 
requirements of morality which one can know naturally. Rather, they 
specify the moral implications of natural law, the law written in our 
hearts (cf Rom 2:15). Thus, the moral teaching of the Church forms 
conscience from within, not by external imposition.
164
  
Thus, Grisez is informing both fervent believers and sceptical doubters that “the moral 
demands of the Church’s teaching are not additions over and above the requirements of 
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morality which one can know naturally; rather, they specify the moral implications of natural 
law.”
165
 Grisez goes even further, however, and advises Catholics that in the event of there 
being a lack of clear teaching on a given moral matter, they need not look outside the 
Catholic fold for a solution; rather they can seek guidance from “a consensus of theologians . 
. . for when theologians agree their reflection very likely articulates true moral norms in the 
light of faith.”
166
 To those Catholic laypeople who surrender to this process of being 
enlightened by Christian wisdom and of attending closely to the teaching authority of the 
Church, Grisez offers the prospect of functioning with a well-formed and informed 
conscience as they take on their own distinctive role.
167
 For those who continue to hesitate, or 
who are deemed not to be “faithful and clearheaded Catholics” he admonishes: “To wish to 
be a Catholic while refusing to accept the Church’s teaching would be rather like wishing to 
have a friend without being a friend.”
168
 This clearly indicates the link or relationship 
between the source of information, formation and the recipient. 
 While Grisez hardly looks beyond the personal insight of “faithful and clearheaded” 
Catholics, in conjunction with the Church and its traditions, theology, theologians and 
divinely endowed wisdom, in his search for the mainstays in the formation of conscience, 
Hogan widens her sweep to include both secular and faith or ecclesial communities. Indeed, 
whereas Grisez emphasises the negative aspects of the family’s and society’s potential impact 
on the formation of conscience, with the former being held responsible for endowing the 
child with a malignant superego, and the latter for facilitating the entry of elements of 
relativism into the process, Hogan adopts a more positive attitude towards secular 
involvement in general. She believes, for example, that knowledge acquired from both 
secular and faith communities, particularly knowledge that may “determine the direction of 
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one’s moral life, one’s self-conscious option for good,”
169
 can prove invaluable in the proper 
formation of conscience. She points out, for example, that “the values and virtues that a 
society embodies do play an important role in the formation of conscience. This is true of the 
limitations and moral blindness of communities . . . but it is also true of the cultivation of 
positive dispositions.”
170
 It is Hogan’s contention, therefore, that individuals do not cultivate 
an orientation for the good within a social or educational void, but rather that their 
consciences are shaped “within a received [communal] tradition, which conveys its sense of 
moral goodness in a variety of ways.”
171
  
 Continuing this vein of positivity, Hogan asserts that to have an informed conscience 
is invariably to have a “good conscience,” which she defines as the constant “disposition or 
orientation to desire good and is the culmination of a life lived consistently in the pursuit of 
virtue.”
172
 For Hogan, therefore, the proper formation of conscience does not take place in the 
context of “some superficial adherence to rules and laws but in working toward goodness 
rather than evil or indifference in every context, no matter how trivial.”
173
 Such an approach 
represents “a move away from considering the morality of acts in isolation,” and from “the 
traditional preoccupation with established norms and principles.”
174
 More importantly, 
however, Hogan’s approach also “confirms the human person, integrally and adequately 
considered, as the source of moral discernment and action.”
175
 It is for this reason that she 
describes the formation of conscience as being “a delicate and complex process,” which 
“involves the integration of the intellectual and emotional capacities of the individual, 
together with a commitment to confront one’s limitations and weaknesses.”
176
 It is also for 
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this reason that she insists that attention should be given to the character of the person and not 
to “moralities that evaluate acts in isolation from the context in which they are performed.”
177
 
While Hogan strongly emphasises the role of the secular community in the formation of 
conscience, she does not do so at the expense of that of the church. Regarding the teaching 
Church, itself, she unequivocally acknowledges, for example, that “It is, clearly, part of the 
tradition accepted by believers that the Church through its pastors has a duty to teach moral 
truth to its members, and that Church members have a serious obligation to respect that 
teaching in forming their consciences.”
178
 Furthermore, as regards Christians in general, she 
maintains they believe that “within the conscience each person has an inner source of moral 
evaluation [that] is not entirely reliant on the individual’s personal resources, [but] is also an 
inner source informed by faith and shaped under the guidance of the spirit.”
179
 Unlike Grisez, 
however, Hogan does not consider such beliefs to be a type of carte blanche that bestows on 
the holder – the Church – the right to have an unconditional say in the formation of 
conscience or in what constitutes an informed conscience. She reminds those involved in the 
formation of their own consciences that “informing one’s conscience is not simply a process 
of uncritically aligning oneself with views expressed by the magisterium,” and therefore 
insists that, as part of their formation process, they “must resist any suggestion that an 
informed conscience is always and necessarily one which is in agreement with an official 
position.”
180
 Moreover, she advises the Church that its involvement in the formation of 
conscience should reflect the reality that it “operates within the constraints of culture and 
time and that its own understanding is inevitably limited by such factors.”
181
 Grisez however 
would find it difficult to gainsay Hogan’s contention that: “The believer ought to be informed 
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of and take serious cognisance of the church’s view on each moral issue and should only 
dissent from that position for serious conscientious reasons.”
182
  
 Unlike, Grisez, though, Hogan accepts as inevitable the likelihood that an informed 
conscience will dissent, not only because it is ‘informed’ and thereby morally entitled to 
differ from the official position, but also because the magisterium may not be measuring up 
to the mark in the guidance it offers. While Grisez would reject such a criticism out of hand, 
Newman believes otherwise, as the following extract indicates. Acknowledging that the 
moral decision-making capacity of conscience needs external assistance to perform 
satisfactorily, he bemoans the fact that such external assistance can be found to be wanting: 
Yet even this office it cannot perform adequately without external 
assistance; it needs to be regulated and sustained. Left to itself, though 
it tells truly at first, it soon becomes wavering, ambiguous, and false; 
it needs good teachers and good examples to keep it up to the mark 
and line of duty; and the misery is, that these external helps, teachers, 
and examples are in many instances wanting.
183
 
 It is no surprise then, that much of Newman’s language in describing an informed 
conscience is God-focused. For example, Newman believes that a conscience whose 
formation has been undertaken in a spirit of openness to receiving the Word of God and 
acting only in terms of the Knowledge of God can naturally be designated “the voice of 
God.”
184
 Equally, such an informed conscience can be respectfully treated as “a messenger of 
Him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us behind a veil.”
185
 In fact, so close is the 
activity of such an informed conscience to the activity of Christ himself, in Newman’s 
estimation, that he confers on it the extraordinary title of “the aboriginal Vicar of Christ.”
186
 
Furthermore, for Newman, this is no honorary title; rather he reminds those who accept such 
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a title for their consciences, that they will be trading the judgements of their own self-serving 
“self-will” for those of a Christ who demonstrated in Scriptures that He can be “a stern 
monitor.”
187
 For the Canadian Bishops, therefore, basing the formation of conscience on the 
knowledge that is acquired through listening attentively to the voice of God can prove to be 
both fulfilling and safeguarding for the active ‘listener’. They maintain that: “The more we 
know about God’s will for us, the more fulfilled we are, the surer we are that we will not 
destroy ourselves and wander into paths which will not enhance our liberty but take it away 
entirely.”
188
 St. Paul, in turn, points to the importance of turning away from the requirements 
of the world, and forming a new mind (an informed conscience) based on the knowledge of 
what God wants. He exhorts his readers as follows: “Do not model yourselves on the 
behaviour of the world around you, but let your behaviour change, modelled by your new 
mind. This is the only way to discover the will of God and know what is good, what it is that 
God wants, what is the perfect thing to do.”
189
 The Christian understanding of the notions of 
the formation of conscience and informed conscience, – concepts that all three scholars of 
this thesis agree on deals with the absolute necessity of acquiring knowledge, information, 
truth and attitudes that are Christ-based, Christ-focused and Christ-friendly, in order to make 
morally correct decisions.
190
 Such a view is reiterated in various documents of the Church.  
 Because the formation of conscience is based around acquiring an ever-deepening 
knowledge of the human person and especially of the Creator, it must be above everything 
else the search for objective truth, in particular “moral truth.” Hence, it can be claimed that an 
informed conscience is one that has been illumined and enlivened by such a divinely inspired 
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truth. Cardinal Ratzinger points out how both the concepts of conscience and truth are 
inextricably linked in Newman’s understanding of an informed conscience. He declares that:  
For Newman the middle term which establishes the connection 
between authority and subjectivity is truth. I do not hesitate to say that 
truth is the central thought of Newman’s intellectual grappling. 
Conscience is central for him because truth stands in the middle. To 
put it differently, the centrality of the concept conscience for Newman 
is linked to the prior centrality of the concept truth and can only be 
understood from this vantage point.
191
  
This notion of truth seems to be particularly vital to Grisez’s understanding of conscience, 
since he defines conscience as “knowledge of moral truth.” He specifically maintains, for 
example, that “the Church’s role is to help form conscience by communicating truth.”
192
 
Hence, Canadian Bishop’s uphold: “Conscience is not . . . an absolute placed above truth. 
Rather, by its very nature, conscience has a relation to objective truth, a truth which is 
universal and which all must seek.”
193
 In this sense, Grisez is right to assert that “moral 
principles are truths which shape one’s judgements of conscience toward human 
fulfilment.”
194
 For him, the importance of such truths or principles in the moral lives of every 
human being derives from the fact that they connect the entire human being to the Creator. 
Thus, he maintains that “Moral truth extends to the whole of the person, to the whole of life, 
to the whole of humankind, and to the whole of reality by way of the human relationship with 
God.”
195
 Indeed, his condemnation of subjectivism is based on his rejection of the notion that 
“in the end, it is my conscience, and not the objective truth, which determines what is right or 
wrong, true or false.”
196
 It is little wonder then that he would describe as “something close to 
a denial of moral truth . . . the current tendency to devalue careful reflection upon moral 
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 However, Hogan’s position on the idea of moral truth poses a challenge for Grisez’s 
use of moral truth, as it relates to conscience formation and an informed conscience. While 
she certainly agrees that “Each judgment of conscience is based on the moral truth that the 
person has come to know,” she distances herself from Grisez when she makes the point that 
the fundamental reason underlying our obligation to follow our decision of conscience is that 
“we must be guided by the moral truth as we understand it.”
198
 Such a subjectivist attitude 
towards moral truths contrasts with Grisez’s terse objectivistic observation that moral 
principles are “truths which cannot be otherwise.”
199
 For Hogan, however, such truths simply 
do not exist; there is no abstract, complete-in-itself, objective entity out there, which human 
beings can refer to and aspire to fully embrace during the course of their lives. She maintains 
instead that 
the moral truth as we understand it may be incomplete or even 
incorrect. History is replete with examples of people who followed 
their consciences and yet committed acts of atrocity, acts that most 
reasonable people find objectionable. . . . It is possible that a soldier 
might believe that the massacre of an entire village or ethnic group is 
right in particular circumstances. The soldier may indeed be acting on 
the moral that he knows. This is just one example from the many 




 In making the above argument, however, Hogan is unwittingly demonstrating that 
when that soldier was in the process of forming and informing his or her conscience, he or 
she was in need of being presented with objective moral yardsticks against which he or she 
could judge his or her decisions and subsequent behaviour. It would be Grisez’s argument, 
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for example, that it was the failure to acquire such yardsticks that gave the soldier the 
freedom to arbitrarily and [im]morally cherry pick a subjective way through the slaughter of 
innocent villagers and ethnic groups. Such an individual, in Grisez’s opinion, needed to have 
his or her subjectivist notions of freedom to ethnically cleanse confronted with objective 
norms that unequivocally stated otherwise.
201
 For some, for example, such cherry picking 
assumes the form of accepting that while moral truths apply to some areas of their lives, this 
may not be the case when it comes to other areas. Hence, as has already been noted, while 
some Catholics might have little difficulty in designating acts of abortion, paedophilia or 
ethnic cleansing as being intrinsically evil, they might adopt a more subjectivist approach in 
such matters as homosexuality, contraception or euthanasia. Indeed, from a personalist 
perspective even the aforementioned acts of intrinsic evil must be open to assessment in 
terms of contextual and intentional factors. Hence, conformists, for example, would argue 
that such a weakening of the notion of objective moral truths leads to a form of opportunistic 
morality whereby moral truths are enthusiastically embraced when the consequences suit the 
actor, but denigrated as anachronisms when they do not. What such opportunists fail to 
acknowledge is that objective morality demands to have its say in unpopular as well as in 
fashionable causes. John Paul II, for example, argues quite strongly that human persons, in 
their consciences, are expected to encounter moral truth, freely embrace it, and personally 
commit themselves to its enactment,
202
 rather than encountering a process that attempts to 
rationalise “contempt for human life after conception and before birth; the ongoing violation 
of basic rights of the person; the unjust destruction of goods minimally necessary for a human 
life.”
203
 In making this argument, John Paul II is simply reiterating Newman’s teaching on 
conscience as comprising the human person’s free adoption of God’s law. Also reiterating 
Newman’s stance on this matter is an observation by George Cardinal Pell, which maintains 
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that: “For Newman, conscience is a hard, objective thing—a challenge to self, a call to 
conversion, and a sign of humility. And this sits uncomfortably with those who see 
conscience as a sign of freedom, and freedom as the right to reject what is unpalatable.”
204
 
Pell also points out that John Paul II’s observation about conscience actually builds on 
Newman’s theory of conscience in that both would agree that: 
Conscience . . . is neither the apprehending of an alien law nor the 
devising of our own laws. Rather, conscience is the free acceptance of 
the objective moral law as the basis of all our choices. The formation 
of a Christian conscience is thus a dignifying and liberating 
experience; it does not mean a resentful submission to God's law but a 
free choosing of that law as our life's ideal.
205
 
 It can be argued that what John Paul II and Newman find dignifying and liberating 
about the sources of moral wisdom, formation of conscience and the binding force of 
informed conscience is that such a process is focused exclusively on the pursuit of moral 
truth at all levels of conscience. We might conclude then that an “informed conscience” is 
one that has undergone a process of conversion whereby conscience/1 with assistance from 
either revelation or church teaching or both proceeds to conscience/3 that is judgement, 
concrete decision or event, an outcome that has been achieved through the dialectics of 
conscience/2 in its capacity as process. 
 One important fact about informed conscience that is not always explicitly 
acknowledged is stated clearly by Pell. He believes that “while we should follow a well-
formed conscience, a well-formed conscience is hard to achieve.”
206
 Numerous factors such 
as political, socio-cultural and religious are responsible for this. For instance, the late 
President John F. Kennedy’s, as a Catholic Senator, campaigning for the U.S. presidency, 
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 and made it clear that he believed in an  
America where the separation of church and state is absolute—where 
no Catholic prelate would tell the President (should he be Catholic) 
how to act, and no Protestant minister would tell his parishioners for 
whom to vote , , , these are my views . . . for contrary to common 
newspaper usage, I am not the Catholic candidate for President. I am 
the Democratic Party's candidate for President who happens also to be 
a Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters—and the 
church does not speak for me. . . . Whatever issue may come before 
me as President—on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling or 
any other subject—I will make my decision in accordance with these 
views, in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the 
national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or 




 There can be no clearer explication of the distinction between a politically informed 
conscience and a religiously informed one than this. This begs the question as to the moral 
position of the individual. This then raises a key issue that all Catholic models of conscience 
must address, namely the question of dissenting from the moral teachings of the church. Is a 
Catholic entitled to dissent from the church’s moral teachings? How should that dissent be 
expressed? How should the Catholic Church treat both the act of dissent and the dissenter? 
6. Conscience and Moral Teachings of the Church – To Dissent or not to Dissent 
 Early on in Confronting the Truth, Hogan makes it clear that, in her view, since “The 
role of conscience involves a complex process of evaluation . . . [it] may find itself in conflict 
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 Furthermore, she claimed that disagreement on moral matters 
must be seen as an inevitable feature of the business of ethics, while faithful dissent from 
particular church teaching should also be accepted.
210
 As her work progresses, however, she 
apparently seeks to steer the debate away from being solely concerned with “conflicts of 
authority” by which she means that the issue should no longer revolve around  
whether and to what extent one has the right to dissent from a 
particular church teaching, but [on] how one can understand oneself as 
a loyal and committed member of the church, while at the same time 
disagreeing with a particular teaching.
211
 
More specifically, and relevant to a dissenting relationship between the individual 
conscience and the teaching authority of the church she argues that her 
approach reflects the reality that ultimately the issue is not about 
legalistic requirements but about seeking to do the good. Our attention 
should be directed toward working out how a person should act on 
her/his conscientious decisions and what one’s response should be 
when church teaching does not coincide with one’s best estimation of 
the right thing to do in a particular situation.
212
 
This is essential as she draws on the writings of the theologian Kevin Kelly, who with 
reference to the Charles Curran case, elaborated on the negative aspects that go with the 
notion of dissent. According to him,  
The term dissent has no feel for all that is positive in such a position–
respect for tradition, concern for the truth, love of the Church, shared 
responsibility for the Church’s mission in the world. It does not 
express the respect for teaching authority in the Church which 
motivates someone adopting this kind of stance.
213
  
He also points out that dissent serves to create a climate of confrontation, makes true dialogue 
impossible and deflects attention away from the respective roles of the teaching authority, 
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theologians and of all believers in the Church’s mission of serving and proclaiming the 
truth.
214
 Hence, according to Hogan, what Kelly is doing here is attempting to point the way 
to a different approach, one that would be seeking to avoid constructing two distinct moral 
authorities, one individual, and one institutional, or one political and the other religious, each 
vying with the other for prominence.
215
 Thus, she suggests that Kelly’s approach be followed 
by focusing primarily on what she describes as the central concern in all moral debates, 




 Hogan is not simply interested in citing aspirations, but recognising the inevitability 
of disagreements occurring, given the nature of the moral enterprise, she recognises that the 
manner of harmonising the insights of each perspective would need to be considered in terms 
of “creating a dialogue to achieve agreement and to find ways of living fruitfully in the midst 
of difference.”
217
 Once again, she draws on Kelly who provides her with a formula for 
expressing dissent, which embodies the model proposed by both of them. Therefore, instead 
of just simply saying “I dissent from the Church’s teaching” which, in Kelly’s view fails to 
capture the essence of the person’s stance, he recommends the following formula:  
… drawing on the richness of the Church’s tradition and in the light of 
the Church’s deeper knowledge of this aspect of human life gained 
through its dialogue with the human sciences today, I believe that 
what I and many Christians are saying is a more adequate expression 
of the richness of our present Christian understanding than is found in 
the current statement of the Church’s teaching.
218
 
Hogan maintains that such an approach: (i) acknowledges the important role that the Church 
has in the formation of conscience; (ii) reflects the reality that the Church operates within the 
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constraints of culture, politics and time; (iii) conveys a sense of the Church’s tradition as 
being developmental and dynamic rather than unchanging; and (iv) reminds us that one’s 
ultimate concern must be with what is good and true in a given context.
219
 According to 
Hogan, this is what the duty of conscience consists of, not simply to assent to magisterial 
teaching, but to work earnestly and courageously for the articulation of the good in each 
context. 
 In the case of Hogan, herself, however, it can be argued that while her aspirations and 
views are noble, she still has to address how moral theologians, and indeed, politicians, and 
economists, for example, respond to teachings emanating from the magisterium, with which 
they do not agree. What is expected of Catholic moral theologians who are in receipt of 
magisterial orders to maintain silence in their areas of expertise? David E. DeCosse and his 
group, for example, asserted that “The one who defines the problem sets the terms of the 
debate and, in the last decades, the Catholic advocates of the ecclesial view have defined the 
problem of conscience in American society as relativism.”
220
 In consultation with some other 
moral theologians, Hogan has sought to bring some reasoned clarity to this situation, not just 
for moral theologians but for all believers. In this vein, she explores Ladislas Örsy’s 
challenging of what is described as creeping infallibility within the church today, and his 
argument that teachings representing the Church’s current but inconclusive thinking on a 
range of issues are being presented with excessive weight and authority.
221
 She reminds us of 
Örsy observation that this can leave the faithful with the choice of either obeying or of being 
excommunicated.
222
 Hogan, herself, then proceeds to point out that the commentary 
accompanying John Paul II’s apostolic letter, Ad Tuendam Fidem, which discussed the notion 
of “definitive teaching more fully” points out that as regards certain doctrines or teaching (not 
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infallible) “whoever denies these truths would be in a position of rejecting a truth of Catholic 
doctrine and would therefore no longer be in full communion with the Catholic Church.”
223
 
Örsy posed the question as to how a point of teaching not guaranteed by the assistance of the 
Holy Spirit (as infallible definitions are) could actually be irreformable.
224
 Two worrying 
aspects that Hogan mentions on this point are that the logic of this ecclesial position is that 
the faithful cannot continue a respectful and loyal dialogue with the Church on a number of 
unresolved issues on the one hand, while, on the other hand, a person may be declared to be 
out of the Church because of the desire to continue to discuss certain issues. Indeed, what 
Hogan actually finds puzzling about all of “this turn to the definitive” is that, in her view at 
any rate, it is in the field of morality that most conflict tends to arise over the nondefinitive 
authoritative teachings of the Church, a category containing much of the church’s moral 
pronouncements over the centuries.
225
  
 It is at this stage that, one could say, the gloves come off for Hogan with respect to the 
magisterium and advocates of the ecclesiast, conformist or legalist model of both Church and 
conscience. The magisterium and the faithful are reminded that: 
The distinctive aspect of this type of teaching is that there is a 
recognition that we are dealing with issues on which the church 
cannot make a definitive statement. It may not be able to do so for a 
variety of reasons. It may realize a possibility that its view may be in 
error, or there may be a degree of uncertainty regarding how the 
church should respond to a particular issue. In addition, particularly in 
the moral field, there are many issues that cannot be properly 
considered or answered in unambiguous statements about right and 
wrong. Many ethical issues require a degree of nuance and attention to 
detail that the general statements of formal teaching cannot provide. 
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Could this be a suggestion on her part to Grisez and other like–minded moral theologians not 
to be so fast about reaching for the moral statute books for complete resolutions that may 
simply not be there? As noted at the outset of this section, and mentioned throughout this 
chapter, one of the most problematic aspects of the debates between Christian personalists 
and legalists is that, in Hogan’s own words, they tend to facilitate the creation of false 
distinctions between respect for church teaching and the necessity for personal moral 
responsibility, and thus perpetuate the mistaken assumption that the teaching Church 
corresponds to the magisterium, and the learning Church to the clergy and the laity.
227
 Hogan, 
herself, has no problem in acknowledging that careful consideration must be given to the 
teachings that emanate from the magisterium, but she is uncompromising in her assertion that 
“the Christian tradition has continuously insisted that moral responsibility and choice reside 
ultimately with each individual . . . [and as] such we must be obedient to our own 
discernment of the spirit; we must adhere to our own consciences.”
228
 
 It is obvious that while Grisez champions loyalty to Church teaching when it comes to 
mediating between church and conscience, Hogan is the vanguard of those who insist on the 
autonomy of individual conscience. The problem of exercising one’s conscience, whilst 
simultaneously striving to be informed by it and be accountable to normative Church 
teachings is therefore complex. For instance, in an extract already referred to in chapter one 
of this thesis, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) affirmed that the 
matter of political participation for American citizens and of their treating public service as a 
vocation was of grave importance to preserving and promoting traditional Church teachings, 
especially in terms of opposing “intrinsic evil”.
229
 It is in this context, then, that the bishops 
make their call on Catholics to always bear in mind that the intentional taking of innocent 
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human life, such as abortion and euthanasia, are actions that “must always be rejected and 
opposed and must never be supported or condoned.”
230
 They remind Catholic electorate 
preparing to go to the polls that “a well-formed Christian conscience does not permit one to 
vote for a political program or an individual law which contradicts the fundamental contents 
of faith and morals.”
231
 Furthermore, they unequivocally caution their Catholic flock that: 
“Those who knowingly, willingly, and directly support public policies or legislation that 
undermine fundamental moral principles cooperate with evil.”
232
 Some would take such 
cautionary advice as an implicit directive by the Catholic bishops to American Catholics on 
what should be the uniform outcome to the exercising and following of their individual 
consciences. In fact, it could be claimed that there is nothing implicit in their assertive 
reminder to their followers that: “A Catholic cannot vote for a candidate who takes a position 
in favour of an intrinsic evil, such as abortion or racism, if the voter’s intent is to support that 
position.”
233
 American Catholics are simply being strongly reminded what their church 
expects of them in this particular situation.  
American Catholic politicians are not exempt from this call from the Bishops. They 
too are reminded that they are expected to vote in “good conscience” against any legislation 
that could be seen to promote intrinsic evil under any of its guises. Much of this matter has 
already been addressed in terms of conflicts that can arise in terms of exercising one’s 
political or religious conscience, and also in terms of the contribution of then Senator John F. 
Kennedy to that debate.  Suffice it here to state his observation “I believe in a president 
whose religious views are his private affair, whatever issue may come before me as president 
. . . I will make my decision . . . in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be the 
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national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates.”
234
 Had 
President Kennedy survived longer than he did, would he eventually have found himself in 
situations where he would have been politically required to make decisions that would have 
placed him on a collision course with the teachings of the Catholic Church? As it was, in the 
short years he exercised office, he was engaging thousands and thousands of American troops 
in the war in Vietnam, a war that was even then causing grave moral headaches for many 
Christians, both Catholic and Protestant. Such an approach by Kennedy to the exercise of a 
political and or religious conscience would have definitely placed him at odds with moral 
theologians such as Grisez, and his contention that the conscience of faithful and clearheaded 
Catholics must conform to Church teaching. That same approach, however, would definitely 
have found favour with Hogan, who maintained, for example, that Catholics were free to 
reject particular teachings of the Church, provided they held views that were well-informed 
and sincerely held. With regard to the role of the Church in this “political conscience” 
controversy, Hogan, herself points out that “the church teaches in many different ways and 
with different gradations of authority and that not all instances of church teaching are equally 
contentious.”
235
 More telling, however, in terms of most politicians’ personal experience of 
being in opposition or of having to take measures that are demonstrably unpopular with the 
electorate, is Hogan’s observation that:  
Rather than being ruled out, loyal opposition is essential if a 
community is to flourish. Loyal opposition signals a primary 
commitment to seek the truth, even if it leads one to depart from one’s 
community’s understanding of that truth. But it also signals a degree 
of confidence in the community, so that even when there are 
differences of opinion, one remains faithful to it.
236
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 While Grisez’s and Hogan’s contrasting approaches to carving out a Catholic 
understanding of conscience serve as a stark reminder as to how deeply divided people are in 
their conscientious exercise of the Church’s moral teachings, it can be argued that Newman’s 
approach seems to stand apart from such infighting, occupying a niche of its own. Newman, 
for example, teaches that “conscience cannot come into direct collision with the Church's or 
the Pope's infallibility; which is engaged in general propositions, and in the condemnation of 
particular and given errors.”
237
 To an extent, then, it can be argued that Grisez is correct in 
maintaining that ‘faithful and clearheaded’ Catholics are required to “conform their 
consciences exactly to the Church’s moral teaching.”
238
 On the other hand, it can also be 
argued that neither is Hogan wrong in stating that “we must adhere to our own 
consciences.”
239
 As to the subjective aspect of conscience, it appears that Newman, Grisez 
and Hogan acknowledge its necessity as a potentially valid component of the process of 
conscience. Not surprisingly, however, for Grisez the activities of that element must be so 
‘well-policed’ and monitored, that the Catholic conscience, on reaching conscience/3, which 
is the level of the event or concrete judgement or decision, should have reached an event that 
corresponds with the objective aspect of conscience, namely that taught by the magisterium. 
This is not necessarily the case, according to Newman. Reiterating much of what Aquinas has 
to say on the matter of conscience, and also putting his own erudite twist on the controversy, 
Newman has the following advice to offer the individual in the matter of conscience/2, 
specifically when the event subjectively arrived at in conscience/3 is judged not to correspond 
with the objective teachings of the Church. Newman advises as follows: 
If in a particular case [conscience] is to be taken as a sacred and 
sovereign monitor, its dictate, in order to prevail against the voice of 
the Pope, must follow upon serious thought, prayer, and all available 
means of arriving at a right judgment on the matter in question. And 
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further, obedience to the Pope is what is called ‘in possession;’ that is, 
the onus probandi of establishing a case against him lies, as in all 
cases of exception, on the side of conscience. Unless a man is able to 
say to himself, as in the Presence of God, that he must not, and dare 
not, act upon the Papal injunction, he is bound to obey it, and would 
commit a great sin in disobeying it. Primâ facie it is his bounden duty, 
even from a sentiment of loyalty, to believe the Pope right and to act 
accordingly. He must vanquish that mean, ungenerous, selfish, vulgar 
spirit of his nature, which, at the very first rumour of a command, 
places itself in opposition to the Superior who gives it, asks itself 
whether he is not exceeding his right, and rejoices, in a moral and 
practical matter to commence with scepticism. He must have no wilful 
determination to exercise a right of thinking, saying, doing just what 
he pleases, the question of truth and falsehood, right and wrong, the 
duty if possible of obedience, the love of speaking as his Head speaks, 
and of standing in all cases on his Head's side, being simply discarded. 
If this necessary rule were observed, collisions between the Pope's 
authority and the authority of conscience would be very rare.
240
 
Firstly, Newman points out that it is a Catholic’s ‘bounden duty’ to believe the Pope right and 
to act accordingly, and that the onus therefore rests with the individual conscience to prove 
otherwise in any particular case. The individual is also required to look to his or her 
motivations in carrying out any act of dissent; in particular, they must establish for 
themselves that their dissent is not simply a matter of being either self-willed or innately anti-
authority. On the positive side, Newman points out that the road to dissent must be one of 
engaging in serious thought and prayer, and of seeking all available means “of arriving at a 
right judgement on the matter in question.”
241
 Pell, referring to Sermon 17, “The Testimony 
of Conscience,” reemphasises Newman’s advice to present day dissenters. Pell writes: 
“Where a Catholic disagrees with the Church on some serious matter, the response should not 
be ‘that's that—I can't follow the Church here.’ Instead we should kneel and pray that God 
will lead our weak steps and enlighten our fragile minds, as Newman recommends.”
242
 
 If these strategies are implemented, then in Newman’s view, two highly significant 
outcomes will follow. Firstly, the individual will be in a position to say “in the Presence of 
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God, that he must not, and dare not, act upon the Papal injunction, [and that] he is bound to 
obey it, and would commit a great sin in disobeying it,” - ‘it’ in this regard is “the side of 
conscience.”
243
 Secondly, in Newman’s opinion, the adoption of the above strategies would 
ensure that collisions between conscience/2 and conscience/3 or “between the Pope's 
authority and the authority of conscience would be very rare.”
244
  
 Following such responsible strategies in matters of either dissent or assent would be to 
elevate conscience/3 to a position wherein it could be validly and objectively lauded or 
blamed by the individual and his or her peers for its decisions. Indeed, Colavechio, from a 
personalist perspective, augments Newman’s advice to avail of all possible aids in assessing 
moral teachings, with the following recommendation: “When the Christian chooses to 
manifest himself by any action, when he wishes to express himself authentically, he must 
consider among all the relationships which converge at this point in time, the relationship with 
the Body of Christ.”
245
 In Colavechio’s opinion, therefore, should the Catholic “Christian 
choose to act in a way which does not reflect his awareness of the authoritative teaching of the 
church, [the Catholic] is not manifesting the relationship with Christ which was established in 
Baptism.”
246
 Overall, Colavechio is making an argument, one that Grisez would certainly 
support, that if Catholics choose to ignore their responsibilities as members of the Body of 
Christ, and choose willy-nilly to dissent from Church teaching and to engage in acts of 
intrinsic evil, then they cannot be considered to be morally reflecting human nature or to be 
responsible and authentic Catholics. In a way, such individuals may be deemed to have 
excommunicated themselves from the authentic Body of Christ.   
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 In concluding the section, while it has to be acknowledged that conscience/3 as an 
event must be considered the overall high point of the activities of conscience, note must be 
made of the fact that both conscience/2 and conscience/3 are levels where errors can and do 
occur, and so stand in constant need of ongoing and thorough formation. It is for this reason, 
according to all three scholars that there exists an essential role for the Church in the realm of 
conscience. In fact, it can be argued that the greatest challenge facing the Church in the 21st 
century is how it should assist and engage with the individual in the highly personal process 
of forming his or her conscience. We have just noted some comments from Newman on this 
matter. As regards Grisez, the kernel of his teaching on the subservient role of conscience to 
the will of God, as unerringly mediated to his Creatures by both His Spirit and an infallible 
Catholic Church, is to be found in an opening piece to his article “The Duty and Right to 
Follow One’s Conscience,” which reads: 
Christians . . . believe that God’s loving wisdom is the highest 
standard of morality, and that he guides those who believe in him not 
only by the natural light of reason but by faith. Therefore in forming 
their consciences, they conform their judgements to moral truth 
derived from this source. . . . By the authorisation of her divine 
founder, the Catholic Church speaking through her magisterium 
teaches all her members what they must do to be saved. So, faithful 
and clearheaded Catholics consider the moral guidance offered by the 
pope and the bishops in communion with him to indicate moral truths 
by which they must form their consciences. Therefore, for faithful and 
clearheaded Catholics, the duty to follow one’s judgement of 
conscience cannot conflict with the duty to live according to the moral 
teaching which the magisterium proposes. . . . For unless they fulfil 
the latter duty, they have only their own subjective opinion to follow, 
not an authentic judgement of conscience.  
And finally there remains Hogan, whose views, as shall be seen in the conclusion, 
contrast starkly with those of Grisez. While she has made strong arguments for the inclusion 
of context, intention, traits and memory, for example, throughout her account, it is her stance 
vis-à-vis the Church’s magisterium and the believer in the pew that stands out in her attempts 
470 
 
at Catholicising Personalism. Even though parts of this have already been alluded to, her note 
of almost defiance, contrasts sharply with Grisez’s obeisance. Thus, she asserts that 
within the personalist paradigm differences of opinion between 
individuals and the magisterium can be regarded as an inevitable 
aspect of the dynamic nature of human growth and aspect of the 
dynamic nature of human growth and understanding. Furthermore, 
they are recognised as arising necessarily from the unity-in-difference 
that is the essence of vibrant communities. Rather than being ruled 
out, loyal opposition is essential if a community is to flourish. Loyal 
opposition signals a primary commitment to seek the truth, even if it 
leads one to depart from one’s community’s understanding of that 
truth. But it also signals a degree of confidence in the community, so 




Of the three scholars, Hogan appears to be more resolute and blunt about the need for the 
Church as a moral teacher to be clear and unambiguous in her moral teachings. But then, so is 
Grisez in his call to believers to follow the teachings of the magisterium, and Newman that 
Christians should recognise the link between conscience and the Moral Judge. In fact, 
Colavechio put it simply that for Christians to express themselves authentically they “must 
consider among all the relationships which converge at this point in time, the relationship 




 Basically the point that we have analysed in this work can be summed up as an 
enquiry into the understanding of conscience in the teaching of Newman, Grisez and Hogan 
in relation to church teaching. This we have approached through the theological development 
of the concept from its Greek word—synderesis which is the level at which conscience is a 
distinctive characteristic of the human person in contrast to brutes, the level at which the 
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human person is believe to possess the capacity to know and distinguish right from wrong, 
good from evil. It is the level of moral instinct for virtuous principles. 
 The second level designated as conscientia is the Latin word used by Roman scholars. 
It is the level of application, conclusion and action. It is the stage where all of human 
personality and dynamics engages with the level of synderesis. The role or function of 
conscience is made manifest at this stage. We become illumined with all innate and acquired 
knowledge (informed conscience) as we scrutinise, evaluate, and discern what to do or avoid 
hic et nunc.  
 The outcome of judgment, action or concrete event brings us to a third and vital level 
of conscience — the consequent conscience — the level of approval or disapproval of the 
concrete event executed. Conscience lauds and blames the human person if the concrete event 
is good or evil respectively. The experience of this level can motivate future action or help us 
avoid such actions. It is necessary then for the teaching Church to use the experience of 
individuals, faith or ecclesial community on the consequent level of conscience as a whole to 
foster formation of conscience. 
 Thus the meaning of conscience should take into account its wider scope and should 
not be restricted or based on only one of its levels or an aspect of one of the levels. Its 
meaning must be understood from a holistic perspective since in its nature, conscience is 
composed of different components. However, we may admit first and foremost, with Daniel 
C. Maguire, that “to understanding conscience is to see it as the morally conscious self in his 
[or her] actual state of moral awareness.”
249
 It is a matter only of a person in relation to 
himself or herself.
250
 Hence it remains a person’s only moral whip. Vatican II provides the 
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most fundamental faith meaning as the Council Fathers teach: “Conscience is the most secret 
core and sanctuary of the human person. There they are alone with God whose voice echoes 
in their depths.”
251
 Conscience in this sense is first and foremost subjective but engages with 
objective truth as the human person relates with the self and other. 
 Newman, Grisez and Hogan all agree on the understanding of conscience as summed 
up above. A major point of difference is noticeable especially between Grisez and Hogan. 
While Grisez believes that conscience at the point of judgment or concrete decision or event 
must conform to objective truth as taught by the church, Hogan’s personalist teaching 
opposes such a stand because it limits freedom of choice, the autonomy of individual 
conscience thereby putting pressure on Catholics to yield to external moral authority other 
than the self. Newman’s contribution on the other hand is very theonomous, theocentric and 
christocentric. This earns him a special niche above Grisez and Hogan. Thus, he deserves the 
appellations: “Doctor of Conscience” and “Teacher of Conscience”. 
 Despite the fact that our scholars have approached the understanding of conscience 
from different perspectives, the fact is that its presence, role in the human person and the 
constant need for formation cannot be denied or overlooked. Various terms may be used to 
refer to conscience in different cultures such as: heart, καρδία, cor, ẹdọ, anamnesis or even 
the Freudian psychological term of “superego” but one thing is obvious, it is the “morally 
conscious self”, the “most secret core and sanctuary of the human person” and the role of the 
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